FM 3-11
Field Manual
No. 3-11
Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 10 April 2025

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

From the Cold War into the 1990s, United States (U.S.) Army training and doctrine expected enemy CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats to shape the battlefield. Training at Combat Training Centers frequently involved reacting to chemical strikes within division and brigade operational areas. In addition to demonstrating core task proficiency, Army units also required subordinate elements to perform their tasks in a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment. Over the past 20 years of conflict in the Middle East, U.S. defense policy prioritized contemporary asymmetric threats over CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and other large-scale combat operations threats. Operational and strategic emphasis on counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East, combined with the asymmetric threat's inferior technical capability to pursue a robust WMD program, led tactical echelons to prioritize training toward tasks more pertinent to the conflicts at hand. After 20 years, this significantly reduced the Army's CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear training and readiness. Today, peer threats recognize that developing CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capability provides them an opportunity to exploit the reduced capability of U.S. forces to operate in a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment. With an integrated air defense capability and superiority in fires, adversaries might leverage CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities to induce battlefield complexity, creating conditions for regional overmatch. In 2015, Russia realigned its CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces, allocating a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear brigade to support every combined arms and tank army. The Russian Army trains extensively in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear conditions during annual training exercises. Much like the Soviet Army of the past, they see CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear as an exploitable condition on the battlefield that provides conditions for force overmatch when employed on constrictive, canalizing terrain. North Korea also maintains a robust CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear program that threatens the Republic of Korea and surrounding countries, focusing their recent efforts on theater and intercontinental ballistic missiles that plausibly could strike the U.S. mainland. Iran remains a destabilizing regional adversary in the Middle East, with nuclear ambitions and a government adversarial to U.S. interests. China maintains a covert CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear program that continues to grow and may be used in future conflicts. Each of these CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capable peer threats represents a challenge to the United States Army's readiness across the competition continuum. It is highly anticipated that these threats will use multiple approaches and in different phases to leverage CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities to their advantage. The Chemical Corps and other technical forces (such as force health protection and area laboratories) exist to enable the joint force to prevail in a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-contested environment. The U.S. Army’s CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear force is an agile, adaptive team that provides critical capability to enhance the Army’s ability to fight and win in a complex CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment. This manual describes how to employ CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense capabilities to enable freedom of action within U.S. Army formations and how CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs provide expertise to maximize survivability, exploit enemy CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear use, and prevail in large-scale combat operations. FM 3-11 serves as a foundation of knowledge and provides the professional language articulating how CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear Soldiers perform tasks related to the Army's role—the employment of land power to support joint operations. Familiarity with FM 3-0 will help the reader understand how CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations enable the Army to accomplish missions, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains. This revision aligns with the Army’s focus on multidomain operations in large-scale combat operations. It represents a significant change from the previous version. The most significant changes to FM 3-11 include— • Organizing and aligning content with the changes in FM 3-0 and FM 3-90. • Aligning the logic chart with the form and function of that in FM 3-0. • Modifying the definition of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations. • Providing conceptual context for the role of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations in the Army’s operational concept. • Updating the organizations, capabilities, and training tasks that support CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations. The following is a brief introduction and summary of the chapters: • Chapter 1 provides a framework for the core functions and for the operational environment (OE) in which CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations are conducted. • Chapter 2 describes the capabilities of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces and ties their core functions directly to the support of operations tasks for the offense, defense, and stability operations. It illustrates examples of how CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces support maneuver in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments in order to enable combined arms operations and achieve freedom of action. • Chapter 3 is broken into two sections; section one covers CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear organizations and capabilities, and section two covers CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear training guidance for all organizations. • Appendix A highlights the relationship between the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff and each warfighting function. • Appendix B outlines the Army’s role in domestic and international CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response operations. • Appendix C describes the role of the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff within the protection working groups, the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center, and the warning and reporting system. • Appendix D lists individual and collective CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear training tasks. The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms. Based on current doctrinal changes, certain terms for which FM 3-11 is proponent have been modified. See introductory table-1 for specific term changes. Introductory table-1. Modified Army term Term Remarks chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations Modified definition. Introductory figure 1 depicts a logic chart showing how CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations nest with FM 3-0 and joint efforts. The Army conducts multidomain operations in support of the joint force. When CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards are present or suspected, Army forces conduct CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations with support from CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units and staffs. The Chemical Corps provides tailorable, scalable, and adaptive CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance, hazard mitigation, and technical expertise in support of operations to ensure freedom of action and survivability at home and abroad. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces are task-organized at echelon with leaders, Soldiers, and the right tools and skills for supporting Army maneuver, countering and exploiting the use of WMD, and providing layered and integrated protection from hazards. This is executed through the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear core functions and the integrating activities to enhance protection, preserve combat power, and enable the force to prevail in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments. Legend: CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive CWMD counter weapons of mass destruction DSCA defense support of civil authorities HR hazard response JIIM joint, interagency, international, and multinational OPTEMPO operational tempo SF special forces TIM toxic industrial material WMD weapons of mass destruction This page intentionally left blank.

