INTELLIGENCE

Effectively providing doctrine on the nature of intelligence and operations requires a sequential approach. Therefore, FM 2-0 is structured in three parts, starting with fundamental concepts and progressing to detailed discussions. Part I focuses on intelligence and operational fundamentals, concluding with how those fundamentals apply across the Army strategic contexts. Part I comprises three chapters that include the following points of emphasis: • The intelligence warfighting function and intelligence warfighting function tasks (IWFTs). • The intelligence process. • Intelligence capabilities. • Fighting for intelligence. • Understanding an operational environment (OE). • Multidomain operations, the Army’s operational concept. • Large-scale combat operations. • Operational tenets and imperatives. • Operational approach and operational framework. • Integrating intelligence into operations. • Fighting for intelligence within and across the Army strategic contexts.

The doctrinal concepts in part I—intelligence and operational fundamentals—are important to fully understand the content in part II, which discusses major intelligence activities—intelligence staff support (chapter 5) and intelligence operations (chapter 6). Chapters 5 and 6 further set the foundation to understand the specifics of fighting for intelligence, which is discussed in detail in part III.

Fighting for intelligence requires leveraging national to tactical information collection, analytical capabilities, and PED capabilities to overcome challenges posed by threats within the OE. No one unit or echelon can collect all of the relevant information needed to identify and open windows of opportunity to continuously provide commanders and staffs situational understanding of the threat, especially during large-scale combat operations. Fighting for intelligence requires the G-2/S-2, in coordination with the G-3/S-3, other staff members, and the intelligence enterprise, to holistically portray the OE so friendly forces can gain and maintain situational understanding, present multiple dilemmas across domains, and deliver lethal capabilities.

Considerations JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS A-1. When a corps or division is designated to function as a JTF headquarters, it requires significant augmentation to fulfill the associated tasks. An Army unit designated as a JTF headquarters follows joint doctrine. (See JP 3-33.) The Army intelligence staff assumes the role of the J-2, whose primary function is providing information and analysis to facilitate accomplishing the mission. (See JP 2-0.) A-2. The primary function of the Army intelligence staff when employed as a JTF intelligence staff does not change; however, this function becomes more complex. The amount of available information often exceeds the staff’s ability to manage, fully understand, and leverage it. There is a high demand for information from national leaders, the media, and higher headquarters. This demand has the potential to overwhelm the staff unless additional resources are allocated. There are also complex multinational and interagency considerations for conducting intelligence operations, the intelligence architecture, liaison, and intelligence sharing. A-3. The primary tasks of the joint intelligence staff include— ⚫ Facilitating an understanding of the OE and supporting decision making. ⚫ Tailoring and distributing intelligence operations, if necessary, implementing a federated structure across multiple echelons. When appropriate, the joint force intelligence staff must also place analysis assets in forward locations to better support lower-echelon requirements. ⚫ Ensuring availability of intelligence. ⚫ Prioritizing collection and allocating analysis resources. ⚫ Integrating threat assessments developed by the combatant command intelligence organization to provide the JTF commander, staff, components, and subordinate units with the complete air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace threat situation. A-4. The joint force intelligence staff uses the joint IPOE process to analyze the relevant aspects of the environment, including the physical domains of air, land, maritime, and space; the information environment, which includes cyberspace and the electromagnetic OE; and the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure system and subsystems. This analysis allows the joint staff to develop a COP and the joint force intelligence staff to provide other intelligence support products. A-5. Joint ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and Army information collection both share the purpose of integrating and synchronizing the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and PED systems in DS of current and future operations. In both joint and Army doctrine, this activity is an integrated operations and intelligence function. A-6. Army information collection doctrine expanded the joint doctrinal concept of ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance by better accounting for the role of ground reconnaissance and surveillance operations. (See FM 3-55.) Information collection activities are a synergistic whole, with emphasis on integrating and synchronizing all components and systems. Commanders and staffs have vital responsibilities in information collection planning, preparation, execution, and assessment. Commanders’ involvement is particularly important. The success of information collection is measured by its contributions to the commander’s understanding, visualization, and decision making. A-7. Table A 1 depicts the comparison of joint ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and Army information collection.

THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING FUNCTION TASK LIST B-1. The Army Intelligence Warfighting Function Task (IWFT) List is a comprehensive, but not all-inclusive, listing of Army IWFTs, missions, and operations intended to inform commanders, staffs, and Soldiers of intelligence warfighting function contributions. Units and staffs perform these tasks, missions, and operations or capabilities at the corps level and below. As a reference, the Army IWFT List captures doctrinal tasks associated with the intelligence warfighting function. (See figure B-1.) Notes. This appendix is a proponent-developed listing of Army IWFTs. The numbering system is based on the Functional Category 2 (Intelligence) for doctrine, assigned in accordance with DA PAM 25-40. Appendix B can be treated as a stand-alone appendix; therefore, acronyms and definitions have been reintroduced. PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FORCE GENERATION (IWFT 2.1) B-2. Force generation is an element of military force. It is the operation that creates and provides units for projection and employment to enable military effects and influence across multiple operational environments. It is the primary responsibility of the Services to develop, provide, and preserve forces in support of the national military strategy to enable the combatant commanders to execute their missions (AR 525-29). Provide intelligence support to force generation is the intelligence warfighting function’s flexible and responsive support to the Army sustainable readiness model that involves providing intelligence readiness; planning, establishing, and revising an intelligence architecture; providing intelligence overwatch; and tailoring the intelligence force. These activities facilitate the design and augmentation of military forces deployed to respond to a crisis or contingency operation. Provide intelligence support to force generation includes establishing intelligence communications and knowledge management architectures, which enable collaboration among strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence organizations through intelligence reach, collaborative analysis, data storage, processing and analysis, and intelligence support to force generation. Provide intelligence support to force generation includes four tasks, as shown in figure B-2. P ROVIDE I NTELLIGENCE R EADINESS (2.1.1) B-3. Intelligence readiness operations develop baseline knowledge of multiple potential threats across domains and the operational environment (OE). These operations support ongoing operations, contingency planning, and operational preparation. These operations and related intelligence training activities enable the intelligence warfighting function to support the commander’s intelligence requirements. Provide intelligence readiness includes four tasks: ⚫ Provide warnings. ⚫ Conduct intelligence readiness operations. ⚫ Execute training using Foundry, the Mission Training Complex, and the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer (IEWTPT). ⚫ Execute security programs and associated required training. Provide Warnings (2.1.1.1) B-4. The provide warnings task provides the commander with advanced warning of threat actions or intentions. The intelligence staff develops warnings to rapidly alert the commander of events or activities that would change the basic nature of the operation. The conduct of CI activities can detect and identify threat intelligence targeting U.S. forces, allowing the commander to understand and counter threat intentions. Warnings enable the commander and staff to quickly reorient the force to unexpected contingencies and to shape the OE. Conduct Intelligence Readiness Operations (2.1.1.2) B-5. Conducting intelligence readiness operations supports contingency planning and preparation by developing a baseline knowledge of multiple potential threats and OEs. This information and training enable a collaborative effort and environment to provide the best possible initial threat understanding. Execute Training Using Foundry, the Mission Training Complex, and the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer (2.1.1.3) B-6. The Foundry Intelligence Training Program is a critical enabler to Army global readiness; it provides commanders select resources to train military intelligence (MI) Soldiers and civilians supporting multidomain operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Foundry— ⚫ Enables available and ready MI individuals and units to conduct multidomain intelligence operations and activities to support commanders executing their missions. ⚫ Provides venues for commanders to collectively certify MI individuals and units (team and higher) to support regional alignment and global contingency operations. ⚫ Enables intelligence oversight and compliance of laws, policies, and directives for intelligence missions that are highly technical. ⚫ Provides access to the intelligence enterprise and sensitive networks, required accreditation, and technical certification. ⚫ Enhances command and control (C2) proficiency. ⚫ Compliments unit-led training and the Training Support System. B-7. The Mission Training Complex supports commanders’ collective and individual training by providing various C2 training capabilities to enhance unit readiness. It unifies exiting capabilities that provide simulation/stimulations to integrate live, virtual, and constructive training environments and execute training and exercises for all echelons. Mission Training Complex locations include all military installations with a corps or division headquarters. B-8. IEWTPT is the Army’s program of