Field Manual
No. 3-0
Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 21 March 2025
OPERATIONS

This version of FM 3-0 is an update to the edition published in October 2022. The manual retains the focus on large-scale combat operations and reinforces the point: all operations are multidomain operations. Since 2022, the Army learned from the Ukraine-Russia conflict, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and other regional conflicts around the world. These observations confirmed that the Army’s thinking about warfare was realistic and informed by the correct considerations. The Army also learned from its experiences during implementation of the multidomain operations concept—what was well understood, what needed clarification, and what needed more detail. The result was refinement of how we address strategic contexts, convergence, information, conventional and special operations forces integration, operations in maritime and nuclear environments, and a new imperative elevating the importance of the electromagnetic spectrum. This update to FM 3-0 remains focused the multidomain approach to operations and the combined arms employment of Army and joint capabilities. These are necessary for Army forces to defeat capable threats that can contest the joint force on land as well as in the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains. Army forces play an important role in supporting joint operations through the projection of combat power from land into the other domains and setting theaters for the joint force. Threats with peer capabilities who enjoy regional advantages represent a grave challenge to the U.S., its allies, and its partners. They are seldom vulnerable at a single decisive point or in a single domain. To defeat these threats, Army forces create and exploit relative advantages over time. This requires Army forces to fight as echelons of integrated formations that decide and act more quickly than the enemy, accepting risk to create opportunities. A common understanding of the operational environment, tenets and imperatives of operations, and the enemy is foundational. Army forces maneuver to seize or retain key terrain and exert control over resources and people for as long as is necessary to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives for joint force commanders. Army forces expand opportunities for the joint force by creating options other types of forces cannot. Multidomain operations apply at all echelons. Lower tactical echelons depend upon higher echelons to employ joint and scarce Army capabilities, while higher echelons depend upon lower echelons to exploit the opportunities those capabilities provide. All echelons must see themselves, the threat, and their assigned areas through the three dimensions of the operational environment model. Likewise, they must understand how the imperatives of operations apply to their formation. Army forces conduct operations within three strategic contexts: competition below armed conflict, crisis, and armed conflict. During competition and crisis they set conditions for success when deterrence fails. Forward-stationed Army forces defend forward to provide “stand-on” capabilities that counter adversary standoff approaches, reduce risk to joint force projection, deter adversary aggression, and achieve joint force commander objectives. During conflict, Army forces enable joint force commanders to defeat enemy aggression and consolidate gains on the ground to ensure enduring political and strategic outcomes. The logic chart for this manual is shown in the introductory figure on page xii. The logic chart begins with identifying the methods used by peer threats to contest the joint force and how the joint force and Army forces counter those approaches through multidomain operations. Multidomain operations are the Army’s contribution to unified action, conducted by Army echelons in an operational environment consisting of five domains and three dimensions, and the strategic contexts of competition, crisis, and armed conflict. It concludes with a description of multidomain operations through guiding principles of war, tenets, and imperatives that enable Army forces to accomplish missions, defeat enemy forces, and meet objectives. Chapter 1 describes the challenges faced by Army forces and how multidomain operations help resolve them. It describes the Army’s vision of war and warfare, the strategic contexts in which Army forces conduct operations, and the operational environment, including the domains and dimensions. Chapter 2 describes how the synchronization of warfighting functions generates combat power to apply against enemy forces. It then describes threats and their methods, and how Army forces counter these threat methods through unified action and joint capabilities. Chapter 3 explains multidomain operations in detail, describing the tenets and imperatives of operations. It then highlights key elements of an operational approach and the operational framework. Chapter 4 describes how Army forces operate during competition to set conditions for armed conflict and counter adversary malign behavior. Chapter 5 describes how Army forces provide options during crisis to prevent armed conflict while continuing to fulfill political aims. Chapter 6 describes how Army forces operate during armed conflict, with a focus on how to enable the joint force and integrate capabilities from all domains in large-scale combat operations. Chapter 7 describes how Army forces operate in the unique conditions of maritime environments. Chapter 8 describes the role of commanders and leaders in the demanding conditions of large-scale combat operations. Appendix A provides an overview of the principles of war. Appendix B describes command and support relationships. Appendix C describes considerations for when enemy forces contest deployment. The introductory table outlines changes to Army terminology reflected in FM 3-0. Introductory table. New, modified, and rescinded Army terms Term Reasoning agility ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. close operations ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. conventional warfare ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. convergence ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. deep operations ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. disintegrate ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. dislocate ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. endurance ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. irregular warfare ADP 3-0 modifies and takes proponency from FM 3-0. multidomain operations ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. national strategic level of warfare ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. protection warfighting function ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. rear operations ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. relative advantage ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. sector ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. setting the theater ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. support area operations ADP 3-0 modifies and takes proponency from FM 3-0. theater strategic level of warfare ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. zone ADP 3-0 takes proponency from FM 3-0. 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War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. Carl von Clausewitz This chapter describes the range of military operations and the Army’s focus on readiness to conduct large-scale combat operations. It describes how Army forces meet challenges and conduct multidomain operations as part of a joint and multinational force. Beginning with the Army’s view of war and warfare, this chapter describes key concepts that help leaders understand an operational environment. ARMY OPERATIONS 1-1. The Army’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. It supports four strategic roles for the joint force. Army forces shape operational environments, counter aggression on land during crisis, prevail during large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. The Army fulfills its strategic roles by providing forces for joint campaigns that enable integrated deterrence of adversaries outside of conflict and the defeat of enemies during conflict or war. The strategic roles clarify the overall purposes for which Army forces conduct multidomain operations on behalf of joint force commanders (JFCs) in the pursuit of a stable environment and other policy objectives. Fulfilling policy objectives requires national-level leaders to orchestrate all instruments of national power throughout the entire government and coalition, in a manner commensurate with national will. (See JP 3-0 for more information on joint campaigns and deterrence. See ADP 3-0 for more information on the Army’s strategic roles.) 1-2. Military operations on land are foundational to operations in other domains because almost all capabilities, no matter where employed, are ultimately based on, or controlled from, land. While any particular domain may dominate military considerations in a specific context, conflicts are usually resolved on land because that is where people live and make political decisions and where the basis of national power exists. 1-3. Army forces achieve objectives through the conduct of operations. An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1, Volume 1). Operations vary in many ways. They occur in all kinds of physical environments, including urban, subterranean, desert, jungle, mountain, maritime, and arctic. Operations vary in scale of forces involved and duration. Operations change factors in the physical, information, and human dimensions of an operational environment. 1-4. The complex environment in which operations occur demands leaders who understand both the science and art of operations. Understanding the science of operations—such as combat power ratios, weapons ranges, and movement tables—helps leaders improve synchronization and reduce risk. However, there is no way to eliminate uncertainty, and leaders must exercise operational art to make decisions and assume risk. Intangible factors, such as the impact of leadership on morale, using shock effect to defeat enemy forces, and supportive populations are fundamentally human factors that can overcome physical disadvantages and often decide the outcomes of an operation. (See ADP 3-0 for more information on the art and science of operations.) 1-5. Army forces meet a diverse array of challenges and contribute to national objectives across a wide range of operational categories, including large-scale combat operations, limited contingency operations, crisis response, and support to security cooperation. (See figure 1-1 on page 2 for a depiction of operational categories and the spectrum of violence.) 1-6. Most operations occur on the lower end of the spectrum of violence, and their objectives do not reach the level of vital national interests or national survival. These operations typically shape operational environments in ways that stabilize global security and facilitate conditions that are generally favorable to the United States. They provide valuable options to JFCs because they achieve objectives best supported by persistent presence, often at relatively low cost. 1-7. While the overwhelming majority of operations conducted by Army forces occur either below the threshold of armed conflict or during limited contingencies, the focus of Army readiness is on large-scale combat operations. The United States always retains the option to employ greater levels of force when less coercive methods are ineffective, and when a vital interest or national survival is at stake. This requires Army forces to be prepared for the most demanding and dangerous types of operations. Army forces contribute to conventional deterrence through their demonstrated capability, capacity, and will to wage war on land in any environment against any opponent. Credible combat forces make the other instruments of national power more potent, and they help deter the enemy’s escalation of violence during other types of operations. 1-8. Credible combat forces are those able to overcome the advantages peer threats generate within a specific regional context. Enemies typically initiate their aggression under conditions optimal for their success, requiring U.S. forces to respond at a disadvantage. U.S. combat operations typically involve force projection over long distances, providing advantages for enemy forces operating closer to their bases of support. Enemies typically have a degree of popular support cultivated through decades of propaganda and isolation from the free flow of information. This increases the enemy’s will to fight and can make local populations hostile to U.S. forces and objectives. Although a combatant command and theater army may accrue a variety of advantages as they set the theater and prepare for armed conflict during periods of competition, Army forces are typically faced with challenges they have to overcome at the onset of hostilities and throughout the conduct or armed conflict. MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS 1-9. Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders (ADP 3-0). Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use of all available combat power from each domain to accomplish missions at least cost. Multidomain operations are the Army’s contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the competition continuum. Below the threshold of armed conflict, multidomain operations are how Army forces accrue advantages and demonstrate readiness for conflict, deterring adversaries while assuring allies and partners. During conflict, they are how Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control populations and resources to deliver sustainable political outcomes. 1-10. Army forces conduct operations in support of joint campaigns which for the most part occur as part of a larger coalition operation. Leaders must understand the interdependencies between their own assigned forces and the forces or capabilities provided by others to generate the complementary and reinforcing effects of combined arms approaches. Army forces employ joint and other unified action partner capabilities to the degree they are available. However, because peer threats can contest the force in all domains, Army forces must be prepared to conduct operations when some or all joint capabilities are unavailable to support mission accomplishment. 1-11. All operations are multidomain operations. Army forces employ organic capabilities in multiple domains, and they continuously benefit from air, maritime, space, and cyberspace capabilities that they do not control, including strategic transportation, global positioning, satellite communications, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). Lower echelons may not always notice the opportunities created by higher echelons or other forces that operate primarily in other domains; however, leaders must understand how the absence of those opportunities affects their concepts of operations, decision making, and risk assessment. 1-12. During operations, small advantages can have significant impacts on the outcome of the mission, particularly when they accrue over time. Creating and exploiting relative advantages are therefore necessary for all operations, and they become even more critical when opposing sides are evenly matched. A relative advantage is a location or condition, in any domain, relative to an adversary or enemy that provides an opportunity to progress towards or achieve an objective (ADP 3-0). Commanders seek and create relative advantages to exploit through action, and they continually assess the situation to identify ways to expand opportunities. (See paragraphs 1-113 through 1-124 for more information on physical, information, and human advantages.) Army forces must accurately see themselves, see the enemy or adversary, and understand their operational environment before they can identify or exploit relative advantages. 1-13. Army leaders are accustomed to creating and exploiting relative advantages through the combined arms approach that traditionally focuses on capabilities from the land, air, and maritime domains. The proliferation of space and cyberspace capabilities further requires leaders who understand the advantages those capabilities create in their operational environment. The ability to integrate and synchronize space and cyberspace capabilities at the most effective tactical echelon expands options for creating advantages to exploit. 1-14. Multidomain operations fracture the coherence of threat operational approaches by destroying, dislocating, isolating, and disintegrating their interdependent systems and formations, and exploiting the opportunities these disruptions provide to defeat enemy forces in detail. Army forces therefore require timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to understand threat characteristics, capabilities, objectives, and courses of action. Intelligence initially drives what combinations of defeat mechanisms commanders pursue as they employ the capabilities of their forces in space and time against enemy forces. Army forces combine maneuver and targeting methods to defeat enemy formations and systems. Army forces employ maneuver to close with and destroy enemy formations in close operations. Targeting generally sets priorities for information collection, fires, and other key capabilities to disintegrate enemy networks and systems. Leaders execute the targeting process to create advantages that enable freedom of maneuver and exploit the positional advantages created by maneuver. Targeting is a key way for leaders to integrate the joint capabilities required to create depth in the battlefield and protect friendly formations. Some combination of maneuver and attrition is typically necessary to achieve victory during armed conflict. This is reflected in the defeat mechanisms which encompass both ideas. CHALLENGES FOR ARMY FORCES We don’t maintain a strong military force to conquer or coerce others. The purpose of our military is simple and straightforward: We want to prevent war by deterring others from the aggression that causes war. President Ronald Reagan 1-15. The joint force deters most adversaries from seeking to achieve strategic objectives through direct military confrontation with the United States. As a result, adversaries pursue their objectives indirectly through malign activities and armed conflict targeting others in ways calculated to avoid war with the United States. These activities include subversive political and legal strategies, establishing physical presence on the ground to buttress resource claims, coercive economic practices, supporting proxy forces, and spreading disinformation. However, several adversaries have both the ability and the will to conduct armed conflict with the United States under certain conditions, which requires Army forces to be prepared at all times for limited contingencies and large-scale combat operations. 1-16. Global and regional adversaries apply all instruments of national power to challenge U.S. interests and the joint force. Militarily, they have extended the battlefield by employing network enabled sensors and long-range fires to deny access during conflict and challenge friendly forces’ freedom of action during competition. These standoff approaches seek to— The notion of integrated deterrence goes beyond preventing armed conflict. It includes preventing adversaries from increasing the scope and intensity of their malign activities conducted below the threshold of armed conflict. • Counter U.S. space, air, and naval advantages to make the introduction of land forces difficult and exploit the overall joint force’s mutual dependencies. • Increase the cost to the joint force and its partners in the event of armed conflict. • Hold the joint force at risk both in the U.S. and at its overseas bases. • Contest Army forces’ deployment from home station to forward tactical assembly areas overseas. 1-17. Adversaries increase risk to the U.S. joint force to raise the threshold at which the United States might respond to a provocation with military force. By diluting the joint force’s conventional deterrence, adversaries believe they have greater freedom of action to conduct malign activities both within and outside the U.S. homeland. Adversaries exploit this freedom of action through offensive cyberspace operations, disinformation, influence operations, and the aggressive positioning of ground, air, and naval forces to support territorial claims. Adversaries employ different types of forces and capabilities to attack private and government organizations, threaten critical economic infrastructure, and disrupt political processes, often with a degree of plausible deniability that reduces the likelihood of a friendly military response. Conducting these activities in support of policy goals threatens allied cohesion, weakens responses, and creates additional opportunities. (See paragraphs 2-40 through 2-44 for description of enemy information warfare.) 1-18. Threat standoff approaches intensify other friendly challenges. These challenges include— • Gaining and maintaining support of allies and partners. • Maintaining the continuous information collection needed to determine composition, disposition, strength, and activities of enemy forces. • Integrating and synchronizing intelligence at all echelons, distributed across large operational areas with diverse requirements. • Preparing forward-stationed forces to fight and win while outnumbered and isolated. • Protecting forward-positioned forces and those moving into a theater. • Minimizing vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction. • Maintaining command and control (C2) and sustainment of units distributed across vast distances in noncontiguous areas and outside supporting ranges and distances. • Maintaining a desirable tempo while defeating fixed and bypassed enemy forces. • Defeating threat information and irregular warfare attacks against the United States and strategic lines of communications. 1-19. Army forces prepare to conduct operations in contested theaters prior to and during armed conflict, including in the United States. Army forces protect against constant observation and the threat’s ability to gain and maintain contact in all domains, wherever they are located. Forward-postured forces must be sufficient to achieve assigned campaign objectives. Other Army forces must be ready to deploy on short notice to austere locations and be capable of immediately conducting combat operations. 1-20. During the initial phases of an operation, Army units may find themselves facing superior threats in terms of both numbers and capabilities. Initial enemy offensive operations focus on seizing lightly defended areas that provide positional advantages. Enemy forces rapidly transition from offensive operations to defend their gains against counterattack. Forward-postured forces fight with allies and partners to limit enemy offensive gains. Successful forward postured forces minimize the amount of terrain that must be recovered during subsequent operations by follow-on forces. 1-21. The first deploying units require the capability to defend themselves and collect information on threat activities, as they provide reaction time and freedom of maneuver for follow-on forces. Army units with limited joint support defend while exposed to enemy long-range fires in environments with degraded, denied, and disrupted communications. Forward-stationed forces may defend critical terrain with other coalition forces to delay enemy offensive operations. Some forward-stationed forces may defend joint bases to mitigate the impact of enemy attacks against strategic and operational lines of communications. In both cases, forward-stationed Army forces must be prepared to fight while relatively isolated in the early stages of an enemy attack. 1-22. The likelihood of the enemy force’s use of massed long-range fires and weapons of mass destruction increases during large-scale combat operations—particularly against C2 and sustainment nodes, assembly areas, and critical infrastructure. To survive and operate against massed long-range fires and in contaminated environments, commanders ensure as much dispersion as tactically prudent. Army forces seek every possible advantage using dispersion, deception, counterreconnaissance, terrain, hardening of positions, cover, concealment, masking, and other procedures to avoid detection and mitigate the impact of enemy fires. In the offense, Army forces maneuver quickly along multiple axes, concentrating only to the degree required to mass effects, and then dispersing to avoid becoming lucrative targets for weapons of mass destruction and enemy conventional fires. Although dispersion disrupts enemy targeting efforts, it increases the difficulty of both C2 and sustainment for friendly forces. Success demands agile units that can adjust dispositions rapidly, assume risk, and exploit opportunities when they are available. 1-23. The high tempo of large-scale combat operations creates gaps and seams, generating both opportunities and risks as enemy formations disintegrate, disperse, or displace. After generating sufficient combat power for offensive operations, friendly forces may intermingle with or fix and bypass enemy formations. This requires follow-on and supporting units to protect themselves and to defeat enemy remnants in detail within the rear area as part of consolidating gains. 1-24. Army forces deploying from the United States and elsewhere face a wide range of threats that are difficult to counter without joint support. The disruptive effects of enemy action may occur at unit home stations, ports of embarkation, while in transit to the theater, and upon arrival at ports of debarkation. Army forces may not have the capability, or the authority, to preempt these attacks, although counterintelligence may aid in early identification of threats. The threat’s ability to contest the deployment of forces may degrade combat power available to forward forces and cause unit personnel and equipment to arrive in piecemeal fashion at ports of debarkation. (See Appendix C for more information on deployments contested by threat forces.) LETHALITY: OVERCOMING CHALLENGES 1-25. Army forces overcome challenges posed by threats and the environment with credible formations able to employ lethal capabilities. Lethality is the capability and capacity to destroy. Employing and threatening the employment of lethal force lies at the core of how Army forces achieve objectives and enable the rest of the instruments of national power to achieve objectives. 1-26. Lethality is enabled by formations maneuvering into positions of relative advantage where they can employ weapon systems and mass effects to destroy enemy forces or place them at risk of destruction. The speed, range, and accuracy of weapon systems employed by a formation enhance its lethality. The demands of large-scale combat rapidly deplete available stockpiles and require forces to retain large reserves of ammunition, weapons, and other warfighting capabilities. Leaders multiply the effects of lethal force by employing combinations of capabilities through multiple domains to create, accrue, and exploit relative advantages—imposing multiple dilemmas on enemy forces and overwhelming their ability to respond effectively. Overcoming challenges in the operational environment further requires lethal Army forces that employ all available capabilities to— • Continuously cultivate landpower networks with allies and partners to facilitate interoperability. Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people (ADP 3-0). • Be demonstrably prepared for large-scale combat operations to deter conflict on land. • Employ capabilities in a combined arms manner to create exploitable opportunities. • Maneuver, mass effects, and preserve combat power to defeat threats to other Service components of the joint force. • Defend forward-positioned critical joint infrastructure and key terrain. • Conduct offensive operations to create and exploit opportunities and achieve objectives. • Consolidate gains during competition, crisis, and armed conflict to enable sustainable political outcomes. 1-27. The effective employment of Army forces depends on leaders who understand war, warfare, and the environment within which military forces fight. Gaps in understanding are often causes of failures to achieve sustainable political outcomes with military means. WAR AND WARFARE [ W]e now need another voice of wisdom to tell us, “Technology is not enough.” War is not one big engineering project. There are people on the other side-with strengths and will that we never bothered to measure. As a result of that omission we have been drawn into a greater, and certainly more ruinous, belligerent action than we intended. To fight without understanding the opponent ultimately serves neither the repute of the military nor the repute of the nation. Barbara W. Tuchman 1-28. War is a state of armed conflict between different nations, state-like entities, or armed groups to achieve policy objectives. Wars are fought between nations locally, regionally, or on a global scale. Wars are fought within a nation by a central government against insurgent, separatist, or resistance groups. Armed groups in semiautonomous regions also fight wars to achieve their objectives. Wars range from intense clashes between large military forces—sometimes backed by an official declaration of war—to more subtle hostilities that intermittingly breach the threshold of violence. For U.S. forces there is a legal basis for all war. Joint and Army forces employ violence only when granted the authority, and then they can only apply force within directed constraints. 1-29. The object of war is to impose a nation’s or group’s will on its enemy in pursuit of policy objectives. Regardless of the specific objectives, the decision to wage war represents a major policy decision and changes how Army forces use military capabilities. The nature of war, its principles, and its elements remain consistent over time. However, warfare, the conduct and characteristics of war, reflects changing means and contexts. 1-30. The Army’s multidomain operations concept accounts for the constant nature of war and the changing character of warfare. Its balanced approach guides how Army forces operate across the competition continuum given the prevailing characteristics of anticipated operational environments now and in the near future. Doctrine for the conduct of operations begins with a view of war and warfare that includes the— • Nature of war. • Principles of war. • Characteristics of warfare. • Methods of warfare. • Offense, defense, and stability. • Large-scale combat operations. • Combined arms. • Levels of warfare. • Army strategic contexts. • Consolidating gains. (See Chapter 3 for more information on the multidomain operations concept.) T HE N ATURE OF W AR 1-31. While the term war has multiple uses depending on the context (for example, the war on drugs or the war on poverty), it is the threat or use of violence to achieve political purposes that distinguishes war in the military context from other human activities. This distinction accounts for three elements of the Army’s view of war. War is— • Fought to achieve a political purpose. • A human endeavor. • Inherently chaotic and uncertain. Note. War, by definition, includes at least two opposing sides. However, not all violence for political gain causes a war. For example, in the current security environment China imposes low levels of violence and new types of violence (including space and cyberspace attacks against government, economic institutions, private industry, and infrastructure) that do not trigger significant military responses. In these cases, China sees itself in a state of war with its adversaries, but its adversaries do not. Such a disparity in perspective is dangerous for those nations opposing China that may endure low levels of violence for long periods, while slowly ceding interests until it is too late to respond effectively. Responding to such situations requires a comprehensive government approach supported by joint and Army forces. Political Purpose 1-32. All U.S. military operations share a common purpose-to achieve or contribute to national policy objectives. As a principle of war, objective reinforces the proper relationship between military operations and policy. War must always be subordinate to policy and serve a political end. In conjunction with political leaders, military leaders develop strategies to achieve the desired policy outcomes. Policy outcomes often relate to the nation’s ability to influence, control, or secure populations, civil infrastructure, natural resources, and access to global commons in all domains. (See Appendix A for a discussion of the principles of war.) Objective—to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal—is a principle of war. Human Endeavor 1-33. War is shaped by human nature and the complex interrelationships of cognition, emotion, and uncertainty. National sentiments are often targets to be affected or manipulated by one or both sides. Values and ethics are some of the cognitive factors that motivate both the cause for going to war and restrictions in the conduct of war. Fear, passion, camaraderie, grief, and many more emotions affect the resolve of a war’s participants. They affect the behavior of combatants, including how and when leaders decide to persevere and when to give up. Individuals react differently to the stress of war; an act that may break the will of one enemy may only serve to stiffen the resolve of another. Human will, instilled through commitment to a cause and leadership, is the driving force of all action in war. The human dimension infuses war with its intangible moral factors. (See paragraphs 1-122 through 1-124 for more information on the human dimension.) Inherently Chaotic and Uncertain 1-34. War is inherently chaotic and uncertain due to the clash of wills and intense interaction of innumerable factors. Orders are misunderstood, enemy forces do the unexpected, units make wrong turns, unforeseen obstacles appear, the weather changes, and units consume supplies at unexpected rates. This friction affects all military operations, and it must be anticipated by leaders. The chaotic nature of war makes discerning the precise cause and effect of actions difficult, impossible, or delayed. The unintended effects of operations are difficult to anticipate and identify. Such chaos imposes a great deal of uncertainty on all operations and drives the importance of leaders who are skilled at assuming risk. P RINCIPLES OF W AR 1-35. From a U.S. military perspective, war involves nine principles, collectively and classically known as the principles of war. The nine principles of war represent the most important factors that affect the conduct of operations, and they are derived from the study of history and experience in battle. (See table 1-1 on page 8 for a concise listing of the principles of war.) 1-36. The principles of war capture broad and enduring fundamentals for the employment of forces in combat. They are not a checklist that guarantees success. Rather, they summarize considerations commanders and their staffs account for during successful operations, applied with judgment in specific contexts. While applicable to all operations, they do not apply equally or in the same way to every situation. (For more information on the principles of war, see Appendix A.) 1-59. The levels of warfare distinguish four broad overlapping activities—providing national direction and creating national strategy (national strategic), conducting continuous theater campaigning (theater strategic); planning and conducting campaigns and major operations (operational); or planning and executing operations, battles, engagements, and actions (tactical). Some commanders act at more than one level of war. For example, a combatant commander (CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders) formulates theater strategy and designs the campaign plan. A land component commander assists a CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders in campaign design and may lead a field army during major operations. The levels of warfare are conceptual, without finite limits or boundaries. They do, however, correlate to specific activities and responsibilities. They help commanders visualize the relationships and actions required to link strategic objectives, military operations at various echelons, and tactical actions. Among the levels of warfare, planning horizons, methods, and products differ greatly. Without this context, tactical operations become disconnected from operational end states and strategic objectives. There are skills and practices related to strategic, theater strategic, operational, and tactical level that differ from each other and are enhanced by specific training and education. National Strategic Level of Warfare 1-60. The national strategic level of warfare is the level of warfare at which the United States government formulates policy goals and ways to achieve them by synchronizing action across government and partners and by employing the instruments of national power (ADP 3-0). The instruments of national power are all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives, expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. The national strategic level of warfare focuses on developing global strategy and providing global strategic direction. Strategic direction provides context, tasks, and purpose for the employment of the instruments of national power. The specifics of strategic direction address long-term, emerging, and anticipatory issues or concerns that may quickly evolve due to rapidly changing circumstances. Strategic direction is always evolving and adapting. 1-61. The theater strategic level of warfare is the level of warfare at which combatant commanders synchronize with unified action partners and employ all instruments of national power to fulfill policy aims within the assigned theater in support of the national strategy (ADP 3-0). Based on strategic guidance, CCDRs with assigned areas of responsibility and staffs—with input from subordinate commands, including theater armies and supporting commands and agencies—update their strategic estimates and develop theater strategies. A theater strategy is an overarching construct outlining a combatant commander’s vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. The theater strategy prioritizes the ends, ways, and means within the limitations established by the budget, global force management processes, and strategic guidance. The theater strategy serves as the basis for development of the combatant command campaign plan (CCP). Operational Level of Warfare 1-62. The operational level of warfare is the level of warfare in which campaigns and operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve operational objectives to support achievement of strategic objectives (JP 3-0). The operational level links the employment of tactical forces to the achievement of strategic objectives. 1-63. The operational level of warfare generally is the realm of combatant commands and their Service or functional components and subordinate joint task force (JTF) headquarters and their Service or functional components. This includes the theater army headquarters as the Army Service component to a combatant command and any other echelon operating as an ARFOR, JTF headquarters, or land component command. The focus at this level is on operational art-the design of campaigns and operations by integrating ends, ways, and means, while accounting for risk. (See ADP 3-0 for more information on operational art.) 1-64. Actions at the operational level of warfare usually involve broader aspects of time and space than tactical actions. The theater army’s activities continuously support the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders in shaping the operational and strategic situation. Operational-level commanders need to understand the complexities of the operational environment and look beyond the immediate situation. Operational-level commanders seek to create the most favorable conditions possible for subordinate commanders by preparing for future events. 1-65. Because the operational level is fundamentally about linking tactical action to strategic objectives, leaders must understand both strategy and tactics. They must have some expertise in the capabilities and operations of all Services and components and those of allies and partners. Leaders at the operational level must be able to assess large, complex operational environments and be expert planners. They must understand the application of warfighting functions on a large scale and how this application differs from application at the tactical level. The elements of operational art help operational leaders understand, visualize, and describe their campaigns and major operations. (See ADP 3-0 for details on the elements of operational art.) Tactical Level of Warfare 1-66. The tactical level of warfare is the level of warfare at which forces plan and execute battles and engagements to achieve military objectives (JP 3 0). Activities at this level focus on tactics —the employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to each other (ADP 3-90). Operational-level headquarters determine objectives and provide resources for tactical operations. Tactical level commanders plan and execute operations to include battles, engagements, and small-unit actions. 1-67. Tactical-level combat operations rise to the level of battles or engagements. A battle is a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement (ADP 3-90). Battles can affect the course of a campaign or major operation, and they are typically conducted by corps and divisions over the course of days or months. An engagement is a tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelon maneuver forces (JP 3-0). Engagements are typically conducted at brigade echelons and below. They are usually short, executed in minutes or hours. 1-68. The strategic and operational levels of warfare provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations devolve into a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Likewise, tactical operations inform strategic and operational objectives, ensuring that those objectives remain tethered to reality and adjust, when necessary, according to the situation. Strategic and operational success is a measure of how the achievement of objectives in one or more battles contributes to winning a major operation or campaign. (See ADP 3-90 for more information on tactics.) A RMY S TRATEGIC C ONTEXTS 1-69. Joint doctrine describes the strategic environment in terms of a competition continuum. Rather than a world either at peace or at war, the competition continuum describes three broad categories of strategic relationships—cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. Each relationship is defined as between the United States and another strategic actor relative to a specific set of policy aims. This model provides a way of describing situations when the United States maintains multiple relationships with another nation at the same time. Cooperation, competition, and even armed conflict commonly go on simultaneously in different parts of the world. Because of this, the needs of CCDRs and Army component commanders in one area are affected by the strategic needs of others. (See JP 3-0 for more information about the joint competition continuum.) Note. This manual uses “competition” to mean “competition below armed conflict.” 1-70. Although combatant commands and theater armies campaign across the competition continuum, Army tactical formations typically conduct operations within a context dominated by one strategic relationship at a time. Therefore, Army doctrine describes the strategic situation through three contexts in which Army forces conduct operations: • Competition below armed conflict. • Crisis. • Armed conflict. The strategic contexts are not linear phases. Army forces can transition between them in any order. 1-71. The Army strategic contexts generally correspond to the joint competition continuum and the requirements of joint campaigns. Because cooperation is generally conducted with an ally or partner to counter an adversary or enemy, Army doctrine considers it part of competition. Army doctrine adds crisis to account for the unique challenges facing ground forces that often characterize transition between competition and armed conflict. 1-72. Two or more units can operate at the same time and in the same area, but the strategic contexts can be different. For example, conventional units often conduct security force assistance during competition, while special operations units conduct direct action against a terrorist organization in the same area. 1-73. Each of the contexts generally corresponds to authorities permitting or limiting the use of force. During competition, lethal force is generally constrained to self-defense and is reactive by nature. During armed conflict, Army forces receive authorities that enable more proactive use of force against enemy forces. During conflicts with lower levels of violence, authorities for the use of force may be adjusted to increase the protection of civilians, account for mission factors, or conform to policy constraints. Large-scale combat operations and other highly lethal armed conflict situations have fewer constraints on the use of force. During crisis, changes in the operational environment may render authorities invalid and require leaders to account for the fact that strategic leaders have not had time to update them. (See figure 1-3 for an illustration of Army strategic contexts.) Competition Below Armed Conflict 1-74. Competition below armed conflict exists when two or more state or non-state adversaries have incompatible interests, but neither seeks armed conflict. Nation-states compete with each other using all instruments of national power to gain and maintain advantages that help them achieve their goals. Low levels of lethal force can be a part of competition below armed conflict. Adversaries often employ cyberspace capabilities and information warfare to destroy or disrupt infrastructure, interfere with government processes, and conduct activities in a way that does not cause the United States and its allies to respond with force. During competition, joint and Army forces have the right to self-defense, and they may receive authority to employ lethal force for specific missions, such as counterterrorism, against specific threats for a specific window of time. Depending on the situation, these pulses of violence may be considered brief transitions into and out of armed conflict. 1-75. Competition provides military forces time to prepare for armed conflict, opportunities to assure allies and partners of resolve and commitment, and time and space to set the necessary conditions to prevent crisis or conflict. Conventional and special operations forces maintain persistent presence wherever possible during competition. This presence allows conventional forces to set theaters for the joint force and ARSOF to conduct operational preparation of the environment. Both efforts contribute to integrated deterrence and combat readiness. Examples of competition include return of forces to Europe (known as REFORGER) exercises conducted during the Cold War, security assistance provided to Ukraine since 2014, and Pacific Pathways activities to improve readiness in the Indo-pacific region. (See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of Army forces during competition.) Crisis 1-76. A crisis is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives (JP 3-0). Commanders must consider the possibility that overt military action may escalate a crisis towards armed conflict. The use of space and cyberspace capabilities provides other options that are less likely to cause escalation. The context of crisis is relative to an adversary, which is different from crisis response, which can result from a natural or human disaster. During crisis, armed conflict has not yet occurred, but it is either imminent or a distinct possibility that requires rapid response by forces prepared to fight if deterrence fails. Note. A crisis can be long in duration, but it can also reflect a near-simultaneous transition to armed conflict. Leaders do not assume that a crisis provides additional time for a transition to armed conflict. 1-77. Army forces contribute to joint operations, seeking to deter further provocation and compel an adversary to de-escalate aggression and return to competition under conditions acceptable for the United States and its allies or partners. Through rapid movement and integration with the joint force, Army forces help signal the readiness and willingness to prevail in combat operations. When authorized, Army forces can inform or influence perceptions about an operation’s goals and progress to amplify effects on the ground during a crisis; however, commanders ensure their message aligns with reality and that their narratives are truthful and credible. 1-78. Army forces help the joint force maintain freedom of action and associated positions of relative advantage through the activities they conduct and their presence on the ground. They operate in a way that disrupts adversary risk calculations about the cost of acting contrary to U.S. national interests, compels de-escalation, and fosters a return to competition conditions favorable to the United States. If deterrence fails to end a crisis, Army forces are better postured for operations during armed conflict. Examples of crisis include the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, North Korean missile and rocket provocations in 2017-2018, and the Russian attacks into Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. (See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of Army forces during crisis.) Armed Conflict 1-79. Armed conflict occurs when a state or non-state actor uses lethal force as the primary means to satisfy its interests. Armed conflict can encompass irregular warfare, conventional warfare, or combinations of both. Entering and terminating armed conflict is a political decision. Army forces may enter conflict with some advanced warning during a prolonged crisis or with little warning during competition. How well Army forces are prepared to enter an armed conflict ultimately depends upon decisions and preparations made during competition and crisis. 1-80. At the onset of armed conflict, forward-positioned Army forces may defend key terrain or infrastructure while seeking opportunities to gain the initiative or reposition to more favorable locations with partner forces. Army forces help JFCs gain and maintain the initiative, defeat enemy forces on the ground, control territory and populations, and consolidate gains to establish conditions for a political settlement favorable to U.S. interests. Army forces provide landpower to the joint force and conduct limited contingency or large-scale combat operations to ensure enduring political outcomes favorable to U.S. interests. Examples of armed conflict include the Vietnam War, OPERATION DESERT STORM, and OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE. (See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of Army forces conducting operations during armed conflict. See Chapter 7 for a discussion of Army forces in large-scale combat in maritime environments.) C ONSOLIDATING G AINS 1-81. Army commanders must exploit successful operations by continuously consolidating gains during competition, crisis, and armed conflict. Consolidate gains are activities to make enduring any initial operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous part of competition, and it is necessary for achieving success across the range of military operations. Successful consolidation of gains requires a realistic and pragmatic assessment of strategic conditions, ally and partner legitimacy, friendly and adversary relative advantages, and the viability of a sustainable political outcome. Operations to inform and influence foreign audiences also play a key role in achieving lasting outcomes. 