This chapter describes the challenges that commanders and staffs must consider when conducting large-scale combat operations in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) environments. It introduces the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear core functions, highlights the roles of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units and staffs within Army strategic roles and the competition continuum, and describes the anticipated operational environment (OE). OVERVIEW 1-1. The current OE presents conditions that challenge current and future commanders conducting operations. State and nonstate actors continue to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs to gain an advantage against the United States and its allies. The proliferation of WMD (and the constant pursuit of the materials, expertise, and technology required to employ WMD) will increase in the future. Through proxy forces, peer threats operationalize emerging pathogens and new agents against civilian populations to increase confusion and inflict mass casualties. Peer adversaries may create novel chemical warfare agents. These nontraditional agents may present unique challenges to CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense capabilities and are expected to be employed for purposes that parallel those for traditional chemical agents if used on a smaller scale. The anticipated CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear OE will contain dense urban environments and subterranean environments. Troop formations will contend with highly restrictive terrain because employed CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents will limit freedom of maneuver and industrial facilities may cause exposure to manufactured agents or toxic industrial materials (TIMs). Despite these potential challenges, the Army accomplishes its mission as part of a joint team by shaping the OE, preventing conflict, conducting large-scale combat, and consolidating gains against peer threats. To accomplish this mission, the Army conducts multidomain operations. 1-2. Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages to achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders (ADP 3-0). Commanders balance the inherent risks of military operations with mission accomplishment. Commanders achieve this balance in part through the protection warfighting function. 1-3. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks, systems, and methods that prevent or mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve the force, deny the enemy freedom of action, and enable commanders to apply combat power (ADP 3-0). Protection integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard the force, personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, and physical assets of the United States and its mission partners. Protection is not a linear activity—planning, preparing, executing, and assessing protection is continuous and enduring. One of the primary protection tasks is conduct CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations. 1-4. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations is the employment of capabilities that assess, protect against, and mitigate chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards to enable freedom of action. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations support operational and strategic objectives to counter WMD and increase lethality, survivability, and readiness to operate in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments while executing large-scale combat operations. 1-5. The likelihood of enemy WMD use increases during large-scale combat operations—particularly against mission command nodes, massed formations, and critical infrastructure. Commanders ensure as much dispersion as is tactically prudent. In the offense, Army forces maneuver quickly along multiple axes, concentrate to mass effects, and then disperse to avoid becoming lucrative targets for enemy WMD and conventional fires. In the defense, Army forces improve the condition and capability of existing buildings or fortifications against CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards, issue medical countermeasures, and cover or disperse supplies to limit the effects of contamination. 1-6. The capabilities provided by CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units and staff support the Army operational concept—multidomain operations. The implications of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations have operational and strategic impacts, even if the actions are tactical. Army actions in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments described in this field manual are linked to joint doctrine (JP 3-11, JP 3-40, JP 3-41, JP 4-02) and Army and multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures publications. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear core functions of assess, protect, and mitigate are the strength that CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units and staffs provide in support of operations in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments, countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD), and CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response. 1-7. The following vignette describes the application of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear functions used by the Allied Expeditionary Force newly formed 1st Gas Regiment in World War I. The emergent use of chemicals to shape the battlefield impacted tactics and nearly changed the outcome of World War I. Gas Warfare in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive Over 47 days (from 26 September to the Armistice on 11 November 1918), the American Expeditionary Force was engaged in the largest battle yet fought in the history of the United States—the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. More than 1.2 million American Servicemembers were committed to the battle in a combined allied effort to finally break through German lines and once again combat the enemy on an open battleground. Throughout this campaign, toxic chemical agents first introduced on the battlefield in April 1915 were used effectively by German forces, inflicting a great number of casualties among American forces building up for the attack. From 1915 to 1918, the Germans held the initiative in most areas of gas warfare by introducing agents (such as phosgene and mustard gas) that allowed them to alter the tactical situation rapidly and by using gas to support maneuver during an infantry attack. Initially, having no prior experience in addressing gas threats, the allies struggled to keep up with such offensive doctrine. The use of toxic chemicals by the enemy effectively hindered Allied forces freedom of maneuver, isolating forces from one another and denying key terrain. Areas saturated by chemicals could be impenetrable for days and disrupt operations. The key to the success of the campaign was the newly organized Chemical Warfare Service, which was tasked to provide offensive and defensive assistance to the American