*FM 3-07
Field Manual
No. 3-07
Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 2 June 2014

Stability

This chapter begins with a discussion of the five primary stability tasks. Then it provides guidance to help Army leaders identify and execute them effectively. Finally, it presents considerations for related activities and missions that apply to all aspects of stability tasks. PRIMARY STABILITY TASKS 1-1. Stability tasks are part of every operation. However, the proportion of stability tasks, in relation to offensive and defensive tasks, may change. Whether an operation is a peace operation preventing conflict or a large-scale combat operation, forces will always integrate offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. For example, in a peace operation, forces may still perform offensive tasks such as raids to capture war criminals. Conversely, in large-scale combat operations, forces perform stability tasks to control captured areas or provide emergency essential services. 1-2. The primary stability tasks reflect myriad interrelated activities conducted across the five stability sectors. Tasks performed in one sector inevitably create related effects in another sector; planned and performed appropriately, carefully sequenced activities complement and reinforce these effects. Achieving a specific objective or setting certain conditions often requires performing a number of related tasks among different stability sectors. An example of this is the effort required to provide a safe, secure environment for the local populace. Rather than the outcome of a single task focused solely on the local populace, safety and security are broad effects. Military forces achieve them by ending hostilities, isolating belligerents and criminal elements, demobilizing armed groups, eliminating explosives and other hazards, and providing public order and safety. In other words, to ensure security will be sustained over time, forces perform numerous tasks across all the stability sectors. 1-3. Operations focused on stability aim to stabilize the environment enough so the host nation can begin to resolve the root causes of conflict and state failure. These operations establish a safe, secure environment that facilitates reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Operations focused on stability aim to establish conditions that support the transition to legitimate host-nation governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market economy. 1-4. The size of the force and combination of tasks necessary to stabilize conditions depend on the situation in the operational area. When a functional, effective host-nation government exists, military forces work through and with local civil authorities. Together they restore stability and order and sometimes to reform the security institutions that foster long-term development. In this situation, the size of the force and the scope of the mission are more limited. However, in a worst-case scenario, the security environment would be in chaos and the state would be in crisis or failed altogether. In this situation, international law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and to address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. This requires a force capable of securing borders, protecting the population, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities, regulating the behavior of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablishing essential civil services, and setting conditions in the operational area that enable the success of other partners. 1-5. Military forces provide support to facilitate the completion of tasks for which the host nation is normally responsible. Typically, these tasks have a security component ideally performed by military forces. However, military forces sometimes provide logistics, medical, or administrative support to enable the success of civilian agencies and organizations. These tasks generally fall into one of three categories, representing the collective effort associated with an operation focused on stability:  Tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility.  Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations likely retain responsibility, but military forces are prepared to execute until transition can safely occur with those organizations.  Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility. 1-6. The primary stability tasks are—  Establish civil security.  Establish civil control.  Restore essential services.  Support to governance.  Support to economic and infrastructure development. E STABLISH C IVIL S ECURITY (I NCLUDING S ECURITY F ORCE A SSISTANCE) 1-7. Civil security is the provision of security for state entities and the population, including protection from internal and external threats. Establishing a safe, secure, and stable environment is key to obtaining local support for military operations. The primary task of establishing civil security may include security force assistance tasks depending on the missions assigned. As soon a host nation’s security forces can perform this task, Army forces transition civil security responsibilities to them. Within the security sector, transformation tasks focus on developing legitimate, sustainable, and stable security institutions. Civil security sets the conditions for enduring stability and peace. 1-8. Military forces set these conditions by performing subordinate tasks during all three phases of the stability framework—initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. During the initial response phase of the stability framework, Army units often perform the tasks on their own because the host nation lacks capability. 1-9. In the transformation phase of the stability framework, host-nation personnel and, potentially, interorganizational entities begin to contribute. Army units then focus more on security force assistance, particularly the systems required to professionalize a host nation’s security forces. 1-10. In the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, Army units transition to a steady-state posture focused on advisory duties and security cooperation. The host nation assumes responsibility for its civil security. Some societies have strong cultural resistance against foreign or domestic military involvement in civil security. On these occasions, United States (U.S.) forces explore other options or mitigate concerns about such involvement by synchronizing information-related capabilities and engagement. 1-11. Depending on the situation, establishing civil security can include seven subtasks:  Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.  Determine disposition and composition of host-nation armed and intelligence services.  Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.  Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.  Support identification programs.  Protect key personnel and facilities.  Clear explosives and other hazards. (For a more detailed discussion of establish civil security subtasks, see chapter 2 of ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-07.5.) E STABLISH C IVIL C ONTROL 1-12. Civil control fosters the rule of law. The rule of law means that all persons, institutions, and entities—public and private, including the state itself—are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights principles. To strengthen civil control and the rule of law, Army units seek to improve the capability, capacity, and legitimacy of host-nation judicial and corrections systems by providing training and support to law enforcement and judicial personnel. Army units focus on implementing temporary or interim capabilities to lay the foundation for host-nation or interorganizational development of this sector. 1-13. Civil control is based on a society ensuring individuals and groups adhere to the rule of law. A society that embraces the rule of law provides equal access to a legal system consistent with international human rights principles. Developing such a society is a long-term process guided by civilian entities. 1-14. Military forces perform subordinate tasks to facilitate civil control during all three phases of the stability framework. Initial response tasks focus on establishing civil control and fostering the rule of law. During the initial response phase of the stability framework, Army units may have to complete tasks on their own because the host nation has little or no capability or legitimacy. In other phases, host-nation security forces can maintain public order and require little Army unit involvement. 1-15. Transformation tasks develop justice, corrections systems, and other legal fields that meet international human rights standards and support viable processes for redress and reconciliation. In the transformation phase of the stability framework, host-nation police forces and interorganizational entities take the lead with Army units focusing on security force assistance, particularly the professionalization of host-nation security forces. 1-16. Fostering sustainability tasks emphasizes the transfer of the judicial and corrections systems to host-nation personnel. Army units facilitate this transfer, continue to monitor and report, and transition to a steady state posture focused on advisory duties and security cooperation. 1-17. Depending on the situation, nine subtasks may be performed:  Establish public order and safety.  Establish an interim criminal justice system.  Support law enforcement and police reform.  Support judicial reform.  Support a civil property dispute resolution process.  Support criminal justice system reform.  Support corrections reform.  Support war crimes courts and tribunals.  Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs. (For a more detailed discussion of establish civil control subtasks, see chapter 3 of ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-07.5.) R ESTORE E SSENTIAL S ERVICES 1-18. Restoring services essential to local expectations of normalcy allows people to return their daily activities and prevents further destabilization. Ideally, the host nation’s government and civilian relief agencies should restore and develop essential services. In most cases, local, international, and U.S. agencies have arrived in country long before U.S. forces. However, when partner organizations are not well established or lack capacity, Army units accomplish these tasks until the other organizations can. 1-19. Military forces perform subordinate tasks to facilitate restoring essential services during all three phases of the stability framework. During the initial response phase of the stability framework, Army units take the lead in providing for the population’s immediate critical needs, supporting and enabling other actors as they become operational. Army units provide minimal assistance if the other actors are already well-established. In any case, Army units assess essential services based on local norms. They determine the levels of functionality necessary to mitigate instability. 1-20. The transformation phase of the stability framework occurs once the immediate crisis is past and sufficient capacity begins to grow. This phase establishes the foundation for long-term development and resolves root causes of conflict that lead to famine, dislocated civilians, refugee flows, and human trafficking. 1-21. In the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, the host nation makes the efforts permanent by institutionalizing positive change in society and ensuring it has the means to sustain progress. If the situation in the host nation regresses, the host nation may resume stability tasks from earlier phases. 1-22. Restore essential services can include eight subtasks:  Provide essential civil services.  Perform tasks related to civilian dislocation.  Support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.  Support nonfood relief programs.  Support humanitarian demining.  Support human rights initiatives.  Support public health programs.  Support education programs. (For a more detailed discussion of restore essential services subtasks, see chapter 4 of ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-07.5.) S UPPORT TO G OVERNANCE 1-23. Governance is the set of activities conducted by a government or community organization to maintain societal order, define and enforce rights and obligations, and fairly allocate goods and services. Effective, legitimate governance ensures these activities are transparent, accountable, and involve public participation. Elections, while often an end state condition in planning, does not ensure these outcomes. In societies divided along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines, elections may further polarize factions. Generally, representative institutions based on universal suffrage offer the best means of fostering governance acceptable to most citizens. If a host nation’s government or community organizations cannot provide governance, some degree of military support may be necessary. In extreme cases where civil government or community organizations are dysfunctional or absent, international law requires military forces to provide basic civil administration. 1-24. Military forces perform subordinate tasks to facilitate support to governance during all three phases of the stability framework. During the initial response phase of the stability framework, the U.S. military may be directed to act as the transitional military authority to establish governance. In other cases, Army commanders can influence host-nation officials who have formal authority but little capacity. In either case, Army units develop host-nation partnerships and foster governance in their areas of operations. Even if U.S. forces have formal authority as a transitional military authority, they work closely with host-nation and interorganizational entities in order to prepare host-nation government and community organizations to assume responsibility for governance. 1-25. In the transformation phase of the stability framework, responsibility for governance is transferred to civilian authorities. This may be provisional under the control of an ambassador, a United Nations (UN) mission, or some other temporary entity. In some cases, authority will be transferred to host-nation representatives that may be from the same host-nation government prior to the operation. As Army units develop host-nation institutional capability and capacity, they continue to foster good governance by advising, assisting, supporting, and monitoring other actors. 1-26. In the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, host-nation authorities assume complete responsibility for governance. Army units and host-nation security partners focus on maintaining security, building capability and capacity, and facilitating appropriate security forces involvement in governance. Army units continue to monitor developments regarding governance and identify concerns to host-nation authorities and the U.S. Government. 1-27. Depending on the situation, support to governance has four primary subtasks:  Support transitional administrations.  Support development of local governance.  Support anticorruption initiatives.  Support elections. (For a more detailed discussion of support to governance subtasks, see chapter 5 of ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-07.5.) S UPPORT TO E CONOMIC AND I NFRASTRUCTURE D EVELOPMENT 1-28. Long-term peace and stability require sustainable host-nation economic and infrastructure development. The end state is the creation of a sustainable economy. In post-conflict and fragile states, host-nation actors, interagency partners, and interorganizational partners often have the most useful knowledge and skills regarding the restoration and facilitation of economic and infrastructure development. However, if security considerations or other factors restrict their ability to intervene, Army units should assist host-nation entities to foster sustainable economic and infrastructure development. 1-29. Military forces perform subordinate tasks to facilitate support to economic and infrastructure development during all three phases of the stability framework. In the initial response phase of the stability framework, Army units take the lead in assessing local economic conditions and prioritizing the obstacles to economic development. If other partners are unable to mitigate them, Army units work with host-nation and interorganizational partners to implement activities. Depending on the situation, Army units may provide security to foster commerce, create short-term livelihood opportunities, facilitate market access, secure key infrastructure or natural resources, or perform other tasks. It is crucial for Army commanders to implement only activities that support long-term sustainable development. For example, a project focused on creating jobs in the short term must ensure appropriate wages for local economic conditions. Inadequate wages for teachers or other professionals could eventually lead to their resignations. Such situations could disrupt progress and distort expectations of the host nation’s economy and government. 1-30. During the transformation phase of the stability framework, Army units establish the foundation for sustainable economic development and transition control of economic development to host-nation officials or interorganizational entities. Army units focus on establishing host-nation institutions that can provide sustainable economic growth. Once a civilian administration assumes control, Army units primarily advise and assist those officials. During this phase, Army forces continuously update the economic and infrastructure assessments. They transfer responsibility for maintaining the economy and infrastructure to host-nation officials or interorganizational entities. In general, the transformation phase builds on and reinforces successes of the initial response phase. 1-31. In the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, Army units facilitate the institutionalization of a long-term, sustainable economic infrastructure development program and transition economic control to host-nation officials and the civil society. The primarily task of Army units is to advise and assist host-nation civilian economic officials. 1-32. Depending on the situation, economic and infrastructure development has ten primary subtasks:  Support economic generation and enterprise creation.  Support monetary institutions and programs.  Support national treasury operations.  Support public sector investment programs.  Support private sector development.  Protect natural resources and environment.  Support agricultural development programs.  Restore transportation infrastructure.  Restore telecommunications infrastructure.  Support general infrastructure reconstruction programs. 1-33. Before implementing any activities, Army units must first assess the economic and infrastructure situation. This assessment should be based on local norms. It should identify and prioritize the sources of instability that threaten effective economic and infrastructure development. (For a more detailed discussion of support to economic and infrastructure development subtasks, see chapter 6 of ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-07.5.) IDENTIFICATION AND ACCOMPLISHMENT OF STABILITY TASKS 1-34. Ensuring a state’s long-term stability depends on applying combat power to those tasks that are, in fact, essential. For the commander and staff, operations focused on stability require a unique combination of knowledge and understanding, the ability to achieve unity of effort, and a thorough depth of cultural astuteness. A finite amount of combat power is available to apply against the essential tasks associated with a given stability mission. Essential stability tasks lay the foundation for success. This foundation must sustain the burdens of governance, rule of law, and economic development that represent the future viability of a state. Establishing this foundation depends on applying combat power to the essential stability tasks identified during the initial assessment of the situation and the framing of the basic problem. Decisions about using combat power are more than a factor of the size of the force deployed, its relative composition, and the anticipated nature and duration of the mission. I DENTIFICATION OF T ASKS 1-35. Success in operations focused on stability often depends on the commander’s ability to identify the tasks essential to mission success. Success also depends on the commander’s ability to prioritize and sequence the accomplishment of those tasks with available combat power, the diverse array of actors participating, and the ability of the host nation to accept change. Even more so than in the offense and defense, operations focused on stability require commanders to demonstrate cultural understanding and a clear appreciation of the myriad stability tasks to determine which are fundamentally essential to mission success. 1-36. The commander and staff identify essential stability tasks after considering the relevant mission variables. Essential stability tasks are those that the force must successfully complete to accomplish the specific mission. These essential tasks may include specified and implied tasks required to establish end state conditions that define success. They include the primary stability tasks, informing and influencing of audiences, and protection of civilians. In addition, they include any essential offensive and defensive tasks associated with the defeat of an enemy force. Typically, military forces retain primary responsibility for these initial response tasks. Other tasks may be included that are not the primary responsibility of military forces. Some tasks are performed simultaneously and some sequentially. A CCOMPLISHMENT OF A LL E SSENTIAL T ASKS 1-37. In a complex operational environment—with unstable security conditions and a failed or nonfunctioning government—a military force may be the only substantial stabilizing presence. In these conditions, the force must be prepared to perform all the tasks essential to establishing and maintaining security and order while providing for the essential needs of the populace. In most situations, local and international aid organizations will be present in the operational area but may have limited access to the population. Military forces can significantly contribute to increasing the access of these aid organizations, allowing them to provide essential humanitarian assistance and conduct development activities for the civilian population. In turn, this reduces a substantial logistics burden on military forces, allowing them to focus on providing a safe, secure environment. RELATED ACTIVITIES AND MISSIONS 1-38. Operations characterized by stability tasks often combine with certain activities and missions common to Army operations. These activities and missions cut across all stability missions regardless of the focus and require increased emphasis and attention by commander. Some activities—such as security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration—cut across the primary stability tasks and may be the centerpiece of an operation. Some operations feature a large component of stability tasks relative to offensive and defensive tasks. However, these operations, as with most decisive action, have elements of offense and defense as well. Some types of operations have a greater focus on stability tasks than others. Related activities and missions include—  Information-related capabilities.  Protection of civilians.  Mass atrocity response operations.  Security sector reform.  Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.  Destruction, monitoring, and redirection of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and mitigation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) hazards.  Army support to security cooperation.  Peace operations.  Foreign humanitarian assistance.  Counterinsurgency.  