1-82. During competition, Army forces may consolidate gains from previous conflicts for many years, as JFCs seek to maintain relative advantages against a specific adversary and sustain enduring political outcomes. U.S. forces in Europe, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Middle East remained in place for decades to consolidate gains made in earlier conflicts. Army forces also consolidate gains by continuously expanding landpower networks, developing multinational interoperability, improving mutual support between forward postured forces, and demonstrating readiness for large-scale combat operations. 1-83. During armed conflict, Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains throughout an operation as part of defeating enemy forces in detail to accomplish overall policy and strategic objectives. Early and effective consolidation activities are a form of exploitation performed while other operations are ongoing, and they enable the achievement of lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest time span. Tactical units consolidating on an objective can be the first step in consolidating gains. In some instances, Army forces will be the lead for integrating forces and synchronizing activities to consolidate gains. In other situations, Army forces will be in support of allies and partners. Army forces may consolidate gains for a sustained period over large land areas. Military governments in occupied territories stabilize civilian populations. Military authorities may temporarily govern areas until populations are stable enough for transition to legitimate civilian authorities. This transition of control to civil authorities reduces demands on combat power. UNDERSTANDING AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided—except in the rarest of cases—either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do. Sir Julian Corbett 1-84. An operational environment is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). For Army forces, an operational environment includes portions of the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains understood through three dimensions (human, physical, and information). The land, maritime, air, and space domains are defined by their physical characteristics. Cyberspace, a man-made network of networks, transits and connects the other domains as represented by the dots shown in figure 1-4. Note. Joint doctrine describes the components of an operational environment as the physical areas of the land, maritime, air, and space domains; the information environment (which includes cyberspace); the electromagnetic spectrum; and other factors. (See JP 2-0 and JP 5-0 for more information on describing and analyzing an operational environment from a joint perspective.) 1-85. The operational environment model aids in accounting for the totality of factors, specific circumstances, and conditions that impact the conduct of operations. This understanding enables leaders to better identify problems; anticipate potential outcomes; and understand the results of various friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral actions and the effects these actions have on achieving the military end state. A description of an operational environment includes all the factors that the commander and staff need to capture and understand to inform the conduct of operations. 1-86. Knowledge of the operational environment is the precursor to effective action. Obtaining knowledge about an operational environment requires aggressive and continuous intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and security operations to acquire information. Information collected from multiple sources and analyzed becomes intelligence that answers commanders’ intelligence requirements. Using all available relevant information to determine how the operational environment affects operations is essential to understanding which courses of action are the most feasible, suitable, and acceptable. Throughout the course of operations, commanders and staffs rely on an integrated information collection effort to develop an accurate picture of their operational environment. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets and as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). 1-87. An operational environment is the totality of factors that affect what occurs in an assigned area. These factors include actors, events, or actions that occur outside the assigned area. How the many entities behave and interact with each other is difficult to discern. No two operational environments are the same, and all of them continually change. Changes result from opposing forces and actors interacting, learning, and adapting. The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment makes determining the relationship between cause and effect challenging, and it contributes to the uncertain nature of war and human competition. This requires that commanders, supported by their staffs, develop and maintain the best possible understanding of their operational environment. Several tools and processes assist commanders and staffs in understanding their operational environment. They include— • Domains. • Dimensions. • Operational and mission variables (detailed in FM 6-0). • Running estimates (described in ADP 5-0). • Army design methodology (described in ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 5-0.1). • The military decision-making process (described in ADP 5-0). • Building intelligence knowledge (described in FM 2-0). • Intelligence preparation of the operational environment (described in ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01.3). • Sustainment preparation of the operational environment (described in FM 4-0). D OMAINS 1-88. Within the context of an operational environment, a domain is a physically defined portion of an operational environment requiring a unique set of warfighting capabilities and skills. Each military Service and branch trains and educates its leaders to be experts about operations in a primary domain, although each Service has some capability in each of the domains, and each develops shared understanding of how to integrate capabilities from different domains. Land operations require mastery of terrain and ground maneuver. Cyberspace operations require mastery of digital information systems and computer code. Space, air, and maritime operations likewise require specific capabilities and skills, which manifest themselves in separate Services within the joint force. Understanding the strengths and dependencies of joint capabilities in each domain is fundamental to a multidomain, combined arms approach to operations. Although most domains align with the skills developed in a particular Service, no Service focuses entirely upon or exerts total control of that single domain during operations. Joint commanders assign responsibilities and task-organize based on mission requirements. However, the domains present very different conditions of warfare and require the specialized warfighting skills developed by the different Services and subcomponents within each of the Services. Army leaders do not need to understand all the technical components of what the joint force does in other domains, but they do need to understand the complementary and reinforcing ways in which they can request and employ those capabilities and methods in support of operations on land. (See Chapter 3 for a discussion of convergence.) Land Domain 1-89. The land domain is the area of the Earth’s surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals (JP 3-31). Variations in climate, terrain, and the diversity of populations have a far greater impact on operations in the land domain than in any other domain. The most distinguishing characteristic of the land domain is the human dimension. Humans transit the maritime, air, and space domains, but they ultimately live, make political decisions, and seek conflict resolution on land. 1-90. The nature of combat on land is unique due to the impacts of terrain on all warfighting functions and the application of combat power. For example, terrain provides forces opportunities for evading detection and increasing survivability. It also provides enemy forces the same opportunities. Although technology increases the range of capabilities, complex terrain causes opposing forces to fight at close ranges. Land combatants routinely come face-to-face with one another in large numbers in a wide variety of operational environments containing all types of terrain and potentially nuclear, biological, and chemically degraded environments. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, Army forces close with and destroy or capture them through close combat. Close combat is warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets (ADP 3-0). The outcome of battles and engagements depends on the ability of Army forces to close with enemy forces and prevail in close combat. 1-91. Land-based domain capabilities can use or alter the terrain, operate in all forms of weather, and operate among populations to maintain access to strategically valuable areas when air and maritime capabilities are temporarily denied access. Land capabilities extend operational reach and provide options for enabling joint operations. Long-range artillery provides the joint force with a fires capability that is more survivable in some circumstances than air and maritime fires. Land-based electromagnetic capabilities can jam enemy communications and C2 systems. Land-based air and missile defense (AMD) capabilities, enabled by space and cyberspace capabilities, provide protection for Army and joint forces. 1-92. The other four domains depend, in some way, on land. Airfields, ports, servers, ground control stations and land-based radars support or enable operations in other domains. Most cyberspace capabilities and all the electricity that powers them depend on land-based networks. The energy that fuels air, space, and most maritime platforms comes from locations on land. 1-93. Operations on land depend on capabilities from other domains. Air lift, sea lift, cyberspace networks, and all non-land based examples of ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and fires enable operations on land. (See JP 3-31 for information on joint land operations.) Maritime Domain 1-94. The maritime domain is the oceans, seas, seabed, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, rivers and littorals and the airspace above and the water below (JP 3-32). It overlaps with the land domain in the seaward segment of the littoral. Maritime capability may be viewed as global, regional, territorial, coastal, and self-defense forces. Only a few navies are capable of sustained employment far from their countries’ shores. However, whether their navies are capable of global power projection or not, most maritime nations also maintain air forces capable of conducting operations over the adjacent maritime domain. This air capability, combined with land-based long-range fires, greatly impacts operations in the maritime domain. 1-95. The Navy and its partners employ five functions in a combined arms approach to provide a unique relative advantage for the joint force. These functions are sea control, power projection, deterrence, maritime security, and sealift. 1-96. Maritime forces move strategic fires capabilities globally, conceal strategic capabilities below the surface of the ocean, transport personnel and equipment over vast distances, and sustain maritime operations for long periods. Maritime forces depend on or require support from the joint force to— • Protect maritime capabilities from enemy interdiction. • Protect ports. • Secure geographic choke points. • Influence populations. • Mitigate long timelines associated with maritime movement. • Compensate for the limited number of available maritime platforms. • Mitigate the inability to replace ships lost during a conflict. 1-97. Army forces rely on maritime capabilities for deployment and sustainment. Additionally, maritime fires and AMD complement and reinforce land-based systems. Army forces assist maritime forces with sea control, projecting power ashore to neutralize threats or control terrain in the landward portion of the littorals. Army long range fires, attack aviation, AMD, and cyberspace capabilities contribute to local and regional maritime superiority. 1-98. For intratheater operations, Army watercraft provide a capability to move maneuver formations and sustain operations in a maritime environment. Army watercraft systems support joint and combined seabasing and joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS). In some circumstances, Army watercraft capabilities can mitigate enemy antiaccess (A2) or area denial (AD) approaches by providing access to shallow coastal waters, rivers, and narrow inland waterways where mature ports or road networks are unavailable. (See JP 3-32 for information on joint maritime operations.) Air Domain 1-99. The air domain is the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible (JP 3-30). The speed, range, and payload of aircraft, rockets, missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles operating in the air domain directly and significantly affect operations on land and sea. Likewise, advances in AMD, electromagnetic warfare, directed energy, and cyberspace capabilities increasingly contest freedom of maneuver in the air. 1-100. Control of the air and control of the land are often interdependent requirements for successful campaigns and operations. Control of the air provides a significant advantage when attacking strategically valuable targets at long ranges. However, control of the land is necessary for operating secure airfields and protecting other key terrain that enables air operations. The desired degree of control of the air may vary geographically and over time from no control, to parity, to local air superiority, to air supremacy, all depending upon the situation and the JFC’s approved concept of operations. 1-101. Army forces rely on the Air Force and other joint and multinational air capabilities for ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, strategic attack, close air support, interdiction, personnel recovery, communications, sustainment, and mobility. Air platforms are unencumbered by terrain, but they are vulnerable to detection and interdiction. Effectiveness of air platforms can be contingent upon weather conditions. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance cannot always detect enemy capabilities concealed by vegetation or terrain. The number of sorties air platforms can conduct depends on having control of airfields and their proximity to targets. 1-102. Army aviation provides ground commanders and the joint force with land-focused air capabilities. Joint force commanders and land component commanders establish control measures to enable Army forces to operate unimpeded in the air domain, coordinated when necessary with air capabilities from the other Services. Army aviation (including fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft) provides reconnaissance and surveillance, fires, intelligence, communications, and movement capabilities to Army, joint, and multinational forces. Army rotary-wing aviation uses terrain to protect it from enemy detection. Army forces also have aerial ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that support security operations, targeting, delivering precision fires, and information collection. Army land-based AMD capabilities provide protection against enemy air and missile attack. (See JP 3-30 for more information on joint air operations.) Space Domain 1-103. The space domain is the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible. Like the air, land, and maritime domains, space is a physical domain in which military, civil, and commercial activities are conducted. The U.S. Space Command (known as USSPACECOM) has an area of responsibility that surrounds the earth at altitudes equal to, or greater than, 100 kilometers (54 nautical miles) above mean sea level. It has responsibility for planning and execution of global space operations, activities, and missions. 1-104. Proliferation of advanced space technology provides access to space-enabled technologies to a global audience. Some adversaries have their own space capabilities, while commercially available systems allow almost universal access to some level of space-enabled capability with military applications. 1-105. Space capabilities provide information collection; early warning; target acquisition; electromagnetic warfare; environmental monitoring; satellite-based communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing information for ground forces. Activities in the space domain enable freedom of action for operations in all other domains, and operations in the other domains can create effects in and through the space domain. 1-106. Army forces rely on space-based capabilities to enable each warfighting function and effectively conduct operations. Commanders and staffs require an understanding of space capabilities and their effects and the ability to coordinate activities between involved agencies and organizations. Commanders cannot assume that U.S. forces will have unconstrained use of space-based capabilities, including data communications. Therefore, Army forces must be prepared to operate under the conditions of a denied, degraded, and disrupted space domain. (See FM 3-14 for doctrine on Army space operations.) Cyberspace Domain 1-107. For Army forces, the cyberspace domain is the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, embedded processors and controllers, and relevant portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Cyberspace is an extensive and complex global network of wired and wireless links connecting nodes that permeate every domain. Cyberspace networks cross geographic and political boundaries to connect individuals, organizations, and systems around the world. Cyberspace allows interactivity among individuals, groups, organizations, and nation-states. Friendly, enemy, adversary, and host-nation networks, communications systems, computers, cellular phone systems, social media, and technical infrastructures are all part of cyberspace. Cyberspace is congested, contested, and critical to successful operations. 1-108. Cyberspace is dependent on the land, maritime, air, and space domains. Cyberspace operations use links and nodes located in these domains and perform functions to gain access and create effects first in cyberspace and then, as needed, in the other domains. Virtually all space operations depend on cyberspace, and a critical portion of cyberspace bandwidth can only be provided via space operations. These interrelationships are important considerations during planning. 1-109. Army forces conduct cyberspace operations and supporting activities as part of both Army and joint operations. Because cyberspace is a global communications and data-sharing medium, it is inherently joint, interorganizational, multinational, and often a shared resource, with signal and intelligence organizations maintaining significant equities. Cyberspace planning encompasses the larger electromagnetic spectrum and its impact on operations. 1-110. Commanders can use cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities to gain situational awareness and understanding of the enemy through reconnaissance and sensing activities. These reconnaissance and sensing activities augment and enhance the understanding a commander gains from other forms of information collection and intelligence processes. Cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities enable decision making and protect friendly information. They are a significant means for informing and influencing audiences. 1-111. Leaders maintain situational understanding of friendly electromagnetic signatures to assess vulnerabilities. By protecting friendly information systems and signals from disruption or exploitation by an adversary or enemy, a commander can ensure C2 and maintain operations security. Conversely, a commander might use cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities to slow or degrade an enemy’s decision making processes by disrupting enemy sensors, communications, or data processing. To achieve an information advantage, a commander must plan early to integrate cyberspace operations and electromagnetic warfare activities into the overall scheme of maneuver. (See FM 3-12 for more details on cyberspace.) D IMENSIONS 1-112. Understanding the physical, information, and human dimensions of each domain helps commanders and staffs assess and anticipate the impacts of their operations. Operations reflect the reality that war is an act of force (in the physical dimension) to compel (in the information dimension) the decision making and behavior of enemy forces (in the human dimension). Actions in one dimension influence factors in the other dimensions. Understanding the interrelationships enables decision making about how to create and exploit advantages in one dimension and achieve objectives in the others without causing undesirable consequences. Physical Dimension 1-113. The physical dimension is the material characteristics and capabilities, both natural and manufactured, within an operational environment. While war is a human endeavor, it occurs in a material environment, and it is conducted with physical things. Each domain possesses inherent physical characteristics. Terrain, weather, military formations, electromagnetic radiation, weapons systems and their ranges, and many of the things that support or sustain forces are part of the physical dimension. Activities or conditions in the physical dimension create effects in the human and information dimensions. 1-114. The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is one of the material characteristics that crosses all the domains. It consists of a range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands. The EMS is relevant in the land, maritime, and air domains because capabilities in those domains depend on electromagnetic spectrum-enabled communications and weapon systems. The EMS plays a key role in the ability to detect enemy forces that can be identified by their electromagnetic signatures. Conversely, friendly forces must take efforts to mask their electromagnetic signatures to degrade enemy surveillance and reconnaissance efforts. Effective understanding and control of the EMS is essential to the combined arms approach to operations. 1-115. A physical advantage is a condition when a force holds the initiative in terms of a combination of quantitative capabilities, qualitative capabilities, or geographical positioning (ADP 3-0). Physical advantages are most familiar to tactical forces, and they are typically the immediate goal of most tactical operations. Finding enemy forces, defeating enemy forces, and seizing land areas typically requires the creation and exploitation of multiple physical advantages, including occupation of key terrain, the physical isolation of enemy forces, and the destruction of enemy units. While this dominates tactical operations, leaders understand that physical advantages both complement and are complemented by human and information advantages. 1-116. Examples of physical advantage include favorable geography, superior equipment, quantity of resources, and favorable combat power ratios. Superior equipment and favorable geography provide options for seizing the initiative. Superior combat power allows friendly forces to engage enemy forces on favorable terms. The exploitation of physical advantages reduces an enemy force’s capacity to fight, creating information and human advantages. Physical advantages implicitly communicate a message that can influence enemy forces’ will to fight, sway popular support, and influence enemy risk calculus. Information Dimension 1-117. The information dimension is the content and data that individuals, groups, and information systems communicate and exchange, as well as the analytics and technical processes used to exchange information within an operational environment. Information systems include the technical processes and analytics used to exchange information. The information dimension contains the information itself, including text and images. It also includes the flow or communication pathways of information. Information exchange may be in the form of electromagnetic transmission, print, or speech. The information dimension connects humans to the physical world. 1-118. Information transits through all domains in some way or another, whether in electromagnetic transmissions, radar data collected by a destroyer, leaflets dropped from aircraft, social media messaging, books, or satellite photography collected in and transmitted from space. Information, whether true, false, or somewhere in between, is used by friendly, enemy, adversary, and neutral actors to influence the perceptions, decision making, and behavior of individuals and groups. Effective employment of information depends on the audience, message, and method of delivery. 1-119. Information is available globally in near-real time. The ability to access information—from anywhere, at any time—broadens and accelerates human interaction, including person to person, person to organization, person to government, and government to government. Social media enables the swift mobilization of people and resources around ideas and causes, even before they are fully understood. Disinformation creates malign narratives that can disseminate quickly and instill an array of emotions and behaviors among groups, ranging from disinterest to violence. From a military standpoint, information enables decision making, leadership, and combat power; it is also a key component of combat power necessary for seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative and consolidating gains. 1-120. When Army forces conduct operations, they generate signatures observable in the physical dimension. Commanders design operations to influence human perceptions and behavior. The Army employs specific forces to gain advantages by exploiting aspects of the information dimension. These forces include PSYOP, civil affairs, electromagnetic warfare, cyberspace, public affairs, and space forces. Commanders employ these capabilities to inform, manipulate, or deny information to select audiences to support mission accomplishment as part of their combined arms team. 1-121. An information advantage is a condition when a force holds the initiative in terms of situational understanding, decision making, and relevant actor behavior (ADP 3-13). Most information advantages result from physical and human factors or activities intrinsic to the operations Army forces conduct. Because the information dimension bridges the physical and human dimensions, information advantages result when friendly forces understand and exploit various aspects of the information dimension to support achieving information objectives, or by denying the enemy’s ability to do the same. The side possessing better information and using that information more effectively to understand and make decisions has an information advantage. A force that effectively communicates and protects its information while preventing enemy forces from doing the same has an advantage. A force that uses information to deceive and confuse an opponent has an advantage. Exploiting the information dimension to influence relevant actor behavior more effectively than an adversary or enemy is another information advantage. Human Dimension 1-122. The human dimension encompasses people and the interaction between individuals and groups, how they understand information and events, make decisions, generate will, and act within an operational environment. The will to act and fight emerges from the complex interrelationship of culture, emotion, and behavior. Influencing these factors—by affecting attitudes, beliefs, motivations, and perceptions—underpins the achievement of military objectives. 1-123. Commanders and staffs identify relevant actors and anticipate their behavior. Actors are individuals, groups, networks, and populations. Relevant actors are actors who, through their behavior, could substantially impact campaigns, operations, or tactical actions. From this understanding, commanders develop ways to influence relevant actor behavior, decision making, and will through physical and informational means. 1-124. A human advantage is a condition whereby a force holds the initiative in terms of training, morale, leadership, and will (ADP 3-0). Human advantages enable friendly morale and will, degrade enemy morale and will, and influence popular support. Examples of human advantages include leader and Soldier competence, morale of troops, and the health and physical fitness of the force. Forces with a cultural affinity to the population in which they operate are also a form of a human advantage. For Army forces, the mission command approach to C2 is a significant human advantage that enhances the friendly decision cycle. (See ADP 6-0 for more information on mission command.) O PERATIONAL AND M ISSION V ARIABLES 1-125. The operational and mission variables are tools to assist commanders and staffs in refining their understanding of the domains and dimensions of an operational environment. Commanders and staffs analyze and describe an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (known as PMESII-PT). The operational variables help leaders understand the land domain and its interrelationships with information, relevant actors, and capabilities in the other domains. 1-126. Commanders analyze information categorized by the operational variables in the context of the missions they are assigned. They use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to refine their understanding of the situation and to visualize, describe, and direct operations. The mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations, each of which have informational considerations. The mission variables are represented as METT-TC (I). Informational considerations are those aspects of the human, information, and physical dimensions that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, use, act upon, and are impacted by information. (See FM 5-0 for more information on operational and mission variables and informational considerations.) Note. METT-TC (I) represents the mission variables leaders use to analyze and understand a situation in relationship to the unit’s mission. The first six variables are not new. However, the pervasiveness of information and its applicability in different military contexts requires leaders to continuously assess its various aspects during operations. Because of this, “I” has been added to the METT-TC mnemonic. Information considerations are expressed as a parenthetical variable because they are not an independent consideration, but an important component of each variable of METT-TC that leaders must understand when developing understanding of a situation.

If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete. Sun Tzu Army forces integrate capabilities and synchronize warfighting functions to generate combat power and apply it against enemy forces. Successful application of combat power requires leaders to understand the enemy and understand friendly capabilities. A broad understanding of the strategic environment and threat methods provides a basis for understanding specific enemy situations. Leaders must understand how Army forces enable joint operations through multiple domains and the basic roles of Army echelons. They must also understand how the joint force enables the Army to integrate capabilities through all domains to generate more effective landpower. WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS 2-1. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (ADP 3-0). The warfighting functions are— • Command and control (C2). • Movement and maneuver. • Intelligence. • Fires. • Sustainment. • Protection. 2-2. The purpose of warfighting functions is to provide an intellectual organization for common critical capabilities available to commanders and staffs at all echelons and levels of war. Warfighting functions typically include capabilities from multiple domains. Warfighting functions are not branch specific. Although some branches, staff sections, and types of units have a role or purpose that mainly aligns with a warfighting function, each warfighting function is relevant to all types of units. T HE C OMMAND AND C ONTROL W ARFIGHTING F UNCTION 2-3. The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to exercise authority and direction to accomplish missions (ADP 3-0). The primary purpose of the C2 warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating the other warfighting functions (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection) effectively at each echelon, and to apply combat power to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. 2-4. The C2 system includes people, processes, networks, and command posts. All elements of the system are critical in supporting effective decision making and the tempo required to defeat enemy forces. C2 supports the creation and exploitation of information advantages through the activities of developing situational understanding, decision making, and operating networks. 2-5. C2 synchronizes the systems and capabilities that comprise the other warfighting functions. Strategy, operational art, planning, operational approaches, operational frameworks, risk assessment, and decision making are all part of C2. C2 reflects leader action and how Army forces achieve unity of effort and unity of purpose during operations. (See ADP 6-0 for more information on C2.) T HE M OVEMENT AND M ANEUVER W ARFIGHTING F UNCTION 2-6. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage with respect to the enemy (ADP 3-0). Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection. Movement is necessary to position and disperse the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver directly gains or exploits positions of relative advantage. Commanders use maneuver for massing effects to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. 2-7. Effective maneuver requires some combination of reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations to provide early warning and protect the main body of the formation. Every Soldier on the battlefield is a potential sensor that makes key contributions to information collection and the development of intelligence. Effective maneuver requires close coordination of fires and movement. Movement and maneuver contribute to the development of information advantages through the positioning of units able to employ capabilities in close proximity to the enemy, and by physically establishing the facts on the ground that an enemy or adversary cannot refute. 2-8. Maneuver requires sustainment. The movement and maneuver warfighting function does not include routine transportation of personnel and materiel that support operations, which falls under the sustainment warfighting function. T HE I NTELLIGENCE W ARFIGHTING F UNCTION 2-9. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment (ADP 3-0). Intelligence involves analyzing information from all sources, which includes the other warfighting functions, and conducting operations to collect information. The integration of intelligence into operations facilitates understanding of an operational environment and assists in determining when and where to employ capabilities against adversaries and enemies. Intelligence likewise facilitates responses by Army forces to other situations, such as public health crises and events precipitating noncombatant evacuation. The intelligence warfighting function provides support to force generation, situational understanding, targeting and information operations, and information collection. The intelligence warfighting function fuses the information collected through reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations. Commanders drive intelligence and intelligence drives operations. Army forces execute intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) through the operations and intelligence processes, with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and information collection. 2-10. Timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence enables decision making, tempo, and agility during operations. Due to the fog and friction of warfare, commanders must fight for intelligence and share it with adjacent units and across echelons. (See ADP 2-0 for additional information on the intelligence warfighting function.) T HE F IRES W ARFIGHTING F UNCTION 2-11. The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the threat to enable actions across the range of military operations (ADP 3-0). These tasks and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects delivered from both Army and joint forces and other unified action partners. The fires warfighting function does not entirely encompass, nor is it wholly encompassed by, any particular branch or function. Many of the capabilities that contribute to fires also contribute to other warfighting functions, often simultaneously. For example, an aviation unit may simultaneously execute missions that contribute to the movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustainment, protection, and C2 warfighting functions. Space and cyberspace capabilities can provide commanders with options to defeat, destroy, disrupt, deny, or manipulate enemy networks, information, and decision making. (See ADP 3-19 for additional information on the fires warfighting function.) T HE S USTAINMENT W ARFIGHTING F UNCTION 2-12. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to enable freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). Sustainment employs capabilities from all domains and enables operations through each domain. Sustainment determines the limits of depth and endurance during operations. Sustainment demands joint and strategic integration, and it should be meticulously coordinated across echelons to ensure continuity of operations and that resources reach the point of employment. 2-13. Sustainment employs an integrated network of information systems that link it to operations. As a result, commanders at all levels see an operational environment, anticipate requirements in time and space, understand what is needed, track and deliver what is requested, and make timely decisions to ensure responsive sustainment. Because the situation is always changing, sustainment requires leaders capable of improvisation. Because sustainment operations are often vulnerable to enemy attacks, sustainment survivability depends on active and passive measures and maneuver forces for protection. (See ADP 4-0 and FM 4-0 for more information on sustainment.) T HE P ROTECTION W ARFIGHTING F UNCTION 2-14. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks, systems, and methods that prevent or mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve the force, deny the enemy freedom of action, and enable commanders to apply combat power (ADP 3-0). Protection encompasses everything that makes Army forces hard to detect and destroy. Protection requires commanders and staffs to understand threats and hazards throughout the operational environment, prioritize their requirements, and commit capabilities and resources according to their priorities. Commanders balance their protection efforts with the need for tempo and resourcing the main effort. They may assume risk in operations or areas that may be vulnerable, but that are considered low enemy priorities for targeting or attack. Commanders account for threats from space, cyberspace, and outside their assigned area of operations (AO) as they develop protection measures. Protection results from many factors, including operations security, dispersion, deception, survivability measures, and the way forces conduct operations. Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing protection is a continuous and enduring activity. Defending networks, data, and systems; implementing operations security; and conducting security operations contribute to information advantages by protecting friendly information. Prioritization of protection capabilities is situationally dependent and resource informed. (See ADP 3-37 for additional information on protection.) COMBAT POWER 2-15. Combat power is the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time (JP 3-0). It is the ability to fight. The complementary and reinforcing effects that result from synchronized operations yield a powerful blow that overwhelms enemy forces and creates friendly momentum. Army forces deliver that blow through a combination of five dynamics. The dynamics of combat power are— • Leadership. • Firepower. • Information. • Mobility. • Survivability. 2-16. All warfighting functions contribute to generating and applying combat power. Well sustained units able to move and maneuver bring combat power to bear against an opponent. Joint and Army indirect fires complement and reinforce organic firepower in maneuver units. Survivability is a function of protection tasks, the protection inherent to Army platforms, and schemes of maneuver that focus friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses. Intelligence determines how and where to best apply combat power against enemy weaknesses. C2 enables leadership, the most important qualitative aspect of combat power. L EADERSHIP 2-17. Leadership is the most essential dynamic of combat power. Leadership is the activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). It is the multiplying and unifying dynamic of combat power, and it represents the qualitative difference between units. Leadership drives C2, but it is also dependent upon it. The collaboration and shared understanding inherent in the operations process prepare leaders for operations, expand shared understanding, hone leader judgment, and improve the flexibility that leaders apply to the other dynamics of combat power against enemy forces. 2-18. Commanders communicate their will to their formations through leadership. Sound leadership manifests as an unrelenting will to accomplish the mission, the ability to understand and adapt to changing conditions, and the motivation to persevere through hardship. Leadership inspires individuals to push past their perceived breaking point, and to fight for their unit and fellow Soldiers under the most difficult circumstances. It provides the intangible qualitative difference in how much combat power a formation can generate against enemy forces. (See ADP 6-22 for information on leadership.) F IREPOWER 2-19. Firepower is the primary source of lethality, and it is essential to defeating an enemy force’s ability and will to fight. Leaders generate firepower through direct and indirect fires, using mass, precision, or, typically, a combination of the two. Intelligence enables the identification and selection of targets and objectives for the application of lethal force. Movement and maneuver enable the positioning of fires capabilities where they can be most lethal. 2-20. Firepower facilitates maneuver by suppressing enemy fires and disrupting or preventing the movement of enemy forces. Firepower exploits maneuver by neutralizing enemy forces when they react, destroying equipment and people, and degrading the will of enemy forces to fight. 2-21. Leaders increase firepower by using capabilities from all domains in combinations that overwhelm an enemy force’s ability to effectively respond. This is ammunition intensive. Discretion may require leaders to reserve limited numbers of precision munitions for specific, important targets, while they rely on conventional unguided munitions against enemy units and area targets. Large-scale combat requires large reserves of both precision and unguided munitions and the sustainment capacity to move them to forward locations. Air, maritime, space, and cyberspace-based fires enhance the firepower of ground forces. Similarly, ground-based firepower complements firepower from other domains. A multidomain approach to firepower requires understanding the techniques for controlling and integrating joint fires. This includes requesting and integrating space and cyberspace capabilities, electromagnetic attack capabilities, and air capabilities. Large-scale combat operations can consume corps and division ammunition stocks in 72 to 96 hours, particularly those required for cannons, rockets, and mortars. I NFORMATION 2-22. Information contributes to the disruption and destruction of enemy forces. It is central to the application and amplification of combat power. It enables decision making and influences enemy perceptions, decision making, and behavior. Information, like leadership, provides a qualitative advantage to friendly combat power when it can be acted upon more quickly and effectively than the enemy. 2-23. Army forces collect data and information for analysis and process it to understand situations, make decisions, and direct actions that apply combat power against enemy forces. Army forces must fight for information about enemy forces while protecting their own information. Friendly counterintelligence, counterreconnaissance, and security operations prevent enemy access to friendly information. Offensively, commanders fight for information about enemy forces and terrain through continuous reconnaissance and surveillance and offensive tasks such as movement to contact or reconnaissance in force. 2-24. Army forces also use information to enhance the effects of destructive or disruptive physical force to create psychological effects that disrupt morale, cause human error, and increase uncertainty. Using information to manipulate shock and confusion amplifies the psychological effects of lethality and other dynamics of combat power. 2-25. Employing information to confuse, manipulate, or deceive can induce threat forces to act in ways that make them more vulnerable to destruction by Army forces. Employing information creatively can enable Army forces to achieve surprise, cause enemy forces to misallocate or expend combat power, or mislead them as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces. M OBILITY 2-26. Mobility is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 3-36). Mobility encompasses the capability of a formation to move and apply capabilities in specific terrain under specific conditions relative to enemy forces. Exploiting mobility requires intelligence of an enemy force’s disposition, composition, strength, and course of action. This understanding allows leaders to assess their mobility in relation to adversary or enemy forces. Maneuver and fires increase relative mobility by fixing enemy units, reducing obstacles, and providing obscuration. 2-27. The environment impacts mobility and the level of combat power a unit can produce. For example, an armored brigade combat team’s (BCTBCTBasic combat training’s) mobility is limited in dense jungle or urban terrain, but it increases in steppes, in deserts, and on modern roads. Weather affects mobility when it degrades route conditions, or when it increases risks to fixed-and rotary-wing aviation operations. Space-based environmental monitoring provides real-time understanding of the impacts of weather on terrain and mobility. Enemy forces also influence conditions that affect mobility. For example, enemy standoff approaches can isolate land forces operating on islands in maritime environments by destroying maritime transportation capabilities and denying friendly air support. 2-28. Mobility is a function of how quickly units can move in specific terrain under specific conditions. At the tactical level, Army forces exploit mobility to conduct information collection, posture forces in advantageous locations, position fires to range enemy forces, and move classes of supply around an AO. During offensive operations, mobility enables forces to concentrate and then disperse rapidly, achieve surprise, attack enemy forces in unexpected locations, exploit opportunity, and evade enemy fires. During defensive operations, mobility enables counterattacks and the ability to rapidly shift resources between fixed positions. The ability to conduct gap crossings and passage of lines are other operations that can facilitate mobility. S URVIVABILITY 2-29. Survivability is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.34). It represents the degree to which a formation is hard to kill. Survivability is relative to a unit’s capabilities and the type of enemy effects it must withstand, its ability to avoid detection, and how well it can deceive enemy forces. Survivability is also a function of how a formation conducts itself during operations. For example, an infantry BCTBCTBasic combat training’s survivability against indirect fire is contingent on it not being detected, being dispersed, digging in, and adding overhead cover when stationary. An armor BCTBCTBasic combat training’s survivability is a function of logistics, security, and avoiding situations that constrain its mobility or freedom of action. 2-30. Leaders assess survivability as the ability of a friendly force to withstand enemy effects while remaining mission capable. Armor protection, mobility, tactical skill, avoiding predictability, and situational awareness contribute to survivability. Enforcement of operations security techniques and avoiding detection while initiating direct fire contact on favorable terms also increases survivability. Situational awareness regarding the nine forms of contact and minimizing friendly signatures contributes to survivability. 2-31. To increase survivability, units employ air defense systems, reconnaissance and security operations, modify tempo, take evasive action, maneuver to gain positional advantages, decrease electromagnetic signatures, and disperse forces. Dispersed formations improve survivability by complicating targeting and making it more difficult for enemy forces to identify lucrative targets. Tactical units integrate procedures for the use of camouflage, cover, concealment, and conducting electromagnetic protection-including noise and light discipline. During large-scale combat operations, survivability measures may include radio silence, communication through couriers, or alternate forms of communication. Space-based missile warning systems provide early warning of adversary artillery and missile attacks, allowing friendly forces to seek cover. Application of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) defense measures increase survivability in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.34 for more information on survivability.) S TRATEGIC E NVIRONMENT 2-32. The central challenge to U.S. security is long-term, great power competition with China and Russia as individual actors and as actors working together to achieve common goals. China uses its rapidly modernizing military, information warfare, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to its advantage. Concurrently, Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of its governmental, economic, and diplomatic decisions, to subvert the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization), and to change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor. 2-33. Several international states threaten U.S. security. North Korea seeks to guarantee survival of its regime and increase its leverage. It is pursuing a mixture of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, conventional and unconventional weapons, and a growing ballistic missile capability to gain coercive influence over South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Similarly, Iran seeks dominance over its neighbors by asserting an arc of influence and instability while vying for regional hegemony. Iran uses state-sponsored terrorist activities, a network of proxies, and its missile capabilities to achieve its objectives. 