record for training the intelligence warfighting function in realistic simulated mission environments. This provides the digital range for the Military Intelligence Training Standards (also called MITS) certification. IEWTPT enables intelligence warfighting function systems and software with realistic data and information to train collectors and analysts in supporting institutional and operational training objectives. IEWTPT enhances the constructive or virtual training environment with complex simulated data and information that exhibit the characteristics of real-world, relatively raw data. Additionally, this data can also be tailored to address the commander’s specific training objectives. IEWTPT supports MI Soldier and system training for individual and collective events. (See AR 350-32.) Execute Security Programs and Associated Required Training (2.1.1.4) B-9. The staff executes security programs appointed as additional duties or orders from the commander, including training requirements directed by the security program. This task is designed to support programs such as physical security, operations security, communications security, personnel security, and other programs as directed by Army regulations. P LAN, E STABLISH, AND R EVISE AN I NTELLIGENCE A RCHITECTURE (2.1.2) B-10. The plan, establish, and revise an intelligence architecture task supports the intelligence enterprise. It has five tasks: ⚫ Plan an intelligence architecture. ⚫ Establish an intelligence architecture. ⚫ Revise an intelligence architecture. ⚫ Develop and maintain automated intelligence networks. ⚫ Establish and maintain access. Note. The Ground Intelligence Support Activity serves as the Army service provider for sensitive compartmented information systems, the single Army JWICS Internet Protocol registration authority, and the responsible organization for implementing Army JWICS Internet Protocol policy. Successfully Planning, Establishing, and Revising an Intelligence Architecture A successful technique for dealing with the complexities of planning, establishing, and revising an intelligence architecture is using Digital Intelligence Systems Master Gunner (also known as DISMG) course graduates. The course informs leaders of integration factors with joint and mission partner networks to enable OE visualization as well as informs and advises unit leaders on current digital MI capabilities. The Foundry Intelligence Training Program offers the Digital Intelligence Systems Master Gunner course under the direction of the U.S. Army Forces Command G-2. Plan an Intelligence Architecture (2.1.2.1) B-11. Developing an intelligence architecture plan requires planners to understand the mission and OE where the military operation will occur in order to determine intelligence architecture requirements. To do this, planners must evaluate the OE by using the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [PMESII-PT]) and mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations [METT-TC (I)]). Planners must consider the intelligence disciplines, joint and multinational partners/equipment, complementary capabilities, systems interoperability, intelligence and other communications, foreseeable/unforeseeable physical locations of intelligence elements/assets, and system capabilities to support intelligence reach, processing, exploitation, analysis, federated analysis, data storage, and intelligence production. As much as is feasible, the intelligence architecture should be resilient and effective even in degraded, intermittent, and limited communications environments. Establish an Intelligence Architecture (2.1.2.2) B-12. Establishing an intelligence architecture encompasses complex and technical issues such as sensors, data flow, hardware, software, communications, communications security materials, network classifications, technicians, database access, liaison officers, training, and funding. A well-defined and well-designed intelligence architecture can offset or mitigate structural, organizational, or personnel limitations. This architecture provides the best possible understanding of all relevant aspects of the OE. Revise an Intelligence Architecture (2.1.2.3) B-13. The intelligence architecture is developed well before deployment based on future planning and assumptions on the employment of intelligence capabilities. Periodically, units will revise the intelligence architecture based on new planning factors and assumptions, as well as the addition of new capabilities. Before deployment, units task-organize information collection capabilities based on the intelligence architecture and other factors such as the command post structure and other key C2 nodes. Develop and Maintain Automated Intelligence Networks (2.1.2.4) B-14. Developing and maintaining automated intelligence networks entail providing information systems that connect unique assets, units, echelons, agencies, and multinational partners for intelligence, collaborative analysis and production, dissemination, and intelligence reach. They use existing automated information systems and, when necessary, create operationally specific networks. In either case, these networks allow access to unclassified and classified means and interoperability across the area of operations —an operational area defined by the commander for the land or maritime force commander to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). This task includes identifying deficiencies in the systems or networks, Service procedures, system administration procedures, security procedures, alternate power plans, redundancy, system backups, and update procedures. Establish and Maintain Access (2.1.2.5) B-15. The establish and maintain access task entails establishing and providing access to classified and unclassified programs, databases, networks, systems, and other web-based collaborative environments for Army and multinational organizations to facilitate intelligence reporting, production, dissemination, sustainment, and intelligence reach. This task also includes establishing access with joint forces and national agencies to facilitate a multilevel collaborative information dimension. P ROVIDE I NTELLIGENCE O VERWATCH (2.1.3) B-16. Intelligence overwatch is creating standing fixed analytical intelligence capabilities that provide dedicated intelligence support to committed maneuver units. The overwatch element is connected through a shared intelligence network that can extract information from multiple sources and provide succinct answers (vice megabytes of information) directly to supported units when time is critical. T AILOR THE I NTELLIGENCE F ORCE (2.1.4) B-17. The generating force uses mission analysis to focus the allocation of intelligence resources for use by a joint task force or combatant commander as well as to support strategic objectives, the Army’s mission, and operations at each echelon. Based on its own mission analysis, the staff at each echelon allocates intelligence resources obtained through the generating force according to the commander’s guidance, intent, and mission objectives. PROVIDE SUPPORT TO SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING (2.2) B-18. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the operational and mission variables (ADP 6-0). This task provides information and intelligence to commanders so they can clearly understand the force’s current state in relation to the threat and other aspects of the OE. It supports the commander’s ability to make sound decisions. Provide support to situational understanding consists of six tasks, as shown in figure B-3 on page B-6. C ONDUCT P RE -M ISSION A NALYSIS OF THE O PERATIONAL E NVIRONMENT (2.2.1) B-19. Conduct pre-mission analysis is a continuous task driven by the commander. To perform intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE) and the other important intelligence tasks that support operations, the intelligence staff must conduct a significant amount of analysis before the receipt of a mission. As soon as the intelligence officer and other staff sections begin to collect data on the OE, they should organize the data into databases that meet the commander’s visualization requirements. The execution of this task must follow all applicable policies and regulations on information collection and operations security. B-20. The information and intelligence obtained are refined into knowledge for use in mission analysis through functional analysis. Information is obtained through intelligence reach; publicly available information (PAI) research; data mining; database access; academic studies, products, or materials; intelligence archives; and other information sources. Pre-mission analysis is the foundation for performing IPOE and mission analysis. Initial data files are a primary product of the conduct pre-mission analysis of the OE task. B-21. An operational environment is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). For Army forces, an OE includes portions of the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains understood through three dimensions (human, information, and physical). The land, maritime, air, and space domains are defined by their physical characteristics. Cyberspace, a man-made network of networks, transits and connects the other domains. Conduct pre-mission analysis of the OE consists of five tasks: ⚫ Analyze the significant aspects of the domains. ⚫ Analyze the significant aspects of the dimensions. ⚫ Analyze the operational variables. ⚫ Prepare relevant mission variable information and intelligence. ⚫ Complete studies. Analyze the Significant Aspects of the Domains (2.2.1.1) B-22. A domain is a physically defined portion of an operational environment requiring a unique set of warfighting capabilities and skills (FM 3-0). The interrelationship of the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains requires cross-domain understanding. Analyzing the significant aspects of the domains during pre-mission analysis requires understanding the strengths and dependencies of Army and joint capabilities in each domain that are fundamental to a multidomain, combined arms approach to operations. Analyze the Significant Aspects of the Dimensions (2.2.1.2) B-23. Army leaders seek to understand an OE through the human, information, and physical dimensions inherent to each domain. While used to understand all aspects of an OE, analyzing the human, information, and physical dimensions also assists leaders in identifying and understanding informational considerations — those aspects of the human, information, and physical dimensions that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, use, act upon, and are impacted by information (FM 3-0). Understanding the human, information, and physical dimensions of each domain assists commanders and staffs in assessing and anticipating their future operations effects. Analyze the Operational Variables (2.2.1.3) B-24. Analyzing the operational variables begins well before the deployment of forces. Given the limited time available to collect and evaluate information and intelligence on the operational variables during pre-mission analysis, the information obtained from these data files may not be specific enough to support the IPOE process and the military decision-making process (MDMP). However, the commander and staff can use