advance by providing gas training and smoke screens and by eliminating German machine gun positions with thermite. On 28 June 1918, the 1st Gas Regiment (also known as The Hellfire Boys) was formed. The tactical employment of the gas troops was to support the infantry before and during the battle. The 1st Gas Regiment's ability to assess German intelligence and exploit captured German chemical warfare material was critical to understanding how the enemy could and would employ gas in future battles. They were able to rapidly develop new equipment and tactics to protect the force and preserve combat power for major operations. Lastly, their ability to provide decontamination within trench warfare allowed the 1st Gas Regiment to mitigate desired enemy effects on the terrain. The success of the 1st Gas Regiment in support of American Expeditionary Forces highlights one of the very best examples of how CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces support maneuver to win in a complex battlefield. The German Army's tactical advantage in using gas warfare was defeated because of the 1st Gas Regiment's ability to assess the enemy, protect the force, and mitigate the effects of gas warfare on the American Expeditionary Force. 1-8. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units and staffs provide the maneuver commander dynamic options to address CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards. In turn, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs and formations evolve so that when units encounter a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard, appropriate assets operate within, assess, characterize, battle track in real time, and exploit the hazard. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs also provide hazard mitigation strategies, leveraging responsive applications, systems, and tactics. 1-9. The conduct CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations task includes the employment of tactical capabilities that anticipate and counter the range of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards necessary to enable freedom of action. It preserves the force so that commanders can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Commanders and staffs synchronize, integrate, and organize CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations and resources with other protection capabilities to preserve combat power and identify and prevent or mitigate the effects of threats and hazards. Note. For additional information on protection, see ADP 3-37. 1-10. Effective CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations require the full integration of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear Soldiers, units, and staffs as members of the combined arms team. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces integrated with maneuver forces contribute to a shared understanding of the OE and an integrated and synchronized approach to conducting operations in a complex CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment. As Army professionals, shared understanding and mutual trust are established and maintained through habitual training, persistent liaison, collaborative planning and preparation, standard operating procedures, clear command and support relationships, and effective mission rehearsals. CORE FUNCTIONS 1-11. The actions of assess, protect, and mitigate constitute the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear core functions. Functions are the assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or organization. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear functions communicate the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear tasks that provide the Army the means to accomplish its mission in a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment. When applied correctly, units maintain the ability to assess CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards, protect personnel and equipment in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments, and mitigate the potential for or effects of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. These core functions may be executed individually, simultaneously, or sequentially. All units possess the ability to perform the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear core functions; however, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces provide commanders an enhanced capability to perform these functions. These functions define the contribution of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units and staffs to the Army and joint force. These core functions provide a focus for task and unit training, leader development, and force design. Hazard awareness and understanding (HAU) is an integrating activity that links information obtained from these functions to better understand the OE. HAU involves battle tracking, reporting, and common operational picture (COP) management to integrate information obtained. Understanding and excelling at these functions contributes to units prevailing in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments across the range of military operations. 1-12. The functions are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. They feed into each other in either direction and contribute to HAU. Tasks conducted in the assess function provide necessary information for making proactive decisions. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities integrated into a reconnaissance and surveillance plan help assess enemy capabilities and provide early warning of a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack. Actions to mitigate the potential for or effects of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents conserve combat power for future operations. Mitigation also provides insight into further assessments that can drive future operations. All the functions provide the basis for developing HAU. Tasks within each function build on an initial awareness of threats and hazards. Actions taken and information collected from assessing, protecting against, and mitigating CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents furthers the commander's situational understanding of the environment and the impact CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards may have on current and future operations. 1-13. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear functions support CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense tasks, including active and passive CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense. Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear defense is the actions taken to counter chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear hazards; reduce their risks; and prepare for, respond to, and recover from chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incidents (JP 3-11). CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense tasks are connected from joint doctrine through the multi-Service doctrine and intersect with all the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear functions. The combination of active and passive CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defensive measures reduces the effectiveness and success of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and improvised CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear device employment and mitigates the risks associated with hazards. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-11.32 for a description of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear active and passive defense. A SSESS 1-14. Through information collection and dissemination, effective warning and reporting, modeling, and HAU, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs and units provide the Army the ability to estimate the potential for (or the existence of) CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards. Assessing hazards allows proactive decision making and encompasses all the capabilities to evaluate the potential for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards in the OE, detect and model CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards, and determine the characteristics and parameters of hazards throughout the OE that bear on operational and tactical decisions. This function addresses the progression of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities—from just sensing hazards to avoid them to assessing hazards at a distance to enable the freedom of maneuver. 1-15. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs provide commanders and planners assessments of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards in the OE to integrate information from operations and intelligence. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs provide the commander an evaluation of the risks and advise the commander in course of action (COA) development. Assessing hazards allows the commander to better understand the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment, assess the risk, and consider alternative options in the area of operations (AO). See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-11.36 for details on conducting CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear assessments and analysis. 1-16. At the tactical level, reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations are the primary means by which a commander conducts information collection to answer the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) to support essential tasks and purposes. (See FM 3-55 for more information.) A chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident is any accidental or intentional release of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear hazard (JP 3-11). Assessing CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards provides the foundation for an accurate and timely understanding of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear impacts on the OE. The tasks that are associated with this function are related to assessing and characterizing sites, reconnaissance and surveillance, and staff actions to provide assessments in the planning process. 1-17. Information collection tasks conducted during the planning and preparation phases of the operations process provide CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and intelligence staffs information about CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards in the OE. The connection to the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2)/battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2), surgeon sections, and civil military planners is necessary to feed information into threat assessments and aid in intelligence preparation of the operational environment (IPOE). Information about CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards in the OE helps the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff advise the commander so that he can assess and manage risk and consider which vulnerabilities to accept or mitigate. Primary tasks associated with this function include the following: • Contribute to the IPOE process. • Conduct CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat and hazard assessments. • Provide operational and technical advice and planning recommendations on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and operations. • Collect information on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards through reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S). • Advise the commander on the impact of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards on the mission. • Detect, locate, report, and mark hazards. • Manage chemical, biological, and radiological survey and monitoring tasks. • Analyze effects of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards for risk to force and risk to mission. • Provide operational advice to isolated elements on how to avoid or mitigate CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear exposure or effects. 1-18. The Army intelligence process consists of four steps (plan and direct, collect and process, produce, and disseminate and integrate) and five continuing activities (synchronize; conduct intelligence operations; perform processing, exploitation, and dissemination; analyze; and assess). Assessing threats and hazards contributes to this process and uses products from it to further HAU. P ROTECT 1-19. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs and units provide the Army capabilities for protection against CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). It encompasses the execution of physical defenses to negate the effects of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards on personnel and material. Protection conserves the force by providing individual and collective protection postures and capabilities. Protecting the force from CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents includes hardening systems and facilities, preventing or reducing individual and collective exposures, or applying medical prophylaxes. 1-20. If the capability is available, an adversary may create CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards against mission command nodes, massed formations, or infrastructure to deny freedom of action or key terrain during large-scale combat operations. Commanders balance the need to mass effects against the requirement to concentrate forces and ensure as much dispersal as is tactically prudent to avoid presenting lucrative targets for enemy fires and to mitigate the effects of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. Army units deliberately incorporate CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense training into all training tasks to successfully operate under CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear conditions. 1-21. Tasks that support this function may occur throughout all phases of the operations. Examples of protect tasks include the following: • Train units to operate within CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments. • Employ assessments of unit capabilities and vulnerabilities. • Protect personnel, equipment, and facilities from CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, including TIM effects. • Advise the commander on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear readiness. • Coordinate the sustainment of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense equipment and medical chemical defense material. • Employ proactive risk-based decision making. M ITIGATE 1-22. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units and staffs provide the Army the ability to mitigate CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents by responding with personnel, subject matter expertise, and equipment to reduce or neutralize the hazard. Contamination mitigation is described as the planning and actions taken to prepare for, respond to, and recover from contamination associated with all chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards to continue military operations (JP 3-11). The mitigate function includes capabilities to negate hazards, such as the decontamination task. 1-23. Mitigating a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident encompasses a range of tasks to mitigate hazard effects after a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident. A CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident can include deliberate attacks or accidental releases from technological or natural disasters. It includes all efforts to respond to CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents and reduce hazard effects on forces, populations, facilities, and equipment, including contamination mitigation and domestic and international CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response. Contamination mitigation contains two subsets—contamination control and decontamination—which are described in detail in ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-11.33. Tasks for mitigating CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents include the following: • Provide a scalable response to CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. • Provide decontamination expertise and support. • Conduct WMD defeat, disablement, and/or disposal. • Support health service support patient decontamination. • Conduct CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear modeling to assess the impact on operations. • Perform CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response in support of defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) and international partners. 1-24. The tasks conducted within domestic and international CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response are the same decontamination or hazard mitigation tasks conducted in tactical operations. The equipment and environment in which they occur changes some operational considerations. These tasks are described in chapter 3. H AZARD A WARENESS AND U NDERSTANDING 1-25. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear HAU is an integrating activity implemented at the individual and collective level to comprehend implications of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments on operations. HAU integrates all of the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear core functions (assess, protect, mitigate), preincident through postincident, to facilitate situational understanding. HAU aids the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff in the collaborative process of IPOE to provide the commander an understanding of how CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards in the AO affect mission accomplishment. 1-26. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard awareness is achieved through the gathering of information or data from individuals; sensors; or intelligence assessments, reports, and products. The chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear warning and reporting system (CBRNWRS) and CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear unit reports are sources of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear information that help the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff build their COP and enhance hazard awareness. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard understanding is achieved through the fusion of all information. This fusion results in the ability to comprehend the implication, character, nature, or subtleties of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards and their impact on the OE, mission, and force. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs integrate all available information and translate technical information about the hazard into information that is useful to the commander in making risk decisions. 1-27. The tasks associated with HAU occur throughout the operations process and throughout all phases of operations. Information collected from the execution of the tasks within the functions of assess, protect, and mitigate contributes to enhanced HAU. ARMY STRATEGIC ROLES 1-28. The Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. It supports four strategic roles for the joint force. Army forces shape OEs, counter aggression on land during crisis, prevail during large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. This publication focuses primarily on countering aggression on land during crisis, prevailing during large-scale combat operations, and consolidating gains. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear support to shape the OE is critical for the joint force to implement the national strategy and set desirable conditions to prevent and deter the adversary’s undesirable actions. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CAPABILITIES ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 1-29. The Army operates in a strategic environment that can result in military operations under many conditions. These operations are conducted within increasing violence and an increasing level of national interests (see figure 1-1). CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities exist to support contingency and large-scale combat operations and to aid in DSCA, security cooperation, military engagement, and CWMD. 1-30. Force projection usually begins as a contingency operation or as a rapid response to a crisis. Contingency operations may be required for combat or noncombat situations. Contingency operations could be joint, interagency, intergovernmental, or multinational. Committed forces are tailored and task-organized for rapid deployment, effective employment, and mission accomplishment. 1-31. As WMD materials, technology, and expertise proliferate across the globe, it is likely that the United States will encounter them in military operations across the range of military operations. Because CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards make any operation more difficult, detailed planning is crucial. Many CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear unit capabilities reside in the reserve component; therefore, operational planners consider the time required for mobilization. The amount and type of mobilized reserve forces depend on the strategic context. 1-32. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities support operations by assessing CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards, providing protection against CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards, mitigating CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, and providing HAU. All CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear functions share a common fundamental purpose that fits within the protection warfighting function to achieve or contribute to national objectives. 1-33. While the United States (U.S.) Army is manned, equipped, and trained to operate across the range of military operations, large-scale combat operations against a peer threat represents the most significant readiness requirement. Chapter 3 provides an overview of how CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces support combined arms operations. See FM 3-0 for a discussion on large-scale ground combat operations. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 1-34. The operational environment is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Commanders and leaders charged with conducting operations in a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment begin planning with a thorough understanding of the OE, the risks and opportunities associated with the OE, and the ways and means available for preserving combat power through protection. Seeing the enemy and understanding the OE is imperative to defeating enemy forces and achieving objectives. Leaders view the OE in terms of domains, dimensions, operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time), and mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations [METT-TC(I)]) to provide an understanding that helps identify current, developing, and potential hazards and threats and enable the tasks to mitigate or eliminate them. Through continuous analysis of the OE, civil affairs staff can provide analyzed and evaluated civil considerations data concerning the host nation and indigenous populations and institutions. Military and civil capabilities include CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense and decontamination capabilities; general information regarding the existence or movement of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials; local expertise, resources, or technology related to CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations; and industrial CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear processing, storage, or experimental facilities. Note. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-11.36 and FM 2-0 for more information about analyzing the OE through operational variables and METT-TC(I). See FM 3-57 for more information on civil considerations. 1-35. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear survivability addresses protection or mitigation for chemical, biological, and radiological contamination of personnel and equipment. Also included are prompt nuclear effects including blast, thermal radiation, prompt radiation, and electromagnetic pulse. AR 70-75 and DODIDODIDepartment of the Defense Instruction 3150.09 establish policies and procedures for ensuring the survivability of the force to operate in chemical, biological, and radiological or nuclear environments as a deterrent to adversary use of WMDs against the United States, its allies, and interests. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives are components that are threats or potential hazards with adverse effects in the operational environment (ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.11). Commanders and planners assess, on a regular basis, the ability of their forces to operate in these environments. 1-36. Large urban areas and complex subterranean environments continue to present a concern for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations. Dense populations create concerns for pandemic diseases, the rapid spread of infections, mass casualties, and chaos created by panicked individuals. Operations in subterranean environments have unique hazards, such as poor air circulation from insufficient ventilation or a lack of breathable air due to toxic vapor displacement. Subterranean environments exist in three major categories—tunnels or natural cavities and caves, urban subsurface systems, and underground facilities. The production and storage of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials and WMD (which may occur in subterranean environments and can increase atmospheric hazards) requires the alignment of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear enablers with maneuver forces. This combined arms effort allows forces to successfully manage, plan/account for, isolate, clear, exploit, and transition underground facilities. Note. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-21.51 for more information on subterranean environments and operations. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear T HREATS AND H AZARDS 1-37. Planning for large-scale combat operations deliberately accounts for possible enemy use of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and allied retaliatory response options. Planning also accounts for toxic industrial hazards caused by combat operations. Enemy employment of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons or an allied response would affect all domains, but they present a disproportionate effect in the land domain. The use of these weapons does not terminate a conflict and may cause it to escalate. Units prepare to preempt the use of and operate in, around, and through contaminated environments. This is fundamental to deterring adversaries from employing WMD through the denial of benefit. 1-38. An awareness of the fundamental aspects of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards aids in the understanding of the associated risks. Threats and hazards have the potential to cause personal injury, illness, or death; equipment or property damage or loss; or mission degradation. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats include chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons; WMD programs; and improvised devices with a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear payload that produce CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards. When an improvised explosive device also utilizes a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard to produce effects, it becomes an improvised chemical device, improvised biological device, or improvised radiological device. A brief overview of the considerations associated with each of the C-B-R and N threats and hazards is important to fully grasp the influences each has on the decisions of the commander. Note. Technical information about these hazards can be found in TM 3-11.91. 1-39. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats include the intent and capability to employ weapons or improvised devices to produce CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards. In contrast, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards include CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear material created from accidental or deliberate releases of TIMs, chemical and biological agents, nuclear materials, radiological materials, and hazards resulting from the employment of WMD or encountered by U.S. Armed Forces during the execution of military operations. 