2-34. While states are the principal actors on the global stage, non-state actors also threaten the strategic environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, threat cyber actors, and other malicious non-state actors have transformed global affairs with increased capabilities of mass disruption. Terrorism remains a persistent tactic driven by ideology and enabled by political and economic structures. T HREATS 2-35. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). Threats faced by Army forces are, by nature, hybrid. They include individuals, groups of individuals, paramilitary or military forces, criminal elements, nation-states, or national alliances. In general, a threat can be categorized as an enemy or an adversary: • An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADP 3-0). An enemy is also a combatant under the law of war. • An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). Adversaries pursue interests that compete with those of the United States and are often called competitors. 2-36. The Army organizes, trains, and equips its forces primarily for large-scale combat operations against peer threats. Where no peer threat exists Army units supporting combatant commanders (CCDRs) focus on other missions, but they can alter their priorities to support large-scale combat operations when necessary. Peer threats are adversaries or enemies with capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple domains worldwide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage. Peer threats possess roughly equal combat power to U.S. forces in geographic proximity to a conflict area. Peer threats may also have a cultural affinity with specific regions, providing them relative advantages in the human and information dimensions. Peer threats generate tactical, operational, and strategic challenges that may constitute an existential threat to the United States and its allies. 2-37. Peer threats employ strategies that capitalize on their advantages to achieve objectives. When these objectives are at odds with the interests of the United States and its allies, conflict becomes more likely. Peer threats prefer to achieve their goals without directly engaging U.S. forces in combat. They often employ information warfare in combination with conventional and irregular military capabilities to achieve their goals. They exploit friendly sensitivity to world opinion and attempt to exploit American domestic opinion and sensitivity to friendly casualties. Peer threats believe they have a comparative advantage because of their willingness to endure greater hardships, casualties, and negative public opinion. They also believe their ability to pursue long term goals is greater than that of the United States. 2-38. Peer threats employ capabilities from multiple domains against Army forces, and they seek to exploit vulnerabilities in all strategic contexts. During conflict, peer threats seek to inflict significant damage across multiple domains in a short amount of time. They seek to delay friendly forces long enough to achieve their goals and end hostilities before friendly forces can decisively respond. T HREAT M ETHODS 2-39. Peer threats use various methods to render U.S. military power irrelevant whenever possible. Five broad peer threat methods, often used in combination during conventional or irregular conflicts, and below the threshold of conflict, include— • Information warfare. • Systems warfare. • Preclusion. • Isolation. • Sanctuary. Information Warfare 2-40. In the context of the threat, information warfare refers to a threat’s orchestrated use of information activities (such as cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations) to achieve objectives. Operating under a different set of ethics and laws than the United States, and under the cloak of anonymity, peer threats conduct information warfare aggressively and continuously to influence populations and decision makers. They can use information warfare to create destructive effects during competition and crisis. During armed conflict, peer threats use information warfare in conjunction with other methods to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Note. Threat forces use the term electronic warfare, which differs from U.S. doctrine’s use of electromagnetic warfare. Electronic warfare consists of the measures threats conduct to control or deny friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), while ensuring its use by the threat. For U.S. forces, electromagnetic warfare is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-85). 2-41. Threats seek to employ information warfare to attack or disrupt in depth, including within the continental United States, viewing it as a low-cost and low-risk activity. A cyberspace attack may disrupt U.S. infrastructure that impedes deployment of forces, or a disinformation campaign can reduce morale and the will to fight. In some situations, threats use proxies for information warfare to achieve policy aims without having to incur the risks associated with employing military forces or official government entities. 2-42. Peer threats typically have fewer policy and legal restrictions than U.S. forces on how they employ information warfare, giving them an initial advantage. They exploit the nature of open societies while restricting their population’s access to information. They obscure their activities to prevent detection or attribution. 2-43. Peer threats sow disinformation among U.S. and allied populations while at the same time strictly limiting access to and manipulating the information their own populations receive. They employ all available means to influence a wide range of audiences, including both civilian and military and domestic and international, in support of their goals. Information warfare is a means to exploit cultural differences, historical grievances, and a self-serving interpretation of international law to limit U.S. military options and degrade U.S. political will. Peer threats use diverse means to conduct information warfare, and these means may include— • Cyberspace operations. • Perception management. • Deception. • Electronic warfare. • Physical destruction. • Political warfare. • Legal warfare. • Proxies and non-state actors. 2-44. Peer threats systematically and continuously combine all of these means to create specific effects within the human, information, and physical dimensions of an operational environment. Peer threats use misinformation, disinformation, propaganda, and information for effect to create doubt, confuse, deceive, and influence U.S. and partner decision makers, forces, and populations. They can use information warfare to destroy essential network-based capabilities, such as economic infrastructure, private and government communications, and electrical grids. This use of information warfare is not merely disruptive. It can result in the loss of immense resources and human life, depending on the scale and duration of the attack. (See FM 3-53 for a discussion of threat information categories.) Systems Warfare 2-45. Systems warfare is the identification and isolation or destruction of critical subsystems or components to degrade or destroy an opponent’s overall system. Peer threats view the battlefield, their own instruments of power, and an opponent’s instruments of power as a collection of complex, dynamic, and integrated systems composed of subsystems and their components. They use systems warfare to attack critical components of a friendly system while protecting their own system. Simple examples of attacking critical components are adversary use of electronic warfare to disable the links between unmanned aircraft system (UAS) controllers and the aircraft in a specific area, and the emplacement of layered integrated air defense systems from a position of sanctuary to prevent the integration of opposing airpower with ground operations. 2-46. Peer threats believe that a qualitatively or quantitatively weaker force can defeat a superior force, if the weaker force can dictate the terms of combat. Peer threats believe that the systems warfare approach makes it unnecessary to match an opponent system-for-system or capability-for-capability. Peer threats seek to locate the critical components of the opposing combat system, determine patterns of interaction and dependencies among components, and identify opportunities to exploit this connectivity. 2-47. Systems warfare approaches work in concert with other approaches, and they manifest themselves at the tactical level in terms of integrated fires complexes characterized by surface-to-surface and surface-to-air systems enabled by long-range ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. They generally represent one means by which adversaries achieve preclusion at the strategic and operational levels, and they are adversaries’ preferred means for destroying friendly forces at the tactical level. An example of systems warfare occurred in Ukraine in 2014. Systems Warfare and Sanctuary: Eastern Ukraine, 2014 In July 2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine moved several mechanized brigades into a position near the Russian border to prevent the illegal movement of military equipment across the frontier to rebels in eastern Ukraine. Early on the morning of 11 July, soldiers at the position noticed a drone orbiting above them for some time. Not long after the drone disappeared, rockets fired from 9A52-4 Tornado multiple launch rocket systems located in Russian territory began landing on one of the brigades. Reporting indicated that the UAS was cued by other systems that located civilian cell phones in the assembly area. The barrage lasted four minutes. Rockets carrying a mixture of high explosive, cluster, and thermobaric munitions impacted the unit’s position. Cannon rounds followed the rockets with devastating effect. The Ukrainian units took heavy losses. One battalion was virtually destroyed, and others were rendered combat ineffective due to heavy losses in vehicles and personnel. Casualties quickly overwhelmed army and local medical facilities. In the days that followed, rocket and cannon strikes continued, disrupting the Ukrainian army’s ability to defend that region of eastern Ukraine. The lethality of the attacks was enabled by a sophisticated real-time targeting system that used inexpensive unmanned aircraft systems for ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, target acquisition, and fire control. Russian forces likely fired rockets from a town in their territory, hampering potential Ukrainian military responses due to the sanctuary of an international border and civilian proximity. Additionally, Russia extended its integrated air defense system, located within Russian territory, over the conflict zone in Ukraine. This action denied Ukraine’s ability to use its air power, which separated Ukraine’s air capability from its ground forces. Without air power for close air support and counter UAS operations, the Ukrainian ground forces were left vulnerable to the sophisticated targeting systems used by Russian and pro-Russian forces. Ukrainian military forces adapted. In 2022, Russia attacked along multiple axes throughout Ukraine. Ukrainian forces responded effectively. They exercised a more disciplined and efficient use of the EMS, complicating Russian detection efforts. Ukrainian forces also defended in more mobile, dispersed formations, providing fewer lucrative targets for Russian fires. Preclusion 2-48. To preclude is to keep something from happening by taking action in advance. Peer threats use a wide variety of actions, activities, and capabilities to preclude a friendly force’s ability to shape an operational environment and mass and sustain combat power. Antiaccess (A2) and area denial (AD) are two strategic and operational approaches to preclusion. Antiaccess is an action, activity, or capability, usually long-range, designed to prevent an enemy force from entering an operational area (JP 3-0). For example, A2 activities prevent or deny forces the ability to project and sustain forces into a desired area. The employment of A2 capabilities against Army forces begins in the continental United States and extends throughout the strategic support area into a theater. Peer threats have the means to disrupt the United States’ force projection capability at home station. These means include ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and space, cyberspace, and information warfare capabilities. 2-49. Area denial is an action, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy force’s freedom of action within an operational area (JP 3-0). Usually adversaries do not design area denial to keep friendly forces out, but rather to limit their freedom of action and ability to accomplish their mission within an operational area. Threat forces pursue AD using long-range fires, integrated air defense systems, electronic warfare, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, man-made obstacles, and conventional ground maneuver forces. Figure 2-1 and figure 2-2 depict employment of A2 and AD approaches in different types of theaters. For illustration purposes, A2 and AD reach are tied to specific capabilities. However, adversary forces can use different actions, activities, or capabilities in an A2 or AD approach. Isolation 2-50. Isolation is the containment of a force so that it cannot accomplish its mission. Peer threats will attempt to isolate U.S. forces in several ways. Some examples include— • Attacking political bonds with allies and partners. • Preventing or limiting communications to and within an AO. • Interdicting or severing lines of communication to block support or reinforcement of forward positioned units. • Deceiving friendly forces about the current situation and their role in the operational environment. • Deceiving the public about the current situation to reduce its support of friendly operations that counter threat goals. • Exploiting inadequate friendly understanding of an operational environment or cultural affinity in an area or region. • Blocking support or reinforcement of forward-positioned units through direct and indirect fires. • Using economic coercion. • Preventing friendly access and overflight. 2-51. During competition, peer threats may attempt to isolate friendly forces using disinformation campaigns and the threat of aggression. During crisis, peer threats seek to physically isolate U.S. forward-positioned forces and prevent their support from the United States or elsewhere in theater. During armed conflict, enemy forces identify isolated friendly forces using a variety of capabilities and rapidly attempt to destroy them through long-range, massed, and precision fires. Sanctuary 2-52. Sanctuary is the positioning of threat forces beyond the reach of friendly forces. It is a form of protection derived by some combination of political, legal, and physical boundaries that restricts freedom of action by a friendly force commander. Peer threats have large land areas that create depth within their boundaries and protect strategic assets including long range fires and sustainment. Peer threats will also protect their key interests, whether these interests reside in their homeland or in another country. To create a sanctuary that protects key interests, adversaries employ combinations of both physical and nonphysical means to protect key interests, including— • International borders. • Complex terrain. • Hiding among noncombatants and culturally sensitive structures. • Counterprecision techniques, including camouflage, concealment, and deception. • Countermeasures, including decoys, hardened and buried facilities, integrated air defense systems, and long-range fires. • Information warfare. • Threatening attacks against the U.S. homeland, possibly using including weapons of mass destruction. • International law, treaties, and treaty agreements. • Internal population information control (by denying the internet or jamming external radio and television). • Overseas bases at strategically valuable locations to expand influence. 2-53. Most means of sanctuary cannot protect an entire enemy force for an extended time. Therefore, a threat will seek to protect selected elements of its forces for enough time to gain the freedom of action necessary to pursue its strategic or diplomatic goals. Threat forces seek to protect their conventional forces, advanced aircraft, and extended-range fires systems. Many peer threats invest in long range rocket and missile systems, such as the Russian Smerch 9A52 and Chinese PHL-03, capable of counterfire at extreme ranges to allow sanctuary behind international borders. Improved air defense systems, including counter ballistic missile systems, often provide protection for these advanced fires capabilities. UNIFIED ACTION AND ARMY FORCES [S]eparate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. President Dwight D. Eisenhower 2-54. To counter threats and protect national interests worldwide, the Armed Forces of the United States operate as a joint force in unified action. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1, Volume 1). Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization that is the product of successful unified action (JP 1, Volume 2). Army forces, as part of unified action, conduct operations in support of the joint force, with multinational allies and partners, and in coordination with other agencies and organizations. The Army’s contribution to unified action is multidomain operations, which seek to employ all available capabilities in unexpected combinations that create and exploit relative advantages. Leaders must be capable of employing all unified action partners to the greatest extent possible, including conventional forces, special operations forces, allies, partner-nation forces, territorial defense forces, and any other organization or individual whose efforts can legally be harnessed to help achieve objectives. J OINT O PERATIONS AND A CTIVITIES 2-55. Single Services may perform tasks and missions to support Department of Defense (DOD) objectives. However, the DOD primarily employs two or more Services (from two military departments) in a single operation from, in, and across multiple domains, particularly in combat, through joint operations. Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces (JP 3-0). A joint force is force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments that operate under a single joint force commander (JP 1, Vol. 1). Joint operations exploit the advantages of interdependent Service capabilities in multiple domains through unified action. Joint planning integrates military power with other instruments of national power (including diplomatic, economic, and informational) to achieve a desired military end state. The end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives (JP 3-0). Joint planning connects the strategic end state to the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) campaign design and ultimately to tactical missions. JFCs use campaigns and major operations to translate their operational-level actions into strategic results. 2-56. The joint force is organized, trained, and equipped for sustained large-scale combat anywhere in the world. The capabilities to conduct large-scale combat operations enable a wide variety of other operations and activities. In particular, opportunities exist prior to large-scale combat to shape an operational environment to prevent, or at least mitigate, the effects of war. Characterizing the employment of military capabilities (including people, organizations, and equipment) as one or another type of military operation has several benefits. For example, the Army can develop publications that describe the nature, tasks, and tactics associated with specific types of diverse operations, such as counterinsurgency and peace operations. 2-57. Doctrine categorizes joint operations and activities by their focus, as shown in figure 2-3. In some cases, the title covers a variety of missions, tasks, and activities. Many activities are accomplished by Army forces and do not constitute joint operations, such as tasks associated with security cooperation. Nonetheless, most of these occur under a joint “umbrella,” because they contribute to achievement of CCDRs’ campaign objectives. M ULTINATIONAL O PERATIONS 2-58. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). While each nation has its own interests and often participates within the limitations of national caveats, all nations bring value to an operation. Each nation’s force has unique capabilities, and each usually contributes to an operation’s legitimacy in terms of international or local acceptability. Army forces should anticipate that most operations will be multinational and plan accordingly. (See FM 3-16 for more information on multinational operations.) 2-59. Multinational operations present challenges and demands. These include culture and language issues, unresolved policy issues, technical and procedural interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use of respective forces, the authorities required for sharing of information and intelligence, and rules of engagement. Commanders analyze the particular requirements of a mission in the context of friendly force capabilities to exploit the multinational force’s advantages and compensate for its limitations. Establishing effective liaison with multinational partners through embedded teams, collaborative systems, and leader contact is critical to establishing a common operational picture (COP) and maintaining situational understanding. 2-60. Multinational operations present many benefits and opportunities. Having multinational forces as part of an operation provides international legitimacy that helps isolate adversary or enemy forces. They may provide cultural awareness, foreign language skills, and affinities with populations that help with understanding the environment, conducting stability tasks, and transitioning to legitimate authorities. Allies and partners often operate with different authorities to employ key capabilities in space, cyberspace, and the information dimension of an operational environment. Lastly, multinational allies and partners bring additional forces to an operation, and they often possess capabilities U.S. Army forces may lack. I NTERAGENCY C OORDINATION AND I NTERORGANIZATIONAL C OOPERATION 2-61. Interagency coordination is a key part of unified action. Interagency coordination is the planning and synchronization of efforts that occur between elements of Department of Defense and participating United States Government departments and agencies (JP 3-0). Army forces conduct and participate in interagency coordination using established liaison, personal engagement, and planning processes. 2-62. Unified action may require interorganizational cooperation to build the capacity of unified action partners. Interorganizational cooperation is the interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08). Interorganizational cooperation includes civil-military integration. (See FM 3-57 for more information on civil-military integration.) C ONVENTIONAL AND S PECIAL O PERATIONS F ORCES I NTEGRATION 2-63. Unified action requires Army forces to integrate conventional, irregular, and special operations forces in complementary and reinforcing ways. The mission and operational environment drive the command and support relationships between conventional and special operations forces during an operation. Regardless of C2 and support arrangements, both types of forces integrate and synchronize operations to increase effectiveness, promote interdependence, provide mutual support, limit the redundant use of resources, and reduce the risk of fratricide. 2-64. Conventional forces provide the mass, firepower, and sustainment necessary to prevail in large scale combat, as well as control land areas and populations. They likewise provide the bulk of forces during limited contingencies, both conventional or irregular in nature. JFCs employ conventional forces in echelons of formations encompassing theater armies, corps, divisions, and the brigades and battalions that comprise them. 2-65. Special operations forces (SOF) are organized into small, flexible, and agile teams that can gain access to and operate in austere, hostile environments. They provide options for achieving objectives using low-profile, special methods, and special equipment. United States Special Operations Command (known as USSOCOM) is a combatant command with global responsibilities for special operations. The frequent integration and interdependency among service SOF makes special operations inherently joint. SOF core activities include— • Direct action. • Special reconnaissance. • Countering weapons of mass destruction. • Counterterrorism. • Unconventional warfare. • Foreign internal defense. • Security force assistance. • Hostage rescue and recovery. • Counterinsurgency. • Foreign humanitarian assistance. • Military information support operations. • Civil affairs operations. (For more information on SOF see JP 3-05 and ADP 3-05.) 2-66. During competition and crisis, conventional forces complement SOF by setting and maintaining the theater with forward-postured forces, which include providing sustainment support and training with allies and partners. SOF complement conventional forces through their forward presence, access to a global network of allies, partners, capabilities, and operational preparation of the environment. When directed by a combatant commander, SOF conduct counterterrorism or direct action for discreet periods of time in specific geographic areas against enemies, while the rest of the theater maintains a competition or crisis posture. 2-67. During large-scale armed conflict, conventional forces complement SOF by providing infrastructure, transportation, and other sustainment support. Conventional forces provide fires and air and missile defense capabilities to support special operations missions. Conventional forces are often attached to special operations forces teams for security, technical expertise, or to conduct tactical missions, such as outer cordons in support of SOF direction action. Conventional forces provide advisors and combat power to support large-scale security force assistance and counterinsurgency operations. SOF complement conventional forces with operations occurring within or outside a conventional force’s area of operations. SOF contributions during deep and extended deep operations are often critical to setting conditions for conventional close and rear operations. SOF intelligence can bridge conventional information collection gaps. Unconventional warfare and direct action led by SOF can set conditions for conventional operations. Civil Affairs and PSYOP elements are often critical for consolidating gains made by both SOF and conventional forces. J OINT I NTERDEPENDENCE 2-68. Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service’s capabilities to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects of both. The degree of interdependence varies with specific circumstances. 2-69. The Army depends on the other Services for strategic and operational mobility, joint fires, and other key enabling capabilities. The Army supports the other Services, combatant commands, and unified action partners with ground-based indirect fires and air and missile defense (AMD), defensive cyberspace operations, electromagnetic warfare, communications, intelligence, rotary-wing aircraft, logistics, and engineering. The Army’s ability to set and sustain a theater of operations is essential to allowing the joint force freedom of action. The Army establishes, maintains, and defends vital infrastructure. It also provides the JFC with unique capabilities, such as port and airfield opening, logistics, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense, and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of forces. D OMAIN I NTERDEPENDENCE 2-70. The Army provides forces and capabilities from all domains to the joint force. Army forces employ joint capabilities from all domains to complement and reinforce their own capabilities. Understanding domain interdependences helps leaders better mitigate friendly vulnerabilities while creating and exploiting relative advantages. Successful operations in an environment where the enemy can contest every domain requires continuous joint integration down to the lowest tactical echelons. Air 2-71. Land capabilities enable air operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include— • Fixing enemy ground forces for destruction from the air. • Providing air-delivered fires through rotary-wing and UAS platforms. • Controlling, securing, and defending airports and airfields. • Securing land-based C2 nodes for air operations. • Destroying enemy surface-to-air systems. • Employing surface-to-air fires. • Integrating all-source intelligence to identify threats to friendly air capabilities. • Providing logistics support to other Service components. 2-72. Air capabilities enable land operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include— • Providing air-to-ground fires. • Providing offensive and defensive depth through air interdiction and strategic attack. • Protecting ground forces from air attack. • Employing airborne platforms for information collection. • Providing aerial movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. • Employing airborne electromagnetic warfare platforms. Space 2-73. Land capabilities enable space operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include— • Destroying enemy space ground stations, ground links, and launch sites with surface-to-surface fires. • Securing ground links and launch sites. • Securing bases and C2 nodes for units controlling space capabilities. • Securing bases and C2 nodes from which to launch attacks against enemy space capabilities. 2-74. Space capabilities enable land operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include— • Enabling geolocation and timing-dependent technology, including global positioning systems and precise and accurate fires. • Enabling a global C2 network through satellite communications. • Enhancing situational understanding by providing meteorological, oceanographic, and space environmental factors and detailed imagery of land areas and enemy dispositions on land. • Deceiving, disrupting, degrading, denying, or destroying enemy space systems. • Conducting navigation warfare to disrupt enemy use of positioning, navigation, and timing-enabled devices. • Enabling theater missile warning and other warning intelligence. Cyberspace 2-75. Land capabilities enable cyberspace operations in multiple ways. These include— • Securing critical cyberspace infrastructure including data storage facilities, wired network transport, ground-based repeaters, and terminals. • Conducting information activities that protect and defend joint communications networks and data. • Conducting physical attacks against enemy cyberspace-based capabilities and infrastructure on land. • Defeating enemy forces collecting information through cyberspace. 2-76. Cyberspace capabilities enable land operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include— • Enabling secure global communications and a shared COP. • Supporting decision making and logistics. • Facilitating high-volume data storage and knowledge management. • Networking sensors and fires platforms. • Attacking enemy networks including C2, integrated air defense systems, and integrated long-range fires systems. • Enabling rapid communication to audiences through social media and other applications. • Enabling targeted influence operations. Maritime 2-77. Land capabilities enable maritime operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include— • Attacking land-based threats to maritime capabilities, including enemy air bases, surface to surface fires, and sensors. • Protecting ports and defending land areas that control maritime choke points. • Denying maritime areas with surface-to-surface fires and surface-to-air fires. • Integrating joint all-source intelligence to identify threats to maritime capabilities. • Providing directed logistics support to maritime oriented forces operating from land. 2-78. Maritime capabilities enable land operations in multiple ways. Some of these ways include— • Increasing operational reach and lethality through long-range fires systems and information collection. • Providing access to otherwise inaccessible land areas. • Providing and protecting transportation of units, equipment, and supplies on a large scale, over strategic distances. • Integrating with all-source intelligence. • Preventing enemy forces from using sea lines of communications and supply routes. • Attacking enemy maritime threats to land forces. A RMY F ORCE P OSTURE 2-79. U.S. policy and strategic guidance drive an Army force posture that balances combatant commander requirements, combat readiness, and resource constraints. This balance influences where Army forces are stationed and how capabilities are distributed across three components—Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and the Regular Army. Although U.S. Army forces can respond rapidly to regional and global crisis, the ability to build and project large scale combat power can take months. 2-80. Forward postured forces support joint campaigns. Joint campaigns deter armed conflict, expand U.S. influence, and provide initial response options to adversary aggression. 2-81. During competition, forward postured forces create positional advantages that extend operational reach, depth, and endurance for future operations. These advantages increase risk to adversaries, complement and reinforce other Service’s capabilities, and add potency to other instruments of national power. Expanding mutual support between units and improving survivability during competition is a critical component of conventional deterrence. Lightly defended bases and exposed forces are vulnerable to adversary offensive action and cannot easily be restored or replaced. 2-82. Limited resources constrain U.S. forward posture. Success depends heavily on the broader multinational landpower network. Theater armies lead and cultivate landpower networks with allies and partners to support shared strategic objectives by employing forward stationed forces, rotational forces, and security force assistance brigades. Army special operations forces (ARSOF) conduct operational preparation of the environment. These actions help combatant commanders accomplish objectives during competition and prepare for war if the need arises. 2-83. Forward-postured forces must be sufficient to support general defense plans. These forces harden their positions to survive in areas at high risk to enemy fires. They must sustain operations until the rest of the joint force can support them. Inadequate forward-force posture creates unacceptable risk to mission and forces, especially when a situation rapidly escalates to armed conflict. When gaps exist between general defense plan requirements and forces available, theater armies can generate greater support from allies and partners, request additional U.S. forces, or recommend more limited policy objectives. 2-84. During armed conflict, a forward-postured network of mutually supporting forces adds depth to a general defense plan. At the same time the landpower network limits the enemy’s operational reach, facilitates the speed of RSOI, and reduces the amount of area that must be restored through high-risk offensive operations. 2-85. Forces based in the strategic support area allow for unit training and a sustainable readiness cycle. These forces are part of the Army’s global response capability, or they are in support of regional contingency plans that typically have deployment timelines that occur over months. 2-86. Army Reserve Components support a wide variety of domestic and global Army operations. Although they constitute about half of the Army’s organized units, they provide about 80 percent of the Army’s sustainment units, over 70 percent of maneuver support units, a fourth of the Army’s mobilization base expansion capability, and most of its civil affairs capacity. The Army Reserve Components are the Army’s major source of trained individual Soldiers for strengthening headquarters and filling vacancies in the Regular Army during a crisis. Reserve Components provide a key resource for reconstitution operations during armed conflict. It is critical for planners to understand that Reserve Components forces have mobilization requirements that take time and typically have deployment time limits that must factor into force management and contingency plans. (See ADP 1 for more information on Army reserve forces. See Chapter 6 for more information on reconstitution. See Chapter 5 for information on reserve mobilization.) A RMY E CHELONS 2-87. The Army operates through echelons to ensure manageable spans of control for leaders. Echelons allow commanders and staffs to focus on a specific set of military problems and an appropriate portion of the enemy force. Army forces integrate capabilities at the most effective echelon to solve a military problem or employ against an enemy formation. Echelons generally correspond to a particular level of warfare, but they may contribute to two or more levels depending on the situation. Even though each echelon focuses on its part of the problem, commanders integrate their subordinate echelons into a cohesive operation by ensuring unity of purpose and effort. 2-88. Normally, higher echelons (for example, divisions and higher) have greater experience in their command teams and staffs. They have the expertise and perspective to coordinate large-scale operations and complex or politically sensitive tasks. They retain control of scarce resources so that they can employ them at the right time and place. This often includes joint air, space, maritime, and cyberspace capabilities. Higher echelons generally employ these critical capabilities to set conditions for lower echelon success and to weight the main effort appropriately. An echelon typically sets conditions by creating advantages that their subordinate echelons can exploit. Higher echelons maneuver subordinate formations and use capabilities from all domains to shape the environment and create and exploit relative advantages. 2-89. Generally speaking, the joint force command degrades enemy strategic capabilities to enable forcible entry and sustained operations. The land component command sets the theater, defeats enemy long-and mid-range fires, provides operational-level sustainment, and apportions joint capabilities to corps. Corps, operating as tactical formations, defeat enemy long-range fires, employ joint capabilities to set conditions for divisions to maneuver, and maintain the tempo of operations through sustainment and other rear operations. Divisions defeat enemy mid-range fires, mass effects on enemy forward echelons, and synchronize BCTBCTBasic combat training maneuver in close combat with enemy forces. BCTs conduct close operations to defeat and destroy enemy forces during battles and engagements. 2-90. Normally, subordinate echelons (for example, brigades and lower) contribute to the overall mission by executing tasks and fulfilling the purpose assigned to their unit. They provide awareness to the higher echelon with their proximity to the current situation at the point of execution. While higher echelons provide broad perspective, subordinate echelons provide tactical fidelity. Combining the higher echelon perspective with the perspectives of subordinates creates the shared situational understanding that fosters disciplined initiative. Shared situational understanding does not require all leaders to agree. Instead, leaders use differences of opinion to frame the problem, assess operations, understand risk, and guide information collection. 2-91. The focus of echelons changes across strategic contexts as do their responsibilities for integrating capabilities into operations. Their broad roles are listed in paragraphs 2-87 through 2-103. (See Chapters 4, 5, and 6 for descriptions of each strategic context and more detailed information on echelon roles and responsibilities.) Theater Army 2-92. The theater army’s mission is the most diverse and complex of any Army echelon. The theater army headquarters is tailored to a specific CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders with the ability to conduct both operational and administrative C2 over Army forces theater wide. It provides enabling capabilities appropriate to theater conditions, such as theater intelligence, theater sustainment, theater signal, theater fires, theater information activities, civil affairs, engineer, and theater medical. In theaters without assigned field armies, corps, or divisions, the theater army assumes direct responsibility across warfighting functions for its tactical commands. The theater army is the Army Service component command to a geographic combatant command. The seven functions performed as the Army Service component command are— • Execute the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders’s daily operational requirements. • Provide administrative control (ADCON) of Army forces. • Set and maintain the theater. • Set and support operational areas. • Exercise C2 of Army forces in the theater. • Perform joint roles of limited scope, scale, and duration. • Plan and coordinate for the consolidation of gains in support of joint operations. (See FM 3-94 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-93 for additional information on theater army administrative and operational requirements.) Field Army 2-93. A field army is constituted to meet specific requirements. A field army may consist of a headquarters battalion with subordinate companies and special troops, a variable number of attached corps, an attached expeditionary sustainment command, a variable number of divisions normally attached to corps, and other attached functional and multifunctional brigades. 2-94. When required, a field army is an operational headquarters that provides C2 over multiple corps. During operations, forces are assigned or attached to the field army. Although it may employ subordinate units during operations, these units are provided by external Army, joint, and multinational sources based on the situation and the field army’s role and mission. When constituted, a field army is tailored to mission requirements and designed to perform operational ARFOR tasks; it is the Army component to the JFC to which it is assigned. 2-95. The field army provides additional operational capacity to a CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders facing peer adversaries in its area of responsibility (AOR). The field army is tailored based on the capabilities of the peer adversary. As the adversary’s capabilities change, so do those of the field army. When constituted, the field army provides Army, joint, and multinational forces with a headquarters capable of performing in a variety of ways across the range of military operations. Field armies are most likely to be employed in theaters where peer adversaries have the capability of conducting large-scale combat. These regions include the U.S. European Command and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Corps 2-96. The corps is the most versatile echelon above brigade due to its ability to operate at both the tactical and operational levels. While it is organized, staffed, trained, and equipped to fight as a tactical formation, the corps may be called upon to become a joint and multinational headquarters for conducting operations. When operating as the senior Army headquarters under a joint task force (JTF), the corps will serve as the ARFOR. The corps can also serve as the coalition forces land component commander (CFLCC) when properly augmented with joint and multinational personnel. If the corps is uncommitted to specific CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders requirements, it focuses on building and sustaining readiness to prevail in large scale combat operations. The roles of the corps include acting as the— • Senior Army tactical formation in large-scale combat, commanding two to five Army divisions together with supporting brigades and commands. • ARFOR (with augmentation) within a joint force for campaigns and major operations when a field army is not present. • JTF headquarters (with significant augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency operations. • CFLCC (with significant augmentation) commanding Army, Marine Corps, and multinational divisions together with supporting brigades and commands when a field army is not present. 2-97. During large-scale combat operations, a corps headquarters normally functions as a tactical headquarters under a joint or multinational land component. The corps is the echelon best positioned and resourced to achieve convergence with Army and joint capabilities. (See FM 3-94 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-92 for more information about Army corps.) Division 2-98. The division is the Army’s principal tactical warfighting formation during large-scale combat operations. Its primary role is to serve as a tactical headquarters commanding brigades. A division conducts operations in an AO assigned by its higher headquarters-normally a corps. It task-organizes its subordinate forces according to the mission variables to accomplish its mission. A division typically commands between two and five BCTs, a mix of functional and multifunctional brigades, and a variety of smaller enabling units. The division is typically the lowest tactical echelon that integrates capabilities from multiple domains to achieve convergence during large-scale combat operations. Winning battles and engagements remains the division’s primary purpose. During limited contingencies, it can organize itself to serve in multiple roles. The roles of the division include acting as a— • Tactical headquarters. • ARFOR headquarters (with significant augmentation). • CFLCC (with significant augmentation). • JTF headquarters (with significant augmentation). (See FM 3-94 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-91 for more information about Army divisions.) Brigade Combat Teams 2-99. A BCTBCTBasic combat training is the Army’s primary combined arms, close-combat maneuver force. BCTs maneuver against, close with, and destroy enemy forces. BCTs seize and retain key terrain, exert constant pressure, and break the enemy’s will to fight. They are the principal ground maneuver units of a division or a JTF. Divisions seek to employ BCTs in mutually supporting ways to the greatest extent possible. However, BCTs must be capable of fighting isolated from higher echelon headquarters and adjacent units during periods of degraded communication and when operations are widely distributed. 2-100. There are three types of BCTBCTBasic combat training: the infantry BCTBCTBasic combat training, the armored BCTBCTBasic combat training, and the Stryker BCTBCTBasic combat training. Depending on the tactical situation, these three types of organizations are augmented with additional Army and joint capabilities to help them accomplish their missions. (See FM 3-96 for more information on Army BCTs.) Multifunctional and Functional Brigades 2-101. Theater armies, corps, and divisions are task-organized with an assortment of multifunctional and functional brigades to support their operations. These brigades add capabilities such as intelligence, attack and reconnaissance aviation, fires, protection, contracting support, or sustainment. The theater army may tailor subordinate corps and divisions with combinations of multifunctional brigades. 2-102. Multifunctional brigades provide a variety of functions in support of operations. Normally, they are attached to a corps or division, but they may be under the command of a joint or multinational headquarters. Multifunctional brigades include combat aviation brigades, field artillery brigades, sustainment brigades, and maneuver enhancement brigades. 2-103. A functional brigade provides a single function or capability. These brigades can provide support to a theater, corps, or division, depending on how each is tailored. Functional brigade organization varies extensively. Examples of functional brigades include security force assistance brigades (SFABs), air defense artillery (ADA) brigades, special forces groups, expeditionary military intelligence brigades, and engineer brigades. Army Special Operations Forces Employment 2-104. Army special operations forces are those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations (JP 3-05). Most joint special operations forces come from the Army. ARSOF includes special forces, Rangers, special mission units, select civil affairs, select psychological operations, and Army special aviation forces assigned to the United States Army Special Operations Command—all supported by a sustainment brigade. ARSOF are specifically organized, equipped, and trained to execute specified core activities, and they are often employed by joint special operations headquarters. 2-105. JFCs often employ ARSOF in a combined arms approach with space and cyberspace capabilities. This combination of capabilities provides options to shape the operational environment, achieve objectives, and set conditions for future operations. ARSOF elements often provide the terrestrial link between space and cyberspace capabilities to enhance their operational reach and effectiveness. 2-106. ARSOF are employed with other joint special operations forces by joint C2 elements tailored and scalable to the mission. These C2 elements employ ARSOF and coordinate with conventional forces headquarters and typically coordinate with corresponding conventional headquarters. The theater special operations command (TSOC) provides theater-level command and control of SOF. A special operations joint task force (SOJTF) provides major-or lieutenant general-level C2 and coordinates with divisions and corps. A joint special operations task force provides colonel or brigadier general-level C2 and coordinates with divisions and brigades. A lieutenant colonel or service equivalent commands a special operations task force and typically coordinates with brigades and battalions. A major or service equivalent commands an advanced operations base and interacts with battalion and company-level headquarters. The TSOC and SOJTF are described below. (See ADP 3-05 for more information about the C2 of SOF.) Theater Special Operations Command 2-107. A TSOC is a joint component command subordinate to a combatant command. For example, Special Operations Command Pacific is a subordinate unified command of United States Indo-Pacific Command. 2-108. CCDRs normally exercise operational control of SOF attached or assigned to them through the TSOC. Commanders of TSOCs are the principal special operations advisor to the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders. The TSOC facilitates integration and interoperability with conventional forces. It also facilitates the development and continuity of strong regional partnerships and ensures the operational access required for mission success. (See ADP 3-05 for additional information on ARSOF and TSOCs.) Special Operations Joint Task Force 2-109. A combatant commander, subordinate unified command commander, or a JTF commander establishes an SOJTF to support special operations as part of a campaign or major operation. An SOJTF is a flag-officer-level task force designed to provide integrated, fully capable, and enabled joint special operations forces to CCDRs and JFCs. 2-110. The task force acts as a single headquarters to plan and coordinate all theater or joint operational area special operations. The SOJTF includes special operations capabilities from more than one Service and may include partner-nation SOF. The task force may have partner-nation conventional force units assigned or attached to it to support or enable execution of specific missions. It provides C2 over multiple subordinate joint special operations task forces. The command must be able to integrate Service and partner-nation representatives into its headquarters, and it may designate key positions of responsibility to be filled from an element that has significant forces assigned to the task force. (See JP 3-05 and ADP 3-05 for additional information on ARSOF and TSOCs.) This page intentionally left blank.