Foreign internal defense. I NFORMATION -R ELATED C APABILITIES 1-39. Stability operations depend heavily on keeping audiences informed to minimize noncombatant interference, countering adversary and enemy information, and shaping their support of local transitional civil or military authorities. Information-related capabilities are integrated to directly influence the perceptions and increase support among key populations. An information-related capability is a tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions (JP 3-13). Synchronizing information-related capabilities—such as Soldier and leader engagement and military information support operations—can amplify positive actions, counter enemy information activities, and increase support. Commanders use received information and actions to shape analyzed information and operational environments to multiply the effects of friendly successes. 1-40. During operations, commanders and staffs synchronize information-related capabilities and tasks to produce complementary and reinforcing actions, themes, and messages. Army forces make every effort to reduce the potential for conflicting information that could interfere with achieving objectives. Commanders inform and influence audiences inside and outside their organizations. Commanders—  Provide their commander’s intent, the mission narrative, and their vision of the desired end state.  Establish and synchronize themes and messages to inform and influence audiences inside and outside their organization.  Incorporate cultural awareness, relevant social and political factors, and informational considerations into the operations process.  Guide the integration of information-related capabilities during the operations process.  Assess how the staff and subordinate units use information-related capabilities to support operations.  Understand their audiences, ranging from the audiences in the United States to indigenous civilians in the area of operations. 1-41. A critical information-related capability is Soldier and leader engaging with key leaders and the population. Soldier and leader engagement is interpersonal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with audiences in an area of operations (FM 3-13). Soldiers and leaders conduct engagement to provide information or to influence attitudes, perceptions, and behavior. Engagement is critical to understanding host-nation population concerns, explaining how Army units are pursuing stability along with other objectives, and gaining the cooperation with other actors. Engagements with adversaries may at times be appropriate to improve stability efforts. Soldier and leader engagement provides a venue for building relationships, solving conflicts, conveying information, calming fears, and refuting rumors, lies, or incorrect information. 1-42. Army leaders account for effective engagement that includes females in the population. Leaders consider how gender norms differ by culture. They plan and prepare to include female teams and interpreters, which are critical to effectiveness. In some situations, a trained female team can interact with the population, develop an understanding of gender and family issues, provide care to victims, and influence a significant but often inaccessible part of the population. Female teams require special training as these functions will likely differ from their normal responsibilities. Female teams have been known to experience difficulties with integration into military units; therefore, commanders emphasize their importance and integration to avoid problems. 1-43. Army units will have to engage actors who are in competition with each other. Soldiers must be careful to maintain their impartiality and avoid manipulation by actors with ulterior motives. Additionally, some actors may be perpetrators or otherwise have questionable legitimacy. Some actors will use negotiation as an expedient tactic that is part of a larger campaign in opposition to the Army unit’s objectives. Units should be careful not to overlook or marginalize important groups such as women or minorities. Effective Soldiers strive to understand and address the concerns of each group. If possible, units coordinate engagements with activities of other partners to avoid contradictory messages. Finally, units take care that engagements do not generate unrealistic expectations. (See FM 3-13 for a more detailed discussion of Soldier and leader engagement and other information-related capabilities.) P ROTECTION OF C IVILIANS 1-44. Protection of civilians applies across the range of military operations. Regardless of the primary objective, protection of civilians is an important moral, political, legal, and military consideration. The protection of civilians refers, in general, to efforts that protect civilians from physical violence, secure their access to essential services and resources, and protect human rights. Military and nonmilitary stability partners perform tasks that support protection of civilians in the short term and long term. In addition to physical protection from imminent violence and provision of necessities, elements include setting broader enabling conditions. 1-45. A civilian is a person who is not a member of his or her country’s armed forces or other militia. The credibility and legitimacy of an Army operation, the success of the overarching mission, and the achievement of U.S. strategic goals depend on Army units being able and willing to protect civilians. Army units must ensure that civilians are not the object of attacks. They must ensure that civilians are spared and protected during conflict. The law of war (also known as international humanitarian law) requires belligerents to protect civilians from the effects of war and military occupation. Moreover, in many operations, the population’s support may be the center of gravity or indispensable for mission accomplishment. Political objectives often include security, stability, a sustainable peace, and other favorable conditions. Civilians living in a highly insecure environment, and observers around the world, expect that Soldiers will protect civilians. 1-46. Army units frequently work with, support, and enable other actors to establish an environment in which civilians are protected in the short term and long term. Army units will likely comprise one part of a larger multidimensional effort that includes other actors whose activities are, in fact, the most significant for ensuring protection of civilians in the long term. These actors include host-nation and international civilian, police, and military organizations that address security, governance, rule of law, humanitarian, and developmental needs. The various actors may have dissimilar objectives and use different methods, but they agree about the general desirability of protecting civilians. 1-47. Protection of civilians may be the primary purpose of a mission or a supporting task. Effective protection of civilians depends on adaptive units, a command climate that emphasizes its importance, and leaders who can make timely and appropriate decisions based on critical situations on the ground. Regardless of the operation, leaders will likely have to address protection of civilians. 1-48. Army units support protection of civilians by doing no harm and performing deliberate actions to protect civilians. First, Army units do no harm. These units act in accordance with the law of war and other relevant bodies of law in order to minimize civilian harm. Additionally, Army units avoid actions that undermine efforts by other actors that improve human security. Second, Army units perform deliberate actions to protect civilians. These units perform offensive, defensive, and stability tasks expressly intended to mitigate harm to civilians, including operations intended to create an environment conducive to protection of civilians. Risks to Civilians 1-49. Civilians are potentially at risk from armed conflict and many other situations. Examples include widespread or systematic targeted violence including genocide and other mass atrocities, sexual violence, human trafficking, displacement, and impeded access to humanitarian assistance and essential services. To mitigate these risks, Army units must understand the relevant civilian vulnerabilities and the threats to civilians’ well-being. Civilian Vulnerabilities 1-50. Civilian vulnerabilities come from many sources, including individual and community factors, environmental factors, and unavailability of services such as healthcare and emergency food distribution. For example, ethnic or sectarian violence may target certain groups within a population, rendering those more vulnerable than others. Civilians near military targets may be more vulnerable to collateral damage, and dislocated civilians who flee their homes may be more vulnerable to disease, starvation, and crime. Some groups may be vulnerable in certain contexts, including women, children, or the elderly, infirm, and disabled. Stability partners can mitigate vulnerabilities in many ways, including assistance and security. Threats to Civilians 1-51. Threats consist of individuals or groups with the capability, intent, and opportunity to harm civilians. Specific threats vary in terms of their dimensions, type, and perpetrators’ objectives. The most important aspect of the threat is the perpetrators’ motivation or strategic logic behind the violence. If the violence is intrinsic to the goals or ideology of the perpetrator (such as cases of sectarian violence, ethnic cleansing, or genocide), the perpetrator may view the civilian population as a threat, and may prove difficult to deter. Similarly, when violence against civilians is intrinsic to a group’s existence, such as a group that survives from forced recruitment and pillage, it can be difficult to deter the perpetrators. When violence is instrumental to a group’s goals, such as some cases of terrorism or a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, perpetrators may attack civilians as a means to achieve some other objective. In such cases, perpetrators may be deterred or persuaded to use other methods. Their motivations may change over time and may overlap. Five Guidelines for Protection of Civilians 1-52. Five overarching guidelines assist Army units with protection of civilians during operations. (See figure 1-1.) Leaders ensure Army forces do not neglect any of the guidelines as doing so increases the possibility that civilians will suffer unnecessary harm. These guidelines are not prioritized. However, their sequence suggests that Army units should understand the circumstances in which they will operate, establish their goals, conduct operations to achieve their goals, develop synergy with other actors, and shape the surrounding environment to enable success. Continually Understand the Situation 1-53. Army leaders must constantly have situational understanding of an operational environment, relevant actors, and dynamics. The staff’s analysis of the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time, known collectively as PMESII-PT) contribute to understanding threats to civilians and ways to protect them. 1-54. Units have to influence (and, in many cases, should be influenced by) a wide range of other actors. These actors may be loosely categorized as adversaries, vulnerable civilians, bystanders, negative actors, and positive actors. These categories may overlap and could change over time. For example, a particular ethnic group could be both a perpetrator and victim of violence against civilians. In many situations, the military operates in support of other actors whose efforts are more important for achieving protection of civilians. 1-55. Additionally, effective Army leaders comprehend dynamics. These dynamics include evolving strategic guidance and mandates, the strategic logic of perpetrators, the impact of operations, changing vulnerabilities and threats that relate to protection of civilians, emerging opportunities to enhance protection of civilians, and changes in an operational environment or among the actors. 1-56. A situation often features a complex and evolving relationship among the operational variables and other dynamics, requiring good intelligence, efficient information management based on the commander’s critical information requirements, and effective current assessments. Different actors concerned with protecting civilians may be reluctant to exchange information—when this exchange could compromise their neutrality, confidentiality, or operations security. However, it may be possible to develop formal and informal information-sharing mechanisms that improve Army and partner efforts to protect civilians. Pursue the Desired Outcomes 1-57. Effective protection of civilians ultimately depends on achieving five outcomes (or end states) essential to human security:  Safe and secure environment.  Good governance.  Rule of law.  Social well-being.  Sustainable economy. 1-58. These outcomes are directly related to the Army’s primary stability tasks. They are often related to peace building and development and usually must be pursued as parallel, mutually supporting efforts. Failure to achieve these end states can result in civilian harm or inflame grievances that result in conflict and place civilians at increased risk. Tensions and tradeoffs often exist between short-term goals and long-term outcomes, as well as a potential tension between protection of civilians and other objectives. Army units are primarily involved with establishing a safe and secure environment. In addition to improving protection of civilians, security is necessary to enable a political settlement, permit a normal life for civilians, and support the end states for which other partners are responsible. However, to maintain security, units must be flexible. In varying degrees, units may need to enable, monitor, or support the objectives of other partners. In extreme cases of last resort, Army units may have to assume temporary responsibility for other tasks. Army units, at a minimum, will have to be aware of the status of other partners’ efforts, even if these partners do not have primary responsibility and authority for those tasks. This awareness enables units to comprehend the big picture, do no harm, and avoid undermining nonmilitary tasks that may be critical to mission accomplishment. Design and Conduct Operations That Quickly Reduce Risks to Civilians 1-59. During operations, Army units may be required to protect civilians, neutralize threats to civilians, and mitigate civilian casualties or other forms of civilian harm. While conducting operations, units must routinely and proactively incorporate protection of civilians’ considerations, as failure to do so can convey the message that violence against civilians is acceptable. Some operations, such as patrols, checkpoints, support for humanitarian assistance, or evacuation of noncombatants, may be conducted to enhance protection of civilians directly. In other cases, operations have a secondary effect of protecting civilians. Routine Army warfighting functions such as intelligence, mission command, sustainment, and protection may require some modification to account for protection of civilians. Comprehensively Engage the Full Range of Actors 1-60. Protection of civilians usually requires contributions from a wide variety of military and nonmilitary actors (both local and international) who are not subordinate to a common authority and do not necessarily share the same objectives. A comprehensive approach to protecting civilians is, generally, the most effective. In a comprehensive approach, military and nonmilitary actors integrate military and nonmilitary means to achieve shared objectives while understanding that many of the nonmilitary considerations are most important in the long term. It is particularly important to understand protection of civilians from the local population’s perspective. Army units should integrate plans and operations with those of other partners. Examples of comprehensive engagement includes engaging with key leaders and the population, conducting multinational operations with international and host-nation police and military partners, building the capacity of (or enabling) other partners, developing effective civil-military operations centers, and enabling humanitarian assistance. Shape the Protective Environment 1-61. In addition to understanding and operating within an operational environment, Army leaders must determine how to shape that environment in ways that enhance protection of civilians. These shaping efforts are achieved through effective risk mitigation, information-related capabilities, and programs including security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and transitional justice. Additionally, Army leaders focus on eliminating conflict-related sexual violence and protecting children from threats—including recruitment as child soldiers. These problems are often overlooked but are critical to address. It is impossible to have a secure environment and adequate protection of civilians when atrocities of these types regularly occur. Local, community efforts are also critical for protection of civilians. Other partners (including domestic and international political, police, humanitarian, and developmental organizations) have primary responsibility, authority, and capability for many functions. Often, Army units are limited to a supporting and enabling role. Challenges to Protection of Civilians 1-62. While conducting operations to achieve protection of civilians, military forces will confront tradeoffs, gaps, and challenges that require difficult choices by unit leaders. Most problems will be situational in nature and defy a blanket solution. Tradeoffs occur when conflicting considerations exist and leaders must attempt to strike a balance between them. For example, peace and stability are important objectives, but so is a just environment in which basic human rights are protected and violators are held accountable. Other tradeoffs include the role of host-nation and external actors, the pursuit of short-term and long-term goals, and the balanced protection of civilians with other objectives. Requirements for effective protection of civilians will likely exceed capacity. In addition, host-nation corruption, constraints with respect to civilian authorities and responsibilities, and difficulties in achieving unity of effort among the diverse actors will likely challenge Army units. (For additional resources, see the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute [PKSOI] Web site.) M ASS A TROCITY R ESPONSE O PERATIONS 1-63. Commanders should be prepared within their capabilities to monitor, prevent, and if necessary, respond to mass atrocity situations in all operations, not just in peace operations. Evidence of previously committed mass atrocities can also become known during the course of peace operations, potentially raising diplomatic, political, and social turmoil, the consequences of which can directly affect ongoing operations. Addressing the sources of instability may contribute to preventing mass atrocities. Military support and supporting efforts of other agencies and organizations in response to mass atrocities may be key to the success of stability missions. (JP 3-07.3 provides joint doctrine for mass atrocity response operations. For additional resources, see the PKSOI Web site.) S ECURITY S ECTOR R EFORM 1-64. Security sector reform is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice (JP 3-07). Security sector reform aims to provide an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civil authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. It may include integrated activities to support defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and concurrent reduction of armed violence. 1-65. Security sector reform involves reestablishing or reforming institutions and key ministerial positions that maintain and oversee the safety and security of a nation. Through the whole-of-government approach, ministerial officials and institutions can assume an effective, legitimate, and accountable role; they are responsible for security and should be subordinated under civil authorities. Effective security sector reform enables a nation to build its capacity to provide security and justice. Security sector reform promotes stability, fosters reform processes, and creates an environment for economic development. Security sector reform should result in effective and legitimate security sector firmly rooted within the rule of law. Roles and Responsibilities of United States Government Partners 1-66. The departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, including the Department of Defense (DOD), pursue integrated security sector reform based on a whole-of-government approach. With the support of the host nation, military officials collaborate with interagency and interorganizational partners to design and implement security sector reform strategies and plans. The Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency for security sector reform, providing oversight for these efforts through its bureaus, offices, and overseas missions. DOD provides capabilities to support the establishment, reform, and restructuring of a host nation’s armed forces and defense sector. DOD also helps other U.S. agencies involved in security sector reform. Army forces participate in and support security sector reform as directed by the joint force commander. (Roles and responsibilities of interagency partners in security sector reform are discussed in the combined United States Agency for International Development [USAID], DOD, and DOS publication Security Sector Reform.) 1-67. The Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) can often serve as the primary effort for justice system reforms within a host nation. Effective commanders request assistance with identifying the critical tasks prior to deployment. If ICITAP personnel deploy, commanders involve ICITAP with all planning efforts. ICITAP can assist not only on police systems, but on both detention centers and prisons as well. ICITAP lends expertise in the following areas:  Organizational development within the justice systems.  Terrorism and transnational crime.  Public integrity and anticorruption.  Specialized and tactical skills.  Marine and border security.  Academy and instructor development (basic through advanced courses to include leadership and executive development).  Criminal justice coordination (such as training and development for police, prosecutors, and judges).  Criminal investigations.  Forensics (basic to international standards).  Basic police services.  Community policing.  Corrections.  Information systems within the justice systems.  Intelligence-led policing. 1-68. While the military may initially shape an operational environment, organizations and agencies such as ICITAP can provide long-term assistance from the tactical to the sustained institutional levels of development. The Military Role in Security Sector Reform 1-69. Security sector reform can occur at any point across the range of military operations, in conditions ranging from peace to the aftermath of major combat operations. No matter the conditions, security sector reform focus on mitigating conditions that might foster crisis and conflict. Within unified land operations, security sector reform is often an aspect of operations focused on stability. Security sector reform includes tasks, functions, and activities from each of the primary task areas. It concentrates on generating the capacity of the state and societal institutions to support responsible governance and the rule of law. (The roles and responsibilities of the military in security sector reform are discussed further in ADRP 3-07 and JP 3-07.) The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in Security Sector Reform 1-70. Since the end of the Cold War, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have emerged as prominent partners in security sector reform efforts worldwide. The most prominently recognized among these actors is the UN. The UN brings high levels of legitimacy, special capabilities provided by a broad mix of member states, and a capacity for sustaining large missions over long periods. The UN deploys many agencies capable of supporting security sector reform across the security sector. Integrated missions mandated by a UN Security Council resolution and directed by a special representative to the UN Secretary General encourage cooperation in security sector reform by multiple partners from UN agencies. Security Sector Reform and Host-Nation Autonomy 1-71. Operations focused on stability seek to enhance the legitimacy of host-nation governance while leveraging efforts to reform the security sector. A host nation’s constitution, institutions, laws, and processes, however developmental, should play a central role in security sector reform. External influences frequently shape security sector reform policy, especially when a host nation’s government functions poorly. Nonetheless, security sector reform planners carefully uphold the host nation’s sovereignty by integrating its government into reform planning and execution. 