the information to assist in framing the OE during the Army design methodology. Upon receipt of a warning order (WARNORD) or mission, the commander and staff draw relevant information categorized by the operational variables and filter it into the mission variables used during mission analysis. Prepare Relevant Mission Variable Information and Intelligence (2.2.1.4) B-25. During pre-mission analysis, the staff obtains information and intelligence focused on the relevant aspects of the OE as they pertain to the staff’s warfighting function. The intelligence staff focuses primarily on the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. However, depending on the staff’s echelon, the type of OE, the type of operation, and changes in the OE, the staff may need to update its analysis to ensure the mission focus is both relevant and accurate. This task comprises four subtasks. Develop the Foundation to Define Threat Characteristics (2.2.1.4.1) B-26. Developing the foundation to define threat characteristics entails obtaining detailed information and intelligence about threat characteristics affecting the conduct of operations. The intelligence section obtains this information from sources that include intelligence reach; PAI research; data mining; database access; academic studies, products, or materials; intelligence archives; and other information sources. This task develops specific, detailed information for each threat characteristic. The information, intelligence, products, and materials obtained are refined for use in mission analysis, IPOE, and other planning tasks. This refinement occurs through functional analysis and other analytic techniques. Obtain Detailed Terrain Information and Intelligence (2.2.1.4.2) B-27. This task entails obtaining detailed information and intelligence about the terrain in the expected area of interest (AOI) from sources that include intelligence reach; PAI research; data mining; database access; academic studies, products, or materials; intelligence archives; and other information sources. The information, intelligence, products, and materials are refined for use in mission analysis, IPOE, and other planning tasks through functional analysis. This task encompasses the types of environments (for example, the desert and jungle) and the military aspects of terrain. Obtain Detailed Weather and Weather Effects Information and Intelligence (2.2.1.4.3) B-28. This entails obtaining detailed information and intelligence of the present and future physical environment. Detailed information and weather analysis includes incorporating climatology effects on the AO and assessments of current and future weather effects on Army operational capabilities, including forecast weather effects on both friendly and enemy forces. The intelligence staff relies on the Air Force staff weather officer at each echelon to assist in developing mission analysis and IPOE weather support products, information, and the knowledge required to incorporate forecast weather effects into all Army operational planning and mission execution. Obtain Detailed Civil Considerations Information and Intelligence (2.2.1.4.4) B-29. This task entails obtaining specific and detailed information and intelligence concerning the civil considerations (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events [also called ASCOPE]) within or affecting the AOI. The intelligence section obtains this information and intelligence within or affecting an expected OE through staff collaboration with the G-9/S-9; intelligence reach; PAI research; data mining; database access; academic studies, products, or materials; and intelligence archives. The data, information, intelligence, products, and materials obtained are refined for use in mission analysis, IPOE, and other planning and operational tasks through functional analysis. Complete Studies (2.2.1.5) B-30. To assist in achieving goals and objectives, the complete studies task entails providing the requesting command or organization with detailed information, assessments, and conclusions about the AO and AOI. A study can be a systems or functional analysis product and should be as detailed as time allows. Studies provide knowledge that supports understanding local populations; cultures and caste systems; societal systems or organizations; political systems and structures; religions practiced and their impacts; moral beliefs and their impacts; civil authority considerations; military organizations, structure, and equipment; and attitudes toward U.S., multinational, or host-nation forces. Studies can also include the views and attitudes of multinational and host-nation forces toward these factors. The complete studies task consists of two subtasks. Produce an Area, Region, or Country Study of a Foreign Country (2.2.1.5.1) B-31. Units study and provide mission-focused knowledge of the terrain and weather, civil considerations, and threat characteristics for a specified area or region of a foreign country—including the attitudes of the populace and leaders toward joint, multinational, or host-nation forces—to assist in achieving goals and objectives. Studies can also include the views and attitudes of multinational and host-nation forces. Studies provide detailed information, assessments, and conclusions concerning the AOIs of the requesting command or organization. Produce a Specified Study (2.1.4.5.2) B-32. Units study and provide focused knowledge of the terrain and weather, civil considerations, and threat characteristics for a specified topic or requirement. Studies provide the requesting command or organization with detailed information, assessments, and conclusions on the AOI. Studies should be as detailed and in-depth as time allows. L EVERAGE D ATA, I NFORMATION, AND I NTELLIGENCE (2.2.2) B-33. To leverage data, information, and intelligence to support operations, intelligence professionals must understand the relationship between data, information, and intelligence for situational awareness, situational understanding, and knowledge. Commanders require intelligence about the threat and other aspects of the OE before and during operations—to effectively accomplish their missions—and after operations—to continuously assess the OE and determine if subsequent operations may be imminent. B-34. Data is, in the context of decision making, unprocessed observations detected by a collector of any kind (human, mechanical, or electronic) (ADP 6-0). After data is collected and assigned meaning, it becomes information —in the context of decision making, data that has been organized and processed in order to provide context for further analysis (ADP 6-0). Information is obtained through information collection and by using already available information, which units can access through intelligence reach, research, data mining, databases, academic studies, intelligence archives, and PAI. The information and intelligence obtained can be refined into specific knowledge for the conduct of operations. B-35. Leverage data, information, and intelligence consists of three tasks: ⚫ Create and maintain intelligence databases. ⚫ Conduct intelligence reach. ⚫ Conduct intelligence collaboration. Note. When leveraging formal national-level intelligence, it is important to understand that these products adhere to analytic intelligence standards and tradecraft principles outlined in the Intelligence Community Directive 203. Create and Maintain Intelligence Databases (2.2.2.1) B-36. This task entails creating and maintaining unclassified and classified databases to establish interoperable and collaborative environments for Army forces, joint forces, national agencies, and multinational organizations. This task also facilitates intelligence analysis, reporting, production, dissemination, sustainment, and intelligence reach. It also includes the requirements for formatting and standardization, indexing and correlation, normalization, storage, security protocols, and associated applications. (As technology improves the integration of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and potential autonomous data processing, MI analysts will have greater access to the volume of data/data sets at speeds and durations to improve assessments, enabling decision making.) The following must be addressed in database development, management, and maintenance: ⚫ Data sources. ⚫ Information redundancy. ⚫ Import and export standards. ⚫ Data management and standards (maintaining data literacy). ⚫ Update and backup procedures. ⚫ Data mining, query, and search protocols (executing data sets). Conduct Intelligence Reach (2.2.2.2) B-37. Intelligence obtained through intelligence reach —the activity by which intelligence organizations proactively and rapidly access information from, receive support from, and conduct direct collaboration and information sharing with other units and agencies, both within and outside the area of operations, unconstrained by geographic proximity, echelon, or command (ADP 2-0)—assists the staff in planning and preparing for operations and answering intelligence requirements without the need for the information to pass through a formal hierarchy. The staff can perform the following steps to ensure the optimal use, operability, and effectiveness of intelligence reach: ⚫ Establish data exchange methods and procedures. ⚫ Establish electronic message transfer procedures. ⚫ Establish unit-specific links for identified forces. ⚫ Establish points of contact for the following: ▪ Production centers. ▪ Combatant command joint intelligence and operations centers. ▪ The Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, and its major subordinate commands, such as the National Ground Intelligence Center. ▪ Higher MI organizations. ⚫ Ensure the intelligence staff has the necessary personnel, training, automated systems, bandwidth, and resources to conduct intelligence reach. ⚫ Determine information requirements through staff planning. ⚫ Develop production requirements for identified intelligence gaps. ⚫ Obtain geospatial products for the projected AOI. ⚫ Establish and maintain a comprehensive directory of intelligence reach resources before deployment and throughout operations. The value of intelligence reach greatly increases as the staff develops and maintains ready access to rich information resources. These resources are numerous and may include Army, joint, DOD, non-DOD, national, commercial, foreign, and university research programs. ⚫ Know the types of information that intelligence reach resources can provide. Continuously expand the resource directory by identifying new resources. ⚫ Use intelligence reach first to fill intelligence gaps and requirements and to answer requests for information (RFIs). This technique can preclude unnecessary tasking or risk to limited collection assets. ⚫ Strive to maintain continuous situational understanding and anticipate intelligence requirements. Use intelligence reach to answer these requirements and provide the results to the commander and staff for the conduct of operations. ⚫ Exchange intelligence reach strategies with other units, allies, and partners. ⚫ Present the information retrieved through intelligence reach in a usable form; share the information derived from intelligence reach with subordinate, lateral, and higher echelons; and ensure follow-on forces have the