There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard. There are not more than five primary colors, yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen. There are not more than five cardinal tastes, yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted. Sun Tzu This chapter describes the Army’s operational concept, multidomain operations. It provides an overview of multidomain operations and describes it in terms of tenets, imperatives, an operational approach, a strategic framework, and an operational framework.

In all history, this is the first time that an allied headquarters has been set up in peace to preserve the peace and not to wage war. General Dwight D. Eisenhower on the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization) This chapter begins with an overview of how the Army contributes to competition below the threshold of armed conflict as part of the joint force. It describes methods employed by adversaries and how Army forces contest adversary activities by supporting combatant command campaign plans and preparing for large-scale combat operations with unified action partners. The chapter concludes by discussing how Army forces consolidate gains and transition to crisis or armed conflict as branches to joint campaigns. OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS DURING COMPETITION 4-1. Competition below armed conflict occurs when an adversary’s national interests are incompatible with U.S. interests, and that adversary is willing to actively pursue them short of open armed conflict. While neither side desires, at least initially, to use military force as the primary method to achieve its goal, the adversary is willing to employ national instruments of power, including military force, below the threshold of actual armed conflict to achieve its aims. The resulting tension between the two sides creates potential for violent escalation when one side challenges the status quo. 4-2. Operations during competition are intended to deter malign adversary action, set conditions for armed conflict on favorable terms when deterrence fails, and shape an operational environment with allies and partners in ways that support U.S. strategic interests and policy aims. Theater armies support combatant commanders (CCDRs) as they conduct operations to deter adversaries and achieve national objectives. These operations, conducted as part of a combatant command campaign plan (CCP), occur over time and across broad areas without armed conflict. This may include cooperative training, support to local institutions, construction projects, and a range of other activities. In many cases, enduring engagement is necessary, especially given the tendency of adversaries to pursue strategic objectives over long periods of time that do not comport with the shorter political-strategic cycles found in the U.S. and many of its allies and partners. Select special operations forces (SOF) operations and activities play a prominent role during competition to deter adversarial aggression, prevent escalation, and set conditions for armed conflict if deterrence fails. Army forces are successful during competition when they deter adversary malign action, enable the attainment of other national objectives, and maintain the ability to swiftly and effectively transition to armed conflict when deterrence fails. 4-3. Army forces contribute to conventional deterrence during competition by preparing for armed conflict, including large-scale combat operations. This includes assisting allies and partners to improve their military capabilities and capacity. Preparing for combat operations and demonstrating the U.S. joint force’s interoperability with allies and partners present the strongest deterrence to adversaries. Deliberate messaging that communicates the will and capability to conduct combat operations can amplify the deterrent effect of physical actions on the ground. Interoperability, coupled with the demonstrated capabilities and capacity of Army forces, reinforces a unified approach to defending mutual interests. Even a small contingent of forward-stationed U.S. Army forces is a challenge to defeat when operating with allies and partners. A force ready for large-scale combat operations contributes to the potency and integration of the other instruments of national power, provides CCDRs capabilities for graduated responses, and enables the Army to help the joint force achieve national strategic objectives through competition rather than armed conflict. ADVERSARY METHODS DURING COMPETITION 4-4. To effectively plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations during competition requires a broad understanding of the strategic environment and common adversary methods and objectives. Adversaries use a range of techniques to hinder the United States from achieving its objectives during competition and further their own interests. Forward-positioned Army forces may be able to detect and assess such adversary activities. By understanding and effectively countering adversary techniques, Army forces can help the joint force and unified action partners achieve their objectives. A CTIVITIES TO A CHIEVE S TRATEGIC G OALS 4-5. Adversaries employ all of their instruments of national power in a combination of ways to pursue strategic interests without direct military confrontation with the United States. For example, Russia applies its elements of national power through an approach called “New-Type War” (also labeled “Russian New Generation Warfare”). This approach allows Russia to achieve many of its strategic goals below the level of armed conflict and with limited employment of military forces. If coercion through diplomatic, information, and economic instruments fails, Russia is prepared to employ its conventional military power and proxy forces as needed. China also relies on a comprehensive use of its instruments of national power. Like Russia, China seeks to achieve many of its strategic objectives with nonmilitary instruments of national power and keep military forces in a supporting role that reinforces facts established on the ground with other than overt military action. 4-6. By using all instruments of national power, an adversary can further its interests through a range of nonmilitary and military activities that may provide advantages over U.S. forces. Examples of nonmilitary activities include Russia and China’s diplomatic efforts to establish security cooperation agreements with neighboring countries to expand regional influence. Another example is China’s use of infrastructure projects, as part of “The Belt and Road Initiative”, to grow its economic influence. In both examples, adversaries primarily use nonmilitary means to achieve strategic objectives while weakening U.S. influence and undermining political-military partnerships between the United States and other countries within these same regions. 4-7. Adversaries can pursue more aggressive options through military activities that expand and safeguard their interests abroad, maintain regional stability, and exert influence regionally and globally. These activities may include controlling or reducing access to certain areas of the global commons, challenging the established borders of other nations, establishing bases and military cooperation that threaten U.S. security and other interests, or using the threat of force to influence the decisions of neighboring countries. Adversaries may pursue these activities overtly with the use of conventional military forces or through a combination of proxy forces, unconventional warfare, and information warfare. 4-8. Proxy forces can be state or non-state actors that perform activities on behalf of or in accordance with another state actor’s strategic objectives. Examples of proxies can include paramilitary groups, criminal organizations, private civilian organizations, private companies, special interest groups, and religious groups. Covert methods, such as the use of proxy forces, provide adversaries with plausible deniability and cost savings in achieving strategic objectives. A CTIVITIES TO C OUNTER A U NITED S TATES R ESPONSE 4-9. While adversaries desire to further their interests and achieve their goals without U.S. involvement, they will be prepared to counter a response from the U.S. military. To do this, an adversary may attempt to prevent or constrain the United States’ ability to project forces to the region and limit U.S. response options by using the following methods: • Conduct information warfare activities to manipulate the acquisition, transmission, and presentation of information in such a way that legitimizes the adversary’s actions and portrays the United States as the aggressor. • Conduct preclusion activities through nonlethal means to undermine relationships, raise political stakes, manipulate public opinion, and erode resolve to constrain or eliminate basing rights, overflight corridors, logistics support, and concerted allied action. • Isolate the United States from allies and partners by fostering instability in critical areas and among relevant actors to increase U.S. operational requirements. • Create sanctuary from U.S. and partner forces through international law and treaty agreements, monitoring and attacking partner forces from across international borders, and using proxy forces. • Conduct systems warfare by executing cyberspace attacks against critical force projection and sustainment infrastructure nodes to delay or disrupt the United States’ ability to deploy forces. Systems warfare approaches include nonattributable attacks on domestic infrastructure and the employment of networked military capabilities that support isolation and preclusion efforts. A CTIVITIES TO P RECLUDE U NITED S TATES A CCESS TO A R EGION 4-10. Adversaries seek to establish conditions that limit or prevent U.S. access to a region, typically in locations close to their borders. This includes forward positioning of layered and integrated air defenses, early warning surveillance radars, rocket artillery, electronic warfare capabilities, and counter-space capabilities. Additionally, adversaries may seek to position intermediate-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), and naval surface and subsurface forces to shape an operational environment in their favor. Positioning systems that support an antiaccess (A2) strategy allows adversaries to deny or disrupt U.S. access to a region in the event of hostilities while providing leverage against friendly partner nations with the potential use of force. Furthermore, the positioning of systems capable of delivering conventional and nuclear munitions creates additional challenges for the United States. An adversary’s ability to establish, maintain, and demonstrate robust A2 systems bolsters its domestic narratives while eroding partner nation trust and confidence. 4-11. Friendly forces must assume they are always under observation because of all the means available to a peer adversary, particularly those available in space and cyberspace. In addition to forward positioning capabilities that support A2 and area denial (AD) approaches, these adversaries seek understanding of the disposition, readiness, and activities of U.S. forces within a contested region. Adversary activities include reconnaissance of U.S. military installations, unit movements, ports of embarkation and debarkation, and staging areas to identify potential targets for ballistic missiles and long-range fires. Adversaries employ cyberspace tools to conduct reconnaissance of friendly networks to identify vulnerabilities for possible exploitation. An adversary may conduct probing actions in the air and maritime domains to test responses by U.S. and other friendly forces. The intelligence gained through these activities will prepare an adversary for hostilities in the event a situation escalates to armed conflict. (See the ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 7-100.1 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 7-100.3 for detailed discussions of specific threat capabilities and employment strategies. See Chapters 6 and 7 for specific examples of how adversaries are likely to employ A2 and AD capabilities at the beginning of a conflict.) PREPARATION FOR LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS 4-12. Army forces that cannot credibly execute operations during armed conflict fail to deter adversaries or assure allies and unified action partners, making preparation for large-scale combat operations the primary focus of Army conventional forces during competition. While there are multiple forms of armed conflict, large-scale combat among state actors is the most complex and lethal form of armed conflict, and it demands significant focus along multiple lines of effort to prepare for it. Some of the activities Army forces execute to prepare for armed conflict include— • Setting the theater. • Building allied and partner capabilities and capacity. • Improving joint and multinational interoperability. • Protecting forward-stationed forces. • Preparing to transition and execute operation plans (OPLANs). • Training and developing leaders for operations in specific theaters. S ET T HE T HEATER 4-13. Setting the theater is the broad range of activities continuously conducted to establish conditions for the successful execution of operations in a theater (ADP 3-0). Setting the theater never ends. It is conducted to enhance an operational environment in ways favorable to friendly forces, and it occurs during competition, crisis, and armed conflict. While setting the theater occurs across each strategic context, its importance is greatest during competition because that is when the most time is available. Army forces must set the theater during competition to enable quick transitions during crisis and conflict, when time favors the aggressor. Army forces use military engagements, security cooperation, and other activities to assess and understand the current conditions within the theater and execute specific theater-setting activities to enable joint forces and other unified action partners. 4-14. Setting the theater requires a comprehensive approach among unified action partners and bilateral or multilateral diplomatic agreements that allow U.S. forces access to ports, terminals, airfields, and bases in the area of responsibility (AOR) to support future operations. This includes but is not limited to theater opening; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI); establishing networks; classifying routes; and other operational activities that set the conditions for operations. Information activities are a significant part of setting the theater. They enable decision making, protect friendly information, inform domestic and international audiences, and influence foreign audiences while helping to counter adversary information warfare. 4-15. Setting the theater is a continuous activity for all staff sections across warfighting functions. It involves significant sustainment, air and missile defense (AMD), engineering, information collection, intelligence, and communications focused on setting conditions to counter known or potential threats to U.S. interests across the AOR. All warfighting functions, functional areas, and branches that comprise staffs and commands conduct operational preparation of the operational environment to address unique considerations for setting the theater within their respective areas of expertise (for example, civil preparation of the environment and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment). (For more information about the land component’s roles and responsibilities for setting the theater in conflict, refer to JP 3-31 and JP 3-35. For additional information about the subordinate Army tasks and activities associated with setting the theater, refer to ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-93 and FM 4-0. See paragraphs 4-63 and 4-64 of this publication for considerations unique to theater armies and Chapter 7 for theater-setting considerations in a maritime environment.) B UILD A LLIED AND P ARTNER C APABILITIES AND C APACITY 4-16. Army forces fight as part of a joint and multinational force. The United States cannot achieve its security interests without the cooperation of treaty allies, partner nations, and other unified action partners. Helping partner nations build, rebuild, or maintain their national security institutions is a critical step in maintaining regional stability, and it is ultimately less expensive than requiring U.S. forces to do so. Additionally, by maintaining partner-nation security institutions, the Army helps add to the aggregate force that is available to potentially deter adversary forces or counter them if they choose to pursue their goals through armed conflict. Forward-stationed U.S. Army forces, by themselves, generally do not enjoy favorable combat power ratios with peer adversaries. Allies and other partners provide the bulk of forces initially able to conduct operations during armed conflict. This combined force capability enhances deterrence for both the partner nation and the United States. (See paragraphs 4-39 through 4-54 for more information on how Army forces help build allied and partner capabilities.) 4-17. Combined training and exercises with partners play a key role in building allied and partner capabilities and shaping an operational environment. Such events are the most overt and visible means of demonstrating friendly capabilities, interoperability, and will. Exercises also help set the theater. Multinational forces that maintain high levels of combat readiness provide the credibility essential to assure partners and deter adversaries. Combined exercises build relationships and mutual respect among allies and other multinational partners, identify systems and processes to employ partner capabilities effectively, and reveal shortfalls to be improved upon. Training exercises occur at all echelons of command, from tactical units to large, combined task forces. The application of lessons learned during these exercises is key to improving multinational interoperability during competition. An example of a failure to prepare for large-scale combat operations occurred in the Philippines in 1941. Failure to Prepare for War: The Philippines 1941 During the summer of 1941 the United States Army took steps to prepare for potential armed conflict with Japan. The War Department created the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) and recalled General Douglas MacArthur to active duty to serve as the commanding general. The War Department provided USAFFE with the priority for equipment and reinforcements within the Pacific Theater of Operations to support General MacArthur’s defensive plans. By December 1941, USAFFE had made significant strides, but had not done enough to effectively prepare for war. When Japan’s forces attacked the Philippines on 8 December 1941, ten hours after their attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, USAFFE was short personnel, supplies, and equipment. Aside from a provisional tank group, most forces were ill-equipped and possessed obsolete weapons and vehicles. The Philippine armed forces, whose readiness was also a USAFFE responsibility, were even less prepared than U.S. forces. They lacked modern weapons, effective logistics systems, and training. The War Department and USAFFE attempted to make up for these shortcomings by distributing supplies from pre-positioned stocks on the islands of Corregidor and the Bataan Peninsula to both U.S. and Philippine units stationed throughout the archipelago. The Far East Air Force was equally unprepared. It lacked early warning systems and anti-aircraft artillery. Planned survivability improvements to airfields were incomplete, leaving aircraft exposed on flight lines and parking aprons. As a result, the Far East Air Force lost over half of its aircraft by the conclusion of the first day of the war, most destroyed on the ground. Although the U.S. and Philippine forces mounted a fierce resistance for nearly six months, Japan eventually isolated the defenders in the Bataan Peninsula and on the island of Corregidor with naval and air forces. In the absence of friendly air and naval support, the U.S. and Philippine forces were unable to receive reinforcements, resupply, or conduct an evacuation. As a result, the U.S. and Philippine forces in the Bataan Peninsula fell to Japan’s forces in April 1942, and the remaining forces on Corregidor and the surrounding islands surrendered in May 1942. I NTEROPERABILITY 4-18. The ability of Army forces to fight as a cohesive whole, integrated with the joint force, allies, and partners, is vital to maximizing combat power and creating a deterrent effect in a theater. Interoperability is the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives (JP 3-0). An Army formation that is interoperable with joint and multinational partners is substantially more capable than one that is not. Interoperability with any unified action partner is essential for effective operations. Interoperability standards and procedures must be trained, tested, and refined during competition; it is too late to seek interoperability once a crisis or armed conflict begins. 4-19. Interoperability starts with mutual understanding across echelons throughout a multinational force. Effective interoperability includes understanding technical challenges and developing methods to bridge gaps, understanding the tactical capabilities of each member in the multinational force, and integrating partners into a unified operational approach. During competition, the theater army or a delegated command is responsible for building the system that enables this. Communication is primarily achieved through liaison teams, understanding staff processes, and ensuring adequate access to partner nation command and control (C2) systems (within the limits of national caveats). Understanding foundational interoperability requirements like NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization doctrine; American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (known as ABCANZ) Armies Program interoperability standards; and Combined Forces Command (in the Republic of Korea) processes is critical to communicate and interoperate with allied forces. It is essential that these requirements and standards are incorporated into routine training and exercise planning at all echelons to build the required interoperable readiness needed in a time of crisis or conflict. (See FM 3-16 for more information on multinational operations and interoperability.) P ROTECT F ORWARD -S TATIONED F ORCES 4-20. Peer threats possess reconnaissance and surveillance, fires; SOF; and other capabilities that can target forward-stationed Army forces and place them at risk. The protection of Army forces forward, under the assumption that deterrence is not guaranteed, is essential. Army forces implement procedures and conduct necessary activities to ensure that they, and the elements of the joint or partner force they protect, can endure an initial attack with little early warning. This includes preparation for threat attacks from any domain that is informed by understanding what puts friendly forces at risk and how a threat may attack. An adversary could attack using capabilities from domains other than land, either to set conditions on the ground or as a means of escalation designed to limit friendly options. Preparation by Army forces therefore includes planning and integration with other elements of the joint force. Coordination for Army and joint capabilities that can protect friendly forces during armed conflict and enable them to endure until they can be supported is critical to establishing deterrence. 4-21. The demonstrated ability of Army forces to withstand an adversary’s initial attack adds to the integrated deterrence effect on adversaries and may dissuade them from escalation. Host-nation capabilities may constitute a significant part of force protection and forward defense, so they must be integrated into theater protective efforts. Forward deployed forces that cannot be adequately protected or quickly repositioned during adversary escalation to armed conflict should be relocated to more defensible locations. P REPARE T O T RANSITION AND E XECUTE O PERATION P LANS 4-22. Army forces at every echelon prepare to execute OPLANs that they are expected or likely to support. The foundation for this is active, continuous information collection and intelligence analysis. Higher echelons, such as the theater army and corps, identify initial targets and the required Army and joint capabilities needed to attack those targets in the initial stages of an armed conflict. They likewise consider whether general defense plans that provide guidance for subordinate unit immediate action during the early stages of a conflict initiated with few indications or warnings are necessary or prudent. 4-23. Preparation to execute OPLANs must extend to all echelons and partners. Lower tactical echelons train tactical tasks related to the parts of an OPLAN they support or execute. Units conduct deployment rehearsals and emergency deployment readiness exercises to improve response times and validate plans. Rehearsals with unified action partners build mutual understanding and improve interoperability. Units conduct thorough reconnaissance of all lines of communications, infrastructure, avenues of approach, assembly areas, and potential firing points or battle positions. Leaders and Soldiers should walk the actual terrain that engagements and battles could be fought on and, when possible, they should use this terrain for rehearsals. A shared understanding of OPLANs, terrain, and adversaries down to the lowest tactical echelon will allow an effective transition to armed conflict. T RAIN AND D EVELOP L EADERS 4-24. Leaders prepare themselves, their subordinates, and their organizations for operations in specific combatant command AORs. When developing expertise in specific regions, units become familiar with applicable OPLANs and coordinate with the theater army, the assigned military intelligence brigade-theater (MIB-T), and other theater army-assigned units as appropriate. This regionally specific readiness augments ongoing training and leader development activities conducted across the force. (See Chapter 8 for a detailed discussion on the role of leadership during operations.) RELATIVE ADVANTAGES DURING COMPETITION 4-25. During competition, Army forces seek relative advantages at the theater strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Relative advantages are advantages that Army forces provide the joint force commander (JFC) in relation to a specific adversary, and they are always contextual. They are necessary to deter adversaries, assist the joint force in promoting U.S. interests, and set conditions to conduct operations during crisis and armed conflict. These advantages augment unified action partner activities, and they address Service-specific issues identified during combatant command campaign development. Identifying, achieving, and maintaining these advantages helps the Army employ combat power effectively during crisis and armed conflict. A relative advantage is temporary. Adversaries quickly adapt to counter advantages (especially technological ones) once they are created or employed, and they seek to reduce or eliminate their effectiveness. 4-26. Understanding advantage relative to an adversary requires understanding the adversary’s capabilities and will, friendly capabilities and will, and the operational environment within the theater. It further requires understanding of the interrelated influences of each dimension in an operational environment, including how physical, human, and information factors affect each other in a specific context. Changes in one dimension often have outcomes in the other two and in more than one physical domain. P HYSICAL A DVANTAGES D URING C OMPETITION 4-27. Due to the expected tempo of operations, enough Army forces comprised of the right capabilities must be forward stationed to provide CCDRs with a credible deterrent force and the ability to respond, when necessary, to adversary actions. Physical advantages that improve combat credibility include positional advantages, survivable battle positions, mutual support between forces through all domains, and superior available combat power. Examples of activities that create physical advantages during competition include— • Working with allies to conduct a deployment exercise of a theater-tailored unit to improve its OPLAN integration and interoperability. • Surveying a potential assembly area with a forward engineer support team to determine if the area is large enough to accommodate a properly dispersed Army formation. • Hardening facilities against attack and rehearsing drills in response to potential adversary courses of action. • Maintaining stocks of key supplies and equipment (Army pre-positioned stocks [APSAPSArmy pre-positioned stocks]) in or near areas of concern to accelerate deployment of forces during crises or armed conflict.) I NFORMATION A DVANTAGES D URING C OMPETITION 4-28. Information activities play a key role during competition. They include Army support to the combatant command and unified action partner strategic messaging. Coordinating with interagency and other unified action partners helps to develop and deliver coherent messages that counter adversary disinformation. Army forces reinforce strategic messaging by maintaining and demonstrating U.S. Army readiness for operations. Examples of relative information advantages are— • Identifying targets and conducting target development on threat capabilities. • Setting the conditions for convergence by developing methods to penetrate adversary computer networks. • Discrediting adversary disinformation by helping the JFC inform domestic and international audiences through Army and joint information activities. • Promoting the purpose and outcomes of multinational exercises and training events. • Continuously monitoring the operational environment to detect changes to adversary methods or narratives. • Building partner-nation capability to influence populations. H UMAN A DVANTAGES D URING C OMPETITION 4-29. The institutional depth and professionalism of U.S. Army personnel contribute to the morale and will of partner security forces as Army forces interact across all ranks and echelons. Army formations serve as a professional force operating under the rule of law as guests in a specific region to facilitate the accomplishment of mutual military training goals. This can be a powerful advantage over adversaries who seek to extract concessions, including financial and informational gains, from other countries or groups. This bond of trust forms the foundation of the U.S. alliance system, and it is the primary means to ensure the security of the United States and its partners. Examples of activities that help achieve human advantages include— • Training U.S. and partner nation forces in multinational exercises at combat training centers. • Routine interaction with allies and other unified action partners that builds and maintains human, technical, and procedural interoperability through agreed-to standards. • Hosting international officers at U.S. professional military education programs and sending U.S. officers to international military schools. • Sustained presence by theater-aligned advisor teams that builds relationships and promotes interoperability over time. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 4-30. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities separate from, but integrated with, the efforts of interagency participants. These actions are coordinated by diplomatic chiefs of mission and country teams. Understanding their roles and relationships is critically important. The Department of State is responsible for the diplomatic instrument of national power. Chiefs of mission are the final approval authorities for all U.S. military activities that occur in the nation they are responsible for, and they have the authority to modify the execution of planned activities during competition. (See JP 5-0 for more information on country-specific plans.) 4-31. Activities that occur during competition encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power supports and is subordinate to the other instruments of national power. Competition overseas generally requires cooperation with international organizations (for example, the United Nations) and government entities in other countries to protect and enhance mutual national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. U NITED S TATES D IPLOMATIC M ISSION 4-32. U.S. diplomatic missions include representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies physically present in the country. Chiefs of missions are the principal officers in charge of diplomatic missions. They are often, but not always, ambassadors. They oversee all U.S. government programs and interactions with and in a host nation. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President and reports through the Secretary of State, ensuring all in-country activities serve U.S. interests and regional and international objectives. 4-33. The United States maintains different types of diplomatic missions in different countries. Some countries have only a consulate, many have only an embassy, and others have an embassy and several consulates. Typically, Army elements conducting security cooperation activities coordinate with diplomatic mission officials, even in nations with only a consulate. Relationships with consular offices are determined on a case-by-case basis. The same entities and offices existing in an embassy are present or liaised at consulates. (See FM 3-22 for a detailed explanation of this role in relation to Army operations.) C OUNTRY T EAM 4-34. The country team is the point of coordination within the host country for the diplomatic mission. The members of the country team vary depending on the levels of coordination needed and the conditions within that country. The country team is made up of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as directed by the chief of mission. The team may include the senior defense official or defense attaché, the political and economic officers, and any other embassy personnel desired by the ambassador. 4-35. The country team informs various organizations of operations, coordinates elements, and ensures unity of effort. Military engagement with a host country is coordinated through the Defense Attaché Office or Office of Security Cooperation at the embassy or consulate. However, several other attachés and offices may also be integral to security cooperation activities, programs, and missions. The country team provides the foundation of local knowledge and interaction with the host-country government and population. As permanently established interagency organizations, country teams represent the single point of coordination, integration, and synchronization of security cooperation activities supported by combatant commands and the theater army. It is incumbent upon the theater army, with the approval of the combatant command, to work with and inform the country team of recommendations for military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities that involve Army forces across all domains. COMPETITION ACTIVITIES There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them. Attributed to Winston Churchill 4-36. Competition involves activities conducted under numerous programs within a combatant command. The CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders uses these activities to improve security within partner nations, enhance international legitimacy, gain multinational cooperation, and influence adversary decision making. Competition activities include obtaining access for U.S. forces, maintaining sufficient forward-based presence within a theater to influence conditions in the strategic environment, and mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis or armed conflict. At any time during competition, but especially during times of heightened tension, leaders must take great care to ensure Army forces avoid activities that accidently provoke crisis or armed conflict. Army forces, as directed by the theater army, must stay within an activity level that meets the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders’s intent for readiness without unintentionally increasing tensions. 4-37. Activities during competition directly align with authorities in various titles of the United States Code (USCUSCUnited States Code) and approved programs, integrating and synchronizing with the Department of State, other government agencies, country teams, and ambassadors’ plans and objectives. The Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) help produce the joint regional strategy to address regional goals, management, and operational considerations. Each country team develops both an integrated country strategy and a country development cooperation strategy to address joint mission goals and coordinated strategies for development, cooperation, security, and diplomatic activities. Working with the Department of State and various country teams, the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders develops country-specific security cooperation plans, which are codified in the country-specific security cooperation section of the CCP. Some CCPs include regional country plans, posture plans, and theater distribution plans that facilitate synchronization of resources, authorities, processes, and timelines to favorably affect conditions within the CCDRs’ AORs. 4-38. Army forces execute activities during competition that support joint force campaigning goals, satisfy interagency requirements, and set the necessary conditions to employ Army combat power during crisis and armed conflict. The theater army works with the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders to develop objectives for the employment of Army forces in theater and develops support plans to address Army-specific activities. Army forces provide security cooperation capabilities across any given theater of operations by conducting military engagement, security cooperation, nuclear deterrence, counter-weapons of mass destruction activities, and humanitarian assistance. Many of the activities conducted during competition continue during armed conflict and complement and reinforce the employment of lethal capabilities. M ILITARY E NGAGEMENT 4-39. Military engagement is contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence (JP 3-0). Military engagement is part of security cooperation but also involves interaction with domestic civilian authorities. Army forces also routinely communicate with nongovernmental organizations, either directly or indirectly, to ensure expectations and roles are understood. 4-40. Engagements occur when Army forces conduct training and other events with host-nation military forces, governments, and populations. Army forces strengthen bonds with allies and partners that are necessary for developing host-nation capabilities. This helps host-nation forces deter and defeat threats and address stability challenges within their sovereign borders unilaterally or in conjunction with Army forces. 4-41. CCDRs and Army senior leaders seek out partners and communicate with adversaries to discover areas of common interest and tension. This increases the knowledge base for subsequent decisions and resource allocation. Such military engagements can reduce tensions, prevent conflict, or provide the United States with greater access and stronger alliances or coalitions if conflict is unavoidable. Army conventional forces and SOF support military engagement through deliberate interactions with unified action partners at the junior-Soldier through senior-leader levels. Engagements occur when Army forces conduct multinational training and other events with host-nation military forces, governments, and populations. Army forces facilitate and maintain partnerships with allies and partners that are necessary for developing host-nation capabilities. This helps host-nation forces deter and defeat threats and address stability challenges within their sovereign borders unilaterally or in conjunction with Army conventional forces. The State Partnership Program provides an example of how successful military engagement can strengthen U.S. alliances and partnerships. Successful Engagement: State Partnership Program The State Partnership Program supports the security cooperation objectives of CCDRs by developing enduring relationships with partner countries and carrying out activities to build partner capacity, improve interoperability, and enhance U.S. access and influence while increasing the readiness of U.S. and partner forces to meet emerging challenges. The program links a state’s National Guard with the partner nation’s military, security forces, and disaster response organizations in a cooperative relationship. Since the program’s inception in 1993 with the three Baltic Republics, it has expanded to encompass partnerships with 89 nations. Most of the earliest State Partnership Program partner countries in Europe have gone on to become U.S. allies in NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization, and many of them credit the State Partnership Program and their National Guard partners with helping make that possible. By building enduring relationships based on mutual trust and support, the State Partnership Program has expanded the pool of aligned global security providers and improved the capabilities of both U.S. Army units and partner nation militaries across the world. S ECURITY C OOPERATION 4-42. Security cooperation is Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations (JP 3-20). These efforts may include Army forces participating in joint and multinational exercises and employing regionally aligned forces. Conducting security cooperation is one of the Army’s primary stability tasks. 4-43. Security cooperation is governed by the Foreign Assistance Act (22 USCUSCUnited States Code, 2151) and the Arms Export Control Act (22 USCUSCUnited States Code, 2751) addressing Department of Defense (DOD) interactions with other nations. The Department of State is the lead agency for security sector assistance. All DOD security cooperation programs must nest with Department of State security sector guidance. (See JP 3-20 for more information on joint security cooperation and FM 3-22 for additional details on Army support to security cooperation.) 4-44. Commanders and staffs conduct security cooperation to develop allied and other friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, to improve information exchange and intelligence sharing, to provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access, and to mitigate conditions that could lead to a crisis. Multiple types of security cooperation activities can often occur simultaneously with overlapping purposes. These activities include security assistance, security force assistance (SFA), foreign internal defense (FID), and support to security sector reform efforts. Security Assistance 4-45. Security assistance is a group of programs the U.S. Government uses to provide defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales. Security assistance programs are typically focused on the transfer of defense articles and services to eligible foreign governments, the provision of training and education to foreign military personnel, and the sale of construction services in support of partner nations’ military establishments. Military education and training exchanges are invaluable for building interoperability and fostering trust over time between U.S. Army and partner personnel. Security Force Assistance 4-46. Security force assistance is the Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20). Security forces are duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state (JP 3-22). Consistent with DOD policy for SFA, the Army develops, maintains, and institutionalizes the capabilities of its personnel to support efforts to organize, train, equip, rebuild or build, and advise foreign security forces and relevant supporting institutions. SFA activities are conducted primarily to assist partner nations to build their capacity to defend against external and transnational threat actors. Security force assistance brigades (SFABs) are Army organizations focused specifically on this mission. (See paragraphs 4-90 through 4-91 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-96.1 for information on SFABs.) 4-47. SFA and security assistance are different. Security assistance is a broader set of programs that includes training, but also includes equipment transfers, sales, and other programs. SFA works in conjunction with security assistance programs while focusing specifically on building the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Depending on mission requirements, Army forces continue to conduct SFA during armed conflict. Foreign Internal Defense 4-48. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). FID includes the actions of both nonmilitary organizations and military forces, and it is a SOF core activity. 4-49. Army SOF assess, train, advise, and assist host-nation military and paramilitary forces in conventional and irregular warfare tasks. Most FID activities occur during competition. During armed conflict FID includes U.S. forces that conduct, support, or advise during combat operations. 4-50. FID is a comprehensive approach that supports partner development towards democratic governance and military deference to civilian rule. These activities may employ the indirect use of military forces along with diplomatic, informational, and economic means. FID involves the support of a standing host-nation government and its military or paramilitary forces. U.S. FID efforts focus on supporting the host nation’s internal defense and development program to build its capability and achieve self-sufficiency. Army special operations forces assess, train, advise, and assist host-nation military and paramilitary forces with tasks that require the specific capabilities of Army SOF. Most FID activities are conducted during competition, but FID can also be conducted during armed conflict when U.S. forces conduct, support, or advise in combat operations. (See JP 3-22 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-05.2 for a detailed discussion of FID.) 4-51. SFA and FID have much in common because both enable friendly partners’ capacities to provide for their own defense. While there can be overlap, FID activities are aimed at strengthening a wide range of functions including both military and civilian governmental institutions against internal threats. SFA activities improve military and other security forces against both internal and external threats, and they do not include activities that primarily support other government institutions. Support to Security Sector Reform 4-52. Security sector reform is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice (JP 3-07). The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. 4-53. Security sector reform is an umbrella term that includes integrated activities in support of defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament; demobilizations and reintegration; and reduction of armed violence. The Army’s primary role is supporting the reform, restructuring, or re-establishing of the armed forces and the defense sector across the competition continuum. 4-54. U.S. and partner military forces collaborate with interagency representatives and other civilian organizations to design and implement security sector reform strategies, plans, programs, and activities. The Department of State leads and provides oversight for these efforts through the integrated country strategy. The desired outcome of security sector reform programs is an effective and legitimate security sector firmly rooted in the rule of law. N UCLEAR D ETERRENCE AND C OUNTERING W EAPONS OF M ASS D ESTRUCTION 4-55. U.S. nuclear capabilities are foundational to the deterrence of adversary weapons of mass destruction use. Joint and Army forces integrate nuclear and conventional force planning and operations to ensure the credibility of this deterrent. Further, Army forces must plan, train, and exercise to conduct operations when the adversary uses of tactical nuclear weapons to deny the adversary any perceived advantage that might result from employing weapons of mass destruction. To do so, they must train under simulated weapons of mass destruction conditions. When under threat of nuclear attack, commanders must balance the risk of dispersing forces to mitigate the impact of nuclear effects across their area of operations (AO) against the ability to concentrate sufficient combat power to achieve objectives. In a chemically contaminated environment, a commander’s decision-making ability is complicated by the effects on Soldier stamina, reaction times, and sustainment. Each of these environments requires unique actions to ensure a formation’s ability to maneuver, fight, and sustain operations. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-90.40 for more information on countering weapons of mass destruction.) H UMANITARIAN A SSISTANCE 4-56. USAID is the lead U.S. government agency, responsible to the Secretary of State, for administering civilian foreign aid and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. USAID often works in concert with Army forces when Soldiers are tasked to provide assistance. It can supplement forces conducting civil affairs operations that the DOD conducts to build relationships and win the trust, confidence, and support of local populations. Designated conventional forces and SOF can rapidly deploy to austere and semi-permissive environments to work with allies and partners to provide relief from man-made and natural disasters. One example of a successful humanitarian assistance operation occurred during an Ebola outbreak in Liberia in 2014. Liberia: OPERATION UNITED ASSISTANCE In October 2014, a joint force comprised of 3,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines deployed to Liberia to help contain and eradicate the Ebola virus. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) served as the joint task force (JTF) headquarters during this operation. The 101st worked with the government of Liberia, the U.S. Embassy, United States Army Africa, USAID, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the U.S. Public Health Service. USAID was the lead federal agency. Army units helped build and supported 17 Ebola treatment centers across Liberia. Army forces trained 1,500 health care workers, and a logistic system was established that provided medical supplies and building materials. As a result of the rapid response and achieving unity of effort, Liberia went from 80 new cases of Ebola a day to being declared Ebola-free within seven months. ROLES OF ARMY ECHELONS DURING COMPETITION 4-57. Theater armies, including their assigned theater-echelon commands and brigades, perform essential functions during competition to achieve national objectives while deterring adversary malign action. Corps, divisions, and brigade combat teams (BCTs) are crucial to the execution of operations, activities, and tasks during competition. These forces may support SFA or FID by participating in multinational exercises and conducting humanitarian and other civil-military operations, development assistance, and training exchanges. Army forces at corps and lower echelons directly engage with partner forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and civilian populations to accomplish missions, build rapport, and improve conditions that promote stability. Note. The organizations listed in paragraphs 4-57 through 4-102 have critical roles during competition. Numerous other organizations also provide important contributions. T HEATER A RMY R OLES D URING C OMPETITION 4-58. The theater army is the primary Army organization that plans, prepares, and oversees the execution of activities conducted by Army forces during competition, and it assesses the results of these activities. It supports and enables the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders’s pursuit and maintenance of operational access critical to achieving advantages throughout an AOR while improving the security capabilities of partner nations. Gaining relative advantages during competition requires intelligence about the adversary’s capabilities and intent relative to friendly forces. While adversary intent is more difficult to ascertain, both factors are equally important since capability plus malign intent represent a larger immediate threat than either factor on its own. This understanding allows theater army commanders to recommend actions to the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders that impede adversary goals or convince adversaries to seek alternative courses of action more favorable to U.S. interests. 4-59. The theater army integrates Army forces and capabilities with the other instruments of national power on behalf of the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders. It fulfills CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders requirements while simultaneously fulfilling Service-specific requirements for Army forces to prepare for large-scale combat operations. It achieves its support to both the joint force and Army by concentrating on seven functions and by providing oversight or C2 to subordinate Army organizations during competition. Within each theater army function, there are multiple tasks the theater army might fulfill to achieve its mission. (See FM 3-94 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-93 for an expanded discussion of each function listed in paragraph 4-60 and the subordinate tasks within each function.) 4-60. During competition, the theater army focuses on enabling the United States, its allies, and other unified action partners to compete effectively below the threshold of armed conflict in ways directed by the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders. These persistent and regular activities provide assurance to partner nations and deter adversaries. The theater army does this by focusing on the following functions: • Execute the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders’s daily operational requirements. • Provide administrative control (ADCON) of Army forces. • Set and maintain the theater. • Set and support operational areas. • Exercise C2 over Army forces in the theater. • Perform joint roles limited in scope, scale, and duration. • Conduct contingency planning for crisis and armed conflict. Combatant Commander Daily Operational Requirements 4-61. The theater army translates the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders’s plans and requirements into concrete actions by Army forces. This includes, but is not limited to, the following activities and tasks: • Provide Army support to other Services (ASOS). • Conduct theater security cooperation. • Assess and develop infrastructure. • Develop concept plans and OPLANs. • Maintain threat models and provide intelligence on significant changes in the operational environment. Provide Administrative Control 4-62. ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support. The exercise of ADCON fulfills a military department’s statutory responsibilities. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10, USCUSCUnited States Code. ADCON includes organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions. The theater army headquarters is responsible for ADCON of all Army forces in the AOR. (See AR 10-87 for more information on ADCON.) Set and Maintain the Theater 4-63. In addition to the broad requirements in setting a theater, including contributions from all warfighting functions (outlined in paragraphs 4-13 through 4-15), theater armies have unique requirements for theater setting met by conducting sustainment preparation of the operational environment. Sustainment preparation of the operational environment is a continuous shaping activity involving analysis to determine infrastructure, environmental, or resource factors in the operational environment that impact the Army’s ability to sustain a commander’s OPLAN. Analysis products cover such topics as host-nation support, selection of lines of communications, determination of operational stock assets, replacement operations, and design of a distribution network and information technology infrastructure for the theater. In most cases these resources (including host-nation labor and services) will be shared with partners of other nations in accordance with negotiated agreements. (See FM 4-0 for more information on sustainment preparation of an operational environment.) 4-64. The theater army continually analyzes, evaluates, and, when directed, expands APSAPSArmy pre-positioned stocks to rapidly provide JFCs with needed Army capabilities. APSAPSArmy pre-positioned stocks augment allocated Army rotational forces already serving in a theater and theater-assigned forces. The tempo and intensity of operations during crisis or armed conflict may not allow for the timely deployment of all of an apportioned force’s equipment sets from the United States via strategic airlift or sealift. Depending on the theater, this may require a large and dispersed equipment force posture based at multiple hardened sites. If needed, a high operational readiness rate will be maintained for APSAPSArmy pre-positioned stocks that allows Army forces to fall in on the equipment and employ it within a few days of arriving in theater. The theater army coordinates with Army Materiel Command to maintain and optimize APSAPSArmy pre-positioned stocks. (For additional information on APSAPSArmy pre-positioned stocks, refer to ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-35.1.) Set and Support Operational Areas 4-65. Setting and supporting operational areas for the joint force occurs at operational and tactical echelons. During competition, the theater army helps identify likely joint operations areas (JOAs) for ground forces. The theater army ensures that the JOA includes bases and base camps needed by forces that primarily operate in the land domain. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.10 for a discussion on base and base camp planning.) Planners must take a holistic approach to understand the needs of the other Services and address Army requirements. Due to the large amount of information needed to properly set and support JOAs, the theater army usually needs to develop a multi-year plan that examines potential AOs. The theater army relies on many low density and high demand units to conduct this tactical level of analysis. Many of these capabilities reside in the United States Army National Guard or the United States Army Reserve. Exercise Command and Control Over Army Forces in the Theater 4-66. The theater army is the Army Service component command (ASCCASCCArmy service component commander), and it has the responsibility to control attached and assigned Army forces within the AOR through ADCON and operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON). As the Army component of the combatant command, the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander is the ARFOR for the theater. When a subordinate JTF is established containing Army forces, the senior Army headquarters in that JTF is normally designated as its ARFOR. (See Appendix B for details on command and support relationships.) 4-67. The theater army initially maintains control of all Army forces assigned to an AOR until control is passed to a subordinate JTF in a JOA. This control is usually passed from the theater army to the JTF when the Army force is ready for onward movement and integration into the JTF. As part of controlling Army forces, the theater army (or other headquarters designated as the ARFOR) maintains ADCON of Army forces and addresses Service responsibilities such as coordinating ASOS. Perform Joint Roles of Limited Scope and Duration 4-68. While serving as the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander, the theater army has the capability to perform three joint roles for the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders. With augmentation, the theater army can be the theater joint force land component command, a JTF, or the joint force land component command to a JTF in a JOA. However, these roles can only be performed in limited scope, scale, and duration, unless the JFC provides significant augmentation. Contingency Planning for Crisis and Conflict 4-69. A key aspect of combatant command and Service component planning during competition or crisis is the development of contingency plans. A contingency plan is a branch of a campaign plan that is planned based on hypothetical situations for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions outside of crisis conditions (JP 5-0). Contingency plans are branches to global, regional, functional, and combatant campaign plans that address potential threats that put one or more national interests at risk in ways that warrant military operations. Contingency plans anticipate the possibility that campaign activities during competition could fail to prevent aggression, a need to respond to instability in a key state or region, or response to natural disasters. (See JP 5-0 for more information on contingency planning.) 4-70. The theater army commander and staff assist the combatant command in developing contingency plans, including developing subordinate plans for Army forces as required. Theater army planners routinely review and update contingency plans to ensure they remain feasible. This includes a review of Army force structure and its relation to joint time-phased force and deployment data. This relationship is covered in detail under force tailoring in paragraph 4-73. Army corps and divisions that are regionally aligned to a specific combatant command may develop subordinate plans as directed. Army corps and divisions train for and rehearse these plans in Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed exercises, Army Mission Command Training Program exercises, and other training events. (See ADP 5-0 for doctrine on Army planning.) Theater commanders may direct the development of a general defense plan to ensure focused preparation for conflict, particularly regarding actions friendly forces take when conflict is imminent, so Army forces understand their requirements during the opening phase of an enemy attack. 4-71. Theater army and select subordinate organizations prepare for operations that could occur in the rear areas identified during OPLAN development. Planning and preparing for rear area operations facilitates consolidation of gains during armed conflict. Where possible, the theater army should involve the rear area command posts of regionally aligned corps and divisions in the development and refinement of plans dealing with rear areas likely to be part of those units’ AOs. Regionally aligned units that primarily operate in the rear area must be included in planning and exercises whenever possible. 4-72. Army formations coordinate, rehearse, and support host-nation execution of stability and security missions. These efforts help minimize the diversion of combat power from other priorities. Civil affairs units have expertise for analyzing potential civil networks to execute these missions. They identify potential civil networks through civil preparation of the environment and the civil network development and engagement process. Civil preparation of the environment is the continuous development of civil knowledge within an area of operations to help commanders identify capabilities within civil society that can be integrated with operations for stability and security activities (FM 3-57). This minimizes the requirement for Army forces in the rear area and facilitates the maintenance or restoration of host-nation governance and legitimacy. Force Tailoring 4-73. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADP 3-0). It involves selecting the right force structure for a joint operation from available units within a combatant command and from the Army force pool. Commanders then sequence forces into an AO as part of force projection. JFCs request and receive forces for each campaign phase, adjusting the quantity of Service component forces to match the effort required. time-phased force and deployment data documents contain both force composition and force flow requirements, and they are the primary method by which JFCs tailor their inbound forces. Theater armies tailor forces to meet land force requirements as determined by JFCs, and they recommend a deployment sequence to meet those requirements. Force tailoring is continuous. (See JP 3-35 for more information on force tailoring and time-phased force and deployment data development.) T HEATER A RMY A SSIGNED F ORCES 4-74. Each theater army has assigned or allocated theater-level forces that provide additional support across the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders’s AOR and help the theater army achieve its objectives. Different theaters have different subordinate forces with distinct command and support relationships based on theater requirements and force availability. The units listed in paragraphs 4-75 through 4-89 are common theater-level formations that facilitate operations during competition. Theater Sustainment Command 4-75. The theater sustainment command (TSC) is the Army’s organization for the integration and synchronization of sustainment in a theater. The TSC connects strategic enablers to tactical formations. It is a theater-committed asset to each theater army, and it focuses on Title 10, USCUSCUnited States Code support of Army forces for theater security cooperation and the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders’s daily operational requirements. 4-76. TSCs execute sustainment operations through their assigned and attached units while integrating and synchronizing sustainment operations across an AOR. They have four operational responsibilities to forces in theater: theater opening, theater distribution, sustainment, and theater closing. The task-organized TSC is tailored to provide operational-level sustainment support within an assigned AOR. It integrates and synchronizes sustainment operations for the theater army, including all Army forces forward stationed, transiting, or operating within an AOR. The TSC coordinates Title 10, USCUSCUnited States Code; ASOS; DOD executive agency; and lead Service responsibilities across the entire theater. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 4-93 for more information on the TSC.) Military Intelligence Brigade-Theater 4-77. The MIB-T is usually assigned to the combatant command with OPCON delegated to the theater army. It provides mission command for the theater army’s information collection and intelligence analysis capabilities across all intelligence disciplines, integrating theater and national architectures and data to support the theater army’s daily operations requirements and preparation for contingency operations. The theater army headquarters specifically relies on the MIB-T for threat characteristics, intelligence estimates, threat and civil considerations, data services, intelligence architecture development and maintenance, and all-source intelligence products. These efforts support theater army planning requirements, including development of Army plans supporting the CCP and maintenance of OPLANs and contingency plans. 4-78. The MIB-T serves as the theater level intelligence focal points through the theater Army component intelligence staff officer for deploying forces. It maintains a regional intelligence architecture that deploying and theater-aligned units can access. This allows units to tailor mission planning and training and effectively leverage the broader intelligence enterprise. The MIB-T’s regional focus provides continuity and cultural context to its analytic intelligence products. The brigade can collect, analyze, and track the threat characteristics and doctrine of theater state and non-state actors over many years, providing indications and warnings of changes in an operational environment. This allows it to create and maintain a valuable database of intelligence regarding persons of interest and the evolving doctrine and capabilities of regional military forces. (See FM 2-0 for more information on the MIB-T.) Theater Aviation Elements 4-79. Theater aviation support is executed by theater aviation brigades, theater airfield operations groups, and theater aviation sustainment maintenance groups. Each theater aviation brigade can conduct assault or general support aviation tasks in support of the theater and its subordinate commands, but it requires augmentation with attack aviation or UAS units to conduct attack, reconnaissance, and security operations. Combat aviation brigades may also support theater aviation operations with lift, attack, and UAS capabilities. Theater airfield operations groups provide air traffic services, conduct airfield management operations, and support RSOI requirements for aviation assets. The theater aviation sustainment group is resourced to provide aviation sustainment maintenance and limited depot sustainment support throughout the theater AO. (See FM 3-04 for more information on aviation brigades and groups.) Army Air and Missile Defense Command 4-80. The Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) is the highest echelon for air defense artillery units. It is usually under OPCON of the theater army, or land component command if designated, with the AAMDC commander serving as the theater Army AMD coordinator. The AAMDC is also usually in direct support of the theater air force, or air component command if designated, with the AAMDC commander serving as the theater deputy area air defense commander. The AAMDC participates in theater exercises and integrates with joint and multinational partners in all aspects of AMD operations. It provides assets and coordinates coverage to protect forward-positioned joint and Army forces, and critical infrastructure, from air, missile, and rocket attack. This protection includes early warning, surveillance, tracking, and defense against tactical short-range targets through intermediate-range ballistic missiles. (See FM 3-01 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-01.94 for more information on AAMDC planning and execution.) Signal Command (Theater) or Strategic Signal Brigade 4-81. The theater army is the designated DOD executive agent for setting and supporting the theater communications and network infrastructure in all AORs. The theater army executes these responsibilities either through a signal command (theater) or strategic signal brigade assigned to support the AOR. Either unit provides connectivity to Defense Information Systems Network services up to secret classification. This connectivity includes establishing and operating the theater network architecture to support all joint and Army forces operating in an AOR. 4-82. The signal command (theater) or strategic signal brigade provides oversight, leadership, and technical direction over the theater network and spectrum management support for all Army units across the theater. It also provides— • Centralized management of data, voice, and video networks, including interfaces with joint, interorganizational, and multinational systems in the theater. • Enforcement of global cybersecurity policies to support the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders and theater army commander. • Oversight of units installing, operating, maintaining, and securing signal support systems and network interfaces to joint and multinational partner systems in theater. • Establishment of mission priorities to ensure network capabilities are available to meet commanders’ information requirements. Theater Engineer Command 4-83. The theater engineer command supports the theater army by organizing and directing Army combat, general, and geospatial engineer assets to improve mobility, enhance survivability, enable force projection and logistics, build partner capacity, and develop infrastructure. The primary focus of the theater engineer command during competition is to determine and build the needed infrastructure to facilitate deployment of U.S. forces, protect forward-stationed U.S. forces, and, where possible, build up the capabilities of allied and partner nations to withstand an initial assault by a peer threat. Examples of engineer activities the theater engineer command directs are conducting route analysis and terrain analysis of potential assembly areas for large Army units like BCTs and identifying needed assets to construct dispersed base clusters in the rear areas to support logistics operations in the close area. When directed, the theater engineer command also provides C2 for engineers from other Services and multinational organizations and provides technical oversight (quality assurance and surveillance) assistance for contracted construction engineers according to the relationships established by the JFC. (See FM 3-34 for more information on theater engineer commands.) Battlefield Coordination Detachment 4-84. A battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) is a specialized, regionally focused Army element that serves as the senior Army operational commander’s liaison with the air component. A BCD is co-located with the joint air operations center, combined air operations center, or the Air Force air operations center. 4-85. The BCD is the Army’s interface for systems connectivity to the joint air operations center and for personnel integration with their joint air operations center counterparts. The BCD supports the land component command during large-scale combat operations. Army corps relay requirements and requests to the land component, who, in turn, relays land component requirements and requests for joint force air component support through the BCD. The BCD represents the joint force land component commander throughout the joint air tasking cycle in the joint air operations center. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-09.13 for doctrine on the BCD.) Theater Fires Command or Element 4-86. An Army theater fires command or theater fires element provides C2 of assigned fires capabilities, serves as the senior organization assigned to a theater army to integrate allocated or assigned fires capabilities, and executes critical fire support functions. It develops and nominates joint targets across the theater. This support to joint targeting supports the continuous setting of the theater and coalition forces land component commander (CFLCC), field army (when constituted), and corps operations. The theater fires command or element ensures the Army’s contribution to the joint targeting process is effectively planned and executed during competition and crisis and can quickly transition to large-scale combat operations in accordance with the ground force commander’s priorities. (See FM 3-09 for additional information on theater fires commands and elements.) Army Field Support Brigade 4-87. The Army field support brigade links strategic resources to tactical units, and it can be assigned in support of a theater army or a corps. It provides APSAPSArmy pre-positioned stocks readiness, ensuring stocks are maintained for use by arriving forces during crisis or armed conflict. The execution of APSAPSArmy pre-positioned stocks equipment configuration and handoff operations are exercised as individual events and as part of larger exercises, including the DEFENDER exercise series. Army field support brigades also run logistics civil augmentation programs. These can be used to provide resources to emerging needs, including theater-wide contract and other support to theater setting and opening requirements. The relationships developed during competition with potential contract support organizations can be leveraged to meet sustainment requirements using organizations already in theater. These and other functions are integral to building and maintaining combat power for large-scale combat operations by enabling the rapid and effective arrival and employment of Army forces. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 4-98 for additional details on the Army field support brigade.) Multi-Domain Task Force 4-88. The multi-domain task force (MDTF) provides the joint force with a formation capable of employing long-range precision fires and other effects from multiple domains in support of the commander’s objectives. It is designed to defeat complex enemy systems through the collection of information and different forms of lethal and non-lethal fires. When required, it can be task-organized to provide capabilities to the JTF or component commander. During competition, the MDTF may be forward stationed in a CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders’s AOR to employ joint and Army capabilities in support of target development. The MDTF headquarters coordinates and synchronizes the information collection operations of its assigned formations with other theater and national assets. 4-89. The MDTF is capable of coordinating and integrating cyberspace electromagnetic activities and space capabilities with long-range surface fires to deceive, neutralize, or disrupt enemy formations, C2 nodes, and cyberspace electromagnetic activities. It does so to enable Army and joint forces to penetrate and disintegrate enemy A2 and AD enabling C2 systems and exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver. The MDTF is designed to operate in a distributed fashion while retaining the ability to deliver effects that create opportunities for joint force exploitation. Based upon specific mission variables, the MDTF may be augmented with capabilities from across the warfighting functions. Security Force Assistance Brigades 4-90. SFABs provide advisors to conduct worldwide SFA operations to develop the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions in support of theater security cooperation objectives. Advisors shape an operational environment by strengthening allies and building lasting partnerships. Advisors increase host-nation capability through joint exercises, and they remain ready to support the partnered force’s operations and modernization in conjunction with other instruments of national power. An SFAB improves interoperability by providing teams to advise partner-nation forces across all warfighting functions. It can advise at the company, battalion, brigade, division, and corps levels as well as within a partner nation’s generating and executive functions. The CCMD’s theater security cooperation plan and partner nation needs drive the levels and type of assistance. 4-91. SFABs are regionally aligned to a specified geographic area to cultivate an in-depth knowledge and experience base capable of addressing the unique concerns of a given theater. The advisors in SFABs, in conjunction with civil affairs and theater information collection assets, enhance the common intelligence picture for a CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders since they have direct knowledge of a partner’s force capabilities and have experience with their population. When directed, they conduct liaison and support activities to enable multinational operations during armed conflict. SFABs are uniquely manned and equipped to provide enduring presence in regions of strategic competition to promote interoperability, build partner conventional warfighting capacity, and set conditions for contingency operations. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-96.1 for additional details on the SFAB.) C ORPS R OLES D URING C OMPETITION 4-92. When a corps is present in a CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders’s AOR, it provides the C2 linkage between subordinate tactical echelons and theater strategic echelons. For example, V Corps oversees theater-assigned units such as the 2 nd Cavalry Regiment, 12 th Combat Aviation Brigade, and the 41 st Field Artillery Brigade, and it oversees the employment of the MDTF assigned to U.S. European Command. During competition, it is also normal for the corps to have an expeditionary sustainment command, operational fires command, expeditionary military intelligence brigade, and a medical brigade in general support. 4-93. During exercises to prepare for large-scale combat operations, the corps fills one of three roles. The corps can be designated as tactical land headquarters employing multiple divisions. It may also assume the role of a joint task force headquarters or land component command headquarters during a contingency operation or training event, after it undergoes the necessary training and joint augmentation. When the corps is the land component command headquarters, it also serves as the ARFOR. (See FM 3-94 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-92 for more information on the corps.) D IVISION R OLES D URING C OMPETITION 4-94. Divisions are often the primary interface with various unified action partners during competition. When regionally aligned, a division with a tailored package of subordinate brigades and other enablers—both Regular Army and Reserve Component—is allocated to a CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders to help execute the CCP. Examples of additional enablers include maneuver enhancement brigades and civil affairs, military intelligence, military police, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear), psychological operations, explosive ordnance disposal, and engineer units. 4-95. A regionally aligned division normally works with multinational partners to conduct security cooperation over extended periods. By establishing habitual relationships, divisions help assure allies, build trust with partner nations, and build interoperability with them and other unified action partners. Divisions help partners build shared situational understanding and partner capacity. They also deter conflict through the conduct of various activities such as exercises, training, equipping, education, conferences, and military staff talks. Division support to security cooperation helps shape regional stability by— • Building defense relationships that promote U.S. security interests. • Developing friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. • Providing the division and other U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations to prevent and deter conflict. • Improving readiness to incorporate allied or partner formations. 4-96. Division headquarters provide direct C2 of the brigades tasked to conduct specific operations supporting security cooperation and interoperability development with partners. They provide training resources and oversight to brigades at home station. Division headquarters are responsible for leader development down to the battalion level. They continuously improve the readiness of Army forces over which they have influence, protecting their time and ensuring that demanding, realistic training is the first priority. 4-97. Division headquarters provide subject matter expertise to assist brigades as they prepare for missions or capstone training exercises, to include awareness of NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization or American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (known as ABCANZ) interoperability standards when forces from those nations are involved. Low density military occupation specialties or specialized units may benefit from the division consolidation of training events. Divisions have subject matter experts in low density specialties who develop, implement, execute, and evaluate training programs across several echelons. (See FM 3-94 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-91 for a further discussion of division roles and responsibilities.) B RIGADE C OMBAT T EAMS D URING C OMPETITION 4-98. BCTs provide CCDRs with a combined-arms, close combat force that can operate as part of a division or a JTF. During competition, they focus on perfecting tactical tasks in preparation to execute OPLANs for large-scale combat operations. Forward-deployed BCTs assess and improve protection measures against adversary capabilities and promote interoperability with host-nation tactical units. While most of a rotational brigade’s training occurs in the continental United States and does not involve partner-nation forces, brigades anticipate and plan how to integrate with host-nation forces. Familiarity with agreed-to coalition or bilateral interoperability standards helps increase alliance or coalition capability and minimizes the time necessary for learning during execution. (See FM 3-96 for information on BCTs and FM 3-16 for information about multinational operations.) A RMY S PECIAL O PERATIONS F ORCES D URING C OMPETITION 4-99. During competition Army special operations forces (ARSOF) are typically employed through Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). TSOCs are subordinate unified commands that plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations. They oversee ARSOF support to CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders theater and country-level security cooperation plan programs and activities. TSOCs provide C2 of special operations core activities until the establishment of a special operations joint task force (SOJTF) or JSOTF is required. 4-100. TSOCs coordinate with CCMD J-5s for SOF integration and Service component support of SOF. ARSOF elements not assigned to a combatant commander fall under the direction of a U.S. Ambassador and country team. 4-101. ARSOF persistent forward presence puts them in position to engage with the partner nation and pursue security cooperation goals. ARSOF foster close partner nation relationships that deepen shared understanding, achieve objectives short of war, and improve combat credibility. ARSOF access is critical to visualizing key information dimension factors. Their capabilities allow them to— • Identify subversive activities. • Expose adversary propaganda. • Operate through the information dimension to counter aggressive action. 4-102. ARSOF conduct core activities that improve partner security-force capability and capacity, counter violent extremist organizations, and accomplish U.S. and partner-nation objectives. Countering violent extremist organizations may involve the use of lethal force and create brief transitions into armed conflict. ARSOF conduct military information support operations to influence audiences while countering competitor messaging. Civil affairs operations integrate with the civil component and facilitate governance. CONSOLIDATING GAINS DURING COMPETITION 4-103. Army forces continuously consolidate gains to maintain an operational environment that is advantageous to U.S. strategic interests. Experience proves that what Army forces do during competition helps ensure stability and reduces the potential for man-made crises or armed conflict throughout a region, even in locations where no previous combat has occurred. Examples of consolidating gains during competition range from transportation system improvements (including port, airfield, and rail lines of communications), increasing theater supply stocks, intelligence cooperation, and providing Army medical personnel and civil affairs personnel to support a combatant command’s humanitarian and civic assistance activities. Army forces contributing to humanitarian relief efforts with allies and partners help cement existing international relationships or set conditions for new ones in other places. 4-104. Army forces consolidate gains most effectively by maintaining a persistent or permanent presence in a theater of operations. This presence enables the cultivation of relationships on a predictable and reliable basis and provides Army forces a high degree of regular access to allies and partners. The enduring results of these activities help ambassadors, country teams, and JFCs gain a greater degree of influence with allies and partners as they pursue mutually beneficial objectives. In addition to this increased influence, Army consolidating gains activities contribute to joint efforts to support deterrence. 4-105. Consolidation of gains during competition following armed conflict or crisis is significantly different than during steady-state competition. In areas that have not seen recent armed conflict or a disruptive crisis, Army forces consolidate gains by reinforcing the success of steady-state competition activities. They do this by following through on what was begun earlier in consistent ways that provide predictability to allies and partners. In most cases, these activities will be indistinguishable from other competition activities designed to build partner capabilities and improve other advantages relative to threat forces. 4-106. Consolidating gains following armed conflict requires significant operations that, if not properly conducted, could result in a return to crisis or conflict. These efforts include information collection and intelligence analysis to understand threats, their support from the population, and what options are available to defeat them. 4-107. Consolidating gains also includes stability tasks related to providing security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment to the population. When appropriate, Army forces then work to restore or rebuild civil institutions and to transition security and stability tasks to those institutions. (See FM 3-07 and FM 3-57 for additional details on stability operations and governance.) 4-108. When immediate concerns are addressed after a crisis or armed conflict, the theater army and supporting forces focus most of their efforts on theater-strategic consolidation of gains. They work with the theater’s other components, the combatant command, interagency partners (primarily the Department of State), partner nations, and other unified action partners to develop and achieve long-term objectives. In general, these consolidation of gains activities are less intense and occur over longer periods of time. Army forces build on the success of past conflicts by conducting targeted engagements with unified action partners. Examples of this include routine engagements with Republic of Korea, Japanese, and NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization forces by forward-positioned and rotational units. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-93 for a detailed overview of routine theater army activities to consolidate gains during competition.) 4-109. Peace operations are a means of consolidating gains. Peace operations are multiagency, unilateral, or multinational actions involving all instruments of national power to restore peace, support reconciliation, and enable rebuilding (JP 3-23). They usually occur under agreements brokered through organizations like the United Nations or through regional bodies like the African Union. (See JP 3-23 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-07.31 for additional details on peace operations.) TRANSITION TO CRISIS AND ARMED CONFLICT 4-110. Transitions are inherently complex and unpredictable because anticipated environmental conditions can quickly change and alter the perception of strategic leaders who do not have all the information necessary for clear understanding. A response by one side can result in the perception of escalation by the other, leading to increased tensions. A crisis requiring a response can also occur because of unforeseen environmental changes. Transition from competition to crisis or armed conflict is often based on four types of decisions, resulting actions, and the follow-on associated effects from the initial action. Examples include— • A decision by national command authorities to escalate or initiate armed conflict. Examples include the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2011 Libya strike, and the 2020 strike against Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. • A decision by adversaries to escalate or initiate armed conflict. Examples include Hezbollah’s rocket strikes against Israel in 2006, the Russo-Georgia War in 2008, and the Russian invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. • A decision by allied nations to escalate or initiate an armed conflict. An example of this is the 1967 Six-Day War that occurred between Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel. • Decisions made in response to a rapid environmental change that neither side planned for but causes tensions to rise. An example is the change brought to the strategic environment by the 2020 pandemic. 4-111. Army forces and leaders anticipate the potential for conflict in their operational environment. Input from the intelligence community and direction from strategic leaders shape this anticipation. SFABs and other regionally aligned units have access to sensitive areas and ally and partner leaders. Their access and robust communications enable them to gain insight on actual conditions on the ground and provide real-time updates to decision makers during fluid situations. Decisions made before and during the initial stages of a crisis or armed conflict have significant impact on the decisions made by adversaries and the ultimate outcome of a particular situation. 4-112. Once a crisis or armed conflict starts, adversaries use all capabilities at their disposal to disrupt the deployment of Army forces. They will attempt to prevent the Army and the joint force from obtaining the needed time to deploy and build combat power. This chaos, with its resultant frictions, is the environment into which Army forces will respond. C ONFLICT T YPE D ETERMINATION 4-113. Army forces and leaders need to anticipate the type of conflict the Nation will fight. This is informed by input from the intelligence community and direction from strategic-level leaders. Decisions made before and during the initial stages of a crisis or armed conflict have significant impacts on the decisions made by adversaries and the ultimate outcome of a particular situation. The initial decisions or recommendations by Army strategic leaders impact the ability of the Army to project force in a timely manner. F ORCE P ROTECTION 4-114. Indications and warnings in a theater may prompt a decision to mobilize and deploy Army forces in anticipation of a crisis or armed conflict. Army forces anticipate and react to adversary actions targeting them where they are located during the initial stages of an operation, whether in the United States or forward deployed. Adversaries seek to degrade and disrupt the ability of Army forces to deploy. Adversaries may employ cyberspace attacks to inflict power outages at home station, target transportation networks to delay shipment of unit equipment, conduct social media attacks on Service or family members, and instigate protests that lower popular support for Army forces. Insider threats and proxies can conduct acts of terror, sabotage, subterfuge, and other activities against U.S. forces stationed in the United States and abroad. Adversaries may immediately employ lethal capabilities against Army forces using their air-, sea-, cyber-, and space-based capabilities to exploit surprise. Forward stationed forces should be prepared to deploy from garrison to dispersed locations to prepare a defense against an enemy attack. Force protection during transition will include physical security measures, operations security, and active information efforts to counter adversary efforts to misinform and otherwise influence Soldiers, Family members, and supporting organizations and communities. N ONCOMBATANT E VACUATION O PERATIONS 4-115. A transition to crisis or armed conflict may require a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). Army forces conduct NEOs under a wide range of conditions. They may be conducted under relatively stable conditions or under unstable conditions that involve enemy combatants. Ideally, leaders anticipate a NEO requirement and can execute it prior to crisis or armed conflict. Uncertain adversary intentions and the threat of violence often create desperation among evacuees and local populations and increase the complexity and risk for forces conducting NEOs. 4-116. Once a NEO is requested, approved, and directed, the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders directs forces to conduct evacuation operations in support of the Department of State and Chief of Mission. NEOs, especially those of significant scale, will require Army forces that would otherwise be dedicated to other missions. (See JP 3-68 for more information on NEOs.) I NITIAL E MPLOYMENT OF F ORWARD -S TATIONED F ORCES 4-117. A key strategic decision during competition or crisis is whether forward-stationed units will defend forward to hold terrain or displace to more advantageous positions. This decision should occur during competition unless a crisis unfolds in unanticipated ways and forces a decision point. During transition, forward-stationed Army forces have three courses of action. The JFC can integrate Army forces with host-nation land component forces as part of a mobile or area defense, assign U.S. Army forces a theater reserve role, or implement a plan that combines both courses of action. A theater reserve role allows the JFC to preserve Army combat power for future offensive operations. Army forces may be required to defend key terrain and infrastructure to allow for receiving deploying forces. Army leaders advise the JFC on the best ways to use forward-stationed forces based on current conditions in the AO.