1-72. After hostilities cease, a comprehensive peace agreement must exist before security sector reform can begin. Once a peace agreement is established, partners can focus on helping the host nation create a national constitution. To create a suitable constitution, the partners ensure constitutional scholars work with host-nation officials to promote understanding of the political structure. National security strategies or policies and subordinate strategic documents, national defense acts, and national justice codes illustrate host-nation guidelines that can help to add structure to the security sector reform effort. Also important to the security sector reform effort are host-nation groups in charge of specific responsibilities, such as government reform agencies and national reconciliation commissions. 1-73. Each partner in security sector reform helps develop the programs using its own policy guidance and implementation mechanisms. For example, UN Security Council resolutions define the mandates of UN peacekeepers and missions led by the UN. Host-nation national policy guidance, national justice systems, and relevant national legislation, treaties, and agreements—bilateral and multilateral—provide a framework for the host nation and its military forces. U.S. security assistance must proceed within the framework of legislated provisions governing the delivery of foreign assistance by U.S. agencies. While security sector reform should integrate these activities, the reform programs should primarily reflect the host nation’s institutions, laws, and processes. (The roles and responsibilities of the U.S. Government and other partners in security sector reform are discussed in JP 3-07 and JP 3-08.) Security Sector Reform Planning 1-74. Sustainable security sector reform depends on thorough planning, assessment, patience, and perseverance. Working within a collaborative environment, the various partners consider the unique capabilities and contributions of each participant. The ensuing plan aims for a practical pace of reform and accounts for the political and cultural context of the environment. The plan accounts for available resources and capabilities while balancing the human capacity to deliver change against a realistic timeline. The security sector reform plan reflects the host nation’s cultures, sensitivities, and historical conceptions of security. It does not seek to implement a Western paradigm for the security sector, understanding that a Western model may not be appropriate. Yet, security sector reform planners cannot adopt a lax attitude toward security practices that contribute to conflict or instability. As with the broader campaign plan, the security sector reform plan seeks to resolve the underlying sources of conflict while preventing new security crises. 1-75. The level of host-nation development—especially as it pertains to poverty and economic opportunity—is an important consideration in security sector reform planning. High levels of poverty and extensive corruption significantly challenge security sector reform efforts. Poverty and corruption at the individual and institutional levels typically lead to poor economic growth, inadequate or excessive government revenues, and a chronically under-resourced public sector. Security sector reform should address these challenges. Programs should confront flagrant corruption in the public sector and accommodate limited host-nation public administration and public management capacities. External resourcing and external fiscal management for the host nation’s security sector, including its military institutions, may be necessary until the host nation can sustain security sector reform. 1-76. Ideally, the host nation’s security strategy and defense policy guide the security sector reform plan. However, in states without established, legitimate government institutions able to develop mature strategy and policy, interagency and interorganizational security sector reform planners must review international security strategy and defense policy before developing a plan. Any such review must account for the characteristics of the host nation’s cultures. It must help ensure the security sector reform plan reflects the genuine needs of the nation, not just the demands of its officials. It must ensure the final plan leads to a sustainable security apparatus appropriate for the needs of the host nation and its people. Principles of Security Sector Reform 1-77. Effective security sector reform requires unity of effort and a shared vision among the agencies, organizations, institutions, and forces contributing to the reform process, both within and outside of the U.S. Government. This unity of effort and shared vision reflects a comprehensive approach. Security sector reform is a cooperative activity, conducted with the other agencies of the U.S. Government, IGOs, nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and the host nation. Integrated programs that consider relationships among organizations, sectors, and actors increase the likelihood of success, minimize unforeseen developments, and ensure the most effective use of resources. Six principles guide security sector reform:  Support host-nation ownership.  Incorporate principles of good governance and respect for human rights.  Balance operational support with institutional reform.  Link security and justice.  Foster transparency.  Do no harm. (The principles for security sector reform are discussed in ADRP 3-07 and JP 3-07.) Foundations of Security Sector Reform 1-78. During security sector reform, participating military forces understand that the ultimate responsibility for reform rests with the host nation. Security sector reform planning is based on the recognition that successful efforts require an extended commitment of time and resources. The military judiciously selects and uses forces to create a secure environment so security sector reform proceeds smoothly. The military may provide temporary capability and expertise, but long-term success in reform depends on how quickly and effectively it transitions to appropriate civilian agencies and the host nation. 1-79. The foundations of security sector reform are—  A concept of security developed by the host nation and ingrained in its culture.  A framework that encompasses all security sector participants and challenges.  Cooperation with and among civil authorities.  Human rights.  Clear policies, accountability, and professionalism. A Concept of Security Developed by the Host Nation 1-80. The host nation develops a concept of security; its culture then ingrains this concept. The core values of security sector reform should reflect the security needs of the people. Security sector reform should instill the principle of ownership. A Framework That Encompasses All Security Sector Participants 1-81. Security sector reform should encompass all security sector participants and challenges. It provides a framework to structure thinking concerning the diverse security challenges facing host nations and their populations. An inclusive framework is essential to integrate security sector reform policies and to achieve civilian involvement and oversight. An inclusive framework is founded on understanding the security sector from the host nation’s perspective. Cooperation With and Among Civil Authorities 1-82. Military forces develop security sector reform approaches in cooperation with civil authorities. Security sector reform approaches should be based on a broad assessment of the security and justice needs of the people and the state. Effective strategies reflect a comprehensive plan that encompasses all the numerous functions in the security sector. Human Rights 1-83. Security sector reform must be based on democratic norms and supported by principles of international human rights. Effective security sector reform creates freedom from fear by measurably reducing armed violence and violent crime. Security sector reform should enhance the institutional and human capacity for security policy to function effectively and for justice to be delivered impartially. Clear Policies, Accountability, and Professionalism 1-84. Security sector reform should include well-defined policies that strengthen the governance of security institutions. It should build professional host-nation security forces that are accountable to civil authorities and capable of executing their responsibilities. The security sector and supporting activities must adhere to basic principles of governance and broader public sector reform programs, including transparency and accountability. (Other considerations in security sector reform planning are discussed in ADRP 3-07 and JP 3-07.) Comprehensive Security Sector Reform 1-85. Through unity of effort, execution of security sector reform unites all elements of the security sector. The activities of military forces may focus on reforming a host nation’s military forces, but those actions are only part of a broader, comprehensive effort to reform the entire security sector. Military forces may directly support related reform efforts or indirectly support the efforts as related, integrated activities. 1-86. Once the security sector is stabilized, other partners can safely begin operations in the operational area. Over time, military forces transfer appropriate responsibilities to other partners in the stability effort, whether from one military force to another or to a civilian group. Military forces complete the transfers of responsibilities and then focus their efforts on other stability tasks. Civilian Oversight and Control 1-87. Establishing civilian oversight and control of the defense sector is critical to the success of any security sector reform. Oversight and control mechanisms as well as processes ensure civilian control of the military, a fundamental tenet of democratic governance. These processes and mechanisms also ensure that the various components of the defense sector are accountable to elected and appointed civilian leadership, in both the executive and legislative branches. That accountability is essential to establishing a sound foundation for defense budget planning and program implementation. 1-88. The ministry of defense acts as the primary agent of civilian oversight and control within the defense sector of many foreign nations. A key indicator of civilian oversight and control is the number of civilian positions in the ministry of defense. The ministry of defense operates within some form of interagency or cabinet framework that establishes political links and accountability between the ministry and the executive and legislative branches. Other agencies involved in the defense sector may share oversight and control responsibilities, such as the cabinet-level leadership of intelligence agencies, executive protection forces, and border forces. In transitioning or post-conflict states, these institutions are frequently weak, dysfunctional, or altogether absent. Security sector reform encompasses restructuring, rebuilding, and, in some cases, creating entirely new institutions. These programs coordinate with the host nation to provide oversight and control mechanisms for the defense sector. 1-89. The legislative branch plays an important role in oversight and control. The legislature typically determines the funding level of government activities while providing the statutory framework for planning and implementation. Constitutional frameworks may give the legislature a share in the appointment of senior government officials, or in the structuring, commissioning, and promoting of Soldiers. In this context, building an effective partnership between the executive and legislative branches becomes an important enabler of effective security sector reform. 1-90. Most transitioning and post-conflict host nations clearly define and delineate the roles and responsibilities of military forces and law enforcement agencies as they provide internal security. If the security apparatus of a host nation begins to fracture, the necessary distinctions between military and law enforcement roles and missions erode or disappear entirely. This situation frequently leads to inappropriate military involvement in political affairs. As a result, military forces may subsume justice and law enforcement functions although they lack professional training and appropriate equipment. Security sector reform must restore the distinction between military and law enforcement functions as well as provide robust mechanisms to sustain that distinction. This is particularly important with host nations embroiled in an insurgency, where the military seeks to assume the primary role while marginalizing the police. 1-91. The primary agent of civilian oversight and control over law enforcement agencies is likely a separate ministry, such as the ministry of interior or of justice. As host-nation capacity for law enforcement increases, inherent power struggles may develop as police leaders strive to control the management of social order. For this reason, security sector reform focuses on improving communication and coordination between disparate ministries that have overlapping responsibilities for maintaining civil security. Often, the threshold for transitioning law enforcement from military to police oversight depends on the level of violence. This threshold serves as a quantifiable measure of effectiveness for military or civilian security sector efforts. The goal is to reduce violence to levels that host-nation police can manage, not to eradicate violence completely. Developing Security Forces 1-92. Security force assistance is the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-22). The development of capability and capacity is integral to successful stability missions and extends to all security forces: military forces, police forces, border forces, and other paramilitary organizations. Development applies to all levels of government within the host nation as well as to other local and regional forces. DOD and other partners help the host nation develop forces that will be able to operate across the range of military operations. Such forces can combat internal threats such as insurgency, subversion, and lawlessness; defend against external threats; or serve as coalition partners in other geographic locations. Partners conducting security force assistance develop programs that will facilitate the host nation to perform stability tasks and eventually sustain its own security. The host nation needs to sufficiently size, resource, organize, train, and equip its forces to meet its own standards (or internationally accepted standards) of security for its people. Successful security force assistance depends on thorough and continuous assessment. It includes the organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising of the forces involved. (Security force assistance is further discussed in FM 3-22 and JP 3-22.) Military Forces 1-93. Military forces conducting security force assistance develop host-nation military forces for the primary purpose of countering external threats. The design of host-nation military forces develops from analyzing external threats to the host nation and determining the capabilities required to counter such threats. Other key military missions include providing humanitarian assistance, and in special cases, countering certain types of internal military threats. External organizations executing security sector reform and the individuals assigned to them are selected for their specific abilities to train and advise the developing force. For example, military police should help develop military police forces. This provides for appropriate development of expertise while facilitating the advising process. Justice and Law Enforcement Forces 1-94. An effective and accountable justice system and supporting law enforcement (especially police) forces are central to a legitimate security framework. Although the military may be involved initially in developing the justice and law enforcement forces, other agencies should assume this task as soon as possible. Qualified, professional justice sector and police trainers support an improved advising process and ensure sustainable development with appropriate civilian oversight. Their expertise ensures an appropriate delineation of roles and responsibilities between military forces and law enforcement sectors. In policing, development of organizational substructure—supervision, process, policy, internal governance, planning, and budgeting—is vital to the long-term sustainability of reform efforts. (Further discussion on justice and law enforcement forces reform is found in JP 3-07.) Law Enforcement 1-95. The Foreign Assistance Act specifically prohibits assistance to foreign police forces by DOD unless a Presidential directive provides specific exceptions. When providing assistance to training, the DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs takes the lead in police assistance. The President, however, may delegate this role to other agencies. For example, in 2004, President George W. Bush signed a decision directive granting the Commander, United States Central Command authority to train and equip the Iraqi police. 1-96. When given the appropriate authority, Army military police support the criminal justice system reform through their law enforcement capabilities. Throughout the joint operational phases—shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority—professional military police units can support host-nation police organizations through partnership and mentorship programs. When criminal justice system reform, specifically the law enforcement activity, has broken down within a society, the military police may initially support efforts to assist in recruiting, training, and equipping host-nation police organizations to build force capability and capacity. 1-97. Following an intervention in a failed or fragile state, an effective police force may not exist. With the local security environment in disarray, international police trainers and advisors often cannot safely deploy into the area. Military forces may be required to take the lead in restoring and maintaining order—through clearing and holding operations—until enough civilian police partners arrive to initiate that component of security sector reform. When few military forces exist, counterinsurgency strategies require systematically creating secured zones before establishing local police in insurgent enclaves. While conventional military forces may be capable of providing immediate security from armed threats, they are not effective trainers of policing skills. Nor are they appropriate providers of police services to local communities unless they act as an occupying force under the provisions of the law of land warfare. Formed police units trained in stability policing skills are appropriate to perform these functions. Initial planning for failed state interventions should plan to incorporate such forces at the earliest opportunity. Typically, military police assist in training and advising local police and establishing police stationing operations for local law enforcement forces. Military police forces may also assist in training and advising corrections officers as part of capacity-building activities. As the police program matures, formal police training centers and academies foster professional police forces. 1-98. Commanders and staffs at all levels during preplanning efforts must carefully analyze and assess the situation from a rule of law perspective. Either as the result of increased looting or an escalation of incidents caused by a simple disregard for the law, the military police may serve as the initial force to assist in stabilizing a situation. In the meantime, planning and coordination efforts must develop with the DOS to deploy civilian experts to the operational area. Specific law enforcement operations and activities that support stability tasks may include:  Conducting police station operations.  Conducting criminal investigations.  Conducting traffic enforcement operations.  Employing forensic capabilities.  Conducting police engagement.  Conducting temporary detention of personnel.  Providing protective services for selected individuals and high-risk personnel security.  Providing investigative support.  Employing biometric capabilities.  Conducting critical site security.  Providing customs support.  Restoring and maintaining order.  Conducting border control, security, and freedom of movement operations.  Restoring public safety, order, and confidence.  Performing host-nation police training and support operations.  Providing support to civil law enforcement. Legal System 1-99. When criminal justice system reform, specifically the legal system, has broken down within a society, staff judge advocates and others may initially support efforts to assist in recruiting, training, and equipping the host nation’s legal system. Prior to deployment should coordinate and formulate basic, flexible rule of law plans that participants can tailor to the particular circumstances of the deployment. These participants can include judge advocates, civil affairs personnel, military police, and others who anticipate a rule of law activity that contemplates criminal justice system reform activities. Once deployed, information and time will likely be in short supply. Criminal justice system reform practices involving the practice of law include, but are not limited to—  Evaluating and assisting in developing transitional decrees, codes, ordinances, courts, and other measures intended to bring immediate order to areas in which the host nation’s legal system is impaired or nonfunctioning.  Evaluating host-nation law, legal traditions, and administrative procedures in light of international legal obligations and human rights standards and, when necessary, providing appropriate assistance to their reform.  Evaluating the training given to host-nation judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, legal advisors, court administrators, and police and corrections officials in light of international legal obligations and human rights standards.  Advising commanders and others on the application of international, U.S., and host-nation law considered in restoring and enhancing rule of law in the host nation.  Advising commanders and U.S., international, and host-nation authorities on the legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the host nation’s legal system—including its government’s compliance with international legal obligations and host-nation law.  When necessary, serving as legal advisors for transitional courts.  Supporting the training of U.S. personnel in the host nation’s legal system and traditions. 