information as well. Conduct Intelligence Collaboration (2.2.2.3) B-38. Collaboration is the central principle of conducting analysis across intelligence organizations. Army tactical units provide accurate and detailed intelligence about the threat and other relevant aspects of the OE (especially those related to Army activities) through the intelligence enterprise, while other intelligence organizations provide expertise and access not readily available to the Army at the tactical level. Additionally, national-level intelligence organizations provide governance over certain intelligence methods and activities. Cooperation can benefit every echelon. P ERFORM I NTELLIGENCE P REPARATION OF THE O PERATIONAL E NVIRONMENT (2.2.3) B-39. Intelligence preparation of the operational environment is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an AOI to determine their effect on operations. The G-2/S-2 leads the staff effort and prepares for the IPOE process during pre-mission analysis of the OE associated with force generation and incorporated into the Army design methodology. During this task, the intelligence staff creates data files on specific OEs based on an evaluation of the information and intelligence related to the operational variables identified. IPOE is a continuous staff planning activity undertaken by the entire staff. The staff aims to understand the OE and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01.3.) Perform IPOE consists of four tasks: ⚫ Define the OE. ⚫ Describe environmental effects on operations. ⚫ Evaluate the threat. ⚫ Determine threat courses of action (COAs). D efine the O perational E nvironment (2.2.3.1) B-40. Defining the OE results in identifying significant characteristics of an OE that can affect friendly and enemy operations. Using the operational variables assists the commander in defining relevant aspects of an OE in time and space. The intelligence staff must identify those significant characteristics related to the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that are relevant to the mission and justify that analysis to the commander. Understanding friendly and enemy forces is not enough; other factors, such as culture, languages, tribal affiliations, and operational and mission variables are equally important. Defining the significant characteristics of each operational variable is essential in identifying the additional information needed to complete IPOE. D escribe E nvironmental E ffects on O perations (2.2.3.2) B-41. The intelligence staff uses operational and mission variables to describe how terrain, weather, and civil considerations affect enemy forces and friendly operations. The entire staff determines the effects to the population of friendly and enemy force actions. E valuate the T hreat (2.2.2.3) B-42. This activity analyzes current intelligence to determine how the threat normally organizes for combat and conducts operations. The evaluation includes each threat function as well as potential foreign intelligence elements, criminal organizations, factions, guerrillas, and insurgents. This step focuses on creating threat models and templates that depict how the threat operates across multiple domains when unconstrained by effects of the environment. D etermine T hreat C ourses of A ction (2.2.2.4) B-43. This activity determines possible threat COAs, describes threat COAs, ranks COAs in probable order of adoption, and, at a minimum, identifies the most probable and the most dangerous threat COAs. P ERFORM S ITUATION D EVELOPMENT (2.2.4) B-44. Situation development is a process for analyzing information and producing current intelligence concerning the relevant aspects of the OE within the AO before and during operations. The process assists the intelligence officer in recognizing and interpreting indicators of threat intentions and objectives. Situation development confirms or denies threat COAs, provides threat locations, explains what the threat is doing in relation to the friendly force commander’s intent, and provides an estimate of threat combat effectiveness. The locations and actions of noncombatant elements and nongovernmental and other civilian organizations in the AO that may impact operations should also be considered. Through situation development, the intelligence officer quickly identifies information gaps, explains threat activities in relation to the unit’s operations, and assists the commander in gaining and maintaining situational understanding. Situation development assists the commander in making decisions, including when to execute branches and sequels. P ROVIDE I NTELLIGENCE S UPPORT TO U NIQUE M ISSIONS (2.2.5) B-45. Intelligence supports the staff sections and warfighting function capabilities by applying the intelligence process, IPOE, and information collection. The intelligence process leverages all sources of information and expertise, including the U.S. intelligence community and nonintelligence entities, to provide situational awareness to the commander and staff. Information collected provides insight into hazards within the AO, enemy activities, capabilities, motivations, and objectives, and it enables the conduct of operations. Providing intelligence support to unique missions is designed to support the different unique missions, branches, and activities, such as those listed in table B-1 on page B-12, necessary to successfully execute operations.

FORCE PROJECTION THREATS C-1. Force projection is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater in response to requirements for military operations (JP 3-0). It is the military component of power projection and a central element of the national military strategy. Army organizations and installations linked with joint forces and industry form a strategic platform to maintain, project, and sustain Army forces wherever they deploy. Force projection operations are inherently joint and require situational understanding and detailed planning and synchronization. C-2. During force projection, peer threats can apply strategic and operational reach to contest Army deployments; in terms of the most dangerous COAs, they can employ devastating lethal and nonlethal capabilities across multiple domains. Gaining situational understanding of threat intentions and activities across force projection processes can present challenges for deploying units since their assigned intelligence collection assets are transitioning from home station to forward theaters, and intelligence analysis may be focused on understanding threats in the forward theater operational areas. C-3. Peer threats possess the capability and capacity to observe, disrupt, delay, and attack U.S. forces at any stage of force projection, including while still positioned at home stations in the United States and while overseas. (See FM 3-0.) The Army relies on various interdependent infrastructures, most of which it does not own or operate. This makes the Army’s domestic operations rely heavily on external resources susceptible to a multitude of lethal and nonlethal threat methods and capabilities leveraged across one or more domains. Leveraged threat methods and capabilities include but are not limited to— ⚫ Conducting lethal and nonlethal attacks against units posturing for deployment. ⚫ Conducting persistent, multidomain information collection on Army forces, training, and installations. ⚫ Conducting information warfare operations against local communities, Service members, DOD civilians, contractors, and Soldiers’ Family members: ▪ Targeted threats through social media, email, or other means designed to frighten and distract deploying Soldiers and their Families. ▪ Cyberspace attacks against Soldier and Family member bank and credit agencies, impeding or disrupting access to personal funds. ▪ Cyberspace attacks against civilian infrastructure (including transportation, supply, fuel, and navigation) used to support military operations. ▪ Targeted strikes against defense communications infrastructure to disrupt communications between units, installations, and other unified action partners that assist deployment. ⚫ Disinformation dissemination and misinformation support designed to— ▪ Undermine the legitimacy of or reduce support for U.S. Government action. ▪ Incite civil unrest in local communities and along road and rail lines of communications that deploying forces need or plan to use to reach ports of embarkation. ▪ Reduce trust in future official communications from government, law enforcement, or military officials by releasing disinformation that appears genuine but contains incorrect or confusing information. ⚫ Conducing infrastructure sabotage using pre-positioned agents in the U.S. homeland or theater. C-4. Peer threat objectives and advantages may not be immediately recognized since the effects of peer threat activities may appear over prolonged time windows. By using a range of military and nonmilitary activities, a peer threat can use various instruments of national power to further its interests and contest Army force projection processes. The adversary’s use of diplomatic, information, economic, and military activities shape the OE well before armed conflict by gaining situational awareness of, detecting, and even deterring Army force projection processes. In crisis, peer threats may seek to delay or disrupt friendly forces moving from the U.S. homeland to overseas theaters long enough to achieve their goals in forward theaters. During armed conflict, peer threats may seek to inflict significant damage to or deny or defeat Army forces in the deployment phase or at home station before Army forces reach their assigned operational area or debarkation location. Army forces must evaluate the peer threat’s ability to contest U.S. force deployment and home station activities in all domains and across the Army strategic contexts. C-5. Nonpeer or opportunistic threats may attempt to detect, deter, delay, or defeat Army forces conducting CONUSCONUSContinental United States and OCONUSOCONUSOutside the continental United States force projection processes. These threats may be inspired or influenced by peer threats and attempt to take advantage of peer threat associated contested deployment activities to advance their own goals. Peer threat, nonpeer threat, or other opportunistic threat actions may use the same methods, making attribution difficult. C-6. Because threat forces may attempt to disrupt one or more force projection processes, G-2/S-2s must continuously leverage the intelligence enterprise to maintain visibility of potential threats to force projection processes in CONUSCONUSContinental United States and OCONUSOCONUSOutside the continental United States territories. Close collaboration between the deploying unit; the installation; appropriate federal, state, and local agencies (both government and law enforcement); and USARUSARUnited States Army Reserve and ARNGARNGArmy National Guard elements is critical in mitigating threat activities leveraged to disrupt force projection. G-2/S-2s and other staff members must consider incorporating strategies into planning and training to mitigate the potential for threat activities during force projection. Key planning and training considerations include but are not limited to— ⚫ Local, state, and federal authorities able to mitigate deployment disruptions. ⚫ Coordination and relationship building with local, state, and federal civilian law enforcement agencies to ensure effective movement control from fort to port. ⚫ Understanding about critical infrastructure vulnerable to sabotage and unsuited for the movement of heavy equipment along surface (road and rail) lines of communications. ⚫ Using alternate railheads and marshalling yards as well as multiple lines of communication to reach ports of embarkation. ⚫ Developing alternate surface transportation options to deliver unit equipment to a seaport of embarkation when rail service is degraded or disrupted. ⚫ Establishing fuel, maintenance, and rest locations along lines of communications. ⚫ Implementing a communications plan that informs the public while maintaining OPSECOPSECOperational Security. ⚫ Establishing specific cyberspace defenses for systems and associated data used to support movement. C-7. G-2/S-2s, in conjunction with the intelligence enterprise, perform IPOE for threat activities associated with force projection processes. Additionally, G-2/S-2s conduct intelligence reach to AISE and theater intelligence units and organizations to inform deployment-related IPOE and address information gaps concerning threats to movement into a specific theater. Conversely, AISE and theater intelligence units and organizations conduct activities to support their intelligence operations, analysis, activities, and anticipated intelligence requirements for Army forces conducting force projection processes. AISE and theater intelligence units and organizations can support force projection processes by— ⚫ Providing situational understanding of the threat’s attempt to gain and/or maintain positions of relative advantage associated with force projection activities. ⚫ Detecting indicators of imminent threat activities. ⚫ Providing an understanding of enemy intentions. ⚫ Tracking enemy activities and capabilities across domains and dimensions. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO FORCE PROJECTION C-8. Unstable conditions worldwide often reduce or limit the amount of time required to produce intelligence to meet contingency operation requirements. Therefore, MI units and staffs prepare for potential contingencies by building intelligence readiness daily, including their skills and systems expertise. When a unit receives a WARNORD for deployment or is assigned a contingency mission, the unit conducts pre-mission analysis of the projected AOI. C-9. Built on a foundation of intelligence readiness, the intelligence warfighting function provides the commander with the intelligence needed to conduct force projection operations. Successful intelligence during force projection operations relies on continuous collection and intelligence production before and during the operation. During force projection operations, higher echelons provide intelligence to lower echelons until the early-entry force secures the lodgment area. The J-2 begins to set the theater, exercising. judgment when providing information to subordinate intelligence staffs to avoid overwhelming them. C-10. Key planning considerations for intelligence in force projection include— ⚫ Staying out front in intelligence planning: ▪ Begin pre-mission analysis of the OE as soon as possible. ▪ Develop a steady effort. ▪ Prioritize information requirements to develop the initial intelligence requirements. ▪ Identify intelligence training requirements (including augmentees). ⚫ Understanding how to get intelligence support: ▪ Understand the combatant command and deployed force intelligence architecture. ▪ Identify asset, sensor, and intelligence PED requirements. ▪ Identify personnel augmentation requirements. C-11. Intelligence leaders anticipate, identify, consider, and evaluate all threats to the unit throughout force projection operations. This is critical during the deployment and entry operations stages of force projection. During these stages, the unit is particularly vulnerable to threat actions because of its limited combat power and knowledge of the AO. Therefore, intelligence professionals emphasize providing combat information and intelligence products that indicate changes to the threat or relevant aspects of the OE. Intelligence leaders should— ⚫ Review available databases on assigned contingency areas, begin collaboration and pre-mission analysis of the OE, and develop initial IPOE products concerning the AOIs. ⚫ Comply with regulatory guidelines for conducting specific intelligence operations. ⚫ Coordinate for and rehearse using the same communications protocols that the joint force, higher headquarters, and subordinate and lateral units use when deployed. ⚫ Plan, train, and practice surging intelligence analysis on regionally aligned, likely, or developing contingencies. ⚫ Prepare and practice coordination with other elements and organizations such as— ▪ Intelligence units and analytical elements. ▪ Information operations officers. ▪ The USAFUSAFUnited States Air Force SWO. (See JP 3-59 and AR 115-10.) ▪ CA elements and units. (See FM 3-57.) ▪ Military information support operations elements and units. (See FM 3-53.) ▪ Space support elements. (See FM 3-14.) ▪ Special forces elements and units. (See FM 3-05 and FM 3-18.) ⚫ Include the following as a part of daily (sustainment) operations: ▪ A linguist plan with proficiency requirements. ▪ Training (individual and collective), including augmentees. ▪ Appointed and trained foreign disclosure personnel. ⚫ Establish formal or informal intelligence links, relationships, and networks to meet developing contingencies. ⚫ Conduct analysis of threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations or submit RFIs in accordance with unit SOPs. ⚫ Determine the need for additional civil considerations and sociocultural research and pre-mission analysis of the OE. ⚫ Establish statements of intelligence interests and develop production and warning requirements. C-12. Intelligence leaders support peacetime contingency planning with intelligence knowledge and IPOE products and databases on likely contingency areas. Intelligence leaders, with the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3, establish an information collection plan implemented upon alert notification. For a smooth transition from predeployment to entry, intelligence leaders must coordinate an intelligence architecture. To support information collection, the intelligence staff identifies requirements, including— ⚫ Collection assets providing support throughout the AOI. ⚫ The intelligence PED required to support collection assets, including the use of expeditionary or reach intelligence PED to best support the requirements of the operation. ⚫ Command and support relationships. ⚫ Report and request procedures not covered in unit SOPs. ⚫ Deployment sequence of information collection personnel and equipment. Early deployment of key information collection personnel and equipment is essential for force protection and operations. The composition of initial and follow-on deploying assets is influenced by the mission variables (METT-TC [I]), availability of communications, and availability of lift. ⚫ Communications architectures supporting both intelligence staffs and collection assets. ⚫ Friendly vulnerabilities to hostile intelligence threats and plans for conducting force protection. The staff must begin this planning as early as possible to ensure adequate support to force protection of deploying and initial-entry forces. ⚫ TPFDD requirements. When necessary, the staff should recommend changes to priority of movement, unit, or capability to enable information collection. C-13. Intelligence leaders continually monitor and update applicable plans and orders to reflect the evolving situation, especially during crisis. National intelligence activities monitor regional threats worldwide and can answer some intelligence requirements supporting the development of plans and orders. FORCE PROJECTION SUBPROCESSES C-14. Force projection is the enabler of the Army’s expeditionary capability. It is a process that ultimately involves unified action. This requires organizing combat power through force tailoring, task organization, and mutual support. The five subprocesses of force projection are— ⚫ Mobilization. ⚫ Deployment. ⚫ Employment. ⚫ Sustainment. ⚫ Redeployment. M OBILIZATION C-15. Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency (JP 4-05). This is also the point where the intelligence staff begins conducting the tasks required to set the theater. It assembles and organizes resources to support national objectives. (See ADP 4-0.) C-16. The intelligence staff updates estimates, databases, IPOE products, and other intelligence products required to support command decisions on force composition and deployment priorities and sequence. Units reassess their collection requirements immediately after alert notification. The intelligence staff begins verifying planning assumptions within the OPLAN. The intelligence staff, with CI personnel support, provides force protection support and recommends antiterrorism measures. C-17. During mobilization, intelligence leaders— ⚫ Monitor intelligence reporting on threat activity, civil considerations, and warning data. ⚫ Manage information requirements and RFIs from the unit and subordinate units, to include updating information collection planning. ⚫ Establish habitual training relationships with augmentation units and personnel as well as higher echelon intelligence organizations identified in the existing OPLAN. ⚫ Support augmentation units and personnel by preparing and conducting intelligence training and threat update briefings and by disseminating intelligence. ⚫ Identify information collection and intelligence PED force requirements for the different types of operations and contingency plans. ⚫ Identify individual military, civilian, and contractor augmentation requirements. C-18. During mobilization, intelligence leaders, in conjunction with the rest of the staff, ensure the adequate equipping and training of MI organizations and individual augmentees that conduct intelligence operations. Predictive intelligence supports the decisions the commander and staff make regarding the size, composition, structure, and deployment sequence of the force. C-19. In a force projection operation, higher echelons provide intelligence for situation and target development to lower echelons until the tactical ground force completes entry and secures the lodgment area. The higher headquarters intelligence section may be reluctant to push everything down through tactical-level intelligence channels due to the volume of the intelligence information available. Intelligence analysis systems provide the BCTBCTBasic combat training S-2 access to theater and national databases with the ability to collaborate with knowledge centers. Intelligence readiness training assists in ensuring intelligence professionals and assets can meet the unit’s needs during operations. The G-2/S-2 must anticipate, identify, consider, and evaluate all potential threats to the entire unit throughout force projection operations. C-20. Throughout mobilization, unit intelligence activities provide deploying forces with the most recent intelligence on the contingency area. The intelligence staff also updates databases and situation graphics. Intelligence