The 1930’s taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged ultimately leads to war. President John F. Kennedy This chapter discusses broad trends in the strategic environment and adversary actions during a crisis. It discusses how Army forces provide options to joint force commanders (JFCs) seeking to obtain relative advantages during crisis and how the Army projects forces. It then describes the roles of theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigades. The chapter concludes with a discussion of consolidating gains and transitioning back to competition or to armed conflict. OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS DURING CRISIS 5-1. A crisis is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives. A crisis may be the result of adversary actions or indicators of imminent action, or it may be the result of natural or human disasters. During a crisis, opponents are not yet using lethal force as the primary means for achieving their objectives, but the situation potentially requires a rapid response by forces prepared to fight to deter further aggression. When directed, the Army provides a JFC with capabilities to help deter further provocation and sufficient combat power to maintain or reestablish conventional deterrence. The introduction of significant land forces demonstrates the will to impose costs, provides options to joint force and national leaders, and signals a high level of national commitment. The effects of a persistent presence on the ground among allied or partner forces cannot be easily replicated with air or maritime power alone. 5-2. Crisis response operations are characterized by high degrees of volatility and uncertainty. A crisis may erupt with no warning, or it may be well anticipated. Its duration is unpredictable. Additionally, adversaries may perceive themselves in a different context or state of conflict than U.S., allied, and partner forces. What is seen by one side as a crisis might be perceived by the other as armed conflict or competition. Army leaders must demonstrate flexibility, anticipate changes in an operational environment, and provide JFCs with credible, effective options. This requires trained forces agile enough to adapt quickly to new situations and commanders and staffs adept at linking tactical actions to attaining policy objectives. Success during a crisis is a return to a state of competition in which the United States, its allies, and its partners are in positions of increased advantage relative to the adversary. Should deterrence fail, Army forces are better positioned to defeat enemy forces during conflict. 5-3. Regardless of the capabilities employed, there are generally two broad outcomes from a crisis. Either deterrence is maintained, and de-escalation occurs, or armed conflict begins. While this requires that Army forces be prepared for either type of transition, forces deploying during crisis always assume they are deploying to fight. While Army forces prepare for armed conflict, they avoid sending signals that armed conflict is inevitable, regardless of what the adversary does, to avoid inadvertent escalation. Generally, senior leaders at the corps and higher echelons influence those perceptions through public communications in support of the JFC and national leaders. Note. Army forces also respond to crises related to disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and defense support to civil authorities when tasked. These crisis contexts and response options are covered in separate doctrinal publications. See JP 3-28, JP 3-29, ADP 3-07, ADP 3-28, FM 3-07, and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-57.20 for more information on these types of crises and associated response options. ADVERSARY METHODS DURING CRISIS 5-4. A crisis is frequently caused by an adversary acting aggressively to coerce and intimidate its opponents with the threat of force. Once an adversary crosses a U.S., allied, or partner crisis threshold, it attempts to shape and control the crisis to limit or prevent a U.S. military response. An adversary’s attempts to control the situation involves escalating or de-escalating its activities based on an assessment of the situation, which includes a calculation of risk. Adversary forces conduct a detailed analysis of their available capabilities, capacity, and operational reach within a theater relative to friendly forces; their overall desired end state; and their willingness to achieve that end state before deciding to escalate. Even after careful analysis, the way a situation develops can be unpredictable. Some peer adversaries view conflict as a continuous condition in which heightened or reduced periods of violence occur and recur. Changing the intensity of their actions, even when that reduces tension, does not end their campaign to oppose U.S. interests. A DVERSARY A CTIVITIES TO S HAPE A C RISIS 5-5. As a crisis develops, peer adversaries will attempt to shape the situation to their benefit through information warfare and preclusion focused on the U.S. joint force. They may use diplomatic, economic, and information means to divide an opponent’s political leadership from its civilian population. They create separation by introducing or exacerbating distrust and division between different groups to weaken an opponent’s political leadership and to create dissatisfaction among an opponent’s civilian population. Adversaries position military forces in ways to increase uncertainty for opponents and to complicate their decision making. These activities create conditions for the adversary to exploit situations with minimal interference from the U.S., allied, or partner military forces. 5-6. Adversaries may use proxy forces to conduct information warfare, unconventional warfare, and criminal activities, although the balance and utility of these forces in crisis differs from their use during competition. Proxy forces, whether they are a militant separatist group, private military company, or criminal network, bring different capabilities to a situation, and the employment of their capabilities shifts as the strategic context changes. For example, while criminal networks can still accomplish useful tasks in environments marked by increased levels of violence, they do not have the same level of utility that they did during competition. Similarly, separatist groups cannot typically operate without significant support from their sponsor’s military or security services, and that support is likely to be focused elsewhere at the beginning of a crisis. Despite their limitations, proxy forces provide adversaries with another tool to shape a crisis. A CTIVITIES TO C ONTROL E SCALATION 5-7. Peer adversaries may attempt to control the escalation of a crisis to avoid armed conflict with the United States by initiating actions to prevent or counter a U.S. response. These actions may focus on allies or partners using diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments. Adversary measures include setting fait accompli conditions on the ground designed to make military responses either too expensive to employ or too late to affect the political situation. An adversary has other options to control escalation, which include accelerating its operational timelines, employing information warfare, increasing support to proxy forces, and increasing the number of forward deployed units in the region. Adversary forces may also initiate crises in other theaters to distract U.S. forces and diffuse their response in the area of greatest interest. In extreme cases, an adversary may conduct a limited attack in response to U.S. reactions to the activities that precipitated the original crisis. A CTIVITIES TO M ITIGATE U NITED S TATES D ETERRENCE 5-8. As adversary forces plan for operations during a crisis, they consider several key actions to mitigate U.S. deterrence efforts and to ensure these operations do not interfere significantly with their interests. These actions may include— • Conducting limited attacks to expose friendly force vulnerabilities. These attacks may also degrade the deterrence value of deployed forces and destroy credibility among current and potential partners. • Disrupting or delaying the deployment of Army and joint forces through cyberspace attacks and denial of space capabilities. • Exploiting gaps in national interests among the United States, partner nations, and potential partners by attacking weaker countries with whom the United States has no treaty obligations to defend. • Conducting deception operations to conceal their real intent. • Increasing the use of proxy forces to coopt, coerce, or influence the local population, organizations, and governments within a crisis region. • Creating multiple dilemmas for the United States by attacking or threatening the use of force against potential partner nations in regions outside of the crisis region. • Impacting the will of the public through information warfare, including cyberspace attacks. • Threatening the use of nuclear weapons to prevent intervention by the United States, allies, and partners. OPERATIONS SECURITY 5-9. Operations security is vital to the success of operations during crisis. Continuously employing the operations security process generates measures and countermeasures to limit an adversary’s ability to discern friendly intent, knowing that friendly forces are always under observation and at risk of detection. Operations security is a function of how tasks and activities are conducted and how individual Soldiers and units are successful in meeting the directed standards. Army units in a joint operations area (JOA) exercise strict operations security to protect friendly information and protect the network against cyberspace attacks. They do this by ensuring no use of personal electronic devices, minimizing electromagnetic emissions, and limiting communications on command and control (C2) information systems to the maximum possible extent. This protects Soldiers from social media and other information-related attacks and limits the information available to adversaries that can be used to target family members. It also makes it more difficult for adversaries to identify units and their locations and reduces the incentive for adversary forces to strike targets they view as lucrative enough to risk conflict to destroy. Stress caused by adversary social media attacks during crisis is potentially circumvented by avoiding social media altogether, since the combined effects of a disinformation campaign could degrade Soldier performance and morale far more than not having access to personal devices and media accounts. Operations security is a continuous activity at every echelon down to the individual Soldier level. The protection of friendly forces requires an understanding of threat reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities in an operational environment. Protection is an outcome based in large part on how operations are conducted at the individual and unit level. No single system or capability can protect a formation on its own. RELATIVE ADVANTAGES 5-10. During crisis, Army forces capitalize on the knowledge and experiences gained and use the systems, processes, and infrastructure developed while setting the theater to respond to adversary aggressions or threats. While this preparation and experience provide Army forces, allies, and other coalition forces with a good starting point in mature theaters, the transition into crisis will most likely be chaotic, and it will present Army leaders with unforeseen challenges that require rapid response. Army forces therefore build upon the information, human, and physical advantages gained during competition to mitigate friction, deter adversaries, and when necessary, transition into armed conflict. P HYSICAL A DVANTAGES D URING C RISIS 5-11. Achieving physical advantage during crisis consists of working with host-nation forces to form a credible defense and ensuring the survivability of allied forces in theater. If there is key or decisive terrain, Army forces and host-nation partners may seek to deter adversaries by setting a defense of that ground early in a crisis. Army forces in theater assume conflict is imminent and take all available measures to protect against attack in every domain where an attack could occur. 5-12. During crisis, Army combat power will likely be limited initially to a small number of forward-stationed forces, those forces that can draw Army pre-positioned stocks (APSAPSArmy pre-positioned stocks) rapidly, and forces used to threaten adversary forces with forcible entry into their area of operations (AO). This combat power will most likely be used in a defensive posture until the JFC receives enough land forces to make offensive operations feasible. The intent should be to increase the combat power of Army forces to a point where they can credibly threaten adversary forces with offensive operations. Ideally, this will deter further enemy action. If, however, deterrence fails, this force facilitates armed conflict that will terminate on terms favorable to U.S. interests. In well-developed theaters, Army combat power will likely be forward stationed and integrated with partner forces as a key part of their defensive plans. This landpower network can disrupt an enemy’s initial attack. It enhances the security of strategic LOCs and facilitates the integration of additional forces into the theater. I NFORMATION A DVANTAGES D URING C RISIS 5-13. Two key information activities are protecting friendly information and degrading the threat’s ability to communicate, sense, make effective decisions, and maintain influence with relevant actors and populations. An example is the use of strategic messaging to undermine the credibility of an adversary by exposing violations of international law and showing that adversary narratives are false. Achieving information advantages is a commander-driven, combined arms activity that employs capabilities from every warfighting function. During crisis, commanders lead their staffs to refine information activities based upon plans and processes developed during competition. Examples include commanders and staffs focusing on the challenges and tasks of establishing a mission-partner environment, building or modifying an intelligence architecture, and creating or refining common operating procedures with allies and other partners. H UMAN A DVANTAGES D URING C RISIS 5-14. While enduring relationships with alliance and coalition partners may be in place at the theater strategic level as a crisis develops, at the operational and tactical levels it is likely that units have less experience operating with one another. Forces deploying into a theater may have experience working with the security forces of partner nations if they were regionally aligned or worked together in a professional military education or training setting, but most will not have such experience. This requires leaders who have worked with joint and multinational partners to focus their staffs on the most critical interoperability tasks necessary for effective coalition operations. It also requires awareness of the difficulty in fully understanding situations when dealing with other cultures. Theater army liaison networks enable simultaneous in-theater training exercises alongside Army force deployments. This facilitates early shared understanding, helping leaders and subordinate units integrate with allied and partner forces in the most expeditious and efficient manner possible while also signaling determination to adversaries. Demonstrated readiness for combat operations and interoperability among U.S., allied, and partner forces helps to upset adversary risk calculations and deter further aggression. ARMY SUPPORT TO THE JOINT FORCE DURING CRISIS 5-15. The military supports unified action partners during crisis by providing flexible deterrent and response options. A flexible deterrent option (FDO) is a planning construct intended to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions carefully tailored to create a desired effect. A flexible response option (FRO) is a military capability specifically task-organized for effective reaction to an enemy threat or attack and adaptable to the existing circumstances of a crisis. FDOs and FROs occur across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (known as DIME) instruments of national power, and they are not just confined to the military. They are most effective when integrated and implemented in a nearly simultaneous manner. Examples of simultaneous FDO and FRO actions are shown in figure 5-1. (See JP 5-0 for additional examples of diplomatic, economic, information, and joint force FDOs and FROs.) 5-16. Determining what threat and enemy forces perceive as important will inform U.S. understanding of their desired end state, associated courses of action, and employment of forces. This allows strategic leaders to determine the appropriate amount of military force to apply in concert with diplomatic, information, and economic activities to prevent adversaries from achieving their objectives. Examples of Army contributions that can deploy rapidly to support joint flexible deterrent and response options are contained in table 5-1.

The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on. Ulysses S. Grant Section I of this chapter introduces large-scale combat operations and the ways in which they vary. It addresses topics applicable to both offensive and defensive operations, including enemy methods, relative advantages, integrating with the joint force, defeat mechanisms, and enabling operations. Section II describes defensive operations. Section III describes offensive operations. Section IV describes transition to post-conflict competition and stability operations.

The basic objectives and principles of war do not change. The final objective in war is the destruction of the enemy’s capacity and will to fight, and thereby force him to accept the imposition of the victor’s will. This submission has been accomplished in the past by pressure in and from each of the elements of land and sea, and during World War I and II, in and from the air as well. The optimum pressure is exerted through that absolute control obtained by actual physical occupation. This optimum is obtainable only on land where physical occupation can be consolidated and maintained. Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, United States Navy This chapter describes Army operations in a predominantly maritime environment. It begins with a discussion of the unique characteristics and challenges posed by maritime regions. It continues with a discussion of maritime planning considerations, and it concludes with a description of a potential operational approach for a maritime environment.

Success ultimately rests on small things, lots of small things. Leaders have to have a feel for small things - a feel for what is going on in the depths of an organization where small things reside. General Colin Powell This chapter describes basic doctrine for combat leadership. It begins with a discussion of the art of command, and it describes the impact of a commander’s competence, presence, decision making during operations, and risk acceptance. It then describes the role of commanders in driving the operations process. The chapter concludes by discussing how leaders adapt their formations for missions while developing junior leaders and teams. THE ART OF COMMAND AND THE COMMANDER 8-1. The commander’s chief responsibilities during operations are to develop effective tactics and to lead and direct the unit in executing them. Soldiers want and willingly follow leaders who win. The most important quality for commanders or other leaders is competence. Good leaders understand tactics, the abilities of their own and enemy units, and what is possible in any situation. Combined arms competence is the combat commander’s greatest contribution to winning. Effective commanders lead and inspire their subordinates to fight and win based upon that competence, while ensuring unity of purpose and unity of effort. They do this through a combination of processes, the staffs and subordinate leaders they empower, and their personal example and influence. While the commander is the primary leader of a formation, all leaders play an important role in carrying out their higher echelon commander’s intent as they provide command and control (C2) to their own subordinates during operations. 8-2. Commanders and their subordinate leaders’ decisions, examples, inspired actions, and will to win determine success or failure. The commander is the focal point for the employment of staff processes that inform the judgment critical for rapid, effective decision making. Commanders must rapidly make difficult decisions with confidence and skill, accepting risk to create and exploit fleeting opportunities. They conceive and implement sound operational and tactical solutions with the speed and force necessary to win. They also seek staff officers and subordinates who are proficient at their specialties and use them to make the unit tactically effective. 8-3. Commanders have a moral responsibility to ensure their units are prepared for combat. They prepare them through realistic training that reinforces individual and small-unit task and battle drill proficiency, collective proficiency in the execution of mission essential tasks under the most demanding conditions, and the development of staffs able to integrate the warfighting functions and joint capabilities in combined arms approaches against enemy forces. Commanders resource training and protect subordinates’ training time. They establish the command climate within their unit, direct staffs and subordinates during operations, and continually assess all aspects of their performance. They build trust, develop their subordinates’ competence and confidence, encourage subordinate commanders to think critically, and demand that they demonstrate initiative within the commander’s intent. Lastly, they prepare subordinates to assume responsibility one and two echelons above their current assignment so that they can effectively assume control of the larger formation when required to because of casualties or lost communications. 8-4. Commanders make decisions informed by judgment grounded in their experience, expertise, intuition, and self-awareness. Judgment is the single most important leadership attribute applicable to selecting the critical time and place to act, assigning missions, prioritizing, managing risk, and allocating resources. Thorough knowledge of military science, a strong ethical sense, and an understanding of enemy and friendly capabilities across domains form the basis of the judgment required of commanders. Judgment becomes more refined as commanders become more experienced, and good judgment becomes even more essential in ambiguous or uncertain operational environments. Self-awareness and experience help commanders become more expert about assessing situations and receiving assistance from their staffs. Self-awareness is required to assess one’s self and to earn the trust of those one commands. Judgment allows commanders to distinguish between risk acceptance essential to successful operations and potentially disastrous rashness. The commander’s judgment and experience help shape information requirements and staff priorities during operations. Subordinate commanders and staffs collaborate to provide the most relevant information in the most effective format for the commander to make sound decisions. APPLYING THE ART OF COMMAND 8-5. Command is more art than science because it requires commanders exercise their judgment, leverage their experience, and use their intuition when leading their units. Commanders apply the art of command by providing leadership, delegating authority, allocating resources, and making decisions. Subordinates operating within the commander’s intent facilitate unity of effort to create and exploit relative advantages. Higher echelon leaders provide subordinate echelons access to information and the authority to use Army and joint capabilities through delegation. Leaders delegate appropriate authority to subordinates based on an assessment of their competence, talents, and experience. C OMMANDER P RESENCE ON THE B ATTLEFIELD One of the most valuable qualities of a commander is a flair for putting himself in the right place at the right time. Field Marshal Sir William Slim 8-6. Commanders provide leadership in combat to inspire their Soldiers, especially in challenging situations. Command presence is the influence commanders have on those around them, through their physical presence, communications, demeanor, and personal example. Commanders establish command presence through personal interaction with subordinates, either physically or virtually through C2 systems, and demonstrating their character, competence, dignity, strength of conviction, and empathy prior to and throughout operations. 8-7. Commanders go where they can best influence operations, assess units, and improve unity of effort. Where commanders place themselves on the battlefield is one of the most important decisions they can make. Commanding forward allows commanders to effectively assess and manage the effects of operations on their formations through face-to-face interactions. It allows them to gather information about actual combat conditions, but it must be balanced against the requirement to be where the best overall situational awareness can be maintained for the entire formation. As far as operational conditions allow, leadership should be exercised up front at critical times and places without interfering with subordinate leader prerogatives, becoming unreachable by other elements of the unit, or making it simpler for the enemy to target multiple echelons of leadership in one place. 8-8. At the battalion level and below, commanders lead by personal example, acquire much information themselves, and communicate face to face with those they direct. Typically, they position themselves well forward to influence the main effort during different phases of an operation. However, even at these levels, commanders cannot provide direct leadership for their whole unit given the challenges of maintaining continuous communications when units are dispersed or in contested electromagnetic environments. Through training and leader development, Army leaders make the tenets and imperatives part of disciplined unit cultures. 8-9. At higher levels, echeloned command posts are central to effective C2. During operations, commanders must assess the situation up front as often as possible without being disruptive to the focus of subordinate commanders. They deliberately plan and organize their C2 approach to mitigate their loss of broad situational understanding during battlefield circulation by the development of subordinate commanders and staff officers empowered to make decisions on the commander’s behalf to exploit opportunities and respond to changing circumstances without needing to ask permission. 8-10. Commanders convey importance and focus the efforts of the command by how they communicate, regardless of where they are physically located. A calm and authoritative tone of voice generates a sense of presence, as does a crisp and efficient manner of providing guidance; both require practice to master. No matter their location, effective commanders encourage their troops, sense their morale, and inspire through personal example. Commanders balance the risk of commanding forward with necessity to build trust by depending upon subordinates to accurately report and demonstrate initiative in their portion of an area of operations (AO). Lieutenant General Eichelberger’s actions to identify and address problems faced by the 32d Infantry Division in Buna in 1942 provide an effective example of commanding forward. Commanding Forward-LTG Eichelberger at Buna In autumn 1942, U.S. forces were attempting to establish positions from which to drive the Japanese from New Guinea and the adjacent islands. The 32d Infantry Division was to eliminate Japanese positions near the village of Buna. By the end of November, however, the division had made little progress, and General Douglas MacArthur sent Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger, I Corps commander, there to correct the situation. Eichelberger’s instructions were to “remove all officers who won’t fight [and]... if necessary, put sergeants in charge of battalions and corporals in charge of companies.” Eichelberger and his staff arrived on 2 December and were disturbed by what they observed: Soldiers were suffering from a number of tropical diseases. Rations were scant. There was little discipline or military courtesy. Morale was low. Organization was very poor. Only a few Soldiers were at the front line; many were in the rear areas, sent there initially to recover from illness or injury, but now under no one’s effective control. Fearing the jungle, Soldiers were afraid to patrol and, consequently, did not know the location of Japanese positions. Leadership at all levels was ineffective. Eichelberger moved quickly to address these problems. He had supplies flown in and distributed so that Soldiers became better fed, clothed, and medically treated. He stopped offensive operations for two days to reestablish effective C2. Patrols were sent out nightly, and Japanese positions identified. Several commanders, including the division commander, were replaced with officers who could instill a more disciplined and aggressive attitude. Eichelberger was frequently near the front, wearing his rank openly to show his Soldiers their commander was present. In addition to demonstrating to his men that he was willing to share the same risks, Eichelberger was able to observe battlefield conditions personally, leading to better commander’s visualization. By 3 January 1943, after a series of resolute-albeit costly-attacks, the 32d Infantry Division had overcome organized resistance at Buna. Eichelberger’s actions reversed the tide of battle in the theater. From a collection of demoralized units, he created a fighting force that stopped the Japanese advance. 8-11. Physical presence allows commanders to gain firsthand appreciation for the situation that they can rarely gain any other way. Face-to-face discussions in their own or subordinate command posts and forward presence allow commanders to see things that may not be conveyed by C2 systems. Forward presence demonstrates a willingness to share danger and hardship, and it provides an opportunity to motivate subordinates. Commanders should avoid putting their subordinates at additional risk when they are forward, however, since the enemy is likely to quickly target senior commanders when their location becomes obvious. The same consideration applies to their own command posts, which should disperse their footprint and reposition often enough to complicate enemy targeting. The following factors, common to all levels of command, may influence where commanders position themselves: • The need to understand the situation. • The need to make decisions. • The need to communicate. • The need to motivate subordinates. 8-12. Commanders delegate authorities to subordinate leaders for the conduct of operations based on their judgment of their capabilities. This allows the commander to be elsewhere, potentially in a location that permits broader perspective and understanding. It also enables faster decision making in contested environments than if both leaders were in the same location, and it prevents the need for continuous communication. Continuous communication allows enemy forces to detect and target commanders, subordinates, and command posts. It should be avoided whenever possible. Exercising a mission command approach to C2 and delegating the broadest possible authorities to subordinate leaders empowers them to exploit opportunities and conduct more effective distributed operations. C OMMANDER ’ S I NTENT 8-13. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of an operation and the desired objectives and military end state (JP 3-0). The commander’s intent succinctly describes what constitutes success for the operation. It facilitates unity of effort as it allows subordinates to understand what is expected of them, what constraints apply, and most importantly, why the mission is being conducted. Understanding why a mission is conducted is important both in maintaining unity of effort and in bolstering the morale and will of subordinates. Soldiers who understand why they are called upon for a specific mission, and how that mission aligns with the higher echelon commander’s intent and concept of operations, are more committed to the success of that specific mission. 8-14. Commanders communicate their intent two echelons down to ensure subordinates understand the boundaries within which they may exercise initiative while maintaining unity of effort. They likewise understand the commander’s intent two echelons above them. A clear and concise commander’s intent should be easily remembered and understood even without an order. Commanders collaborate with subordinates to ensure their commander’s intent is understood. Soldiers who understand the commander’s intent are more able to exercise disciplined initiative in unexpected situations than those who do not. I NITIATIVE The fog of war works both ways. The enemy is as much in the dark as you are. BE BOLD! General George S. Patton 8-15. Leaders at every echelon exercise initiative as they follow orders and adhere to a course of action or scheme of maneuver. When the enemy does something unexpected, or a new threat or opportunity emerges that offers a greater chance of success, subordinate leaders take action to adjust to the new situation and achieve their commander’s intent. Disciplined initiative requires a bias towards action rather than waiting on new orders. The mission command approach to C2 demands subordinates exercise initiative in the absence of orders, when current orders no longer apply, or when an opportunity or new threat presents itself. The cumulative effect of multiple subordinate commanders, leaders, and individual Soldiers exercising initiative produces agility in Army formations. It enables Army forces to seize the operational initiative as they pose multiple dilemmas on enemy forces. 8-16. Commanders and subordinate leaders develop subordinates capable of exercising effective initiative during both training events and operations. Leaders create opportunities during training events in which subordinates must act on their own. Commanders must foster a climate that encourages initiative during training, before the unit is committed to combat. Accepting risk and underwriting good faith mistakes establishes a unit culture that allows subordinates to learn and gain the experience they need to operate under their own responsibility. Endurance requires that the burdens of combat leadership be shared between leaders at each echelon, which is not possible without a leadership culture that demands disciplined initiative. D ISCIPLINE 8-17. Discipline underpins the effective application of initiative during operations. For many parts of an operation, the benefits of exercising disciplined initiative outweigh the cost in synchronization. At other times, when synchronization or a specific process is critical to successful execution, ill-advised initiative can be costly. Neither commanders nor subordinates are independent actors when exercising initiative. Subordinates consider at least two factors when deciding how to exercise initiative, assessing each in terms of the circumstances affecting it: • Whether the benefits of the action outweigh the risk of desynchronizing the overall operation. • Whether the action will further attainment of the desired end state. (See ADP 6-0 for more information on disciplined initiative.) A CCEPTING R ISK TO C REATE AND E XPLOIT O PPORTUNITIES 8-18. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent to all military operations. The pace and tempo of large-scale combat operations demands a high level of expertise for commanders and staffs. Commanders delegate risk acceptance to subordinates through their commander’s intent and other guidance. Based on this guidance, refined as necessary by the commander and staff as the situation changes, leaders accept risk during operations by massing effects in one area while taking economy of force measures in other areas to create opportunities that can be exploited. Understanding how much or what kind of risk to accept requires the ability to accurately see friendly and enemy forces and an operational environment in the context of a particular situation. Leaders and staff officers who are competent in all aspects of their specialties assist the commander in weighing the risk of various decisions and courses of action, balancing short-term versus long-term risk to the mission and the force. This analysis, coupled with imagination and the courage to act boldly, provides opportunities that outweigh the risk incurred. Successful commanders are aware of the effects of cumulative risk over time, and therefore they continuously assess it throughout an operation. 8-19. Opportunities to exploit a relative advantage are fleeting during large-scale combat operations against a capable enemy that adapts quickly. Delaying action while setting optimal conditions, waiting for perfect intelligence, or achieving greater synchronization may end up posing a greater danger than swift acceptance of significant risk now. Leaders’ judgment of risk must be thoroughly informed by their understanding of their operational environment, particularly how actions in other domains impact their forces and how their forces can generate effects outside the land domain. Leaders maintain a common operational picture with their counterparts in higher and lower echelons, since any risk accepted at one echelon may impose additional risk at other echelons. (See paragraphs 8-47 and 8-48 for further discussion on communicating with subordinates.) 8-20. Contingency planning enables commanders to quickly decide and act when the unexpected occurs. By considering multiple enemy courses of action, available friendly capabilities, and developing appropriate branch and sequel plans, the staff and the commander develop a deeper appreciation for how an operation could unfold and build flexibility into their plans. Contingency planning also guards against confirmation bias, where situational cues are interpreted in ways that match preconceived ideas. Effective planning expands understanding of a situation and operational environment, allowing the commander and staff to be better postured to rapidly decide, adjust, or simply be proactive. 8-21. Commanders designate commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) linked to decision points during operations and the execution of branch and sequel plans developed during contingency planning. CCIRs help subordinate leaders prioritize allocation of information collection assets and other limited resources, including time. Detailed contingency planning and the development of CCIRs ensure that commanders and staffs are proactive rather than reactive in responding to enemy activity. CCIRs potentially become irrelevant as the situation changes; therefore, commanders, staffs, and other leaders must regularly review and update CCIRs to ensure relevance throughout the conduct of operations. This is a forcing function for questioning earlier assumptions made during planning that may no longer be valid. (See ADP 2-0 and ADP 6-0 for more detailed descriptions of what constitutes CCIR.) 8-22. Commanders and staffs remain alert to exceptional information during operations. Exceptional information results from an unexpected event or opportunity, or a new threat, which directly affects the success of operations. It would have been a CCIR if it had been foreseen. Identifying exceptional information requires initiative from subordinates, shared understanding of the situation, a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent, and the exercise of judgement based on experience. C OMMAND AND C ONTROL D URING D EGRADED OR D ENIED C OMMUNICATIONS 8-23. U.S. adversaries, including Russia and China, have demonstrated the ability to contest communications in the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and degrade friendly C2. Degraded connectivity to a secure communications network poses risks to situational understanding, C2, and ultimately mission accomplishment. Army forces must be prepared to continue operations and achieve mission objectives when out of contact with higher echelons or adjacent units. They should assume intermittent rather than continuous connectivity during operations. A mission command approach to C2 empowers subordinate leaders to act within the commander’s intent with degraded communications, reporting their new situation when able to do so. 8-24. Exercising C2 with degraded connectivity does not begin when communications breakdown or when a crisis develops. It must be trained and rehearsed as part of an overall cultural norm designed to make friendly forces more difficult to detect. Commanders ensure that staffs are trained on analog and manual C2, and that units have rehearsed reliable primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communications plans. During extended periods of communication breakdown, C2 becomes more difficult as shared understanding of a situation deteriorates over time. To maintain C2 with degraded communication, personnel should be trained and proficient in— • Employing all available C2 systems. • Operating dispersed command posts. • Maintaining an other-than-digital common operational picture (COP). • Managing information with analog processes. • Monitoring communications channels and crosstalk across echelons. • Maintaining manual running staff estimates. • Conducting command post battle drills. 8-25. Army forces improve readiness for degraded communications by decreasing vulnerabilities and preparing appropriately. Units decrease their vulnerability through electromagnetic protection, including emission control, electromagnetic masking, electromagnetic hardening, and electromagnetic security. (See FM 3-12 for more information on electromagnetic protection.) Units practice degraded communications during training and rehearsals, including those that involve allies, and they use the mission command approach to C2 during garrison events. Ultimately, the solution to degraded communications is mission command and training. Even under severely degraded conditions, Army forces continue to make decisions and act in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities arise. 8-26. All leaders must be prepared to act and make timely decisions when communication is not possible. The commander responsible for a decision may not be available to make that decision for a variety of reasons, such as jammed communications, the loss of a command post, or being killed by the enemy. In all cases, the senior leader able to communicate must be ready to take charge and make the best decisions possible based on available information so operations can continue. Navy pilots demonstrated the effectiveness of exercising disciplined initiative through their actions in a degraded communications environment during the battle of Midway. Initiative in the Absence of Orders - Squadron Commanders at Midway On 4 June 1942, American naval aviators, acting on initiative and without communications from higher echelon headquarters, struck a major blow in the Pacific War at the Battle of Midway. The Japanese First Air Fleet, known as Kido Butai, launched a massive raid against Midway Island, causing significant damage. The American carriers Hornet, Enterprise, and Yorktown launched unsynchronized strikes against Kido Butai by several different air groups. Once aloft these carrier groups were soon beyond radio range of their ships and had to rely on prior intelligence, intuition, and luck to find the enemy. Lieutenant Commander John Waldron, commander of Torpedo 8 (Hornet), believed his air group commander was leading the group on an incorrect heading. He broke formation and led his squadron on another course. They found the Japanese carriers and attacked, but the entire squadron was shot down because it had no fighter cover. The torpedo bombers of Torpedo 6 (Enterprise) followed Waldron’s squadron and also suffered heavy losses without scoring a hit. The dive bombers of Bombing 6 (Enterprise) and Scouting 6 (Enterprise) had launched earlier in the day and arrived at their designated coordinates without finding the enemy. Lieutenant Commander Clarence McClusky, commander of Bombing 6, could not radio back to the Enterprise for further orders. Exercising disciplined initiative, he began to search the area despite running low on fuel and found a Japanese destroyer, which he followed to Kido Butai just as Japanese fighters completed the destruction of Torpedo 8 and Torpedo 6. The Japanese fighters and anti-aircraft guns were entirely focused on the low altitude attacks from the torpedo bombers, leaving them vulnerable to a high-altitude dive-bombing run. McClusky ordered an attack by Bombing 6 which, by chance, occurred at the same time as Bombing 3 (Yorktown) arrived on the scene. Acting on their own initiative to carry out the mission, two squadrons fatally damaged three Japanese carriers, the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu, which sank later in the day, putting the formerly outnumbered Americans at a 3:1 advantage in aircraft carriers. Commanders like Waldron and McClusky, out of contact with higher commands and acting on their own initiative, performed in a way that led to victory at Midway. DRIVING THE OPERATIONS PROCESS 8-27. Commanders employ the operations process to incorporate coalition and joint partners, empower subordinate initiative, and to ensure authorities and risk acceptance are delegated to the appropriate echelon required for the situation. Staffs and subordinate headquarters earn the commander’s trust by providing relevant information, anticipating needs, and directing supporting actions. (See ADP 5-0 for more information on the operations process and FM 6-0 for more on the role of commanders in operations.) 8-28. The major components of the operations process are planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. Planning normally begins upon receipt of orders from a higher echelon headquarters and continues through the execution of the operation. The commander and staff continually assess operations and revise the plan through fragmentary orders. Commanders, assisted by their chiefs of staff or executive officers, drive the preparation for an operation by allocating time, prioritizing resources, and supervising preparation activities such as rehearsals to ensure their forces are ready to execute operations. During execution, commanders and staffs focus their efforts on translating plans into direct action to achieve objectives in accordance with higher commander’s intent. (See figure 8-1 on page 198 for a graphic depiction of the operations process.) U NDERSTAND 8-29. An operational environment includes portions of the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains encompassing the AO and area of interest, understood through three dimensions-human, physical, and information. Understanding how capabilities employed from each of the domains influence outcomes in the three dimensions is foundational to success during operations. Commanders communicate that understanding to subordinates. Commanders collaborate with their staffs, other commanders, and mission partners to accurate frame the operational environment encompassing the mission objectives. Commanders must be comfortable with a certain degree of uncertainty and ambiguity within an operational environment-delaying action while seeking perfect understanding may prevent a unit from exploiting a fleeting opportunity or make it vulnerable to enemy attack. 