1-100. Criminal justice system reform activities require continuity. Judge advocates deploying to replace judge advocates already in the operational area rely on their predecessors for information regarding an operational environment. This information can detail the host nation, its legal system, existing rule of law and criminal justice system reform activities, lessons learned, and opportunities identified for future activities. Corrections 1-101. Commanders may have to conduct corrections operations should inadequacies exist within the host nation. Internment and resettlement planners can incorporate the number of companies required based on estimates of capture rates and dislocated civilians. A military police commander may serve as the commander of detainee operations, or a military police brigade commander may perform those functions in a smaller area of operations. Working through host nation’s corrections personnel and through authorized advisory efforts, U.S. corrections specialists can, through any phase of the stability framework, begin initial steps towards improving this crucial aspect of the criminal justice system. Of note, however, the military police houses detainees off the battlefield whereas prisons house inmates awaiting trial or convicted by the courts in the criminal justice system. Other Security Forces 1-102. Requirements may arise for developing other forces within the security sector. These requirements may include specialized security forces; presidential guards; coast guard, border control, and customs services; or intelligence services. The host nation determines the specific requirements on which to develop these forces. Until such forces are developed and trained, other security forces assume responsibilities outside their intended domain. In such cases, commanders ensure forces conduct operations in compliance with relevant host-nation constitutional and statutory provisions and consistent with international law and humanitarian guidelines. Commanders consider civilians’ perceptions of operations and the legitimacy of the forces supporting operations. Units conducting security sector reform continuously assess operations. Commanders use those assessments to monitor the effect of operations on the local populace and broader security sector reform. 1-103. In general, capabilities of security forces reflect the roles for which they were designed and trained. There may be overlap, particularly in times of emergency or until all planned forces are developed and trained. Cooperation between military and police forces is emphasized from the outset, permitting both to maintain their appropriate and distinct constitutional roles in the security sector. Security sector reform educates host-nation forces, civilian oversight agencies, and political leadership on the appropriate roles for each part of the security forces. Security sector reform restricts military forces to their role as a force of last resort in the face of military threats. Using such forces may require several approaches within the constitutional rule of law when military support to civil authority is required. 1-104. Ultimately, force development clearly defines and institutionalizes the separation of roles and responsibilities between military forces and law enforcement agencies. Usually, their organization, training, and equipment reflect this distinction; their design clearly limits the amount and degree of force that law enforcement agencies can generate. For example, civilian police entities may adopt military command structures and systems but not their mobile organizational structure. Another separation of roles and responsibilities exists in that police forces provide services to a particular local area, neighborhood, or community. Since police lack organization for a large-scale maneuver, they seldom form like military forces. (Reform of these other security forces is discussed in JP 3-07.) D ISARMAMENT, D EMOBILIZATION, AND R EINTEGRATION P ROGRAMS 1-105. The immediate goal of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs is to assess the security requirements of the host nation and bring the military and police forces into alignment with those requirements. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts are a critical component of stabilization activities and should be accounted for in initial planning. Often, the terms of these programs are negotiated in ceasefire or peace accords. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs are designed to remediate sources of instability. These programs facilitate achieving long-term peace, security, and development. Efforts focus on immediately managing people previously associated with armed forces and belligerent groups. 1-106. Conceptually, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs transition from disarmament and demobilization to reintegration, but sequential progress is rare among all former warring factions. Disarmament is the voluntary collection and positive control of weapons, while demobilization is the formal disbanding of armed units and their support apparatus. Reintegration helps former combatants become productive members of society. Because of their significance to security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts require a carefully crafted strategy that aligns funding, resources, organizations, and time available. This helps avoid stalled or haphazard programs that could lead former combatants to withdraw in frustration and distrust future efforts. Commanders implement programs as efficiently and effectively as possible. The success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration depends on integrating strategies and planning across all the sectors. These programs can set the foundation for safeguarding and sustaining communities in which former combatants live as contributing, law-abiding citizens. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration will not be effective until all major actors to the conflict participate in the peace agreement. However, minor, irreconcilable factions should not factor into the decision to proceed with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. 1-107. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration officials must seek ways to defray costs and extend their programs as long as possible with the resources given. Leaders aim to conduct efficient operations that provide the maximum benefit to the host nation, keeping in mind that most programs end when funding stops. 1-108. Successful programs are rewarding for participants. Such programs provide certificates of completion along with certificates for education and vocational training. Many participants cherish this recognition. Additionally, forces host a graduation ceremony for successful completion of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. (For doctrine on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, see ADRP 3-07 and JP 3-07. See the DOS’s Lessons-Learned: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations—A Guide for United States Government Planners for interagency perspectives.) Disarmament 1-109. In the context of stability, disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, unexploded ordnance, and light and heavy weapons of former combatants. Disarmament does not extend to the citizenry, which possesses the inalienable right of self-defense. Because disarmament is a voluntary process, coercive techniques are counterproductive to the desired objectives of the disarmament programs. Accordingly, a comprehensive information campaign detailing collection points, dates for turning in weapons, ceremonies, and other pertinent information is essential. The host nation’s government must exploit every medium available to ensure the word spreads. However, it is counterproductive to offer money for weapons, since this can motivate individuals to turn in unserviceable and antiquated weapons. The military often provides security at collection points, but it should not participate directly in collection. For the irreconcilable factions, the host nation’s government should assume responsibility. Demobilization 1-110. Demobilization is the process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality (JP 4-05). Because demobilization is complex, organization of infrastructure, administrative and medical personnel, and the structured program for processing is paramount. While the government security forces can use existing camps, rebel forces cannot. Consequently, these disparate groups need separate temporary camps for effective demobilization. The demobilization process typically takes several days to complete properly. Numerous challenges confront this process: a weapons turn-in and storage point; the ability to in-process and verify statuses of the combatants; medical screening; segregated barracks and latrines for males, females, child soldiers, and families; accommodations for disabled individuals; and food and water. Fighters are not the only former combatants that process through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Service support providers, most often women, must also be demobilized. For example, during in-processing, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration personnel must identify women who are victims of sex slavery and forced marriage and place them in secure barracks. (For additional resources on constructing and operating disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration cantonments, see the PKSOI Web site.) Reintegration 1-111. Reintegration is the process through which former combatants, belligerents, and displaced civilians receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local populace (ADRP 3-07). It encompasses the reinsertion of individual former combatants and dislocated civilians into host-nation communities, villages, and social groups. Reintegration is a social and economic recovery process focused on the local community; it complements other community-based programs that spur job training, employment services, and economic recovery. 1-112. Reintegration includes programs to impart marketable skills to demobilized armed forces and groups, belligerents, and dislocated civilians; relocation assistance to support their resettlement in civilian communities; basic and vocational education; and assistance in finding employment in local economies. It accounts for the specific needs of women and children associated with armed forces and groups, as well as those of civilians forced to flee their homes after violent conflict or disaster. Consequently, temporary camps need facilities for education and vocational skills training. Recruiting local teachers and vocational instructors facilitates members of a society assisting in the reintegration process. Specialized assistance, such as psychiatric counseling for traumatized combatants and devices for disabled combatants, ensures victims of conflict receive necessary assistance. 1-113. Reintegration also addresses the willingness of civilian communities to accept former fighters into their midst. If reconciliation fails, programs include finding new communities for those who cannot be reintegrated. Amnesty and reconciliation are key components to successful reintegration. In this context, reintegration cannot be divorced from justice and reconciliation programs that are part of the broader transition process. Officials cannot promise or grant amnesty and must defer to the UN for such matters. If the host nation assumes this responsibility, it prosecutes alleged war criminals and conducts truth and reconciliation committees for lesser war crimes. In such cases, a temporary camp requires a facility for hearings. Successful reintegration programs tend to be long term and costly, requiring the participation of numerous external and host-nation security sector reform actors. 1-114. Reintegration inherently includes reinsertion, repatriation, and resettlement:  Reinsertion is the assistance offered to former combatants, belligerents, and dislocated civilians prior to the long-term process of reintegration.  Repatriation, in this context, is the return of individuals to their country of citizenship.  Resettlement is the relocation of refugees to a third country that is not the country of citizenship nor the country into which the refugee has fled. 1-115. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance intended to provide for the basic needs of reintegrating individuals and their families. This assistance includes transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment, and tools. While reintegration represents enduring social and economic development, reinsertion comprises short-term material and financial assistance programs intended to meet immediate needs. Resettlement to a third country is granted by accord of the country of resettlement. It is based on criteria that include legal and physical protection needs, lack of local integration opportunities, medical needs, family reunification needs, and threat of violence or torture. W EAPONS OF M ASS D ESTRUCTION AND CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 1-116. A related mission may include the destruction, monitoring, and redirection of WMD as well as mitigating CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats include WMD. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards may result from deliberate attack or accidental release. During the performance of stability tasks, the presence of these CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards can be a major destabilizing force. Destruction activities include the dismantling, removal, transfer, disposal, and consolidation of an adversary’s materials, equipment, personnel (intellectual capital), and infrastructure of WMD. Monitoring and redirection activities follow destruction activities. Monitoring and redirection aims to convert WMD programs, personnel, sites, and facilities to prevent the transfer, reconstitution, and misuse of residual dual-use capabilities. During monitoring and redirecting efforts, leaders need to understand the political and legal ramifications of U.S. military personnel handling WMD—all treaties, conventions, agreements, resolutions, and protocols should be considered. 1-117. The range of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards (beyond just WMD) can continue to pose a problem for both military forces and other partners supporting the stabilization efforts. Removing, decontaminating, or otherwise neutralizing these hazards ensures the safety, security, and well-being of the local populace and freedom of movement to U.S. forces. 1-118. The list of tasks related to CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear activities may include an initial response in which military forces—  Remediate hazards remaining in the area.  Provide decontamination support. (For a discussion of destruction, monitoring, and redirection of WMD, see JP 3-40, and for mitigation of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards, see JP 3-41.) A RMY S UPPORT TO S ECURITY C OOPERATION 1-119. Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (JP 3-22). Security cooperation includes all security assistance programs administered by DOD that build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests. Security assistance programs include all international armaments cooperation activities and other security assistance activities. Security assistance and security force assistance may prove important to the primary stability task of establishing civil security either as part of peacetime activities or as assigned missions along the stability framework after conflict. (For a more detailed discussion of Army support to security cooperation, see FM 3-22.) P EACE O PERATIONS 1-120. In joint doctrine, peace operations include crisis response and limited contingency operations. Peace operations normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment for reconciling, rebuilding, and transitioning to legitimate governance. Peace operations usually have a high proportion of stability tasks compared to offensive and defensive tasks. Peace operations include—  Peacekeeping operations.  Peace building, which are post-conflict actions.  Peacemaking.  Conflict prevention efforts.  Peace enforcement operations. 1-121. Peace operations may be conducted under the mandate of the UN, another IGO, within a coalition of agreeing nations, or unilaterally. As with other types of military operations, peace operations depend on the situation, reflecting the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure characteristics of the environment. (Each type of peace operation is presented in more detail in JP 3-07.3.) 1-122. Peace operations overlap significantly with stability tasks and often contain a sizeable stabilization component. The military force focus initially on tasks relating to the establishment of civil security. A safe and secure environment is essential toward enabling the other nonmilitary aspects of the mission that promote the peace process and strive for resolution of the conflict. Protection of civilians has been key to most peace operations. As the situation stabilizes, the requirements for peace building increase and the military force need to prepare to support tasks dealing with establishment of civil control and governance. 1-123. The political objectives of a peace operation shape the development of key documents that provide legal authority and define its boundaries. These key documents assist commanders and their staffs in planning and accomplishing their missions in peace operations. Some key documents used in peace operations include—  A mandate.  A status-of-forces agreement or status-of-mission agreement.  A term of reference.  A memorandum of understanding.  Rules of engagement. 1-124. Both the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (known as NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization) have published doctrine on the conduct of peace operations. (See the UN Web site for UN publications. See the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Web site for North Atlantic Treaty Organization publications.) F OREIGN H UMANITARIAN A SSISTANCE 1-125. Foreign humanitarian assistance consists of DOD activities, during military operations or peacetime, to alleviate human suffering. (See JP 3-29 for joint doctrine on foreign humanitarian assistance.) Foreign disaster relief, one type of foreign humanitarian assistance, refers to prompt aid to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Army units and other security partners may be required to establish conditions conducive to humanitarian action. The administrator of USAID, the President’s Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance, promotes maximum effectiveness and coordination in responses by the U.S. Government to foreign disasters. Delivery of humanitarian assistance during the initial response phase of the stability framework may prove an important element of restoring essential services. (The minimum-essential stability tasks—provision of minimum levels of civil security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment to the civilian populace—are further discussed in ADRP 3-07. Chapter 4 of ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-07.5 discusses tasks of foreign humanitarian assistance.) 1-126. Threats to civilians are often accompanied by acute needs for essential goods and services. Civilians may flee a threat, thus losing their access to livelihoods, services, and support networks. Perpetrators may destroy sources of food, water, and shelter or otherwise purposely restrict access to essential services. The situation may be a complex emergency, characterized by both conflict and natural disasters such as droughts or flooding. Lack of access to clean water, medical services, and other essentials can harm more civilians than physical violence. Moreover, lack of access to basic goods and services may undermine an individual or communities’ ability to protect or rebound from physical violence. Additionally, competition over scarce essential goods and services can be a root cause of or contribute to conflict and violence against civilians. It is therefore vital to foster an environment conducive to humanitarian assistance to protect civilians. This requirement could accompany other military operations and may at times be the military’s most important task to prevent widespread human suffering. Army Role in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 1-127. With the exception of immediate response to prevent loss of life, U.S. forces normally conduct foreign humanitarian assistance only upon the request of DOS and in coordination with the chief of mission and USAID. The U.S. military’s unmatched capabilities in logistics, mission command, communications, and mobility can provide rapid and robust response to dynamic and evolving situations among vastly different military, civilian, and government entities. Usually the military’s primary task in a humanitarian crisis is to ensure a secure environment in which humanitarian workers can operate. 1-128. Army forces, often as part of a joint task force, normally play a supporting role in foreign humanitarian assistance. Sometimes, the primary role for Army units is to help provide secure space so that humanitarian partners can focus on objective and apolitical human needs. Typical supporting roles include—  Providing prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims.  Making available, preparing, and transporting nonlethal excess property to foreign countries.  Transferring on-hand DOD stocks to respond to unforeseen emergencies.  Providing funded and space available transportation of humanitarian and relief supplies.  Conducting some DOD humanitarian demining assistance activities.  Conducting foreign consequence management. 1-129. Army units sometimes provide direct support to humanitarian operations. For example, in extreme situations and as a last resort, humanitarian actors may request direct assistance such as escorts from Army units for humanitarian teams delivering aid. In such cases, humanitarian use of military assets should seek to comply with international guidance designed to safeguard humanitarian actors and the people they seek to assist. Where humanitarian actors are not present or able to help people in need, Army units may be temporarily involved in the actual delivery of essential goods and services until other actors are able to assume the role. While Army units may become directly involved in humanitarian assistance as a last resort under extreme circumstances, normally these units contribute to an environment conducive to humanitarian action by—  Establishing and maintaining general security, thus providing space in which humanitarian actors can operate.  Providing situational awareness regarding such issues as the location, number, and condition of civilians in need.  Providing information on potential threats.  Providing communications support.  Supporting planning efforts.  Providing security at storage sites and during transload operations, transportation, and distribution.  Improving or building infrastructure capability for transportation and delivery of humanitarian assistance.  Providing transportation support (including helicopter transport and airfield operations).  Providing equipment (such as materials handling equipment) and operators.  Synchronizing information-related capabilities.  Providing required technical expertise with selected Soldiers or units (such as medical, construction, water purification, graves registration, and interpreter expertise). Types of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Activities 1-130. Foreign humanitarian assistance activities conducted by U.S. forces span the range of military operations but are most often crisis response and limited contingency operations. A single foreign humanitarian assistance activity may well contain more than one of the following missions:  Foreign disaster relief.  Dislocated civilian support.  Security missions.  Technical assistance support functions.  Foreign consequence management. 1-131. Foreign disaster relief missions include prompt aid that alleviates the suffering of disaster victims. Dislocated civilian support missions support assistance and protection for dislocated civilians. Dislocated civilian is a broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person (JP 3-29). Security missions may include establishing and maintaining conditions to support humanitarian efforts by organizations of the world relief community. Technical assistance and support functions may include short-term support tasks such as communications restoration, relief supply distribution management and delivery, port operations, base operating support, emergency medical care, search and rescue, and humanitarian demining assistance. (For further information regarding humanitarian demining assistance, see appendix B of JP 3-29.) Foreign consequence management is U.S. Government activity to help friends and allies mitigate the effects of a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident. (For further information regarding foreign consequence management, see JP 3-41.) Army leaders apply the practical guidelines summarized in table 1-1 for Army support to foreign humanitarian assistance.