leaders— ⚫ Fully understand the unit, higher headquarters, and joint force intelligence organizations. ⚫ Revise intelligence and intelligence-related communications architectures and integrate any new systems and software into current architectures. ⚫ Support 24-hour operations and provide continuous intelligence (to include terrain and weather) support. ⚫ Plan all required intelligence reach procedures. ⚫ Determine transportation availability for deployment as well as during deployment. ⚫ Determine all sustainability requirements. ⚫ Determine intelligence release requirements and restrictions and releasability to multinational and host-nation sources. ⚫ Review status-of-forces agreements, rules of engagement, international law, intelligence sharing agreements, and other agreements, emphasizing the effect they have on intelligence collection. (Coordinate with the staff judge advocate on these issues.) ⚫ Ensure deployment priorities for the collection assets and sensors along with the required intelligence PED personnel are reflected in the TPFDD to support information collection activities. ⚫ Ensure intelligence links provide the early-entry commander access to joint and Army all-source intelligence and collection assets, processing systems, and databases. ⚫ Review the supported unit commander’s specified tasks, implied tasks, task organization, intelligence scheme of support, and coordination requirements. Address issues or shortfalls and direct or coordinate changes. ⚫ Establish access to national databases and repositories for each intelligence discipline and complementary capability, as well as links to joint, Service, multinational, and host-nation databases and repositories. D EPLOYMENT C-21. Deployment is the movement of forces into and out of an operational area (JP 3-35). The joint deployment process is divided into four phases: deployment planning, predeployment activities, movement, and joint RSOI. The joint process includes a planning phase at the outset whereas the Army considers planning to be woven through all phases. Moreover, the movement phase in the Army process occurs in two segments: fort-to-port and port-to-port. The Army and other Services rely on the U.S. Transportation Command to provide the strategic lift to, through, and from strategic ports, both in CONUSCONUSContinental United States and OCONUSOCONUSOutside the continental United States. (For doctrine on deployments, see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-35.) C-22. A smooth and effective deployment is a challenge for intelligence staffs and MI units because of the many complex and technical aspects of intelligence support and intelligence operations. During deployment, intelligence organizations at the home station or deployed with the early-entry force use the communications architecture and higher and lower intelligence organizations to provide graphic and textual intelligence updates to the forces en route. En route updates assist in reducing information gaps and allow commanders to adjust plans in response to changes in the situation before arriving at the operational area. During stability operations and other circumstances, intelligence transitions are conducted between arriving units and those that are redeploying. The three primary areas of intelligence transition are— ⚫ Operations. ⚫ Targeting. ⚫ Technical oversight. C-23. Intelligence units extend established networks to connect intelligence staffs and collection assets at various stages of the deployment. Where necessary, units establish new communications paths to meet mission requirements. If deployed, the joint force, theater army, and corps ACEs have a critical role in providing access to and building out the intelligence architecture and in sharing intelligence databases to deploying forces. C-24. The Army relies on space-based capabilities and systems, such as global positioning satellites, communications satellites, weather satellites, cruise missile launches, and intelligence collection platforms. These systems are critical enablers for Army personnel to plan, communicate, navigate and maneuver, provide missile warning, and protect and sustain Army forces. Planning and coordination of space support with national, joint, Service, and theater resources occur through liaison with space and weather professionals. Space-enabled capabilities are key to supporting intelligence during deployment and employment by— ⚫ Monitoring terrestrial AOIs to assist in revealing the threat’s location and disposition. ⚫ Providing communications links between deploying forces, the United States, and its territories. ⚫ Permitting collection assets to determine their position accurately through the Global Positioning System. ⚫ Providing meteorological, oceanographic, and space environmental information and data that are processed, analyzed, and exploited to produce timely and accurate weather effects on operations. ⚫ Providing warnings of ballistic missile launches. C-25. Situation development dominates intelligence activities during early-entry operations. The intelligence staff attempts to identify all threats to arriving forces and assists the commander in developing force protection measures. Peer threat capabilities (such as long-range strike and A2 and AD capabilities) create additional challenges to entry operations and freedom of movement. During entry operations, echelons above corps organizations provide intelligence support, which includes providing access to the national intelligence and early deployment intelligence elements. The entire effort focuses on providing tailored support to deploying and deployed echelons in response to their intelligence requirements. C-26. Collection and processing capabilities are enhanced as assets arrive and buildup in the AO, with emphasis on the buildup of the deployed capability required to conduct sustained information collection activities. Intelligence PED personnel are employed either through the deployment of PED with the force (expeditionary PED) or through reach PED conducted in theater, at sanctuary sites, or from the locations within the United States. C-27. Liaison personnel, basic communications, and an initial intelligence architecture should be in place before the scheduled arrival of parent commands. When the senior Army headquarters arrives in the operational area, the joint force intelligence staff implements and, where necessary, modifies the theater intelligence architecture. Deploying intelligence assets establish liaison with staffs and deployed units. As more units deploy and complete RSOI, the amount of information collection units increases. C-28. Installations in the United States and its territories and other bases outside the operational area continue to support deployed units. Systems capable of rapid receipt and processing of intelligence from national systems and high-capacity, long-haul communications systems are critical to the success of intelligence reach and overwatch to a deployed force. These systems provide a continuous flow of intelligence to satisfy many operational needs. C-29. During entry operations the intelligence staff— ⚫ Monitors protection indicators. ⚫ Assesses the information collection effort. ⚫ Monitors intelligence reporting on threats and civil considerations. ⚫ Assesses— ▪ Push versus pull requirements of intelligence reach and overwatch. ▪ The effectiveness of the intelligence communications architecture. ▪ Reporting procedures and timelines. E MPLOYMENT C-30. Employment is the strategic, operational, and tactical use of forces (JP 5-0). Intelligence and information collection support operations by understanding and answering the commander’s requirements. They focus primarily on supporting the commander’s situational understanding, targeting, and protection requirements. Good planning and preparation can ensure a smooth transition from deployment to employment and from employment through sustainment to redeployment. S USTAINMENT C-31. Sustainment is the provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health services support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion (ADP 4-0). The intelligence warfighting function must both support friendly force sustainment, which is often vulnerable to threat attack, and sustain intelligence support and intelligence operations. Supporting sustainment is similar to supporting other force projection subprocesses and is discussed in other portions of this publication. Sustaining intelligence support and intelligence operations is broad and can be complex. Aspects of sustaining intelligence can include— ⚫ IEW collection systems maintenance. ⚫ Intelligence architecture and PED maintenance and logistics. ⚫ Providing and maintaining the appropriate numbers and skill levels of intelligence professionals, in many situations, low-density specialties. ⚫ Contract support (including linguists). ⚫ Port, railhead, airhead, or transshipment operations. ⚫ Convoy operations and resupply of the different classes of supply. ⚫ Medical support and casualty evacuation. ⚫ Mortuary affairs. R EDEPLOYMENT C-32. Redeployment is the transfer of forces and materiel to home and/or demobilization stations for reintegration or out-processing (ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-35). This definition differs from the joint definition. As with deployment, there is a requirement to conduct an intelligence transition from the redeploying unit to the deploying unit. A well-prepared intelligence transition ensures a smooth and seamless transition between units. C-33. As combat power and resources decrease in the operational area, protection and warning become the focus of the commander’s intelligence requirements. This drives the selection of those assets that must remain deployed until the end of the operation and those that may redeploy earlier. The G-2/S-2— ⚫ Monitors intelligence reporting on threat activity and warning data. ⚫ Continues to conduct intelligence support to protection. ⚫ Requests information collection support (combatant command and national systems) and intelligence to support redeployment. C-34. After redeployment, MI personnel and units recover and return to predeployment activities. Information collection units resume contingency-oriented peacetime intelligence operations. The intelligence staff— ⚫ Prepares after-action reports and lessons learned. ⚫ Monitors intelligence reporting on threat activity and civil considerations for contingencies. ⚫ Updates or consolidates databases. ⚫ Maintains intelligence readiness. ⚫ Provides input to the force-design update process to refine modified tables of organization and equipment and to evaluate the need for individual mobilization augmentee personnel. ⚫ Submits organizational needs requests. HOMELAND DEFENSE AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES CONSIDERATIONS C-35. While Army forces are preparing to deploy during crisis or armed conflict against a peer threat, other units may be tasked to support homeland defense or DSCA. The circumstances that lead to national authorities directing the deployment of Army forces may also necessitate operations to simultaneously defend the U.S. homeland or support civil authorities. (See FM 3-0.) C-36. Homeland defense is the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President (JP 3-27). Defense support