1-40. Commanders and staffs consider CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards during integrating processes (IPOE, targeting, risk management) and continuing activities (liaison, information collection, security operations, protection, terrain management, airspace control). IPOE provides CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear planners intelligence regarding CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards that impact freedom of maneuver. The continuing activity of information collection directs reconnaissance and surveillance toward confirming CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-specific priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). These actions are critical to the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear integrating activities of HAU, which supports the maneuver commander's ability to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to maintain a relative position of advantage. Note. See ADP 5-0 for additional information on integrating processes and operational or mission variables. Threat 1-41. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). The use of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons by the enemy can have an enormous impact on all combat actions. Chemical weapons are more commonly available; therefore, they are more readily integrated into battle plans at the tactical level. The enemy may also have biological, nuclear, and radiological capabilities that deserve consideration. These capabilities have lethal effects over much larger areas than do chemical weapons. The effects of biological weapons can be difficult to localize and employ in combat without them also affecting enemy forces. 1-42. In response to foreign development, peer or near-peer threats maintain the capability to conduct chemical, nuclear, and possibly biological or radiological warfare. However, they initially prefer to avoid the use of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons to prevent an international or multilateral response. Force modernization has introduced a degree of flexibility that was previously unavailable to combined arms commanders. It creates multiple options for the employment of forces at strategic, operational, and tactical levels with or without the use of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. 1-43. Many of the same delivery means available for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons can also be used to deliver precision weapons that can often achieve desired effects without the stigma associated with CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. The threat might use CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons to deter aggression or as a response to an enemy attack. It could use CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear against a neighbor as a warning to a potential adversary to let the adversary know that it is willing to use such a weapon. It may use, or threaten to use, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons that have collateral effects on noncombatants as a way of applying political, economic, or psychological pressure to show its determination and scope of aggression. Peer or near-peer threats have surface-to-surface missiles that can carry chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. (Refer to the Worldwide Equipment Guide: https://odin.tradoc.army.mil, for specific unclassified threat weapon capabilities.) Additionally, a peer threat could use aircraft systems and cruise missiles to deliver a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack. They also maintain the capability of using special-purpose forces as an alternate means of delivering CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear munitions packages. It is important to note the increased likelihood of peer threats employing tactical nuclear capabilities when there is a perceived threat to their sovereign borders or government regime. 1-44. The likelihood of the threat use of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons increases during large-scale combat operations. The use of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and the constant pursuit of the materials, expertise, and technology to employ them will increase in the future. State and nonstate actors continue to develop programs to gain advantage against the United States and its allies. 1-45. Threat forces determine suitable targets for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons based on their perception of friendly vulnerabilities on that kind of attack and how the attack achieves their desired effects. The threat considers the following targets to be suitable for the employment of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons: • Precision weapons. • Prepared defensive positions. • Reserve and troop concentrations. • Communication centers. • Targets that support the threat's tactical scheme of offensive or defensive maneuver. • Targets that support the threat's shaping, disruption, or canalization of friendly forces. Hazard 1-46. A hazard is a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation (JP 3-33). CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards are CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear elements that can create adverse effects due to an accidental or deliberate release and dissemination. Understanding hazards also helps the commander visualize potential impacts on operations. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards create conditions that can damage or destroy life or vital resources or prevent mission accomplishment. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards include toxic industrial chemicals (TICs), toxic industrial biologicals, toxic industrial radiologicals, and special nuclear materials collectively known as TIM. C HEMICAL H AZARDS 1-47. The types of chemical hazards that are of concern to the military have expanded tremendously over the last decade and now include a large number of TICs. Chemical hazards are any chemicals (manufactured, used, transported, or stored) that can cause death or other harm through the properties of those materials. Adversaries have the potential to employ these hazards to limit the friendly scheme of maneuver. 