This chapter starts by discussing levels of stability transitions that must be integrated. Then, it discusses the transition of stability tasks from U.S. forces to the host nation. Next, it explains transitional military authority. Finally, it discusses interim civil authority. STABILITY TRANSITION LEVELS 2-1. Army leaders performing stability tasks at any level must be aware that their actions support goals at other levels. Stability transitions at the tactical level can influence operational or strategic stability goals and transitions. An operation may contain several types of transitions that may or may not occur simultaneously. Commanders and staffs consider how to facilitate smooth and coordinated transitions across all levels. Completing transitions successfully, safely, and seamlessly is vitally important to the success of stability efforts. The most critical and dangerous actions occur when forces shift from one type of operation to another. For example, shifting a unit from the offense to the defense or moving a support area from one locale to another is when loss of focus or missteps often occurs. 2-2. Understanding the levels of transitions, types of transitions, and their horizontally and vertically impacts helps planners achieve the desired end state. Coordination helps ensure military actions conducted across stability tasks are clear to all governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) responsible for the smooth transitions to a stable host nation. Transitions at the strategic level involve coordinated efforts across the civil-military domain. In addition, transition challenges differ at national, regional, and local levels. For example, national-level transitions involve sovereignty, legitimacy, and social and ministerial reform. Local-level transitions may consist of supporting the village leaders in reestablishment of their local customs. Each transition level and phase requires careful planning. 2-3. Returning to normalcy as quickly as possible is critical to success. All partners, including those from other nations, must understand what normalcy looks like so they can plan appropriately. The study of the host nation—as time permits—helps unified action partners understand how the host nation can transition. They should understand the host nation’s history, traditions, customs, and cultures. To facilitate understanding, planners identify host-nation personnel and NGOs already in place who can assist in quickly redeveloping structures and procedures. These people can provide a clear picture of normalcy to planners and practitioners. I MPORTANCE OF I NTEGRATION 2-4. Army leaders ensure the actions of Army forces are integrated within the joint force. Integration is the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole (JP 1). In the context of stability, the actions of United States (U.S.) forces support the integrated efforts of all unified action partners and the host nation. This supports the stability principle of unity of effort and purpose as described in ADRP 3-07—to achieve unity of effort and unity of purpose among all actors. To ensure the integration of transitions, planning must be collaborative and interactive between all partners. For the success of the host nation, all actions by all parties need to be nested and reinforcing. Actions performed at the local level must fit into national efforts while national efforts appropriately support local actions. Each action must be weighted appropriately to create equilibrium. Too much attention to actions at one level or too little to another level can lead to failure. Trying to correct the imbalance will become the focus and distract from the overall strategy. Partners must develop a robust cadre of civilians with the knowledge and training to collaborate effectively with locals and help them build host nation institutional capacity. To ensure long-term success, planners develop transition strategies as early as possible. Military planners establish trust, shared objectives, and collaborative approaches to overcome difficulties that could impede successful unified action among partners. 2-5. Numerous partnerships are needed to ensure smooth transitions. Some are partnerships between the host nation and other nations, but partnerships among actors within the host nation are just as important. A coordinated, comprehensive approach depends on the combined support of external actors’ resources and internal actors’ commitment. Army leaders engage and establish links to all partners to facilitate successful transitions. Agencies and organizations operating within the region often understand the relationships between the new regime and the opposition. These agencies and organizations include U.S. agencies and those of other governments, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other international organizations. The people within these agencies and organizations are not only familiar with the local culture and customs, they may have already developed a relationship of trust among the actors of both sides. This trust will help nurture these critical partnerships. O VERALL T RANSITION P RINCIPLES 2-6. Army leaders at all levels keep in mind how their actions fit into a comprehensive approach. Leaders must avoid considering their missions in isolation from overall stability goals and principles. Principles of effective transition, within this comprehensive approach, include reconciliation, transparency, and patience. Applying these principles can support the development of trust among the various actors and, over time, provide an environment conducive to building partner capacity. Reconciliation 2-7. The principle of reconciliation is to establish the end of conflict and renew a friendly relationship between disputing people or groups so the post-conflict government can represent them all. The transition principle of reconciliation builds on the stability principle of conflict transformation. Reconciliation must include more than an end to armed conflict. It also must involve renewing a friendly relationship between disputing people or groups. The disparate parties within the host nation must sufficiently resolve their differences and accept one another to allow for proper representation of each party in the host nation’s government. Reconciliation can be an end, a means, an outcome, or a process. For the purposes of this doctrine, reconciliation is a prerequisite to restoring governance. It must be achieved for the nation under new governance to move forward toward adequately serving its people. Including all groups and ensuring they all have representation from the beginning facilitate transparency, a key enabler for reconciliation. 2-8. Army units assist the host nation and other contributors in developing a means to facilitate reconciliation. Most likely, developing reconciliation will take time to build trust among the groups within the host nation. Initially units may carry messages among the groups. Eventually the host nation and other contributors discuss key issues that focus on their relationships. Discussing the collective fears and desires of the future will help drive the dialogue. 2-9. Effective stability efforts address underlying issues such as distrust and hatred passed from generation to generation. Planners develop a strategy to address and counter the underlying causes. Reconciliation needs to occur at personal and public levels. 2-10. Transitional justice refers to a society’s efforts to bring accountability, justice, and reconciliation to bear in addressing a legacy of major abuse of human rights and is a key component of reconciliation. Transitional justice mechanisms may include truth and reconciliation commissions, lustrations (banning members of the previous regime from holding public office), reparations, and judicial processes. The country team coordinates U.S. support to specific forms of transitional justice. Ongoing dialogue among host-nation groups includes the root causes of conflict. Root causes may be tribal, cultural, based in religion, or based on the disagreement of land ownership and land rights. Disputing people or groups can resolve less severe grievances through workshops, public apologies, or policy reform. 2-11. To facilitate reconciliation among individuals, transition planners should help the host nation develop a means for individuals to express their feelings through acceptable and peaceful cultural expression. Army units should take advantage of the expertise and contacts those IGOs and NGOs provide. Such organizations not only have direct contact with the many groups involved, but they most likely have tools and resources that can facilitate mutual respect among the host-nation groups. Despite apparent progress toward reconciliation at the national level, Army leaders should remain aware that reconciliation requires the belief of the individuals. All past wrongs are not necessarily swept away with the end of conflict. Individuals who feel wronged and unfairly compensated often harbor resentment. Transparency 2-12. The principle of transparency is to establish openness, integrity, and accountability in the post-conflict government so it will conduct itself responsibly. This transition principle of transparency builds on the stability principle of legitimacy and host-nation ownership. With reconciliation established, external contributors need to assist in ensuring the new government of the host nation is inclusive so that all host-nation actors can develop trust. A lack of transparency can easily become an issue among all groups if resources and programs prove inequitable. A society is likely to perceive, for example, that the political elite or military controls distribution to improve its own position. In some cases, a government can easily control contracting funds, food, and other humanitarian aid. Even with the best of intentions, it can lose credibility within the society if its activities are not transparent. Without proper processes, programs, and supervision to provide accountability, failure will occur. The magnitude of external support can easily overwhelm a fledgling nation that lacks structures and control procedures necessary to arrive in the proper quantity to the right people. Lax structures and control procedures can lead to corruption, particularly when for a culture accepts leaders at any level taking a portion of the payments for themselves. 2-13. Partners supporting a host nation must neither replace the government nor give the government carte blanche in operations until the host nation shows it can operate with transparency. External contributors should understand the difference between supporting the members of a society directly and giving the government resources it can use to provide for its people. Whether supporting the government or supporting the people directly, organizations help a fledgling government to operate effectively. Patience 2-14. The principle of patience is to establish unity of effort with long-term interagency and interorganizational activities so the post-conflict government becomes successful. This principle of patience builds on the stability principle of unity of effort and purpose. All contributors must achieve unity of effort to build success over the long term. As in defense support of civil authorities, military forces will accomplish their missions, hand off tasks, and redeploy when other partners can continue remaining stability efforts without military support. Army leaders focus on the following to ensure successful transition:  Knowledge: develop in-depth knowledge and situational understanding of host-nation actors and dynamics.  Essential functions: focus assistance on essential functions, not all the problems in a particular organization.  Realistic demands and expectations: set realistic demands and expectations for fragile states.  Preeminence of civilian leadership: Civilian agencies should lead assistance to help build government effectiveness in the political, economic, and social spheres. 2-15. Military planners incorporate long-term planning with the U.S. Government, IGOs, and NGOs that remain in the country to assist in further development. Incorporating the United States Agency for International Development (known as USAID) is essential, as it assists in long-term development. Many times when the military is involved in reconstruction, the military looks to make as much impact as possible during its current tour of duty. Commanders ensure that military projects and programs do not interfere with long-range vision of the United States Agency for International Development. History shows that the length of involvement needed to support the transition of organizations exceeds the political will of most external actors. This may be due to financial strains or erroneous expectations about the time needed. In fact, effective transitions may take decades to complete. In most cases, a post-conflict transition continues long after military involvement. (See ADRP 3-07, chapter 4, for guidance on planning operations focused on stability using lines of effort and the desired end state. The discussion in ADRP 3-07 includes force tailoring and task-organizing the force. Refer also to Senior Leader’s Guide to Transition Planning for information on transitions between joint operational phases.) TRANSITION OF STABILITY TASKS 2-16. In the context of stability tasks, transitions occur across each of the five primary stability tasks to achieve the end state. Comprehensive transition planning incorporates the transfer of responsibility, authority, power, and accountability incrementally, on several levels, and by numerous partners. The measures of performance (MOPs) or measures of effectiveness (MOEs) indicating the appropriate time to complete tactical transitions tend to be clear and specific. Strategic transitions are exponentially more complex due to the magnitude of systems affected. A rush to complete transitions may only result in a rush to failure if the host nation and supporting actors are not prepared. A well-structured transition plan helps minimize corruption and dependency of the provisional or interim government. 2-17. Army planners consider managing complex transitions in transition phases. Transition phases are consistent with the Army definition that describes a phase as a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (ADRP 3-0). Transitions include transferring authority and control to other military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and the host nation. Forces should execute transitions phases gradually rather than abruptly. While gradual transitions are optimal, an unexpected change in conditions may require commanders to direct an abrupt transition. In such cases, the overall composition of the force remains unchanged despite sudden changes in mission, task organization, and rules of engagement. 2-18. U.S. government leaders have the lead for managing overall stability transitions. Civil organizations with more expertise in national development take the lead in stability transition. The host nation must have the political will and the resiliency to assume responsibility. The complexity of external actors and contributing nations’ international politics and policies may complicate the process. All short-term actions must nest and reinforce long-term end states. Numerous lines of effort crossing different transition phases potentially add complexity to all partner organizations. The numerous layers of tasks and actors compound the challenges with the finite number of people able to accomplish missions. 2-19. Unified action partners clearly plan and express the steps for their withdrawal so local actors have time to adapt to their responsibilities and structures. Extending a transition phase can provide an opportunity to test local readiness for sovereignty. Conversely, delaying completion of a transition phase might encourage others to create artificial disturbances to extend the delay. 2-20. In an operation, stability tasks transition within the stability framework (see ADRP 3-07). Military tasks are described in the stability framework as the initial response phase, transformation phase, or fostering sustainability phase. Forces accomplish stability tasks over time, carefully planning all levels of transitions throughout operations. Army leaders consider planning stability tasks in three transition phases:  Phase 1—Repair and (re)establish systems.  Phase 2—Normalize systems.  Phase 3—Transfer and exit. 2-21. Initial response tasks generally occur in transition phase 1, transformation tasks in transition phase 2, and fostering sustainability tasks in transition phase 3. (See table 2-1.) However, there is overlap. In the fostering sustainability phase, military planners should keep in mind that the efforts of partners outside the Department of Defense are likely to continue after military forces depart. However, military tasks may continue with the emphasis on security cooperation activities, including security force assistance.