of civil authorities is support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, USCUSCUnited States Code status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events (DODDDODDDepartment of Defense directive 3025.18). Homeland defense and DSCA are critical to successful force projection operations. A peer threat’s ability to impact the U.S. homeland through lethal and nonlethal means across the strategic contexts has increased due to reliance on technology that is susceptible to threat capabilities. The G-2/S-2s must be aware of threats against the U.S. homeland with the potential to impact their units’ operations. C-37. Homeland defense and DSCA operations are conducted in a complex OE that contains layers of different jurisdictions (federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local), many agencies and organizations, the private sector, and several allies and multinational partners. (See FM 3-0.) Within the same city, Army forces may be simultaneously conducting different missions, each with distinct authorities and requirements. This could include adjacent units conducting— ⚫ Deployment preparation activities. ⚫ Homeland defense missions, as directed by the U.S. Northern Command or U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. ⚫ DSCA to support the Department of Homeland Security or other organizations. C-38. During crisis and armed conflict, Army forces allocated to the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders will likely conduct homeland defense and DSCA missions simultaneous to enable Army force projection processes. For Army intelligence forces conducting homeland defense and DSCA, intelligence staffs and units must reference specific intelligence mission and authorities detailed in homeland defense related OPORDs and their associated Annex B (Intelligence). These intelligence homeland defense related intelligence missions are informed by guidelines for theater army, corps, division, and BCTBCTBasic combat training intelligence staffs and units (see chapter 6). C-39. Forward theater intelligence activities greatly contribute to homeland defense. In addition to assessing threats in forward theaters, Army intelligence staffs, units, and organizations worldwide have a significant role in detecting, deterring, and preventing attacks against the United States. Forward theater intelligence staffs, in coordination with intelligence staffs supporting homeland defense, must establish intelligence handover lines and other approved control measures and procedures to lessen the possibility of gaps in coverage to detect threats against the U.S. homeland. C-40. Interorganizational cooperation is critical to homeland defense. The success of interorganizational cooperation hinges on timely and accurate information and intelligence for decision making. Information sharing environments should include as many essential participants as possible, with the understanding that not all can participate in a collaborative environment. When possible, a collaborative intelligence sharing environment should be capable of generating and disseminating intelligence, operational information, and orders, where needed, in the shortest time possible. C-41. Army intelligence units conducting homeland defense should anticipate sharing intelligence with Army units during force projection processes. Theater army ACEs and JTF/JFLCC-level joint force intelligence operations centers have a critical role in making intelligence assessments available to deploying forces. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-91.7 and ADP 3-28.) C-42. Intelligence units may conduct analysis of and intelligence collection against peer threats or foreign-intelligence-related opportunist threats impacting DOD DSCA missions, and in certain instances, provide situational awareness, damage assessments, or incident awareness and assessments according to Secretary of Defense authorization and combatant command DSCA-related mission orders. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-91.7.) Note. For Army intelligence forces conducting homeland defense and DSCA, intelligence staffs, units, and organizations must reference specific intelligence mission and authorities in homeland defense related OPORDs and associated Annex B (Intelligence) in order to ensure compliance with DOD intelligence activity guidance. This page intentionally left blank.

Principles OVERVIEW D-1. Intelligence personnel conducting intelligence operations must comply with laws, regulations, and policies. The implications of and considerations associated with these provisions and authorities include the oversight, management, and resourcing of intelligence operations and the authority for or prohibitions on certain specific intelligence activities. This appendix provides a description of laws, regulations, and policies that govern intelligence operations and a general overview of intelligence oversight. UNITED STATES CODE TITLES D-2. G-2/S-2s, intelligence planners, and MI unit commanders must comply with the intelligence provisions and authorities in the following titles of the USCUSCUnited States Code: ⚫ Title 10, USCUSCUnited States Code, Armed Forces of the United States, addresses— ▪ The authority of the Secretary of Defense over all DOD intelligence organizations and activities. ▪ The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. ▪ The role of national intelligence through tactical intelligence and the integration of DOD ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. ▪ Meeting the needs of CCDRs through tactical commanders. ▪ Funds for foreign cryptologic support. ▪ The appropriation, use, and auditing of DOD intelligence funds. ▪ Congressional oversight. ⚫ Title 18, USCUSCUnited States Code, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, addresses Posse Comitatus prohibition. ⚫ Title 32, USCUSCUnited States Code, National Guard, addresses— ▪ Homeland defense activities. ▪ DSCA. ⚫ Title 50, USCUSCUnited States Code, War and National Defense, addresses— ▪ The role of the Secretary of Defense in conducting intelligence activities. ▪ The purpose of all-source intelligence and the role of integrated and synchronized DOD intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination as part of the larger U.S. IC. ▪ The role of national intelligence through tactical intelligence. ▪ The needs of CCDRs through tactical commanders. ▪ Specialized intelligence functions of the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and DIA. ▪ CI activities. ▪ Intelligence budget and oversight. D-3. Title 10, USCUSCUnited States Code, and Title 50, USCUSCUnited States Code, are inextricably linked and mutually supportive statutory provisions for DOD intelligence activities at every level of warfare (strategic, theater-strategic, operational, and tactical) during peacetime or war. INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT D-4. Intelligence oversight derives from Executive Order (EO) 12333 as amended, with DOD implementing guidance in DODMDODMDepartment of the Defense Manual 5240.01 and the Army implementing guidance in AR 381-10: ⚫ EO 12333, United States Intelligence Activities (as amended)— ▪ Is the principal legal authority for intelligence activities (provides intelligence goals and directions). ▪ Defines the structure and mission of the U.S. IC. ▪ Delineates jurisdictional boundaries among intelligence agencies and establishes duties and responsibilities for each department and agency within the U.S. IC. ▪ Declares rules to guide and limit the conduct of intelligence activities. ▪ Defines agency responsibilities, including the DOD’s role, for national intelligence efforts. ▪ Declares rules of conduct for intelligence activities involving U.S. persons. ▪ Contains general provisions pertaining to oversight, implementation, and definitions. ⚫ DODMDODMDepartment of the Defense Manual 5240.01, Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities — ▪ Establishes procedures to enable DOD to conduct authorized intelligence activities in a manner that protects the constitutional and legal rights and the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. ▪ Authorizes defense intelligence components to collect, retain, and disseminate information concerning U.S. persons in compliance with applicable laws, EOs, policies, and regulations. ⚫ AR 381-10, The Conduct and Oversight of U.S. Army Intelligence Activities — ▪ Establishes policies and procedures for the conduct of authorized intelligence functions to protect the rights and privacy of U.S. persons. ▪ Applies to any Army component performing authorized Army intelligence and intelligence-related activities. ▪ Does not, in and of itself, authorize intelligence activities—it simply sets forth the policies and procedures for conducting such activities, provided the personnel conducting collection have the appropriate mission and authority. D-5. Intelligence activities authorized by EO 12333 as amended are further extended to CCDRs through OPORDs and OPLANs. Additionally, certain intelligence activities may be directed by other legislative authority and are not exclusive to Title 10 or Title 50 statutes. D-6. Each organization or unit must have a specific assigned mission to conduct a particular type of intelligence activity. These specific authorities are often found in a wide range of documents, such as DOD directives, intelligence agency specific authorities, Army regulations, OPORDs, and OPLANs. D-7. If the intelligence staff has any questions on authorities or funding sources—due to the dynamic nature, complexity, and large volume of intelligence laws and policies—the staff should coordinate closely with the unit staff judge advocate for clarification. U.S. Person Information Intelligence personnel will conduct intelligence collection activities in accordance with the requirements of EO 12333 as amended, DODMDODMDepartment of the Defense Manual 5240.01, and AR 381-10 in a manner that ensures legality and propriety and preserves and respects the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. Army intelligence personnel conducting intelligence collection activities will complete intelligence oversight training as required in DOD 5240.1-R and AR 381-10 before conducting intelligence collection activities. Soldiers with an authorized intelligence mission or function can collect, retain, and disseminate intelligence on U.S. persons in compliance with specific criteria and restrictions. An Army component may collect information that identifies U.S. persons only if— • It is necessary to the conduct of a function assigned to the collecting component. • It falls within 1 of 13 categories in DODMDODMDepartment of the Defense Manual 5240.01, procedure 2. • Collection techniques are limited to those necessary to perform assigned functions using the least intrusive means. If, during authorized collection activities, U.S. person information is incidentally collected (it was not the target of the collection), all such information may be temporarily retained, evaluated for permanent retention, and disseminated only in accordance with DODMDODMDepartment of the Defense Manual 5240.01, procedures 3 and 4, and AR 381-10. INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY SOURCES D-8. Table D-1 lists some of the most important intelligence authority sources.

LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS E-1. Military operations highly depend on military-and contractor-provided foreign language support. The requirement to communicate with and serve on multinational staffs, communicate with local populations, and collect information necessitates the use of linguists. The growing focus on multinational operations increases the competition for limited linguist resources that are vital for mission success. L ANGUAGE S UPPORT C ATEGORIES E-2. Language support requirements typically fall into one of seven broad categories: ⚫ Intelligence operations. ⚫ Multinational liaison. ⚫ Special operations. ⚫ CMO. ⚫ CA operations. ⚫ Sustainment. ⚫ Information. Intelligence Operations E-3. Intelligence operations includes linguist requirements inherent in CI, HUMINT, OSINT, and SIGINT. Multinational Liaison E-4. Multinational liaison includes the coordination of military operations and liaison with multinational partners, previously unaffiliated nations, host-nation personnel and offices, and, at times. adversary or former adversary nations. (See FM 6-0.) Special Operations E-5. Operations conducted by special operations forces typically require foreign language capabilities. Because of the broad range of languages, Army special operations forces may not have the required number of personnel trained in a specific language or dialect. In many situations, Army special operations forces require sophisticated language skills requiring a nuanced language capability that can only a native speaker can provide or vet. For example, psychological operations specialists develop product series in target languages to obtain specific responses, and special forces team members convey the intent of the operation to an indigenous force; CA personnel work in specialized teams found in government, law, medical support, law enforcement, infrastructure projects, public safety, and population control. (See FM 3-53, FM 3-18, and FM 3-57.) Civil-Military Operations E-6. Civil-military operations are activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation (JP 3-57). CMO may include military forces performing activities and functions normally performed by the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur before, during, or after other military actions. They are fundamental to executing stability operations conducted during offensive and defensive operations. Commanders are inherently responsible for CMO, and Army forces conduct CMO to coordinate civil and military activities, minimize civil-military friction and threats from the civil component, maximize support for operations, and meet commanders’ legal obligations and moral responsibilities to civilian populations within the operational area. E-7. CA personnel, other Army forces, other government agencies, or a combination of all three perform these activities, and the G-9 is the lead staff officer for these activities. Foreign language support is critical to CMO and may include language requirements in addition to those native in the nation where the operation is occurring, as there may be other foreign governments and nongovernmental agencies involved in stability operations. (See FM 3-57.) Civil Affairs Operations E-8. CA operations enhance the relationship between civil authorities and military forces. They involve applying CA functional specialty skills to areas normally under the civil government’s responsibility. These operations involve establishing, maintaining, influencing, or exploiting relations between military forces and all levels of host-nation government agencies. CA personnel work with specialized vernacular in such areas as government liaison, legal agreements, medical support and operations, law enforcement, infrastructure projects, engineering projects, public safety, security, and population control. (See FM 3-57.) Sustainment E-9. This category consists of foreign language support to sustainment functions, which include logistic contracting; port, railhead, airhead, or transshipment operations; and convoy operations. (See ADP 4-0.) Information E-10. DOD makes every effort to synchronize, align, and coordinate communications activities to facilitate an understanding of how the planning and execution of DOD strategies, plans, operations, and activities will be received or understood by key audiences. To support these efforts, commanders and staffs should identify and understand key audience perceptions and possible reactions when planning and executing operations. This understanding of key audience perceptions and reactions is a vital element of every theater campaign and contingency plan, and it is essential to the Army’s ability to achieve unity of effort through unified action with the joint force, interagency partners, and the broader interorganizational community. Key audience beliefs, perceptions, and behaviors are crucial to the success of any strategy, plan, and operation. E-11. Using accurate language, in the right tone and with the right connation, is crucial to these efforts and requires foreign language support. Through the commander’s communications synchronization, public affairs, information advantage activities, and defense support to public diplomacy are realized as communications supporting capabilities. The commander’s communications synchronization assists leaders, planners, and operators at all levels in understanding the desired effects and anticipating potential undesired effects of the Army’s actions and words, identifying key audiences, and actively addressing their perspectives when appropriate. C OMMAND L ANGUAGE P ROGRAM M ANAGER E-12. Commanders with many assigned linguists (150 or more) must appoint a full-time command language program manager with a specified job description to manage the command language program. All personnel performing command language program manager duties (either full-time or as an additional duty) must attend the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center Command Language Program Manager course. C OMMAND L ANGUAGE C OUNCIL E-13. A command language council is required for a unit with more than 50 language-coded positions authorized on Army manning documents. This council promotes linguistic excellence through the sharing of ideas and information and to prioritize training. The command language council should include the commander, command sergeant major, S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, and the resource manager. However, the commander may direct other staff participation. For units with less than 50 linguists, it is at the commander’s discretion to authorize the establishment of a command language council. (See AR 11-6.) LANGUAGE SUPPORT FOR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS E-14. The SIGINT and HUMINT disciplines require specific language skills to accomplish their collection tasks successfully. SIGINT collectors often analyze and report information obtained through the intercept of foreign language communications. Communications intelligence, together with intelligence research and analysis missions, demands highly skilled listening and reading language capabilities. HUMINT collection operations that require foreign language capabilities include the following: ⚫ Interrogation. Foreign language requirements for interrogation include listening and speaking abilities for conducting the interrogation itself. ⚫ Debriefing. Debriefers require foreign language reading, listening, and speaking capabilities to prepare for and carry out debriefings of foreign subjects. ⚫ Liaison. HUMINT collectors rely heavily on language ability to conduct effective liaison with host-nation and other officials. ⚫ HUMINT source operations. All foreign language capabilities are required to conduct military source operations effectively. E-15. The HUMINT specialty identifies language proficiency with a skill qualification identifier. However, when language-qualified debriefers are unavailable, debriefers may use interpreters. During the train/ready phase, CI and HUMINT Soldiers must have the opportunity to participate in language and cultural immersion programs that provide commanders with the socioeconomic expertise for specific target areas. LANGUAGE SUPPORT SOURCES E-16. Commanders can use various sources to obtain the linguists needed to support operations. It is vital to know the advantages and disadvantages of each type of linguist and to match the available linguists to the various requirements of the operation carefully. A RMY L ANGUAGE M ILITARY O CCUPATIONAL S PECIALTIES E-17. The language-dependent MI enlisted military occupational specialty (MOSMOSMilitary occupational specialties) is 35P with a skill qualification identifier of L (cryptologic linguist). HUMINT collector specialties (MOSMOSMilitary occupational specialties 35M and warrant officer MOSMOSMilitary occupational specialties 351M) are designated as language dependent. Leaders should be aware of the language proficiency level of their assigned HUMINT collectors, which may range from no language to full native proficiency. (See table E-1 on page E-4.) E-18. Not all 35M Soldiers are language dependent. Active Component and ARNGARNGArmy National Guard 35M Soldiers who did not attend language training before 30 September 2020 are grandfathered and do not have to attend language training to maintain MOSMOSMilitary occupational specialties qualification for the duration of their career. Active Component and ARNGARNGArmy National Guard Soldiers who entered service as MOSMOSMilitary occupational specialties 35W or 35M and graduated from the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, or were recruited for their language, are subject to the provisions of AR 11-6. USARUSARUnited States Army Reserve 35M Soldiers who signed a contract before 15 July 2020 are grandfathered. These 35M Soldiers are considered language capable for the duration of their career. USARUSARUnited States Army Reserve 35M Soldiers who enter service after 15 July 2020 are considered language dependent and are subject to the provisions of AR 11-6. E-19. The following non-MI career management fields, branches, and functional areas include language-qualified enlisted MOSs and officer areas of concentration: ⚫ Career management field 18 (special forces [enlisted, warrant officers, and officers]). ⚫ Career management field 37 (psychological operations [enlisted and officers]). ⚫ Career management field 38 (CA). ⚫ Functional area 48 (foreign area officer).

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The glossary lists terms for which FM 2-0 is the proponent with an asterisk (*) before the term. For other terms, the proponent publication is listed in parentheses after the definition.

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