8-30. Commanders, supported by their operations and intelligence staff sections, direct the collection of information and allocate capabilities from as many domains as possible. They use operational and mission variables, intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and running estimates to help understand how capabilities in each domain affect operations on land and vice versa. Competent commanders circulate throughout their areas of responsibilities (AORs) as often as possible, collaborating with subordinate commanders and leaders while observing the situation for themselves. Subordinates often possess a deeper or more nuanced sense of the local situation or aspect of an operation than commanders. Direct exposure to conditions on the ground often allows them to detect trouble or opportunity before a higher echelon staff member does. Maintaining shared understanding is therefore a dynamic, ongoing process, since situations change as operations progress. V ISUALIZE 8-31. Commanders visualize a desired end state and potential solutions to solve or manage identified problems. Commanders look up, out, and down as they develop their visualization of an operational environment, relying on information and observations from superior and adjacent commanders, their staffs, and subordinate commanders. An operational approach may require capabilities provided by external organizations, and the effects delivered may be dependent on conditions in other domains. D ESCRIBE 8-32. Commanders describe their visualization to staffs and subordinate commanders to facilitate shared understanding and purpose. Through collaboration and dialogue, commanders ensure subordinates understand the visualization well enough to plan and conduct operations. Commanders continue to refine their visualization throughout the planning and execution of an operation and balance frequent communication of this updated visualization with the need to provide sufficient time and freedom of maneuver to subordinate leaders. Commanders’ descriptions of their visualizations should account for interdependencies among various domains and the desired end states within those domains. D IRECT 8-33. Commanders direct action to achieve results and lead forces to mission accomplishment. Decision making and timely sharing of information ensures friendly forces reach a position of advantage relative to the enemy. Commanders who can sense, understand, decide, act, and assess faster and more effectively than enemy commanders can impose multiple dilemmas, requiring enemy forces to dedicate resources and combat power which otherwise might further their objectives. Communications systems and other technologies can help enable shared understanding, but leaders must take care to ensure they do not become overly reliant on technical solutions that may not always be available. L EAD 8-34. Leadership is the most decisive element of combat power. Effective leadership can compensate for deficiencies, while poor leadership can negate advantages. Commanders lead by personal example, the quality of the guidance they provide throughout the operations process, and the actions they take during the execution of operations. They focus on the decisions only they can make. Operations encompassing the employment of capabilities from multiple domains demand rapid adjustments based on brief windows of opportunity. Tactical patience is required to develop the conditions that create those opportunities over time. When making or changing decisions, the commander’s will and personal presence provides the moral impetus for necessary action in a timely manner. Friction is inherent in all military operations, and leadership exerted by commanders and their subordinate leaders is what overcomes it. A SSESS 8-35. Commanders, supported by their staffs, assess the situation before execution and throughout operations to understand conditions and determine what decisions they must or are likely to make. They compare the state of current operations to what was anticipated or planned, remain alert to variance from expectations, and watch for information indicating an emerging threat or opportunity. Continuous assessment helps commanders anticipate and adapt their forces to changing circumstances, enabling friendly forces to counter unexpected threats or exploit opportunities. Effective commanders encourage cross talk and dialogue between superior, subordinate, and adjacent staffs, and they conduct dialogue between commanders to share observations and maintain situational understanding. They continuously review assumptions and cumulative risk. Commanders must not be overly fixated on what is happening or may happen on the ground in the physical dimension. Not assessing the relevant events occurring in other domains, or not considering the information or human dimensions, increases the odds that enemy forces can achieve surprise. ADAPTING FORMATIONS FOR MISSIONS AND TRANSITIONS 8-36. The conduct of successful operations requires leaders and units that can anticipate changes and quickly adapt their formations, dispositions, or activities to meet those changes. Anticipating and adapting to changes begins with commanders, but all leaders help create agile and adaptive units, develop subordinates, inspire resilience in their people, and maintain mission focus in the face of adversity. 8-37. Changing conditions and transitions may impact the teamwork and cohesion of a formation; both require adaptation and leader attention. Some examples include— • Task organization changes. • New or changing guidance. • Periods of intense privation and fatigue. • Mission transitions. • Mission failures or setbacks. • Reconstitution. The example of VII Corps actions during the Gulf War demonstrate how teamwork and cohesion allow units to rapidly adapt and act when situations quickly change. Crosstalk in the Desert-VII Corps in the Gulf War On the morning of 17 January 1991, the day after the start of U.S. Central Command’s major air operation against Iraq, the VII Corps commander, Lieutenant General Frederick Franks, was with the 1st Infantry Division as it honed tank and Bradley gunnery skills in the desert of Saudi Arabia. While there, he received a spot report from Brigadier General John Landry, Corps Chief of Staff, over the radio: “55 Iraqi tanks have crossed the Kuwaiti Border, heading southwest toward Hafir al-Batin and are engaging Egyptian coalition forces in what may be the beginnings of an Iraqi preemptive strike.” Within seconds, Colonel Johnnie Hitt, commander of the Corps’ 11th Aviation Brigade, entered the net indicating that he had monitored the report and alerted two Apache battalions that could respond in 30 minutes if necessary. At the same time, Colonel Don Holder, commander of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Corps unit closest to the reported enemy, called to notify Franks that he had issued orders for the entire regiment to occupy blocking positions in the area and to make contact with the enemy force with air and ground scouts. Those were the immediate and correct actions taken by commanders as a result of monitoring the command network and having the confidence to act—confidence developed through training, teamwork, and trust among the key players of the VII Corps team. 8-38. Commanders are responsible for developing subordinate leaders and units that can adapt to the environment and the dynamic nature of operations. Training is the primary opportunity to do so, and all leaders must work to be experts at training formations and developing subordinates during that training. Successful adaptation and leader development depends on a command climate and learning environment that encourages subordinates at all levels to become subject matter experts, think independently, and take the initiative. Using a mission command approach, leaders foster a sense of shared commitment and involvement in decision making. (See FM 6-22 for more information on leader development in a learning environment.) Leaders help establish the conditions for subordinate adaptation by— • Developing leadership experience. • Fostering shared understanding. • Communicating with staff and subordinates. • Developing teams. D EVELOPING L EADERSHIP E XPERIENCE Judgment comes from experience and experience comes from bad judgment. General of the Army Omar N. Bradley 8-39. Commanders and leaders develop subordinates when they prepare and then challenge them with greater responsibility, authority, and accountability. They prepare their subordinates to succeed at the next level of responsibility, since during combat many subordinates will be required to move up and replace more senior leaders who become casualties, usually with no warning. It is the individual professional responsibility of all leaders to develop their subordinates. (See FM 6-22 for more information on leader development.) 8-40. Commanders and leaders may develop their subordinates by observing them in training, accepting subordinates’ risk taking when the consequences of failure are not decisive, and providing accurate feedback. Leaders allow subordinates to accept risk on their behalf. They ensure subordinates make analytic risk decisions as time and circumstances allow, while informing their higher echelon command of the risks they are accepting. During training, leaders may allow subordinates to accept excessive tactical risk as a teaching point to ensure they learn what types of risk are acceptable, which are not, and how to better assess risk. This sort of coaching helps leaders gain trust in their subordinates’ judgment and initiative, and it builds subordinates’ trust in their leader. During operations, leaders intervene when subordinates accept risk that exceeds the potential tactical benefits to the mission. Leaders inform subordinates, either at the time of the decision (if time permits) or in an after-action review, of the residual risk accepted and why. They ensure that risk management does not become risk aversion. 8-41. Inculcating risk acceptance goes hand in hand with accepting mistakes made in good faith. Subordinates who learn from bad decisions become better leaders, and commanders who underwrite those mistakes create a command climate where subordinates learn and gain the experience required to thrive under hardship. Leaders reinforce the importance of a bias towards action by highlighting the value of simply making a decision during operations, including imperfect decisions. Even so, commanders do not repeatedly underwrite subordinates’ mistakes resulting from repeated lack of judgment or an inability to learn. Nor do they tolerate repeated errors of omission or inaction where subordinates fail to exercise initiative. Leaders act to ensure subordinates learn from mistakes. Methods of doing this include— • Publicly discussing a mistake as part of an after-action review, including one made by the leader, to determine a better way to achieve the same purpose. • Correcting a subordinate directly, in situations when there is no time for an after-action review or to enable better shared understanding by the entire team. • Correcting the systemic problem that enabled the mistake. 8-42. Commanders prepare their subordinates to take their place when required, and they use training events and professional development sessions to reinforce the necessity of exercising bold, appropriate initiative. In addition to allowing progress over time, this prepares leaders to quickly assume greater responsibilities immediately during combat. If an echelon of command is destroyed or otherwise made mission ineffective during combat operations, a subordinate leader must assume command as quickly as possible. This may include elements of a subordinate echelon commander and staff assuming the responsibilities of a higher echelon headquarters. Commanders and leaders at all levels are in control of their subordinates during a battle only to the extent that they can communicate. The senior leader able to communicate with most of a formation in a fight needs to quickly take charge when it becomes apparent that the normal chain of command is no longer functional. This requires leaders to be prepared to operate on radio nets and other C2 systems two echelons up when the need arises. 8-43. Self-awareness enables leaders to recognize their strengths and weaknesses and then to take appropriate action. Leaders develop self-awareness through self-critique and self-regulation during training and operations. They actively seek feedback, adapt to change, and possess the humility to accurately examine their own experiences, performance, judgment, and decision making. Under rapidly changing conditions, leaders’ self-awareness is a critical factor in making accurate assessments of changes and their own personal capabilities to operate effectively in those conditions. F OSTERING S HARED U NDERSTANDING 8-44. Shared understanding enables a mission command approach to C2. Commanders communicate their intent two echelons down, and leaders look two echelons up to gain an understanding of the commander’s intent, priorities of effort, and desired end state for operations. Commanders ensure understanding of their intent during continuous dialogue with their subordinates. When relayed in an environment of mutual trust and shared understanding, the commander’s intent frees commanders to move about the battlefield knowing that their subordinates understand the end state and what must be done to achieve it, even as conditions change. Such climates allow leaders to operate knowing subordinates accurately and promptly report both positive and negative information. Prompt and accurate reporting is critical in maintaining the tempo of decentralized operations by dispersed forces along multiple axes. 8-45. Establishing shared understanding begins with leaders who educate and train themselves and their subordinates in applicable allied, joint, and Army doctrine and common tasks, techniques, and procedures. Training develops the teamwork, trust, and shared understanding that commanders need to exercise mission command, and that forces need to achieve unity of effort. This is especially important when units are task-organized and have different command structures than they had prior to an operation. 8-46. Coalition, joint, and Army C2 systems can enable distributed operations in a permissive environment. Some systems, however, will be degraded by enemy or other action to a point that they may not be usable. In these instances, the previously developed shared understanding enables subordinate leaders to take effective action on their own while still working towards their commander’s end state. (See paragraphs 8-23 through 8-26 for more information on degraded communications and leadership.) C OMMUNICATING WITH S TAFF AND S UBORDINATES More than 50 percent of battle command in VII Corps was non-electric. That’s because we were a team forged together quickly during deployment. We practiced using intent. Commanders talked to each other. We were inside each other’s heads. Lieutenant General Frederick Franks 8-47. Written orders continue to have an indispensable place in exercising C2, particularly before operations commence and during their early stages. Clearly written orders promote consistency of approach in all areas of C2, and they provide a common frame of reference from which to depart. During operations, oral communications tend to be more important than written communications, for reasons of time and because of the importance of personal interaction while leading. Face-to-face communication is the most effective method because humans use more than words to express themselves and understand each other. It is, however, impossible to communicate face-to-face with all subordinates during engagements and battles. Operations at the brigade combat team (BCTBCTBasic combat training)-level and below during close combat are largely dependent upon rapid, efficient tactical radio communications. The military bearing of leaders when interacting in person, and the tone of voice they use during communications when not in person, have significant impacts on their subordinates. 8-48. Effective leaders take positive steps that encourage, rather than impede, communications among and with their subordinates and staff members. They make themselves available for dialogue, and they are open to new information. Leaders who react rashly to new information, or who create barriers to communication, whether intentional or not, decrease the chances that they will receive the timely information needed to make critical decisions, and they may hinder the initiative of subordinates. Failure to properly receive and act on new information leads to mission failure. D EVELOPING T EAMS 8-49. Successful operations require shared understanding across domains and effective teamwork with the joint and multinational organizations operating in those domains. Developing teams requires continuous effort. It begins during home station activities and continues throughout preparation for and execution of operations. Leaders may serve with unfamiliar subordinate units or serve under an unfamiliar higher echelon headquarters, and they may have their task organization change multiple times during execution. To effectively understand capabilities and lead across domains, Army leaders must also build trust with elements of the joint force and Army units that they may never see to effectively employ their capabilities. They need to interact effectively with host-nation, allied, and partner nation forces, along with interagency and intergovernmental partners, to ensure unity of effort when directing effects controlled by those outside the joint force. 8-50. Operational requirements may cause units to deploy with different command structures than those used at home station. Often they will not have trained with the higher echelon headquarters that employs them. Collaboration and dialogue across echelons can mitigate these potential obstacles to team building. Through these interactions, commanders gain insight into the needs of unfamiliar organizations while also sharing their own vision and understanding. 8-51. By circulating among subordinate units, commanders can assess readiness, get to know new units in the task organization, and personally motivate Soldiers. Leaders also visit and build productive personal relationships with civilian leaders in other agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the local population in their AOs. Knowledge gained during these visits enables commanders to maintain situational understanding and continuously update their visualization prior to and during execution. 8-52. Different levels of training and cultures among organizations can pose challenges to building teams. Army leaders apply their understanding of different cultures and agencies to place military efforts in context and to serve on civil-military teams. To help build partnerships, commanders strive to have partners— • Represented, integrated, and actively involved in planning and coordinating activities. • Share an understanding of the situation and problems to solve. • Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goals. • Work for unity of effort toward achieving common goals. 8-53. Successful operations require leaders working with partners to develop a shared understanding of the environment and a common commitment to solutions. Achieving unity of effort requires Army leaders to have a high degree of cultural understanding and social skills. Without such understanding and skills, leaders may fail to collaborate with diverse partners. 8-54. Quality leader development and training is required to grow and develop leaders capable of success during operations. Deliberate investment in the abilities of individual leaders, teams, and units is foundational to prosecuting those operations successfully across the competition continuum. (See FM 6-0 for more information on C2, FM 6-22 for more information on leader development, FM 7-0 for more information on training, and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 6-22.6 for more information on Army team building.) This page intentionally left blank.

The art of war owns certain elements and fixed principles. We must acquire that theory, and lodge it in our heads—otherwise, we will never get very far. Frederick the Great This appendix discusses the traditional principles of war. It then discusses the principles of joint operations. THE TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF WAR A-1. The nine principles of war represent the most important physical, human, and information factors that affect the conduct of operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The principles are not a checklist. While considered in all operations, they do not apply in the same way to every situation. Rather, they summarize characteristics of historically successful operations. Applied to the study of past campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements, the principles of war are powerful analysis tools. Joint doctrine adds three principles of operations to the nine traditional principles. A-2. Originally derived from J.F.C. Fuller’s published works for the British army, the principles have essentially remained the same over the last century, standing the test of analysis, experimentation, and practice in war. Fuller is not the only influence on the U.S. Army’s theory of victory, which is the sum of over two centuries of experience and study on the art of war and warfare. Eastern and Western military theorists have often debated constants in the nature of war, and the principles of war as currently described are informed by many points of view. Though the theories of victory and operational concepts have evolved to meet the demands of military operations throughout the decades, the principles have stayed relevant. Fuller ended his work in 1926 with a valuable maxim. Quoting Napoleon Bonaparte, he wrote, “The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack.” Fuller closed his 1926 work, The Foundations of the Science of War, by summarizing the quote in three bold words: GUARD, MOVE, HIT. A-3. In Army doctrine, a principle is a comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an organization approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations (ADP 1-01). Principles apply to the conduct of operations in general and to specific organizations or functions. The principles of war are just one example. The nine traditional principles are organized deliberately, enabling a practitioner to begin with actions on the objective and cognitively work backwards to through the process of organizing forces and activities to accomplish their mission. The principles are— • Objective. • Offensive. • Mass. • Economy of force. • Maneuver. • Unity of command. • Security. • Surprise. • Simplicity. O BJECTIVE A-4. When undertaking any mission, commanders should have a clear understanding of the expected outcome and impact. The ultimate military purpose of war is the defeat of the enemy’s armed forces and will to fight using organized violence or the threat of violence. The principle of objective drives all military activity toward that end, with the least possible employment of resources on secondary considerations. This requires a clear vision of the desired end state. Army commanders need to appreciate the political purpose that war aims to achieve, and they need to understand how military conditions contribute to national policy objectives. Commanders cannot separate the objective from the considerations of restraint and legitimacy. Without these considerations, military actions can make strategic objectives unobtainable. A-5. Below the strategic level, objective means ensuring all actions contribute to the goals of the higher echelon headquarters. The attainment of intermediate objectives must be direct, quickly and economically contributing to the ultimate end state. Commanders designate objectives that are decisive to accomplishing the mission. These become the basis for all subordinate plans. Actions that do not contribute to achieving the objective should be avoided. Conversely, determining and denying enemy forces their objectives narrow options for enemy commanders to freely maneuver and exploit emerging opportunities. Denying enemy forces their objectives while achieving the friendly objective is the ultimate purpose of all operations. O FFENSIVE A-6. The principle of offensive suggests that offensive action, or maintaining the initiative, is the most effective and decisive way to pursue and attain a clearly defined common objective. This is fundamentally true across all levels of warfare. When it is necessary to defend, commanders and staffs maintain an aggressive mindset that seeks to attack enemy formations throughout the depth of their positions and sets the conditions for offensive action. The offense ensures that a force captures and holds the initiative, maintains freedom of action, and achieves results. It permits political and military leaders to initiate operations on their own terms, impose their will on the enemy, set favorable conditions for battle, exploit vulnerabilities, and react rapidly to changing situations or emerging developments. No matter the echelon, the side that retains the initiative through offensive action forces its opponent to react, rather than act. A-7. The offensive applies to the operations and activities Army forces conduct in each domain. An operational approach focused only on land can be defeated by opponents exploiting an offensive approach in the other domains. Likewise, an offensive approach should extend to the human and information dimensions of an operational environment. Commanders and staffs maintain an offensive mindset during competition, crisis, and armed conflict. M ASS A-8. Integrating all the elements of combat power and synchronizing their application against a decisive point achieves mass. Mass can be achieved in any of the domains, and it is mostly tied to the destroy defeat mechanism. Massing effects against one or more decisive points in one or more domains is typically an element of convergence. Concentrating forces, which should be done for only as long as necessary to avoid providing the enemy lucrative targets, is typically necessary to achieve favorable ratios during close combat. The massing of effects, together with the proper application of the other principles of war, may enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive campaign and battle outcomes. Mass, like objective, implies that it is best to minimize the use of resources on secondary efforts. The massing of effects at any echelon to produce a desired effect on enemy forces is crucial to enabling maneuver. A-9. Denying enemy forces the ability to mass at the time or place of their choosing is another consideration for applying the principle of mass. Forcing enemy forces to maintain distributed operations, rather than massing effects or forces as they require for success, can keep an enemy force from achieving its objectives, reorganizing, or consolidating gains. E CONOMY OF F ORCE A-10. A commander must employ available combat power in the most efficient way possible, and there is seldom enough combat power available to enjoy a favorable correlation of forces everywhere. Economy of force, a reciprocal of mass, demands the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It requires deliberately accepting risk in selected areas to achieve relative superiority—or overwhelming effects—in others. Economy of force involves the discriminating employment and distribution of forces. Commanders never leave any subordinate element without a purpose. The allocation of available combat power to tasks such as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations is measured to achieve mass elsewhere. Accepting risk through economy of force creates opportunities to exploit. M ANEUVER A-11. Maneuver is coordinated fires and movement in relation to enemy forces to put them at a positional disadvantage with the least cost to friendly forces. Firepower, mobility, protection, and leadership enable maneuver. Intelligence focuses—and sustainment enables—maneuver over distance and time. In the strategic sense, maneuver has three interrelated characteristics: flexibility, mobility, and maneuverability. Flexibility must characterize thought, plans, and operations to maintain the initiative during changing conditions with an adaptive enemy. Flexibility enhances rapid reaction to unforeseen circumstances. Mobility is the capacity to respond rapidly in crisis, move across strategic distances, and move to a position to conduct operational-and tactical-level maneuver. A-12. Tactically, maneuver is about moving forces and firepower into better positions relative to enemy forces to gain a compelling advantage: the ability to destroy enemy forces unless they reposition while making friendly forces more difficult to fix and destroy. It contributes to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative and preserving freedom of action. Maneuver allows commanders to concentrate and disperse forces to keep enemy forces off balance and out of position. Conversely, limiting enemy maneuver keeps them in positions of disadvantage, ideally leading to their eventual destruction or defeat at the time and place of the friendly commander’s choice. U NITY OF C OMMAND A-13. This principle ensures that all efforts focus on a common goal. Unity of command means that a single commander coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective. Cooperation may produce coordination, but giving a single commander the required authority is the most effective way to achieve unity of effort. Ultimately a single commander is responsible for an objective at each echelon. Diffusing responsibility otherwise creates misunderstandings during the stress of combat. Commanders deny enemy forces unity of command by destroying or disrupting enemy command and control (C2), taking action to isolate enemy echelons, and exploiting boundaries between enemy formations. This makes coordination of forces, collaboration of planning, and cohesive operations more challenging for enemy commanders. Denying enemy forces unity of command is crucial to denying them the ability to exploit emerging tactical opportunities. A-14. The joint, interagency, and multinational nature of operations creates situations where the commander does not directly control all organizations in the area of operations (AO). Achieving unity of effort under such conditions becomes the goal, which requires coordination and collaboration among forces-even though they may not be part of the command structure-toward a commonly recognized objective. S ECURITY A-15. Security enhances freedom of action by protecting and preserving combat power while reducing friendly vulnerability to surprise. Every Army formation is responsible for its own security. The application of the principle of security does not suggest overcautiousness or avoidance of risk but rather the unwillingness to cede any advantages to the enemy unnecessarily. Security is closely related to the operational imperative that friendly forces operate under the assumption that they are under observation and always in contact with enemy forces. Security relies on gaining and maintaining enemy contact on friendly terms, and it is directly related to the principle of surprise. Preventing surprise by maintaining contact with enemy forces enhances security and denies them opportunities to seize the initiative. A-16. At the strategic level, security requires active and passive measures to protect Army forces from espionage, subversion, and strategic intelligence collection. At the tactical level, it is essential to protection and the preservation of combat power. Security results from the protective measures commanders take to prevent surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, or sabotage. S URPRISE A-17. Surprise results from taking actions for which an enemy or adversary force is unprepared. It is a powerful, but temporary, combat multiplier. It is not essential to take adversary or enemy forces completely unaware; it is only necessary that they become aware too late to react effectively. When done well, surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power in favor of friendly forces. Concealing capabilities and intentions is difficult. Rapid advances in strategic surveillance, information gathering, and data skimming and the pervasiveness of social and mass media compound the difficulty of large-scale marshalling and movement of manpower and equipment. A-18. Factors that contribute to surprise include speed of movement, employment of combat power the enemy does not expect, operations security, and variations in tactics that create ambiguity. Commanders can create surprise using changes to tempo, size of forces, direction or location of a main effort, and timing. Deception can aid in the probability of achieving surprise, and at the tactical level it is best practiced by showing enemy forces what they expect to see until the last possible moment and then doing something different. Proactive friendly reconnaissance and security measures deny enemy forces opportunities to surprise friendly forces. S IMPLICITY A-19. Guidance, plans, and orders should be as simple and direct as possible. Objectives and operations must be presented in clear, concise, understandable terms. At the tactical level, simplicity of plans and instructions contribute to successful operations and reduce the chances for misunderstanding and confusion. All factors being equal, a simple plan executed promptly is preferred to a complex plan executed too late. Simple plans allow better understanding and troop leading at all echelons, and they also permit branches and sequels to be easily nested, understood, and executed. Joint, interagency, and multinational operations place a premium on simplicity, accounting for differences in language and culture that can inherently complicate integration. Simple plans and orders minimize the confusion inherent in command posts during operations. The more complicated a plan is, the more vulnerable it is to friction. Simplicity addresses the fog and friction of war, helps commanders and their staffs to maintain shared understanding, and accounts for the nature of war as a human endeavor. PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS A-20. Joint doctrine adds three principles of operations (perseverance, legitimacy, and restraint) to the traditional nine principles of war to account for operations other than conventional large-scale combat, such as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. The additional principles are relevant to how the joint force uses combat power across the competition continuum, particularly during limited contingency. Like the traditional principles, these three do not apply equally across all joint operations but can be universally important and directly relate to the laws of armed conflict. The additional principles are— • Restraint. • Perseverance. • Legitimacy. (See JP 3-0 for more detailed information on the principles of joint operations.) R ESTRAINT A-21. The purpose of restraint is to prevent the unnecessary use of force when better methods of achieving the objective exist. Restraint informs legitimacy. A-22. Destructive force can have a negative military and political consequences in some contexts. Therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balance of security, the conduct of military operations, and national objectives. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of friendly forces and potentially enhancing the legitimacy of the adversary. Sufficiently detailed rules of engagement from a commander tailored to the specific circumstances of the operation can facilitate appropriate restraint. P ERSEVERANCE A-23. The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to achieve national objectives. Perseverance recognizes that enduring outcomes may require enduring commitment of forces. A-24. Perseverance involves preparation for measured, protracted military operations in pursuit of national objectives. Some joint operations may require years to reach the desired end state. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives is essential to success. This frequently involves diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts. Army leaders contribute to perseverance by managing the expectations of seniors and subordinates while setting reasonable objectives to achieve over time. L EGITIMACY A-25. The purpose of legitimacy is to maintain legal and moral authority during the conduct of operations. It is relevant across the competition continuum and the range of military operations. Legitimacy, a decisive factor in the application of information in the operational environment, is based on the actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of the actions from the various perspectives of interested audiences. These audiences can include our national leadership and domestic population, governments, civilian populations, and nations and organizations around the world. A-26. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the coalition and host government, particularly when the host or partner government’s legitimacy is decisive to the operation. All actions must be considered in the light of competing strategic and tactical requirements, and exhibit fairness in dealing with competing factions where appropriate. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation and to the perception of fairness in dealing with various factions. Restricting the use of force, restructuring the type of forces employed, protecting civilians, and ensuring the disciplined conduct of the forces involved may reinforce legitimacy. This page intentionally left blank.

Nothing is more important in war than unity in command. Napoleon Bonaparte This appendix describes command and support relationships for joint, Army, and multinational forces. COMMAND B-1. Forces, not command authorities, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred between commanders, the relationship the gaining commander will exercise and the losing commander will relinquish must be specified. Army and joint doctrine describe these authorities as command and support relationships. Command and support relationships provide the basis for unity of command and unity of effort in operations. Joint doctrine provides the framework for all command and support relationships. Because Army support relationships differ from joint, this appendix provides a discussion of joint command and support relationships first, followed by Army, and it closes with multinational command and coordination relationships. (See JP 1, Volume 2 for information on joint command relationships and authorities.) B-2. Command is central to all military action. Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates. This includes the authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion. Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the accomplishment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the extent of authority is specified by the establishing authority, directives, and law. (See JP 1, Volume 2 and ADP 6-0 for more information on command.) UNITY OF COMMAND AND EFFORT B-3. Unity of command is the direction of all forces under a single, responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces (JP 3-0). Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization that is the product of successful unified action (JP 1, Volume 2). Both are fundamental to mission success. The joint force protects national interests around the world through unified action by establishing unity of command under a single commander in pursuit of a common purpose. B-4. Correct task organization of the force is critical to establishing unity of command and unity of effort. Available forces and resources must be task organized appropriately to achieve operational and strategic objectives. The supply consumption and heavy casualties associated with large-scale combat operations drive commanders to anticipate re-task organizing and reconstitution operations to maintain operational tempo. Completing these tasks faster than the enemy gives friendly forces the advantage. To organize, reorganize, and reconstitute effectively, conventional, irregular, and contributing nations' forces cooperate within an established chain of command. CHAIN OF COMMAND B-5. The President and Secretary of Defense exercise authority and control of the armed forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command, as described in Title 10, United States Code (USCUSCUnited States Code) and JP 1, Volume 2: the administrative branch and operational branch. B-6. The administrative branch of the chain of command runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the respective military department and, as prescribed by the Secretary, to the commanders of those military organizations. Service secretaries prescribe the administrative branch chain of command and designate appropriate command authority to be exercised by subordinate commanders. Those forces not assigned to combatant commander (CCDRs) are characterized as "service retained" or "service institutional" and remain assigned to the respective department secretary. Service-retained forces are forces that are specifically designed to execute operational missions when allocated to CCDRs via the global force management process. Institutional forces are those remaining forces and organizations that conduct the administrative functions of their respective military department secretaries such as service headquarters staffs and service academies. Within their commands and in accordance with their departments' policies, military commanders establish command and support relationships. (See Figure B-1 for more on authority and control of the armed forces.) B-7. The Secretary of the Army has the authority to prescribe command and support relationships for Service-retained and institutional forces to include organic, assigned, operation control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and administrative control (ADCON). The Army's administrative branch chain of command for institutional and Service-retained forces typically extends from the Secretary of the Army to an Army command, direct reporting units, and field operating agencies then to subordinate Army commanders. Army command and support relationships are described in paragraphs B-25 through B-47. The Secretary of the Army exercises ADCON of Service forces provided to CCDRs for operational missions through Army Service component commanders. The Secretary of the Army may also delegate to the Headquarters, Department of the Army staff the authority to direct these command and support relationships. B-8. The operational branch of the chain of command runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the CCDRs. The Service Departments provide forces to the CCDRs through the Global Force Management process. The CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOMCOCOMCombatant commander) over assigned forces and OPCON or TACON of attached forces. CCDRs are directly responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands. CCDRs prescribe the chain of command in their combatant commands and designate the appropriate command authority to be exercised by subordinate joint force commanders. Within their commands, CCDRs and subordinate joint force commanders exercise authorities based on established joint command relationships. B-9. The two branches of the chain of command merge at Service component commands. Under joint doctrine, each combatant command is a unified command. Each unified command includes a Service component command that exercises ADCON over Service forces assigned or attached to that unified command. A Service component command consists of the Service component headquarters and all Service forces assigned or attached to the unified commander. Army doctrine distinguishes between the Army component of a combatant command and Army components of other joint forces. Under Army doctrine, Army Service component command (ASCCASCCArmy service component commander) refers to the Army component assigned to a combatant command. There is only one ASCCASCCArmy service component commander within a combatant command's area of responsibility. The Army components of all other joint forces are called ARFORs. An ARFOR is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command (FM 3-94). An ARFOR consists of the senior Army headquarters and all Army forces that the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders subordinates to the joint force or places under the control of a multinational force commander. The ARFOR then exercises ADCON. (See FM 3-94 and JP 3-0 for more information on ARFOR.) Note. The Secretary of the Army's authority over the administrative branch is established in Section 7013, Section 7074, and Section 10171 Title 10, USCUSCUnited States Code. The Unified Commands' authority over the operational branch is established in Section 162 Title 10, USCUSCUnited States Code. JOINT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS B-10. Joint and Army command relationships define the authority a commander has over forces. However, joint and Army support relationships differ in that joint support relationships are considered command relationships whereas Army support relationships are not. CCDRs and subordinate joint force commanders have the authority to organize assigned or attached forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on intent, the concept of operations, and consideration of Service organizations. The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. Joint force commanders (JFCs) assign responsibilities, establish or delegate appropriate command relationships, and establish coordinating instructions. Joint doctrine uses the terms assigned and attached for providing forces to CCDRs but does not use these terms as command relationships. When an Army organization is assigned or attached to a CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders or JFC, the Secretary of Defense or appropriate JFC also designates a command or support relationship. JP 1, Volume 2 specifies and details four types of joint command relationships. They are— • Combatant command (command authority) (COCOMCOCOMCombatant commander). • Operational control. • Tactical control. • Support. C OMBATANT C OMMAND (C OMMAND A UTHORITY) B-11. Combatant command (command authority) is nontransferable command authority, which cannot be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. (JP 1, Volume 2). (See figure B-2 for a graphic listing joint command relationships.) B-12. COCOMCOCOMCombatant commander only extends to those forces assigned to the combatant command by the Secretary of Defense. COCOMCOCOMCombatant commander is established in federal law by Section 164, Title 10, USCUSCUnited States Code. Normally, the CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders exercises this authority through subordinate JFCs, Service components, and functional component commanders. COCOMCOCOMCombatant commander includes the directive authority for logistics. Directive Authority for Logistics B-13. Included in COCOMCOCOMCombatant commander is the directive authority for logistics, which may not be delegated. CCDRs may delegate authority for a common support capability to a subordinate commander as required to accomplish the subordinate commander's assigned mission. CCDRs exercise directive authority for logistics to coordinate, approve, and issue directives to subordinate commanders to increase effectiveness, improve economy of operations, and prevent or eliminate unnecessary duplication of facilities or redundancy in functions among the Service component commands. During multinational operations, the joint force establishes a national support element to provide logistical support. (For more information on directive authority for logistics, see JP 1, Volume 2.) Directive Authority for Cyberspace Operations B-14. The Secretary of Defense has vested Commander, United States Cyber Command (known as CDRUSCYBERCOM), with directive authority for cyberspace operations (also known as DACO). This authority allows Commander, United States Cyber Command to issue orders to all Department of Defense (DOD) components in directing the execution of Department of Defense information network operations and defensive cyberspace operations internal defensive measures, to compel unified action to secure, operate, and defend the Department of Defense information network. (For more information on directive authority for cyberspace operations, see JP 1, Volume 2.) J OINT O PERATIONAL C ONTROL B-15. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission (JP 1, Volume 2). Commanders exercising OPCON over assigned or attached forces may delegate OPCON or TACON to subordinate commanders. Forces allocated to CCDRs through global force management are typically attached or assigned as OPCON to the gaining CCDRCCDRCombatant commanders. B-16. OPCON normally includes authority over all aspects of operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions. It does not include directive authority for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and operational areas of subordinate JFCs. The Secretary of Defense may specify adjustments to accommodate authorities beyond OPCON in an establishing directive. When transferring forces between CCDRs or when transferring members or organizations from the military departments to a combatant command, adjustments will be coordinated with the participating CCDRs. J OINT T ACTICAL C ONTROL B-17. Tactical control is the authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks assigned (JP 1, Volume 2). Commanders exercising TACON over assigned or attached forces may delegate TACON to subordinate commanders. J OINT S UPPORT R ELATIONSHIPS B-18. Support is a command authority in joint doctrine. A superior commander establishes a supported and supporting relationship between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Designating supporting relationships is important. It conveys priorities to commanders and staffs planning or executing joint operations. Designating a support relationship does not provide authority to organize and employ commands and forces, nor does it include authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support. (See figure B-2 for a depiction of joint command relationships. See table B-1 for a listing of joint doctrine support categories.) Note. The joint command relationship of 'Support' is distinct from Army support relationships. See paragraphs B-33 through B-38 for a discussion of Army support relationships.