This chapter discusses achieving unity of effort with two major groups of stability partners. It begins by discussing considerations for a whole-of-government approach among interagency partners. It concludes by discussing a comprehensive approach for unity of effort with interorganizational partners based outside the United States. WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH 3-1. Army doctrine describes operations focused on stability using both a whole-of-government approach and a comprehensive approach to achieve unity of effort, depending of the nature of the partnerships. A whole-of-government approach encompasses coordination among all interagency partners. Such coordination is known as interagency coordination. Interagency coordination is defined as within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged United States Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 3-0). In the context of Army stability, partners can refer to organizations or their individual representatives who collaborate through structured teams or informal cooperation. Army forces perform stability tasks as partners in support of U.S. policy goals. In addition, this doctrine sometimes refers to U.S. and other partners as stability partners. 3-2. Coordination among United States (U.S.) and other partners is known as interorganizational coordination. Interorganizational coordination is defined as the interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; engaged United States Government agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08). For the purposes of Army stability doctrine, the discussion of a comprehensive approach emphasizes coordination with civilian and military partners based outside the U.S. Government and any not considered of the United States. Many principles that apply to interagency coordination also apply to interorganizational coordination. (See JP 3-08 for joint doctrine on interorganizational coordination during joint operations.) 3-3. Security solutions are not likely to be determined by the military alone. U.S. military security efforts nest within a larger national security strategy that works with all the elements of good U.S. governance. As in the work of provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, engagements often include military forces working alongside governmental agencies in a whole-of-government approach. Working as stability partners, military forces can help build or restore the political, economic, and security institutions of weakened or failing states. Future engagements often include the coordinated action of civilian and military partners following natural disasters. 3-4. In stability, unity of effort results from successful synchronization, coordination, and integration of activities by governmental and nongovernmental entities. While military operations typically demand unity of command (a single commander directs the actions of all forces toward a common objective), operations focused on stability require coordination and cooperation toward common objectives by participants who belong to different commands or organizations. Moreover, achieving unity of effort can be challenging in an ambiguous operational context that is neither war nor peace. During operations focused on stability, extensive overlap among defense, diplomacy, and development activities is necessary to achieve mission objectives. Different stability partners simultaneously perform various tasks to create a secure environment, establish government control, and gain support from the populace. I NTERAGENCY C OORDINATION 3-5. To foster effective interagency coordination, Army leaders need to understand and use the common characteristics of interagency groups. Army leaders should take advantage of the benefits of interagency partnerships, which have been proven by civil-military groups such as provincial reconstruction teams. Leaders and Soldiers should develop essential competencies such as cultural agility. The need for cultural agility applies to coordination among the different cultures of civil and military organizations as well as those of other nations. Army leaders should understand the capabilities of stability partners, including how partner organizations differ from the Army. They should consider relevant financial and legal factors. Above all, Army leaders should know how to improve communication and build relationships. No overarching interagency doctrine delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations. Characteristics of Interagency Coordination 3-6. Interagency partnerships take many forms, such as formally structured teams with assigned tasks and members or informal collaboration among dissimilar groups with overlapping but independent goals. Stability involves networks of groups and organizations—including military groups—who work together toward at least one shared goal. This means Army leaders need to coordinate efforts within their own organization, between their organization and others when forming teams for specific tasks, and across numerous groups (including military units) whose individual efforts work more efficiently through partnerships. 3-7. Power, information, and expertise are widely distributed across civil and military stability partners. Because all the knowledge, skills, or abilities needed to achieve U.S. stability objectives does not reside in any one partner, stability partners establish teams with specialized skills sets. Each team or ad hoc partnership relies on others to provide capabilities it lacks, making all partners interdependent. This reliance results from the dangerous security situation that often characterizes operational environments. It also results from the complexity associated with operations focused on stability. 3-8. The temporary nature of interagency partnerships poses challenges to effective collaboration. Partners who collaborate in operations focused on stability often share a collective identity for a finite period. Interagency teams frequently are ad hoc; often members have little to no interaction before arriving in country. Short-term deployments for team members also make developing and maintaining relationships (and group identity) difficult. In circumstances such as these, leadership and personality factors influence success. Planners may need to factor in additional time to build trust and motivation to collaborate. Benefits of Interagency Coordination 3-9. The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to mission success. For example, nation-building functions—such as implementing rule of law, developing human capital, providing social welfare, providing security, managing the use of the force, and establishing commercial markets—require coordinated and integrated actions from different U.S. agencies. By collaborating with other U.S. agencies, Soldiers gain access to individuals with extensive and specialized knowledge and skills. Collaboration with such individuals often leads to holistic solutions that consider factors normally outside the purview of military personnel. 3-10. Through successful interagency coordination, the U.S. Government conducts operations that achieve shared goals, build international support, achieve sustainability, and conserve resources. Interagency partners collaborate to determine when it is more efficient for partners outside the U.S. Government to perform certain tasks. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), for example, serve large numbers of people and have the capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises—these capabilities can effectively reduce the resources an Army commander would otherwise devote to an operation. Enabling partners to respond to security challenges may also reduce risk to U.S. forces and extend security to areas Army forces cannot reach alone. 3-11. Provincial reconstruction teams illustrate the effectiveness and challenges of interagency partnerships. These teams are interagency groups formed to improve stability in a region by integrating all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. While provincial reconstruction teams have experienced success in Iraq and Afghanistan, their implementation also has highlighted significant challenges to interagency coordination. Overall, their levels of effectiveness, cohesion, and coherence have varied. Observers have suggested that provincial reconstruction team performance hinges almost solely on the ability of the military commander to work around obstacles to coordination. C OMPETENCIES FOR I NTERAGENCY C OORDINATION 3-12. At the national level, the Department of State has led efforts to build frameworks that enhance interagency coordination for stability efforts. However, leaders on the ground may only have general guidance and concepts and few formal arrangements. To improve collaboration in the field, commanders consider types of knowledge and skills along with best practices for working with interagency partners. Development of Cultural Agility 3-13. Soldiers develop cultural agility—their ability to understand new cultures and adjust behavior to function effectively in them. In the context of stability, the idea of cultural differences normally refers to the cultures of a host nation. However, Army leaders also need to understand the organizational cultures of U.S. stability partners. Soldiers improve their sociocultural understanding of other groups by developing a greater awareness of norms, beliefs, practices, and perceptions. They try to understand how cultural factors will influence others’ behaviors, perceptions, and motivations. Sociocultural understanding helps commanders and staffs determine the effects of cultural norms and perceptions on mission objectives. Soldiers assess cultural factors so they can understand how individuals from other groups (societies or partner organizations) may view their behavior. They try to mitigate or avoid misunderstandings. Soldiers improve their ability to establish rapport and build relationships with individuals from different societal and organizational cultures. Understanding of the Context of Interagency Coordination 3-14. The context of interagency coordination includes the interagency partners and an operational environment. A holistic understanding of an operational environment includes an awareness of civil considerations and sociocultural factors, such as beliefs and values, sources of power and authority, and social structures. These form a context for Army and interagency stability efforts. Whatever the mission objective, Army leaders study the environment’s historical, regional, and cultural context. To support situational understanding, Army leaders need to understand how a population perceives Army operations and interagency activities in which Army units participate. 3-15. Army leaders maintain a focused and persistent effort to understanding the culture, geography, politics, infrastructure, and economics of the country or region where forces are employed. This is challenging because such factors are dynamic and constantly evolving. Individuals working on interagency teams must find out where to obtain relevant information about the cultural context. Members must also be able to evaluate the accuracy and completeness of such information. (For more information on civil considerations and sociocultural factors, see FM 3-24.) Understanding of Capabilities of Interagency Partners and Systems for Coordination 3-16. Understanding an operational environment includes understanding all interagency stability partners. Effective collaboration required understanding the policies, processes, and norms of interagency partners. Success in operations focused on stability also requires an awareness of trends that influence views of the actors and an understanding of factors that shape or constrain options and capabilities for partner organizations. 3-17. Army leaders develop the information needed to understand partner organizations, their component teams, and their place in overall U.S. stability activities and goals. This understanding forms the backdrop for assessing the effect of Army actions, plans, and decisions on partner organizations. A poor understanding of the partners must be avoided because it can hamper trust and impair integration of Army team members in interagency decisionmaking. O RGANIZATIONAL D IFFERENCES 3-18. Military and civilian organizational cultures differ in significant ways. Organizational cultures comprise factors such as shared values, norms, expectations, and practices. An organizational culture influences how individuals approach work and what they regard as mission accomplishment. When team members with different organizational cultures interact with one another, differences become evident and can create tension in the group. Soldiers can minimize difficulties by improving their understanding of and attitudes toward partners. 3-19. Organizational differences—in mission objectives, size, and resource capabilities, and neutrality among others—and challenges in information sharing can create friction between military and civilian partners. Military personnel can improve interagency coordination by educating themselves on these differences. They should demonstrate a knowledge and appreciation of their partners’ capabilities and viewpoints. 3-20. Military personnel conducting interagency coordination consider organizational differences related to—  Leadership.  Mission objectives.  Resources available.  The nature of teamwork.  The nature of humanitarian efforts.  Time orientation.  Measurement. Leadership 3-21. Army leaders lack authority over the interagency partnerships in which they participate. Therefore, they need to develop other means of influence, as interagency decisionmaking processes tend to require building consensus. Soldiers also need to develop influence techniques that gain cooperation and preclude resistance to military objectives. Such techniques are uncommon within a traditional military setting. Mission Objectives 3-22. Army leaders ensure various organizational priorities and mandates do not reduce the unity of effort for interagency teams or partnerships. They develop an understanding of the interrelatedness of objectives—how the objectives of Army forces and other partners align within U.S. security policy. With this perspective in mind, Army leaders strive to enhance unity of effort. The objectives of all partners are important and should be integrated into the whole rather than regarded as competing. Resources Available 3-23. Army forces sometimes have more resources than their interagency stability partners have. While uncertain or hostile environments need resource overmatch, this imbalance may hinder success when conducting interagency coordination. Army leaders regularly monitor their attitudes and those of others in relation to volume of resources. They should avoid inadvertently creating a perception that they consider their mission more important simply because they have more resources. Army leaders should avoid inadvertently stifling contributions of smaller agencies or considering partner objectives unimportant in comparison with Army objectives. Such negative attitudes potentially impair collaborative decisionmaking and effective partnerships. Nature of Teamwork 3-24. The take-charge, can-do attitude of Soldiers can come across as overbearing to interagency partners. In areas related to host-nation development, the Army may be seen as attempting to take over and manage all activities. Many partners join stability efforts intending to share the work, discuss the needs, and build consensus with an attitude of collaboration. Certain preferences of Army organizational culture, such as getting right to the point in discussions and taking charge of meetings or missions, often fail to facilitate cooperation. Moreover, Army leaders must remember that the relatively strict hierarchical structure common to Army operations is less common among many partner organizations and possibly unwelcome on interagency teams. Nature of Humanitarian Efforts 3-25. Some U.S. agencies are reluctant to be seen as having direct connections to U.S. forces. Reasons may be philosophical as well as practical. Members of many U.S. agencies providing aid intend to serve altruistic humanitarian purposes. They do not wish to be regarded as serving political objectives or advancing U.S. influence. They prefer their identity to be as civilian as possible in stabilization efforts. Moreover, the host-nation populace may not welcome humanitarian aid when U.S. forces are known or believed to be connected to humanitarian operations. Therefore, members of civilian agencies may feel that increased military involvement in stability efforts impairs their mission or image and compromises humanitarian values. Army leaders should expect such viewpoints. They can avoid friction by understanding that these attitudes may reflect the situation on the ground and most likely do not indicate that partners are criticizing Army operations. Army leaders and partners should determine collaboratively the most effective way Army forces can contribute to the whole-of-government approach. Time Orientation 3-26. Army leaders need to consider how the tendency of Army operations to focus on relatively short-term objectives affects long-term goals of partners and U.S. policy. Some partners tend to emphasize future, long-term goals and the actions necessary to achieve them. For example, in Afghanistan, the Army’s’ short-term orientation has typically led to a focus on projects that achieves quick results. Some partners have considered projects such as building schools or clinics without adequate infrastructure or resources for their sustainment detrimental to Afghanistan’s long-term development. Overall stability efforts must achieve a balance of short-and long-term objectives; interagency coordination that includes military forces can be ideal for this purpose. Measurement 3-27. Military and interagency partners also differ in how they measure success and when they consider the work of stability complete. Due in part to the military’s orientation on relatively short times and quick results, the military often measures tangible items such as the number of units trained or neighborhoods cleared. Conversely, civilian agencies often assess more intangible goals, such as the progress toward reconciliation. Not only are these intangible goals harder to measure, but they also require more time. Friction can result when Army leaders consider their mission accomplished while civilian leaders believe much work remains toward long-term, intangible goals not easily quantified. Army leaders can avoid discord by considering Army efforts within the context of long-term U.S. goals. They can collaborate with interagency partners to apply measurements that show the success of the whole-of-government approach. Army leaders participating in interagency groups—  Learn about partners’ timelines and develop metrics supportive of all U.S. stability objectives.  Establish metrics that measure outcomes (end results), not just activities (such as dollars spent, number of units trained).  Clarify exactly how proposed actions support stability or developmental goals.  Place immediate needs in the context of long-term strategic goals. S TRATEGIES FOR I MPROVING C OMMUNICATION 3-28. Effective Soldiers learn how to facilitate communication and information sharing across partner agencies. Differences in organizational objectives and cultures present variations in informational needs, communication style, information-sharing processes, and priorities. Differences may include willingness or urgency to share information. Further, as teams are likely to be ad hoc, so are information arrangements. Therefore, every effort to enhance communication will support an effective whole-of-government approach. 3-29. Soldiers should ensure information is accessible to all interagency members. This requires an understanding of the available communication processes, technologies, and potential barriers that could impede communication (such as security concerns, system and program compatibility, and connectivity issues). Military organizations should avoid unnecessarily classifying information that could be helpful to partners, especially when the information originally belonged to other agencies. 3-30. Key strategies for improving communication include—  Using a common lexicon of terms among interagency partners, since many terms can be misinterpreted or have slightly different meanings (such as assessment and targeting) across the different agencies.  Avoiding the use of acronyms or terms that may not be familiar to all interagency members, since this may cause confusion or feelings of exclusion.  Practicing suitable ways to share information based on the context and the intended audience. For example, it may be better to discuss certain subjects informally with a limited audience (outside a group meeting) or to bring up other subjects in front of all members of the group.  Engaging in active listening. Active Listening 3-31. No communications skill is more important than listening. Active listeners keep judgments in check while the other person is speaking. They listen to understand before they respond. Interagency group members take notes or write down points for clarification while another person is talking to ensure they capture important details of the message and are not distracted by counterarguments. 3-32. Active listeners restate and paraphrase the message they heard to help confirm they perceive it correctly. When working with interagency partners Soldiers ask open-ended questions to gain more information about the topic. This active listening gives the listener more insight into the speaker’s perspective and viewpoint on the discussion. 3-33. Active listeners pay attention to the verbal and nonverbal aspects of the message and the culture from which the speaker comes. For example, the manner and urgency in which a message is presented provides useful information. If the speaker leans forward and looks the listener in the eye, then the speaker probably tells the truth. Understanding the Perspectives of Others 3-34. A key strategy to increase understanding of others is known as social perspective taking. In the discipline of social psychology, social perspective taking refers to methodically trying to understand what others are thinking and feeling and how their points of view differ from one’s own. Social perspective taking includes approaches individuals can use to improve understanding of others, including the motivations for their behaviors. Soldiers who successfully engage in social perspective taking (also called perspective taking) can see situations from another’s point of view and recognize the issues, challenges, and situations relevant to the actors involved. This understanding increases Army leaders’ ability to interpret, predict, and coordinate interagency behavior. 3-35. Perspective taking has several benefits for Soldiers working with interagency partners. Perspective taking can help Army leaders become aware of how their own organization and its cultural norms are perceived by individuals from partner agencies. Since many interpersonal friction points within an interagency stem from organizational and communication differences, being aware of one’s own cultural norms and potential biases, and how others perceive them, may help Soldiers anticipate and avoid unnecessary issues. 3-36. Soldiers who recognize that others may view a situation differently become more aware of and open-minded to differing or competing ideas. Perspective taking has also been shown to improve communication and facilitate negotiations and conflict resolution. Skilled perspective takers resort to stereotyping less often. 3-37. People are social beings. They naturally try to determine the reasons for others’ behavior. Often, people tend to use their experiences, beliefs, assumptions, and value systems as a frame of reference. This can reduce the accuracy of their understanding of others. Perspective taking efforts may be challenging when Soldiers interact with someone from a different organizational culture. Soldiers may be unaware of the effects their own organizational culture has on their perspective. To increase perspective taking accuracy, Soldiers need to be self-critical when trying to understand the perspective of someone else. Perspective taking is an aptitude that can be increased with training and practice. 3-38. One method to increase social perspective taking is known as the ACTion approach to perspective taking (summarized in table 3-1). This approach illustrates a process Soldiers can use to improve perspective taking and to respond effectively to others. The ACTion approach involves three main steps:  Assess yourself, others, and the situation while managing your emotions.  Create guesses—based on information gathered—about the reasons for others’ behavior, and then test, refine, and prioritize the guesses.  Take a course of action selected after testing, refining, and ranking guesses about others’ behavior and predicting the results. Coexistence 3-126. Coexistence describes when multiple groups are present in an area but do not interact or communicate with each other. This may be the case with certain groups who do not want any affiliation with military forces at all. Communication 3-127. Communication describes when parties have periodic contact, such as at routine meetings, but do not share substantive information on a regular basis, if at all. Parties can contact each other if necessary (for example, they may retain phone numbers for each other). When parties do not share any common interests, direct communication may not even be possible. In cases where no direct communication exists, they may sometimes relay messages through intermediaries such as civilian personnel associated with the mission or host-nation officials. Information Sharing 3-128. Information sharing occurs when parties share substantive information periodically, but such activities are often circumspect and may not occur on a regular basis. Exchanged information is likely to be limited to matters of extremely high mutual concern. For example, a NGO may be willing to provide some information regarding a mass atrocity that has occurred but will be unwilling to share details about its planned operations. Formal Coordination 3-129. Formal coordination occurs when parties regularly exchange information on a wide range of topics, to include some planned operations. This coordination includes generally answering most requests for information when parties can reasonably do so. The parties may find it beneficial to meet on a routine basis and may invite representatives to attend their own internal meetings. Cooperation and Collaboration 3-130. The highest level of interaction entails cooperation or collaboration that can include jointly conducted operations, co-location of organizations, exchange of liaisons, and other measures to achieve more effective integration. In a loosely collaborative relationship, Army units may occasionally provide direct security for the other partners (such as a convoy escort). In a closer collaboration, the interaction is substantive and more permanent. 3-131. Other partners can beneficially contribute to Army units by providing independent, external assessments of relevant issues, to include the military’s activities and benchmarking. Army units should invite partners’ input and contribution to after action reviews, either by direct participation or through acceptable intermediaries such as civilian personnel associated with the operation. 3-132. Some general guidelines will help foster improved coordination with other partners:  Take time to develop and maintain relationships.  Identify and include stakeholders early. Coordination with host-nation security forces (especially police) is particularly important to create a secure environment, particularly since police forces will become responsible for civil security. Army units should seek input from vulnerable societal groups that lack power, as these may have long been without a voice.  Consult; do not dictate.  Be honest and reliable. Back up words with action.  Be respectful. Avoid appearing arrogant or condescending. Show proper courtesy to older or higher-ranking counterparts.  Conduct vertical efforts to supplement horizontal engagements. Direct engagements with counterparts may prove futile for a variety of reasons. It may be necessary to identify a problem to higher echelons in the chain of command that can in turn encourage higher counterparts to direct or take necessary actions.  Consider the impact of and the effect on informing and influencing audiences. Challenges 3-133. Many critical actors attempt to preserve their neutrality and avoid the appearance of collaborating with political and military entities such as Army units or the host-nation government. Because of different objectives, cultures, and chains of authority, disagreements and misunderstandings between the actors occur. Additionally, the competition for scarce resources such as infrastructure and a qualified host-nation work force can create tensions between Army units and other actors. C ONSIDERATIONS FOR M ULTINATIONAL O PERATIONS 3-134. Multinational operations are vital to achieve efficiency, unity of effort, and synergy to perform the primary stability tasks. Multinational operations integrate the wide variety of partners essential for stability and strengthen the population’s confidence in Army units and other security organizations. Multinational operations expand mutual situational understanding and can improve the effectiveness of the participants and enhance their relationships with each other. These operations enable host-nation involvement in and ownership of the primary stability tasks, since the host-nation retains its sovereign obligations and eventually must be capable of meeting them effectively. Multinational operations also capitalize on the host-nation security forces’ understanding of the terrain and population. By providing a method to monitor and mentor host-nation security forces, multinational operations can also support security sector reform. 3-135. While it is possible to integrate individuals at the lowest unit levels (for example, Soldiers and host-nation police operate a vehicle checkpoint together), it is often more appropriate to maintain unit integrity and assign tasks to Army units only. For example, a host-nation platoon might be tasked to establish a security cordon for a search operation conducted by an Army unit, or vice versa. Language differences and the availability of interpreters determine the possible level of integration. Staff integration can be extremely useful, depending on considerations such as language skills, security access requirements, and operations security precautions. 3-136. Multinational operations can be difficult to conduct effectively because of the potential attitudes and capabilities of the different participants. The various organizations will have dissimilar objectives, priorities, chains of authority, and cultures. They may also tend to disregard and mistrust outsiders, or otherwise cooperate reluctantly. Mistakes, misunderstandings, friction, and personality clashes can also undermine combined efforts. Army leaders, who desire effective multinational operations, may need to emphasize their importance, closely monitor their progress, and take corrective action when necessary. Patience and open-mindedness are critical to overcome inevitable obstructions. Multinational operations also have to account for logistics. Some participants may need significant support from Army units to contribute effectively, which could cause them to be perceived negatively. Interpreters are critical in many situations but often in short supply. Successful multinational operations require significant nurturing, which could divert leader focus from other pressing concerns. B UILDING P ARTNER C APACITY 3-137. Building partner capacity addresses the potentially most important stability effort, which is to support and enable partners so they can perform their roles effectively. Building partner capacity results from comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and sustained military engagements. Over time, building partner capacity enhances the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. The Army integrates the capabilities of the operating and generating forces—to include special operations forces—to support capacity-building efforts, primarily through security cooperation activities. (See ADRP 3-0 and ADRP 3-07 for more information.) 3-138. Army units are concerned mainly with the capabilities of military and other security actors but should not ignore capacities unrelated to security sectors. In some cases, Army units can help build the capacity of other international partners who in turn are attempting to improve host-nation institutions. In other cases, Army units may directly assist in improving host-nation capacity and capability. One result of comprehensive engagement with other partners should be an increase in collective capacity to protect civilians. 3-139. Building partner capacity requires a different emphasis from many of the tasks Army units typically perform. Ultimately, the host nation must have the capability to ensure a safe and secure environment and must likewise develop the capacity to maintain acceptable conditions related to good governance, the rule-of-law, social well-being, and economic development. These efforts depend on capable host-nation and international partners from military, police, and civilian sectors. 3-140. Unified action partners (see ADRP 3-0) may have capabilities and a capacity that can contribute to stability; some partners such as the host-nation or coalition military forces operating under international mandates have formal legal obligations while others such as NGO’s contribute without formal obligations. Building partner capacity has short-, mid-, and long-term dimensions that require the determination of realistic objectives. Generally, Army units can help build partner capacity in many of the following ways, to include—  Provide advisors and mentors. In addition to providing technical assistance on security affairs, advisors should emphasize such issues as respect for human rights, the proper treatment of civilians, and civil-military relations.  Assist with development of administrative and logistics systems (such as pay, training, and maintenance).  Monitor and if necessary restrain other partners regarding violence against civilians and human rights abuses.  Assist with assessing, planning, and monitoring efforts to complete any of the primary stability tasks.  Provide facilities and bases from which other partners may operate.  Provide security to other partners.  Provide transportation, communications, medical, or other logistics support to other partners (either on a routine or emergency basis).  Provide personnel augmentation to other partners.  Support and reinforce efforts of other partners by synchronizing information-related capabilities and engagements. 3-141. A major challenge is synchronizing efforts, both top-down and bottom-up, to improve host-nation capabilities. Local bottom-up efforts often begin earlier and are more critical for immediate impact on stability, but centralized top-down programs are necessary for long-term sustainability. Subsequent top-down efforts may conflict with or undermine multiple diverse bottom-up efforts that have already begun. Flexibility is required to integrate existing dissimilar local efforts with newly created centralized programs. The choice of partners must be made with care and with considerations that are more than just military. Potential partners may have questionable legitimacy because of past actions or current behavior. Additionally, Army units have limited authority, responsibility, and capability to influence other partners. Finally, other mission priorities such as daily operations limit an Army unit’s ability to focus on building the capacity of other partners. T HE R OLE OF C IVIL A FFAIRS IN O PERATIONS F OCUSED ON S TABILITY 3-142. Civil affairs forces support unified land operations in every environment across the range of military operations. They are essential to the conduct of successful operations focused on stability. Civil affairs personnel provide unique area and linguistic orientation, cultural astuteness, advisory capabilities, and civilian professional skills that generally parallel those of host-nation governments. They provide the commander with specialized expertise on the civil component of operational environments. The commander draws on this expertise to analyze and influence the human dimension through specific processes and dedicated resources and personnel. Civil Affairs Forces 3-143. Civil affairs forces mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil governments. Civil affairs forces engage and influence the local civil populace by planning, executing, and transitioning civil affairs operations in unified action environment. Civil affairs forces support these operations by addressing civil considerations within the operational area before, during, or after a conflict or disaster. Civil affairs forces help to shape an operational environment by interacting with the local populace to facilitate military operations. A supportive local populace can provide valuable resources and critical information that supports friendly operations. A hostile local populace threatens the immediate success of military operations and may undermine domestic public support for those operations. When executed properly, civil affairs operations reduce the tensions between the local populace and the military force. Civil Affairs Operations 3-144. Civil affairs forces conduct operations that support and are nested within the overall mission and commander’s intent. Civil affairs operations improve the relationship between military forces and host-nation authorities in areas in which the military force operates. They involve applying civil affairs skills to areas normally under the responsibility of a host-nation government. Civil affairs operations establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and all levels of host-nation governments and officials. These operations are fundamental to completing stability tasks successfully. 3-145. Civil affairs organizations and personnel develop detailed assessments based on civil considerations. These include information about infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of civilian leaders, the local populace, and host-nation organizations. These assessments may reveal that a viable host-nation government does not exist or cannot perform its basic civil functions. In such cases, military forces may support or implement transitional military authority until a legitimate host-nation government is established. (FM 3-57 and JP 3-57 provide doctrine on civil affairs.) 3-146. Civil affairs operations help ensure the sustained legitimacy of the mission and the transparency and credibility of military operations. Civil affairs operations minimize the effects of military operations on the local populace, limit how civilians affect military operations, and provide advice to commanders on the legal and moral obligations of the force. 3-147. Civil affairs personnel help the commander understand and visualize the civil component of the operational area. They provide detailed analysis based on careful consideration of operational and mission variables. This analysis helps determine the following within the supported unit’s operational area:  The root causes of instability and civil strife.  The requirement for CMOCs to facilitate communications and coordinate with civilian agencies and organizations.  The need to use liaison teams to enhance communications and coordination with civilian agencies and organizations to facilitate operations at all echelons.  What, when, where, and why civilians might be encountered; what ongoing or planned military operations might affect the activities of those civilians; what activities those civilians are engaged in that might affect military operations; and what actions the military force must take to mitigate the effects of those civilians.  Measures of performance and measures of effectiveness for civil affairs operations to support the larger military operation. Civil-Military Operations Center 3-148. Stability missions often require an established CMOC. A CMOC can facilitate information sharing and coordination between Army units and other partners, including the host-nation population and its institutions, such as police forces. Different echelons may establish their own CMOCs. A CMOC supports Army units as an agency to improve understanding and facilitate remedial action regarding civilian vulnerabilities and stability needs. All Army civil affairs units are organized and equipped to establish a CMOC. A CMOC is tailored to the specific tasks associated with the mission and normally augmented by assets such as engineers, medical, and transportation. It can be an accessible location for civilians to file reports or claims. It can serve as a coordination center for civilian and police organizations whose activities are vital for stability. W ORKING WITH N ONGOVERNMENTAL H UMANITARIAN O RGANIZATIONS 3-149. Organizations that deliver humanitarian assistance are diverse. They include UN agencies and international and local NGOs, each its own governing and accountability structure. Adherence to humanitarian principles, established codes of conduct, and civil-military guidelines vary. Moreover, many organizations can provide short-term humanitarian relief and long-term recovery and development assistance that often contributes to the sustainability of a host nation. 3-150. In addition to providing goods and services (for example, clean water, sanitation, food, and shelter), some humanitarian actors also provide protection programming such as human rights education, local conflict mediation and trust building, and monitoring, reporting and advocacy on the situation. Programming may be limited to ensuring that the provision of essential services does not create or exacerbate harm to civilians. Contributing to conditions that allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance can support these humanitarian protection activities. In some contexts, political and armed actors may not accept humanitarian protection activities as neutral and impartial. Consequently, they may challenge or even target humanitarian workers. Commanders consider these variables when deciding how best to contribute to conditions enabling the provision of humanitarian assistance. 3-151. Some humanitarian actors have strong concerns about remaining neutral and independent to gain or retain access to communities in need. The ability of humanitarian organizations to operate according to their mandates, charters, and principles is sometimes known as humanitarian space. The common interests of humanitarian organizations include—  Security of humanitarian workers.  Mutual access between humanitarian workers and beneficiaries.  The ability of humanitarian workers to interact with nonstate armed actors.  Perceptions of humanitarian actors among beneficiaries and other actors.  Humanitarian advocacy. 3-152. The neutrality and independence of humanitarian workers is especially important in politicized or conflict environments where political or armed actors are unwilling or unable to respect international humanitarian law and are targeting humanitarian workers, the assistance they provide, or the communities they are trying to assist. Humanitarian actors may also be concerned about situations where they can be confused with participants in an armed conflict. This can happen where military or other security forces provide goods and services directly to communities. Humanitarian actors may have other relationships to armed actors, such as receiving funds, even when the humanitarians are not part of the conflict. Therefore, each humanitarian agency has different interests and limitations regarding engagement with political and military actors, regardless of whether military units are tasked to facilitate humanitarian assistance or protect civilians. This diversity can create a confusing environment for Army units that may share common goals with humanitarian actors. 3-153. Humanitarians have developed guidelines to help clarify best practices for civil-military engagement and established sophisticated coordination mechanisms and offices tasked with engaging political and military actors at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. For example, as discussed earlier, humanitarian organizations often meet in clusters. Clusters are coordinating bodies organized by functions such as water and sanitation, protection, emergency shelter, and others. The cluster leads have responsibilities to liaise with external actors. Offices such as the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, if present, may also liaise with military and political actors. 3-154. Military support is more effective when Army units clearly understand the principles, codes of conduct, and policies that guide and sometimes limit humanitarian action and its interface with military actors. 3-155. Even in those situations where military forces are not directly involved, a focused and integrated humanitarian response is essential to alleviating suffering and reestablishing a stable environment that fosters a lasting peace to support broader national and international interests. Providing humanitarian aid and assistance is primarily the responsibility of specialized nonmilitary organizations and agencies, such as USAID. Nevertheless, military forces often support humanitarian response activities either as part of a broader campaign, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, or a specific humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operation. These activities usually consist of stability tasks and generally fall under the primary stability task restore essential services. The discussion beginning with paragraph 3-156 outlines the guiding principles used by the international community to frame humanitarian response activities. 3-156. Generally, the host nation or affected country coordinates humanitarian response. However, if the host nation or affected country is unable to do so, the United Nations often leads the international community response on its behalf. The principles that guide the military contribution to that response are fundamental to success in unified land operations. These principles reflect the collective experience of a diverse group of actors in a wide range of interventions conducted over decades across the world. They help to shape the humanitarian component of operations focused on stability. 3-157. UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 governs the humanitarian response efforts of the international community. It articulates the principal tenets for providing humanitarian assistance— humanity, neutrality, and impartiality—while promulgating the guiding principles that frame all humanitarian response activities. These guiding principles are drawn from four primary, albeit separate, sources:  InterAction and the DOD.  International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.  Oslo Guidelines.  The Interagency Standing Committee. InterAction and the Department of Defense 3-158. InterAction is the largest coalition of U.S.-based NGOs focused on the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people. Collectively, its members work in every developing country. Members meet people halfway in expanding opportunities. They support gender equality in education, health care, agriculture, small business, and other areas. 3-159. InterAction was a key participant in the development of the 2005 Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments (reprinted in JP 3-08). The Guidelines were developed by a working group consisting of military and civilian participants from interagency partners, the United States Institute for Peace, a consortium of U.S. NGOs, and the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. The Guidelines were endorsed by the director of the Joint Staff and disseminated to U.S. forces through the combatant commands. Although the endorsement was not directive in nature, the endorsement advised implementation of the Guidelines when possible. Note. In 2012, the DOS’s Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (formerly known as S/CRS) was replaced by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (known as CSO). International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 3-160. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement encompass two institutions and nearly 200 national societies. The institutions are the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The ICRC is an impartial, neutral, and independent organization. Established in 1863, its exclusively humanitarian mission aims to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in conflicts. It also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening laws pertaining to human rights and universal humanitarian principles. Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross 3-161. Seven fundamental principles bond together the national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the ICRC, and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The principles ensure the continuity of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and its humanitarian work (see JP 3-08 for more information). These principles are—  Humanity.  Impartiality.  Neutrality.  Independence.  Voluntary service.  Unity.  Universality. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Nongovernmental Organization Code of Conduct 3-162. In the summer of 1994, the code of conduct for the ICRC and NGOs in disaster relief was developed. (See table 3-3 on page 3-28.) Eight of the world’s largest disaster response agencies agreed on this code. It represents the body of international standards for disaster response. Before then, no accepted body of professional standards existed to guide their work. Today, the international community uses the code of conduct to monitor its own standards of relief delivery and to encourage other agencies to set similar standards.