The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time. Carl von Clausewitz This appendix discusses unit considerations for conducting deployment operations contested by a peer threat. It begins with an overview and a discussion of threat capabilities that can affect force projection. It then covers considerations when moving from home station to port of embarkation, when in transit from port of embarkation to port of debarkation, and when conducting reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) in a theater of operations. The appendix further expands upon the homeland as a specific operational area where homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) missions will likely be conducted as other units deploy. It concludes with considerations for training and preparation that Army leaders can incorporate into preexisting exercises or conduct as separate events. FORCE PROJECTION AND THREAT CAPABILITIES C-1. Army forces cannot expect to deploy without being challenged by a threat. For decades, U.S. military forces conducted uncontested and generally predictable deployments from home stations to operational theaters because threat actors lacked the capability to significantly affect deploying units at home station or while in transit to a theater of operations. This is no longer the case. Peer threats possess the capability and capacity to observe, disrupt, delay, and attack U.S. forces at any stage of force projection, including while still positioned at home stations in the United States and overseas. Commanders and staffs must therefore plan and execute deployments with the assumption that friendly forces are always under observation and in contact. C-2. A peer threat’s ability to impact U.S. military operations prior to arrival in an operational area extends beyond directly targeting unit personnel and equipment. The Army relies on various interdependent infrastructures, most of which it does not own or operate, making its domestic operations heavily reliant on external resources. This includes the use of civilian transportation infrastructure to move from installations to ports of embarkation, and it also includes home station military dependencies on civilian infrastructure for power, communications, fuel, water, and other life support. C-3. During armed conflict, Army forces should expect deployments to be contested by enemy actions in all domains. Army forces will require greater emphasis on protection functions to conserve combat power, and they should expect to provide forces to support homeland defense and DSCA operations. Defending U.S. territory against attacks by state and non-state actors through an active, layered defense while simultaneously seeking to project forces in a conflict with a peer enemy requires coordination across organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions at the local, state, and federal levels. C-4. Threat actions to contest a deployment are most visible during crisis and armed conflict, but they can also occur during competition. Army forces deploy globally as part of operations during competition to meet national objectives, assure allies and partners, and deter adversary malign actions. Adversary abilities to disrupt these deployments create risks that leaders must assess and mitigate during movement planning and execution. While a conventional attack on U.S. forces conducting operations during competition is unlikely, the greater the perceived danger to their vital national interests, the greater the chance a peer threat will contest U.S. military force projection. Leaders account for this intensified risk during planning and conduct training to improve their units’ resilience and ability to mitigate risk, coordinate with appropriate partner organizations, and respond effectively. C-5. While a threat’s use of lethal capabilities to target the U.S. homeland or deploying forces is unlikely before a crisis or the commencement of armed conflict, it may choose to use other methods to surveil and disrupt Army forces during competition. Russia, China, and other threats possess wide-ranging capabilities to conduct cyberspace attacks, disrupt space capabilities, and conduct information warfare to influence the perceptions and behavior of target audiences. Attribution for these malign activities is challenging. Adversaries take steps to deliberately obscure the source of these activities, and they take full advantage of the ambiguity provided by operating below the threshold of armed response. Cyberspace attacks can be used to compromise government, private sector, and military capabilities, potentially targeting military dependencies on civilian infrastructure. Disruption of space capabilities can be used to hamper communication and navigation capabilities of both military forces and the civilian infrastructure they rely upon. Information warfare, including dissemination of or support for disinformation and misinformation, can be used to attempt to fracture bonds among elements of society. This may include seeking to create or exacerbate divisions between the military, government, private sector, and the public, both nationally and in local municipalities. C-6. Peer threats use a variety of means to understand and predict U.S. and allied force projection, including open source and cyberspace collection. Army leaders should understand threat collection capabilities to reduce the chance of effective detection. Different ways threat forces can collect on a division’s deployment are described in this notional scenario. Notional Threat Open Source and Cyberspace Collection A division has received prepare to deploy orders. Division leaders considered this deployment routine, and they failed to address operations security or force protection at home station during the planning process. As a result, threat forces can understand many details of the pending deployment through open-source and cyberspace collection. Threat intelligence agencies read aircraft tail numbers arriving and departing from air bases that typically support division operations, analyzing observations posted by hobbyists to assess likely missions and cargo. They also analyze publicly available movement contracts for taking unit equipment from fort to port. Increased availability of rental residences near the installation indicates that Soldiers are invoking deployment clauses in their leases, and decreased availability of personal storage units indicates Soldiers are storing their belongings for a deployment. Commercially available applications and databases that track food ordering, cell phone presence and activity, and other data are used to show a continued staff presence after normal business hours at the division headquarters. As the deployment gets closer, Soldier and family member social media posts increase in volume and provide information about upcoming deployment timelines and locations. Threat agents go through financial transactions and credit card data stored on accessible servers to better understand specific unit and key leader timelines and vulnerabilities. Threat agents also comb through Soldier and family member personal data collected as part of application and device user agreements. Some of this data, normally sold for advertising purposes, was purchased through shell companies on the open market. Other credit, banking, and identity data was illegally obtained on the dark web or through other illicit methods. C-7. Threat forces will conduct information warfare operations to slow or otherwise degrade force projection. These campaigns can vary in scope and size, and may target local communities, Service members, Department of Defense (DOD) Civilians, contractors, and Soldiers’ family members. This includes, but is not limited to— • Targeted threats through social media, email, or other means designed to frighten and distract deploying Soldiers and their families. • Cyberspace attacks against Soldier and family member banks and credit agencies, cutting off or disrupting access to personal funds. • Cyberspace attacks against civilian infrastructure (including transportation, supply, fuel, and navigation) used to support military operations. • Targeted strikes against defense communications infrastructure to disrupt communications between units, installations, and other unified action partners that assist in deployment. • Disinformation dissemination and misinformation support designed to—  Undermine the legitimacy of, or otherwise reduce support for, U.S. Government action.  Incite civil unrest in local communities and along rail and road lines of communications that deploying forces need or plan to use to reach ports of embarkation.  Reduce trust in future official communications, from government, law enforcement, or military officials, by releasing disinformation that appears genuine but contains incorrect or confusing information. C-8. Threat information warfare operations can be conducted at a very low cost compared to conventional warfare methods, and they have global reach. At low levels, they can be used to hamper military deployments. With sufficient scale or precision, they have the potential to completely halt effective unit deployment operations. Targeted disinformation and threats delivered via social media to the family members of every Soldier in a unit could potentially be devastating without prior planning, preparation, and trust building. C-9. Commanders and their staffs must understand the potential effects of adversarial disinformation operations on units and leaders. Targeted adversary or enemy activities in the information dimension could rapidly degrade the performance of Soldiers, impacting their readiness. It could also degrade civilian performance and affect the critical infrastructure they manage. Leaders combat this through public communications both prior to and during deployment operations, coordination with relevant public affairs personnel, and Service member and family preparation. This preparation can include incorporating response strategies for disinformation dissemination into exercises and other training. C-10. As U.S. forces transition from competition to crisis or armed conflict, threat actors will increase the intensity and lethality of their tactics. This could include infrastructure sabotage by pre-positioned agents, cyber or information attacks broader in scope (such as targeting an oil pipeline supplying a large region rather than only a specific port), or long-range precision strikes using a variety of munitions. Concurrently, they posture for, and may eventually escalate through, nonlethal and lethal actions of increasing intensity to improve stand-off and prevent power projection from the U.S. homeland and other basing and staging areas. Threat actors may also strike transport vessels along sea lines of communication while these vessels are en route to a seaport of debarkation. C-11. Peer threats may choose to support proxy forces or influence unwitting groups, including irregular forces, saboteurs, sympathetic civil organizations, and criminals. These groups may be used to prevent timely deployment operations by denying access to roads or facilities with crowds, protests, or looting. Use of these forces may also allow for direct action against U.S. targets while masking culpability. Threat actors may design these activities to affect the economy and global trade in addition to the political-military balance in the United States or overseas. Additionally, other state and non-state actors may exploit the situation with attacks in pursuit of their own objectives. These attacks may be conducted within the United States or allied nations, in the theater into which Army forces are preparing to deploy, or in other, unrelated regions. C-12. Leaders anticipate adversary activities in all domains while preparing for or conducting deployment operations. Disruptions may not be preventable. They can, however, be mitigated through training, preparation, and coordination with unified action partners. Effective mitigation in planning, preparation, and execution ensures the Army provides the required forces to combatant commanders (CCDRs) and other joint force commanders (JFCs). (See AR 525-93 for Army deployment policies and responsibilities.) FORT TO PORT C-13. As part of the strategic support area, home station installations, Reserve centers, National Guard armories, and other designated points of origin are where force projection begins. They present targets that enemy forces may attack to delay, disrupt, and degrade force flow into theater. Additional vulnerabilities are present along all routes of movement, and at all potential sea and aerial ports of embarkation. Army forces at all echelons must comprehensively assess emerging threat capabilities that will impede deployment in a contested environment. To the greatest extent possible, formations should account for being under constant observation through strict operations security, including the safeguarding of information on specific deployment timelines and locations and maintaining dispersion of critical assets. The effects of attacks on critical military, national, or private infrastructure could halt or delay unit deployment operations before units have departed the United States. C-14. Contested deployments are a national issue, and they require coordination with many civilian unified action partners to overcome the challenges peer threats can create. However, moving Army forces from military installations to ports of embarkation is also a local and regional challenge. When routine deployment is not possible, installations and units should have a plan to mitigate deployment disruptions. C-15. Deployment disruption mitigation planning requires collaboration between the deploying unit, the installation, appropriate federal, state, and local agencies (both government and law enforcement), and U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard elements. Installations are responsible for building these relationships and understanding how threats will likely affect their local areas. Installations do this by modifying their threat working groups to incorporate relevant military, government, and other local and regional stakeholders. The working group shares information about threats that promote civil unrest, cyber threats that impact critical transportation infrastructure, and other threat activities that impact deployment operations. Key planning and training considerations are— • The local, state, and federal authorities able to mitigate deployment disruptions. • Coordination and relationship building with local, state, and federal civilian law enforcement agencies to ensure effective movement control from fort to port. • Understanding about critical infrastructure vulnerable to sabotage and unsuited for the movement of heavy equipment along surface lines of communication, both road and rail. • Planning to use alternate railheads and marshalling yards and multiple lines of communication to reach ports of embarkation. • Developing alternate surface transportation options to deliver unit equipment to a sea port of embarkation when rail service is degraded or disrupted. • Establishment of fuel, maintenance, and rest locations along lines of communications. • Implementation of a communication plan that informs the public while maintaining operations security. • Establishing specific cyber defenses for systems and associated data used to support movement. C-16. Understanding the requirements and developing mitigation plans to move from the installation to the assigned port of embarkation can help overcome threat activities that could stop or hinder deployments. An example of this is using Army heavy equipment transportation systems (known as HETS) to move tanks, using contract carriers to move other tracked vehicles, and convoying wheeled vehicles to a seaport of embarkation if rail transportation from the installation is degraded or disrupted. C-17. To effectively implement a mitigation plan, deploying units and the installation must understand the capabilities of civilian infrastructure (such as weight limitations on routes from the installation to the port). This includes using data from, and potentially requires coordination with, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command about rail lines and roads designated as part of the strategic rail and highway corridor networks. Planners must consider the security of critical nodes and terrain along projected routes and conduct prior coordination with local and state authorities for security. Existing adversary capabilities that could be used to target civilian infrastructure were exercised during EXERCISE JACK VOLTAIC 3.0, conducted in 2020. Adversary Impacts on Civilian Infrastructure Exercises and research projects provide insight into how peer threats could disrupt the deployment of Army forces by targeting civilian infrastructure. In the Army Cyber Institute’s EXERCISE JACK VOLTAIC 3.0, military, interagency, municipal, state, and commercial partners collaborated to assess interdependencies and available actions by different stakeholders in response to such targeting. During the scenario, the movement of military equipment was disrupted by a combination of traffic delays; social media-incited protests; port access manipulation; the manipulation of rail and vessel cargo manifests; natural gas and electrical disruptions; and, ultimately, interference with the weight distribution for the automated load plan for a ship in port (causing it to tip and dump containers into the shipping channel). None of the measures, taken individually, prevented movement of unit equipment from reaching the destination by the required delivery date. Taken together, however, the actions caused cascading effects that challenged Army unit and installation leaders, port officials, and state and municipal government and law enforcement personnel. C-18. Units establish and maintain an accurate common operational picture (COP) when subordinate or supported units and equipment are en route to ports of embarkation. This includes maintaining visibility of friendly forces and potential threat actions. It also encompasses awareness of partner civilian and military entities supporting the deployment, including law enforcement, mobilized reserve component units, and air and rail activities. C-19. Deploying units and installations coordinate with agencies at ports of embarkation to act should an adversary’s efforts impact deployment operations. This coordination can help Army forces rapidly adjust to emerging circumstances. Unit and installation personnel that manage deployments must rapidly develop new transportation plans if needed, using previously developed branch plans as a start point. C-20. When load planning, Army leaders and staffs must work with transportation authorities to ensure sufficient enabling forces are paired with combat arms forces during transit. Army leaders, working with transportation officials, develop methods to effectively load combat-configured forces in a manner that maximizes available deck space on the transport vessel while making these units operationally relevant upon arrival. Generally, it is desirable for tactical units to be configured as company teams or battalion task forces with the requisite supporting enablers to allow immediate employment. C-21. In most circumstances when threat actions have not significantly degraded port operations, the port support activity stevedores load Army equipment once it arrives at the port of embarkation for transport to the operational theater. In these circumstances, Army forces effectively lose physical control of this equipment until it arrives in theater. Prior to departure for the port, Army forces coordinate with transportation and port officials to ensure that unit containers, rolling stock, and other unit equipment sets are loaded in ways to balance requirements for transport efficiency, combat readiness upon offloading, and risk to readiness if a transport vessel or craft is destroyed en route. PORT TO PORT C-22. Ports of embarkation in the strategic support area, whether in the United States or overseas, are likely targets of cyberspace attack, space capability degradation or denial, and other impacts designed to reduce capabilities or capacity as U.S. forces conduct deployment operations into other theaters. During armed conflict, enemy forces have the range and capacity to target ports with long-range fires, special operations forces, and other capabilities. C-23. Port authorities open, close, and manage port operations based on their pre-existing requirements, not based on what is necessarily most advantageous to a given unit’s deployment requirements. This might include requirements for other Army forces, the joint force, or other government or commercial entities designated as priorities for a period of time. Early, frequent, and detailed coordination with port authorities helps mitigate potential disruptions to deployment operations. Installations and units incorporate port officials into deployment readiness exercises and other training events to improve mutual understanding and effectiveness. C-24. Adversary actions may directly or indirectly cause port officials to close their port or reduce operations. If this occurs, and if authority is granted to use another port, commanders consider the impacts to both their unit and the broader military effort, and to civilian requirements, before recommending or deciding to move assets to another port of embarkation. Port operations conducted by other government agencies or civilian officials may take priority over those that Army forces need to conduct based on current local, state, or national requirements. Additionally, other ports may become congested or disrupted by the time Army forces arrive. Adhering to the original plan while adapting to challenges at the port is generally less disruptive to the overall deployment effort than moving to another port. C-25. Depending on the level of conflict and assessed threat to their interests, peer enemies may attempt to disrupt or destroy unit equipment while in transit. If all of a unit’s equipment is placed on one transport, this could lead to the catastrophic loss of land component capability for the JFC. Spreading unit equipment across multiple transport ships increases the likelihood that some will arrive and be available for employment. While this is not the most efficient or expeditious method to transport Army equipment, it helps ensure that the JFC receives some employable level of Army tactical and operational capability. C-26. During armed conflict, Army forces conduct additional protection activities based on enemy capabilities. Effective targeting by enemy lethal and nonlethal effects will drive protection and mitigation actions for unit personnel and equipment. Army forces may be called on to provide additional protection capabilities to support port authorities. Unit commanders and staffs should balance protection requirements, both at the port and in-transit, against requirements to get as many critical capabilities to the required operational theater as quickly as possible and requirements to have combat-ready units arrive at ports of debarkation for employment by JFCs. C-27. Whether conducting operations at a port during competition, crisis, or armed conflict, Army forces coordinate with the relevant authorities to mitigate potential complications at the port. This includes— • Coordinating for products that provide a general layout of the port and flow of port operations. • Obtaining an understanding of transport ship loading. • Understanding port authority structure and decision making. • Understanding reliance of the port on local infrastructure to conduct operations and identifying potential redundancies (for example, if power is lost can port gantry cranes load containers). • Planning to train Soldiers on port equipment, such as material handling equipment. C-28. Additional considerations for port-to-port transport are the use of unit personnel to improve, monitor, and maintain equipment readiness while in transit. Units should anticipate execution of vehicle maintenance at the port, and leaders may place a limited number of unit personnel on a transport vessel to ensure enabling and combat arms equipment is ready for immediate employment upon arrival in theater. RSOI DURING CONTESTED DEPLOYMENTS C-29. Historically, even during armed conflict, Army forces enjoyed high degrees of sanctuary in rear areas to receive and organize forces before moving them forward. However, the long-range strike capabilities of peer adversaries mean that sanctuary to conduct unimpeded RSOI operations in rear areas can no longer be assumed. It is likely that strikes by peer threats will degrade or destroy port and other transportation infrastructure vital to U.S. force projection. This could cause Army forces to arrive in a disaggregated manner and disrupt RSOI operations. While integrating U.S. forces in theater could be challenging, Army planners must also consider host-nation requirements for logistics infrastructure. The host nation’s response to an attack on its infrastructure, including its military mobilization, can affect freedom of movement for U.S. forces. All of these challenges may require JFCs to alter their operational plans or stay in a defensive posture for an extended period until sufficient combat power is built to enable offensive operations. C-30. The theater army has primary responsibility for conducting RSOI for the entire joint land force. Army equipment may arrive in a piecemeal fashion across numerous ports. Commanders must establish secure communications across the distributed footprint, which allows staff coordination for unit personnel to meet their equipment and facilitate ship offloading. Units provide port support teams with the right personnel and capabilities to expedite port operations, such as licensed vehicle operators and communications. This helps ensure ports of debarkation are not congested with disabled equipment or frustrated cargo. If some unit equipment is lost in transit due to destruction of transport vessels, some tactical unit personnel may be temporarily held at theater facilities to facilitate re-equipping efforts or be otherwise retasked by the combatant command or theater army commander. C-31. If ports are unavailable, are severely degraded, or do not have the draft required for deep draft strategic sealift vessels, the JFC may consider joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations. JLOTS provides the JFC with a limited capability to discharge strategic sealift ships. JLOTS requires a significant amount of lead time to build the needed conditions for successful operations, and it entails significant risk that strategic leaders will need to balance against its potential benefits. (See Chapter 6 of this publication or JP 4-18 for more information on JLOTS.) C-32. After reception is complete, staging occurs. Staging during force projection contested by a peer threat requires understanding of threat standoff and friendly protection capabilities. Units must disperse and seek concealment to improve survivability. Operation plans (OPLANs) should consider the need for expanded assembly areas to increase distances between vehicles and between unit assembly areas. As deploying units assemble, efforts focus on preparing for future operations and integrating into the joint force. Theater-specific training requirements may need to be conducted while afloat or at home station prior to movement to the theater to minimize staging timelines. C-33. Onward movement during contested deployments requires units to execute movement and sustainment along multiple, dispersed routes. Road, rail, and other lines of communication must be assessed and classified for use by arriving forces. Units can avoid aggregation, enhance survivability, and achieve balance by directing personnel, equipment, materiel, and information flow at a rate that can be accommodated at every point along the entire network, from origin to destination. Speed of movement to rapidly get combat power to the operational area for employment is key to the onward movement process. C-34. To facilitate rapid onward movement and overcome the likely degradation of Global Positioning System (known as GPS) and other enabling transportation technology, units conduct convoy briefs, have paper maps, and conduct detailed route planning. This helps prepare Soldiers for the unique considerations of the host-nation transportation infrastructure, and it mitigates vulnerability to threat attacks. Theater-level personnel may augment or conduct separate briefings to share information about current conditions and threat tactics. C-35. RSOI concludes with integration. Effective and efficient integration operations can reduce force vulnerability by ensuring units quickly assess vulnerabilities and counter potential threats to forces, infrastructure, and information systems as they transfer capabilities to an operational commander’s force. When forces are fully integrated, operational control (OPCON) is transferred to the gaining unit. (See Chapter 4 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-35 for additional information on RSOI operations.) HOMELAND DEFENSE AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES C-36. While Army forces are preparing to deploy during crisis response or armed conflict against a peer threat, other units may be tasked to support homeland defense or DSCA. The circumstances that lead to national authorities directing the deployment of Army forces may also necessitate operations to simultaneously defend the U.S. homeland or support civil authorities. Additionally, the act of deploying forces may incite enemy attacks on the homeland, causing some forces to be mobilized for homeland defense or DSCA while others deploy forward to the operational theater. Homeland defense is the military protection of United States sovereignty and territory against external threats and aggression or, as directed by the President, other threats (JP 3-27). Defense support of civil authorities is support provided by United States Federal military forces, Department of Defense Civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events (DODDDODDDepartment of Defense directive 3025.18). C-37. Homeland defense and DSCA operations are conducted in a complex operational environment that contains layers of different jurisdictions (federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local), many agencies and organizations, the private sector, and several allies and multinational partners. Interorganizational coordination and synchronization with governmental and nongovernmental entities may assume a level of importance not matched in most overseas theaters of operations. Within the same city, Army forces may be simultaneously conducting different missions, each with distinct authorities and requirements. This could include adjacent units conducting— • Deployment preparation activities. • Homeland defense missions as directed by U.S. Northern Command or U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. • DSCA in support of the Department of Homeland Security or other organizations. C-38. Changes in an operational environment based on threat action or other circumstances may cause changes to planned and ongoing operations. Army forces preparing to deploy to another theater may be tasked to support U.S. Army North instead. Additionally, units conducting DSCA may be required to transition to homeland defense, or vice versa. Commanders and staffs must remain agile to ensure they understand the responsibilities and authorities for different missions, remaining in constant contact with other unified action partners to ensure shared understanding. Depending on mission requirements and available personnel, this may include agency representatives, liaison officers, and staff representatives able to collaborate, share information, analyze ongoing activities, and participate in planning. H OMELAND D EFENSE C-39. When conducting homeland defense missions, U.S. Army North has been designated to serve as the land component command for U.S. Northern Command. Depending on the threat, defending critical infrastructure and maintaining force projection capability for joint and Army forces will require significant augmentation and cross-command integration. Commercial infrastructure plays a critical role in enabling the communications systems that directly support operations. This infrastructure may be damaged to the point that military and supporting operations are adversely affected. C-40. Protection functions are essential during any operation, and they take on specific importance during homeland defense. Protection during homeland defense includes measures and activities not only conducted for use by the joint force, but also for commercial, law enforcement, and government partners. These protection functions can be supported through several activities. Planning for these operations should include deception, mobility, dispersion, systems resiliency and redundancy, protective construction, warning and surveillance, and operations security. Additional coordination will be required if Army units are tasked to provide these capabilities for government and commercial partners or to build upon existing capabilities so that partners can conduct them themselves. C-41. Army forces support joint force and national efforts to provide the latest relevant information to the American public while maintaining operations security, and they will also counter disinformation posted on social media and distributed through other means. Timely, relevant, and effective responses are critical to mission accomplishment when a peer threat is using high volumes of disinformation to achieve its objectives. Unit commanders and other leaders follow their supported command’s public affairs guidance and act in a supporting role to local, state, and federal agencies. D EFENSE S UPPORT OF C IVIL A UTHORITIES C-42. Army support of civil authorities is vital to enabling other units that are deploying under contested conditions. The range of DSCA responses by Army forces includes support provided by the Regular Army, activated Army Reserve, and the National Guard in Title 32 United States Code (USCUSCUnited States Code) or Title 10 USCUSCUnited States Code status. Even in the absence of orders or in uncertain and chaotic situations, units providing support in the homeland enable core DSCA activities to provide support for domestic disasters, provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) incidents, provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement, and provide other designated domestic support. Domestic military operations are constrained by statute and policy to a greater degree than military operations conducted abroad, and units should become familiar with requisite authorities. C-43. Homeland defense and DSCA operations may also be conducted in a wide range of circumstances not tied to the preparation or execution of force projection to another operational theater. This can include responses to both external and internal threats, natural or man-made disasters, support to law enforcement, and other activities. (See DODDDODDDepartment of Defense directive 3025.18, JP 3-27, JP 3-28, and ADP 3-28 for more information on DSCA and homeland defense.) TRAINING AND PREPARATION CONSIDERATIONS C-44. Training and preparation to conduct deployment operations contested by threat forces will stress joint and unified action partner interoperability and coordination. The Army and other unified action partners conduct joint deployment exercises whenever possible, develop information and intelligence sharing architectures, and collaborate during other preparation activities. Preparing for a contested deployment, defending the homeland, and executing DSCA operations are not primary considerations for most Army units. However, when preparing for large-scale combat operations, units should augment their training plans to help prepare for deployments contested by threat forces and related activities. Examples include— • Conduct deployment readiness exercises that include port authority, law enforcement, and other stakeholder participation from municipal, state, federal, and commercial organizations. • Conduct a road march to a training center rotation from an Army installation to simulate extended convoy operations and test maintenance capability of Army equipment and personnel. • Conduct tabletop exercises with members of the installation threat working group to discover gaps in planning and build a cohesive team. • Conduct training with local communities to test the ability of the installation and local law enforcement to handle demonstrations that may occur due to misinformation. • Conduct training to improve Soldier and family member awareness of likely threat information warfare actions and potential response strategies. • Coordinate to ensure installation and unit threat working groups, emergency response centers, and cyber security measures are expanded to account for critical civilian dependencies, including reliance on civilian infrastructure. • Establish and test a primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (known as PACE) communication plan among key Army units, installations, armories, and unified action partners that facilitate deployment operations. • Identify requisite command and logistics nodes along primary and alternate routes to ports of embarkation, across multiple modes of transportation if appropriate. • Prepare numerous road march plans to compensate for degraded or disrupted lines of communications. • Maintain port overview packages for likely ports of embarkation. • Build and implement an installation strategic communication plan that informs the public while maintaining operations security. • Prepare Soldiers and family members for extended periods of no direct connectivity during initial stages of crisis or armed conflict to maintain operations security. • Create plans for direct communication between Army installations and family members during the initial stages of a crisis or armed conflict to help mitigate the effects of threat disinformation and answer family questions. • Ensure ready access to relief funds and supplies for dependents in case of threat attacks against financial institutions. • Work with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to build relationships and understand requirements if later tasked to conduct homeland defense or DSCA. This page intentionally left blank. Source Notes This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it lists the page number followed by the paragraph number. All websites accessed on 3 December 2024. 1 “War is thus an act…”; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 75. 3 “We don’t maintain…” Ronald Reagan, “Radio Address to the Nation on the Observance of Armed Forces Day.” (21 May 1983). Available at https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/radio-address-nation-observance-armed-forces-day. 6. “[We] now need another…” Barbara W. Tuchman, “Generalship,” Parameters, The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, Volume 2, Number 1 (1972). Available at https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol2/iss1/18/. 17 Since men live upon…”: Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 16. 25 “If you know the enemy and know yourself…” Sun Tzu quoted in Thomas R. Phillips, ed., Roots of Strategy (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985), 50. 33 Systems Warfare and Sanctuary: Eastern Ukraine, 2014. Vignette adapted from Army University Press staff, unpublished text, 2017. 36 “[S]eparate ground, air…”; Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Special Message to the Congress on Reorganization of the Defense Establishment, 3 April 1958.” Available at https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/eisenhowers/quotes. 47 “There are not more …”; Sun Tzu, quoted in Thomas R. Phillips, ed., Roots of Strategy (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985), 28. 48 “The art of war…”; Infantry in Battle by The Infantry Journal Inc. (Washington, DC, 1939), books/infantry-in-battle.pdf. 53. Convergence During World War II. Vignette adapted from John Miller Jr. Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army 1959. Available at https://www.history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-5/CMH_Pub_5-5.pdf. 60 Second Nagorno Karabakh War: September–November 2020. Vignette adapted from Phillip Andrews, “Lessons from the Nagorno-Karabakh 2020 Conflict” (Center for Army Lessons Learned Catalog). August 2021.21-655. https://www.army.mil/CALL : 1, 3-5. Edward Erickson. The 44-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh: Turkish Drone Success or Operational Art? (Military Review. August 2021.) Available at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/img/Online-Exclusive/2021/erickson/Erickson-the-44-day-war.pdf (accessed on 21 November 2024): 11. Matthew Santaspirt and Luke Shabro, host. “Top Attack: Lessons Learned from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.” (The Convergence: An Army Mad Scientist Podcast, episode 317, 1 April 2021.) Available at https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/317-top-attack-lessons-learned-from-the-second-nagorno-karabakh-war/. 83 “In all history…”; Dwight D. Eisenhower on the formation of NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-opening-the-nato-meetings-paris. 87 Failure to Prepare for War: Philippines, 1941. Vignette adapted from Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1993), 14–15, 18, 32– 33, 35–36, 43–45, 48, 50, 457, 467, 560–561. Available at https://history.army.mil/Publications/Publications-Catalog-Sub/Publications-By-Title/The-Fall-of-The-Philippines/. 91 “There is only…”; Winston Churchill, quoted in Field Marshall Alan Francis Brooke in Diaries, 1939-1946. Available at https://kingscollections.org/catalogues/lhcma/collection/a/br60-001/br60-05/br60-05-1?id=1022&asId=as1. 92 Successful Engagement: State Partnership Program. Vignette adapted from the State Partnership Program website, https://www.nationalguard.mil/leadership/joint-staff/j-5/international-affairs-division/state-partnership-program/. 94 Liberia: OPERATION UNITED ASSISTANCE. Vignette adapted from https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docNC09229072E83a8476677a3bd50e3f c31e7477184893cf678a89e21f9a370ac95ca33c3b4eebc. 105 “The 1930’s…”; John F. Kennedy, Radio and television address to the American people on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba, 22 October 1962. Available at https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/historic-speeches/address-during-the-cuban-missile-crisis. 111 Effective Response: OPERATION PAUL BUNYAN. Vignette adapted from Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing folder “Korea–Operation Paul Bunyan” of the Presidential County Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10, 1974–77, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Available at https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0324/1553751.pdf. Reed R. Probst Negotiating with the North Koreans: the U.S. Experience at Panmunjom, 16 May 1977, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks PA. Available at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA042858.pdf. 114 Deployment Friction: Task Force Ironhorse in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Vignette adapted from Christopher D. Croft and Kelvin D. Crow, “Creatively Deploying the Heavy Division: Getting the 4th Infantry Division to Iraq in 2003,” Army University Press website, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Books/Browse-Books/iBooks-and-EPUBs/Deploying-the-Heavy-Division/. 119 Crisis Response: Baghdad Embassy Attack. Combined Arms Doctrine Doctorate staff, unpublished text, 2021. 120 “In the midst…”; Barbara Tuchman, Guns of August (New York: Ballantine Books, 1962), 485. 121 “The art of war…”; Ulysses S. Grant, statement to John Hill Brinton at the start of his Tennessee River campaign, early 1862, in John H. Brinton, Personal Memoirs of John H. Brinton, Major and Surgeon U.S.V., 1861–1865 (1914; reproduced Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University, 1996), 239. 144 Defeat of the North Korean People’s Army, September 1950. Vignette adapted from Department of Defense, Headquarters X Corps, War Diary Summary for Operation Chromite 15 August to 30 September 1950 (1950), 1–2. Available at https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll11/id/1569/rec/2 ; and Department of Military Art and Engineering, United States Military Academy Operations in Korea (West Point, NY: Department of Military Art and Engineering, United States Military Academy, 1953), II-1–II15. Available at https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll11/id/1330/rec/19. 147 Disintegration of Egyptian Defense: 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Vignette adapted from George W. Gawrych, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory (Combat Studies Institute: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 5–14, 27–36, 59– 65, 68. Available at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA323718.pdf. Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Analysis of Factors that have Influenced Outcomes of Battles and Wars: A Data Base of Battles and Engagements, Vol. VI (report prepared for the U.S. Army Concepts and Analysis Agency, June 1983), 203–221. Available at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADB087722. 152 “Even in the defensive position...” Carl von Clausewitz, On War translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 357. 161 “For I am convinced...” General Donn A. Starry, Press On! Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry Volume 1 : Selected, edited, edited, annotated, and with an introductory essay by Lewis Sorley (Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, First Printing, September 2009), 249. Available at https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/a507478-Press-On-General-Starry-Works-Vol-1-Sorley.pdf. 171 “The basic objectives…”; Chester W. Nimitz, “Employment of Naval Forces: Who Commands Sea Commands Trade,” Monthly NEWSLETTER (March 1948). Available at https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/e/employment-of-naval-forces.html 176 Faulty Assumptions—Defeat Across Multiple Domains in Malaya. Malaya and Singapore: Faulty Assumptions—Defeat Across Multiple Domains, Army University Press Staff, Unpublished text, 2017. 177 “Amphibious warfare requires…”; Henry K. Hewitt, quoted in JP 3-02. 180 “A landing on…”; Basil H. Liddell Hart, quoted in Vice Admiral George Carroll Dyer, The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 318. Available at https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/FMFRP%2012-109-I%20%20The%20Amphibians%20Came%20to%20Conquer%20-%20Vol%20I.pdf. 191 “Success ultimately…”; Colin Powell, It Worked for Me (New York: HarperCollins Publishing, 2014), 18. 192 “One of the most…”; William Joseph Slim, Unofficial History (New York: Orion Publishing Group, 1962. Reprinted by Pen & Sword Books), 156. 193 Commanding Forward—LTG Eichelberger at Buna. Vignette adapted from Thomas M. Huber, “Eichelberger at Buna: A Study in Battle Command,” in Studies in Battle Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1995), 123-128. Available at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/battles.pdf. 194 “The fog of…”; George S. Patton, quoted in Pat Williams, The Paradox of Power (Anderson, IN: Warner Press, 2002), 168. 197 Initiative in the Absence of Orders – Naval Bombers at Midway. Vignette adapted from The Battle of Midway Including the Aleutian Phase, June 3 to June 14, 1942, Strategical and Tactical Analysis. Richard W. Bates Naval War College 1948, Available at https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA003054.pdf. “Battle of Midway, 4-7 June 1942.” Naval History and Heritage Command. Available at https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/wars-conflicts-and-operations/world-war-ii/1942/midway.html. H-072-1: Torpedo Squadron 8's TBF Avenger Detachment in the Battle of Midway. Samuel J. Cox, Director NHHC, May 2022. Available at https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-072/h-072-1.html. 200 Crosstalk in the Desert—VII Corps in the Gulf War. Vignette adapted from TRADOCTRADOCU.S. Army Training and Doctrinal Command Pam 525-100-1 [obsolete], Leadership and Command on the Battlefield: Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM (Fort Monroe, VA: HQ, TRADOCTRADOCU.S. Army Training and Doctrinal Command, 1992), 28. Available at https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll9/id/690. 200 “Judgment comes from…”; Simon Bolivar Buckner, as quoted by Omar N. Bradley in “Leadership: An Address to the US Army War College, 07 Oct. 71,” Parameters 1, no. 3 https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=parameters. 202 “More than 50…”; Frederick Franks, “Battle Command: A Commander’s Perspective,” Military Review (May-June 1996): 4–25. Available at https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p124201coll1/id/438/. 205 “The art of war…”; Frederick the Great, Unterhaltungen mit Friedrich dem Grossen. Memoiren und Tagebücher von Heinrich de Catt, edited by Reinhold Koser, Leipzig, 1884. 211 “Nothing is more important...”. Napoleon Bonaparte, quoted in T.R. Phillips, Roots of Strategy (Lanham, MD: Stackpole Books, 1985), 427. 229 “The end for which a soldier is...”. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). 95. 230 Notional Threat Open Source and Cyberspace Collection. Combined Arms Doctrine Doctorate staff, unpublished text, 2021. 233 Adversary Impacts on Civilian Infrastructure “Jack Voltaic 3.0” ; Jack Voltaic 3.0: Cyber Research Report (West Point, NY: Army Cyber Institute). Available at https://cyber.army.mil/Research/Jack-Voltaic/.

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent publication for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

Entries are by paragraph number. 1-99–1-102 air threats, counter, 6-64–6-72 aligned, B-47 allied, build capabilities and capacity, 4-16–4-17 amphibious, operations, 7-62– 7-67 defeat, 7-56–7-67 antiaccess approaches, defeating, 6-89–6-96 anticipate, transitions, 3-92– 3-97 applying, defeat mechanisms, 6-117–6-143 mutual support, 6-49–6-54 operational framework, 7-28–7-35 the art of command, 8-5– 8-26 approaches to armed conflict, Chinese, 6-16–6-26 Russian, 6-10–6-15 arctic region, 7-8–7-10 area denial, defeat, 7-56–7-67 area denial approaches, defeating, 6-89–6-96 area of influence, and area of interest, 3-147–3-150 area of interest, and area of influence, 3-147–3-150 area of operations, assigning area of responsibility, assigning a joint operations area area reconnaissance, defined, 6-149 armed conflict, 1-79–1-80, and large-scale combat operations, 6-1–6-182 competition below, 1-74– 1-75 consolidate gains during, 6-109–6-116 enemy approaches to, 6-9– 6-26 operations during, 6-1– 6-284 relative advantages during, 6-34–6-42 transition to, 4-110–4-117 Army, administrative control, B-40–B-42 command and support relationships, B-25–B-47 command relationships, B-26–B-38 coordinating authority, B-43 direct liaison authorized, B- 44 operational control, B-31 other authorities, B-39–B-47 support relationships, B-33– B-38 tactical control, B-32 Army air and missile defense Army echelons, 2-87–2-110 during crisis, 5-52–5-62 roles during competition, 4-57–4-102 Army field support brigade, 4-87 Army force posture, 2-79–2-86 Army forces, and unified action, 2-54–2-110 challenges for, 1-15–1-24 exercise command and control over in the theater, 4-66–4-67 Army operations, 1-1–1-8 in maritime environments, 7-1–7-83 Army special operations forces, Entries are by paragraph number. during competition, 4-99– 4-102 during transition to post- conflict competition, 6-283–6-284 employment, 2-104–2-110 Army strategic contexts, 1-69– 1-80 Army support to the joint force during crisis, 5-15–5-19 Army-specific considerations, 7-19–7-22 art of command, and the commander, 8-1–8-4 applying the, 8-5–8-26 assigned, B-28 assigned areas, 3-137–3-150 assigned forces, theater army, 4-74–4-91 assigning, a joint operations area within an area of attached, B-29 authorities, NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization, B-61–B-66 other Army, B-39–B-47 other, B-20–B-24