This chapter begins by discussing the importance of assessing stability tasks. Then it presents two interagency frameworks that can support the activities of the operations process and enhance unity of effort. IMPORTANCE OF ASSESSING STABILITY TASKS 4-1. Army commanders measure the effectiveness and performance of stability tasks in relation to accomplishing Army missions and achieving progress toward overall United States (U.S.) stability goals. Determining how completed stability tasks support overall goals, especially in post-conflict situations, is important but challenging because measuring effects may take months or years. Commanders need to establish accurate indicators and track them at repeated intervals, in coordination with interagency partners. Interagency assessment tools can facilitate coordination of measurement efforts. Measuring the success of stability tasks includes—  Identifying and reducing the causes of instability.  Reestablishing or building host-nation capability to reduce, manage, or prevent conflict. 4-2. Army forces use the operations process described in ADRP 5-0 to plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations. The assessment process described in ADRP 5-0 consists of, but is not limited to—  Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.  Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.  Recommending or directing action for improvement. 4-3. The assessment frameworks discussed in this chapter can support the activities of the operations process. These frameworks were developed collaboratively by the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government to identify the root causes of instability, develop activities to diminish or mitigate them, and evaluate the effectiveness of the activities in fostering stability. Unified action partners commonly use these frameworks. They are tools for interagency planning, and they can inform Army planning and enhance unity of effort. These frameworks are not intended to be prescriptive. In this context, terminology usage may differ from standard doctrinal terminology. 4-4. At each level of monitoring and evaluation, commanders identify lessons to improve future stabilization activities or sustain successful ones. For example, military forces may learn certain external factors prevented an activity from being successful. Subsequent efforts need to address those external factors or take a different approach to addressing the sources of instability. DISTRICT STABILITY FRAMEWORK 4-5. To increase the effectiveness of stability missions, the United States Agency for International Development (known as USAID) developed the District Stability Framework. The District Stability Framework was designed to guide and support stabilization efforts by helping civilians and military organizations identify the causes of instability, develop activities to diminish or mitigate them, and evaluate the effectiveness of the activities in fostering stability at the tactical or operational level. The District Stability Framework can be used to create local stabilization plans and provide data for the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, which has a strategic (country or regional) focus. The District Stability Framework supports unity of effort by providing partners with a common framework to—  Understand an operational environment from a stability-focused perspective.  Maintain focus on the local population and its perceptions.  Identify the sources of instability in a specific local area.  Design activities that specifically address the identified sources of instability.  Monitor and evaluate activity outputs and impacts, as well as changes in overall stability. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-07.5 for a more detailed description of the District Stability Framework.) 4-6. The District Stability Framework helps overcome many of the challenges to successful operations focused on stability. It can help—  Keep military formations focused on the center of gravity for operations focused on stability— the population and its perceptions.  Provide a common operational picture for all interagency teams in an area of operations. By focusing on sources of instability, partner organizations can focus their varied resources and expertise on shared priorities.  Prioritize activities based on their importance to the local populace and their relevance to the overarching mission of stabilizing the area.  Enhance continuity between military formations. Units can easily pass District Stability Framework data along from one unit to the next, establishing a clear baseline that identifies sources of instability and the steps taken to mitigate them.  Empower tactical-level formations by giving them hard data useful for decisionmaking at their level and for influencing decisions at higher levels.  Identify measures of performance and measures of effectiveness for unit activities rather than simply tracking measures of performance.  Track indicators of overall stability by assessing whether an area is becoming more stable.  Identify issues that matter most to the population; the District Stability Framework helps identify information themes that resonate with the population. 4-7. The District Stability Framework has four steps. Ideally, all interagency partners in the area participate in the process, organized through the creation of an interagency stability working group. Figure 4-1 illustrates the four basic steps. S ITUATIONAL A WARENESS 4-8. The District Stability Framework uses four lenses to achieve a population-centric, stability oriented, situational awareness of an area of operations. The stability working group by examines the area of operations from four perspectives: an operational environment; cultural aspects; stability and instability dynamics; and local perceptions. The District Stability Framework examines the area of operations and helps leaders achieve a situational awareness of stability conditions and underlying factors. A NALYSIS 4-9. After gaining situational awareness in step 1, the District Stability Framework provides tools to analyze and identify potential sources of instability, their causes, the desired objectives, and the indicators that measure progress in addressing each source of instability. The second step of the District Stability Framework, analysis, consists of four tasks: identify potential sources of instability, vet each source against instability criteria, determine if the source meets two of the three instability criteria, and prioritize the sources of instability. The instability criteria are—  Decreased support for the government or legitimate governance institution.  Increased support for adversaries or enemies.  Undermining of the normal functioning of society. After identifying and prioritizing the sources of instability, practitioners fill out a tactical stability matrix for each source of instability. D ESIGN 4-10. In the third step of the District Stability Framework, practitioners design, prioritize, and synchronize stabilization activities. The stability working group develops activities to diminish the sources of instability identified during the analysis step. The process begins by brainstorming potential stabilization activities. It continues by filtering and refining the proposed activities against a set of stability criteria, design principles, and resource availability. This step is similar to the Army design methodology’s activities develop an operational approach and develop the plan, described in ADRP 5-0. M ONITORING AND E VALUATION 4-11. The final step in the District Stability Framework takes place during and after the implementation of stability activities. Monitoring and evaluation are conducted in three ways:  Measures of performance: track implementation of an activity.  Measures of effectiveness: measure the effect that an activity achieved.  Overall stability: assess the overall stabilizing effect of all the activities conducted over a longer period, as well as the influence of external factors. 4-12. As practitioners conduct this monitoring and evaluation, they identify lessons about what worked, what did not work, and what partners can do to improve their stability efforts as they repeat the District Stability Framework process in the future. 4-13. The District Stability Framework can support effective monitoring, evaluating, and decisionmaking. It focuses on the perceptions of the population and informs a common operational picture for Army units and their interagency partners. Furthermore, it helps inform and influence audiences by identifying themes that resonate with the population. INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 4-14. Interagency partners begin helping host nations prevent, mitigate, and recover from violent conflict by developing shared understanding about the sources of violent conflict or civil strife. To assess conflict situations systemically and collaboratively, interagency teams use a tool known as the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), published by the Department of State in 2008. The ICAF supports interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization. 4-15. Army forces conducting stability operations often are involved in interagency processes. To be effective, Army forces should be familiar with the ICAF. Army forces frequently participate in interagency conflict assessment activities. Using the ICAF for interagency activities also informs Army operational assessments. P URPOSE OF THE I NTERAGENCY C ONFLICT A SSESSMENT F RAMEWORK 4-16. The ICAF provides interagency partners a framework for developing a common perspective about the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict in a country. Partners use the ICAF to create shared understanding that informs national policy and planning decisions. The ICAF may also be used to inform strategic-level decisionmaking. 4-17. The ICAF outlines key concepts, processes, and products essential to conflict assessment. Interagency partners develop supplementary documents, appropriate tools, and data collection procedures as needed. Partners set the composition and functions of each interagency conflict assessment team. 4-18. The ICAF draws on conflict assessment tools used by interagency and interorganizational partners. It is not intended to duplicate or replace independent analytical processes, such as those conducted within the intelligence community. Rather, the ICAF builds upon those and other analytical efforts to provide a common framework. It facilitates shared knowledge and understanding. 4-19. The ICAF is distinct from other forecasting tools that identify countries at risk of instability or collapse and that describe relevant conditions. The ICAF builds on other forecasts and social science expertise. It helps interagency teams understand the reasons conditions exist and identify effective ways to engage and transform those conditions. The ICAF provides a shared, strategic perspective of the conflict against which future progress can be measured. (See ADRP 3-07 for a discussion of conflict transformation in the performance of stability tasks.) A PPLICATION OF THE I NTERAGENCY C ONFLICT A SSESSMENT F RAMEWORK 4-20. The ICAF guides the determination of which partners initiate and participate, when and where the process occurs, the type and application of products needed, and the appropriate level of classification. When interagency partners use the ICAF, they need to complete all of its analytical steps. The nature and scope of the assessment vary according to the situation. 4-21. The ICAF is a flexible, scalable interagency tool suitable for use in—  Steady-state engagement and conflict prevention planning.  U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization contingency planning.  U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization crisis response planning. Steady-State Engagement and Conflict Prevention Planning 4-22. Steady-state or conflict prevention planning efforts normally provide interagency partners with sufficient time for a thorough assessment and a permissive operational environment. Steady-state engagement and conflict prevention planning efforts may include—  Preparing an embassy for National Defense Authorization Act funding.  Answering requests by an embassy or combatant command for interagency assistance in understanding and planning for leveraging U.S. interests in fragile or at-risk countries.  Assisting with the development of combatant command theater campaign plans, including security cooperation planning.  Developing country assistance strategies or mission strategic plans.  Designing interagency prevention efforts for countries listed on state failure watch lists and early warning systems. United States Government Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingency Planning 4-23. Reconstruction and stabilization contingency planning are based on a hypothetical future. The ICAF provides concrete background information about existing dynamics that could trigger, exacerbate, or mitigate violent conflict. The ICAF is a robust element of planning, providing critical information for situational analysis, regardless of where the assessment and planning occur. United States Government Reconstruction and Stabilization Crisis Response Planning 4-24. The ICAF provides detailed situational analysis that can contribute critical information for initial interagency planning. Interagency partners update the ICAF analysis as they have more information available and better access to inform the policy formulation, strategy development, and interagency implementation. When used for crisis response, the ICAF might be a tabletop assessment completed in as little as one and one-half days by an interagency team based in Washington. Conversely, it could occur over several weeks, with conversations back and forth between Washington and interagency partners in the field. Roles and Responsibilities in the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework 4-25. Planners determine which partners serve on an ICAF team and in what capacities. The agency or individual responsible for managing the overall planning process proposes the tools and requests participation of partners. An established country team may use the ICAF to inform country assistance strategy development while a geographic combatant command uses the ICAF to bring an interagency perspective to theater security cooperation planning. In crisis response, the ICAF normally is part of the strategic planning led by a group focused on reconstruction and stabilization of the country in crisis. The ICAF may also be used among partners as part of collaborative planning. 4-26. As a rule, participants using an ICAF include the broadest possible representation of partners with expertise or a stake in a given situation. An ideal interagency team represents diverse skill sets and brings together the collective knowledge and experience of various U.S. departments and agencies. Participants might include relevant regional bureaus, sector experts, intelligence analysts, and social science or conflict specialists. When interagency partners use the ICAF to support planning, the interagency field team includes members of the strategic planning team. The interagency field team expands as needed to include local stakeholders and international partner representatives. 4-27. To ensure the most comprehensive analysis, members of the interagency team must provide all relevant information retained by each department or agency, including the results of past assessments and related analyses. Members of the interagency team must retain reachback capability with their agencies to obtain further information to fill critical information gaps identified through the ICAF process. 4-28. The ICAF includes two major tasks: conflict diagnosis and transition into planning. S TEPS OF C ONFLICT D IAGNOSIS IN THE I NTERAGENCY C ONFLICT A SSESSMENT F RAMEWORK 4-29. ICAF’s first major task is conflict diagnosis. Conflict diagnosis allows the interagency team to deliver a product that describes the context, core grievances and resiliencies, drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, and opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict. Figure 4-2 illustrates the steps of conflict diagnosis:  Evaluate the context of the conflict.  Understand core grievances and social and institutional resilience.  Identify drivers of conflict and mitigating factors.  Describe opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict. Step 1—Evaluate the Context of the Conflict 4-30. During the first step of conflict diagnosis, the team evaluates and outlines key contextual issues in an operational environment. Context does not cause conflict but describes the often long-standing conditions that resist change. Issues may include environmental conditions, poverty, youth bulge, or recent or long-term conflict in a region. Contextual conditions can reinforce divisions between communities or contribute to pressures making violence appear attractive for advancing individual interests. Contextual conditions can shape perceptions of identity groups. Key actors can use the conditions to manipulate and mobilize constituencies. 4-31. Each ICAF step begins with identifying the contextual conditions and issues from which the conflict evolved. This process, depicted in figure 4-2, reflects the complex interaction between the context and the other elements of the ICAF. Step 2—Understand Core Grievances and Sources of Social and Institutional Resilience 4-32. The team should understand, agree upon, and communicate the concepts of core grievances and sources of social and institutional resilience. They should describe them within the specific situation. Under the ICAF, a core grievance is any societal group’s perception that other groups or social institutions threaten its physical security, livelihood, interests, or values. A source of social and institutional resilience is any group’s perception that social relationships, structures, or processes are in place that can resolve disputes and meet basic needs through nonviolent means. 4-33. During the second step of conflict diagnosis, the team must—  Describe identity groups who perceive threats to their identity, security, or livelihood.  Articulate how societal patterns reinforce perceived deprivation, blame, and intergroup cleavages; articulate how those societal patterns promote harmony and peaceful resolution of disputes.  Explain how positive or negative institutional performance contributes to or aggravates the resolution of conflict. 4-34. Identity groups are groups of people that identify with one another, often because of characteristics used by outsiders to describe them. These characteristics can include ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, political affiliation, age, gender, economic activity, or socioeconomic status. Identity groups are inclined to conflict when they perceive that other groups’ interests, needs, and aspirations compete with and jeopardize their identity, security, or other fundamental interests. 4-35. Societal patterns associated with conflict reinforce divisions between groups. These patterns can include elitism, exclusion, corruption, chronic state capacity deficits, and unmet expectations. Capacity deficits consist of systemic economic stagnation, scarcity of necessary resources, and ungoverned spaces. Unmet expectations may be a lack of a peace dividend, land tenure issues, disillusionment, and disenfranchisement. Impacts of societal patterns often include negative economic consequences for disadvantaged groups. 4-36. Institutional performance considers formal and informal social structures to determine the groups’ performance level and if they contribute to or mitigate conflict and instability. Formal social structures consist of governments, legal systems, religious organizations, public schools, security forces, and economic institutions. Informal social structures include traditional dispute resolution bodies; families, clans or tribes; and armed groups. Assessing institutional performance involves distinguishing between outcomes and perceptions. Institutional outcomes are results that can be measured objectively; perceptions are the evaluative assessment of those outcomes. To diagnosis the conflict, teams must understand how various groups within a society perceive outcomes, especially in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy. Step 3—Identify Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors 4-37. The team should understand and outline the drivers and mitigating factors of conflict and enumerate them within the situation being assessed. Drivers of conflict represent the active energy moving the conflict—the dynamic situation resulting from key actors’ mobilization of social groups around core grievances. While core grievances can be understood as the potential energy of conflict, key actors translate that energy into drivers of conflict. Mitigating factors represent the dynamic situation resulting from key actors’ mobilization of social groups around sources of social and institutional resilience. Mitigating factors can be understood as the energy produced when key actors mobilize the potential energy of social and institutional resilience. 4-38. During the third step of conflict diagnosis, the team identifies the key actors central to producing, perpetuating, or profoundly changing the societal patterns or issues of institutional performance identified previously. The team determines whether key actors are motivated to mobilize constituencies toward inflaming or mitigating violent conflict and the means they have at their disposal. To perform the analysis required in this step, the team—  Identifies the key actors.  Identifies key actors’ constituencies. Identify the Key Actors 4-39. The team identifies the people, organizations, or groups who have leadership abilities or power— such as political position, moral authority, charisma, wealth, and weapons. These key actors can affect societal patterns and institutional performance, shape perceptions and actions, and mobilize people around core grievances or social and institutional resilience. 4-40. The team identifies the locations of key actors in leadership positions in governing, social, or professional organizations or networks (either within or external to a state or territory). They include private businesses, religious organizations, government positions, informal and illicit power structures, media, and academic institutions. 4-41. The team identifies what motivates key actors to exert influence on each of the political, economic, social, and security systems within the host nation—such as commitment to a cause or a people, greed (money or notoriety), and religious beliefs. The team identifies the methods key actors use to exert their influence (leadership capability, moral authority, personal charisma, access to resources or weapons, or networks). Identify Key Actors’ Constituencies 4-42. The team first identifies key actors’ supporting and opposing constituencies. Then the team identifies their core grievances or social or institutional resilience around which they are being mobilized. The team identifies the key actors’ critical motivations, means, and resources. 4-43. Using this information, the team drafts brief narrative statements describing the methods and reasons that key actors mobilize specific constituencies around core grievances and sources of social and institutional resilience. Each statement relating to core grievances becomes an entry in the list of drivers of conflict. Each relating to sources of social and institutional resilience becomes an entry in the list of mitigating factors. Step 4—Describe Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity 4-44. In the final step of conflict diagnosis, the team—  Identifies potential situations that could contribute to an increase in violent conflict.  Identifies potential situations that might offer opportunities for mitigating violent conflict and promoting stability. 4-45. The team should specify situations for increasing and decreasing conflict and describe those expected within the specific situation being assessed. These situations are described as windows of vulnerability and windows of opportunity. Windows of vulnerability are potential situations that may trigger conflict escalation. They often result from large-scale responses such as an increase of uncertainty during elections or following an assassination. They also result from an exclusion of parties from important events (such as negotiations or elections) or attempts to marginalize disenfranchised followers. Windows of vulnerability are moments when events threaten to rapidly and fundamentally alter the balance of political or economic power. Elections, devolution of power, and legislative changes illustrate possible windows of vulnerability. Key actors may seize, retain, and exploit the initiative during these moments to amplify the drivers of conflict. Windows of opportunity describe potential situations that may enable significant progress toward achieving stable peace. These windows may include situations where overarching identities assume prominence among disputing groups, natural disasters affect multiple identity groups, the situation requires a unified response, or a key leader driving the conflict is killed. These windows are moments when overarching identities become more important than subgroup identities. These occasions may present opportunities to provide additional support for factors that mitigate conflict. 4-46. The team completes conflict diagnosis by considering windows of vulnerability and windows of opportunity and prioritizing drivers of conflict and mitigating factors identified previously. The team uses the list of prioritized drivers and mitigating factors as the basis for its findings. S TEPS OF T RANSITION INTO P LANNING IN THE I NTERAGENCY C ONFLICT A SSESSMENT F RAMEWORK 4-47. ICAF’s second major task is transition into planning. When the ICAF is used to support crisis response or deliberate planning, the findings of the conflict diagnosis feed into the situational analysis and policy formulation steps of interagency, whole-of-government planning. When the ICAF is used to support steady-state engagement or conflict prevention planning, the team begins preplanning activities after completing conflict diagnosis. During the transition into these types of planning, the team maps existing diplomatic and program activities against the prioritized lists of drivers of conflict and mitigating factors. This mapping identifies gaps in current efforts as they relate to conflict dynamics. However, this is not intended as an evaluation of the overall impact or utility of any specific program or initiative. The team uses these findings as a basis for making recommendations to planners on potential entry points for interagency activities. 4-48. When the ICAF is used to support steady-state engagement or conflict prevention planning, six steps are used to facilitate the transition into planning (summarized in table 4-1).

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which FM 3-07 is the proponent (authority) manual are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

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