1-48. Chemical hazards can be divided into the following categories: • Chemical warfare agents. These are specific agents that are developed as military weapons and designed to kill or severely incapacitate personnel and disrupt movement. Chemical warfare agents are generally considered lethal. It includes traditional agents such as nerve and blister and agents newly added to the Chemical Warfare Convention (like fourth generation agents). • Military chemical compounds (other than chemical warfare agents). These are chemical compounds that are developed, in part, for military use (riot control agents, smokes, obscurants), but not as weapons. Military chemical compounds are generally considered nonlethal and cause temporary illness. Toxic properties are primarily associated with improper use. • TICs. Toxic industrial chemical is any chemical developed, manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial, agricultural, medical, or commercial processes which could pose a hazard (JP 3-11). These same chemicals are considered plausible candidates for terrorist activities. In general, the risk of a TIC being used as a weapon depends on the severity of effects that it may cause and the probability that it may be obtained and released in dangerous quantities. 1-49. A chemical agent is a chemical substance that is intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate, mainly through physiological effects. The term excludes riot control agents when used for law enforcement purposes, herbicides, smoke, and flame. Chemical agents are classified according to the following: • Physical state. Agents may exist as a solid, liquid, or vapor. • Physiological action. Based on their physiological effects, there are nerve, blood, blister, choking, and incapacitating agents. • Use. The terms persistent and nonpersistent describe the time that an agent stays in an area. An adversary may have to expend large quantities of chemical agents to cause mass casualties or achieve area denial.  Persistent agent. A chemical agent that is able to cause casualties for hours or longer. (JP 3-11)  Nonpersistent agent. A chemical agent that, when released, dissipates or loses its ability to cause casualties rapidly, in a matter of minutes. (JP 3-11) 1-50. Nontraditional chemical agents are a broad group of chemicals that are not included in the Chemical Weapons Convention schedules, which were designed to prevent the development of traditional chemical warfare agents. While nontraditional agents possess some of the properties of traditional chemical agents, these properties often present unique challenges. Some nontraditional agents include lethal and incapacitating agents. B IOLOGICAL H AZARDS 1-51. A biological hazard includes any organism, or substance derived from an organism, that poses a threat to the health of any living thing. Biological hazards may be biological weapons, naturally occurring endemic and zoonotic diseases, or natural emerging or reemerging disease outbreaks. Biological agents are microorganisms that can spread disease through humans and agriculture (plants and animals). Biological agents are dispersed or employed as pathogens or toxins that cause disease in personnel, animals, and plants. • Pathogens. Pathogens are disease-producing microorganisms (bacteria, viruses, fungi) that directly attack human, plant, or animal tissue and biological processes. • Toxins. Toxins are poisonous substances that are produced naturally by bacteria, plants, fungi, snakes, insects, and other living organisms and may also be produced synthetically. Naturally occurring toxins are nonliving byproducts of cellular processes that can be lethal or highly incapacitating. 1-52. Biological agents generally have short-lived activity (less than 24 hours) in the environment since oxygen and exposure to sunlight render most organisms nonviable. However, spores in dormant form, notably anthrax, may survive for decades and reactivate in warm, moist environments. This is also true for endemic anthrax that, while not intentional, still has the same operational effects. The longevity of biological threats is greatly dependent on their environmental stability, the success or failure of force health protection measures, and the hardiness or adaptability of microorganisms. 1-53. Pathogens require an incubation period to establish themselves in the body of a host and produce disease symptoms. The onset of visible symptoms may occur days or weeks after exposure. Some toxins can remain active for extended periods in the natural environment. This stability creates a persistent transfer hazard. Unlike chemical, radiological, and nuclear hazards, biological hazards, especially infectious pathogens, are less predictable and more challenging to classify the extent of the hazard. 1-54. Toxic industrial biologicals are a form of biological hazard. Toxic industrial biological is any biological material manufactured, used, transported, or stored by industrial, agricultural, medical, or commercial processes which could pose a hazard. They are often generated as infectious waste, such as on sharp-edged medical instruments (needles, syringes, and lancets) and material contaminated by bodily fluids. 1-55. Biological hazards can provide important advantages to adversaries who use them because of factors such as— • Easy clandestine employment. • Delayed onsets of symptoms. • Detection, identification, and verification difficulties. • Agent persistence. • Communicability. These factors, combined with the factors listed below, increase the threat of biological agents:  Small doses can produce lethal or incapacitating effects over an extensive area.  They are difficult to detect in a timely manner.  They are easy to conceal.  They can be covertly deployed.  The variety of potential biological agents significantly complicates effective preventative or protective treatment. R ADIOLOGICAL H AZARDS 1-56. Radiological hazards include any source of nuclear radiation (such as electromagnetic or particulate radiation) that can produce ions or energy that causes damage, injury, or destruction. The Army is responsible for enforcing precautions and establishing tactics, techniques, and procedures for handling conventional munitions that employ radioactive materials, such as depleted uranium. This includes enforcing standards that protect personnel against inhalation and ingestion of radioactive material and external radiation exposure. In addition, dangerous levels of radiation can result from damaged industrial radiation sources. Due to the downwind hazards that such damage can produce, avoidance is the most effective individual and unit protective measure against industrial radiation hazards. 1-57. Radiological materials are those materials that emit ionizing radiation in the form of charged particles (alpha or beta particles, neutral particles [neutrons]), or electromagnetic energy (gamma rays or X-rays). • Alpha particles. Alpha particles are positively charged, highly energetic nuclei (two protons, two neutrons, but no electrons) that travel through air only a few inches from the nuclei that emit them. Alpha particles are easily stopped by thin materials (such as a piece of paper or human skin). Alpha particles pose an internal hazard to the body and can be very damaging if small particles are inhaled into the respiratory system, deep into the lungs. • Beta particles. Beta particles are electrons or positrons that are ejected from the nucleus of an unstable atom. They travel further than alpha particles (up to 30 feet in air) and can be effectively stopped by a sufficient thickness of low-density materials such as aluminum, plastic, or tightly woven fabric. Beta particles are an external hazard to the eyes and skin but also pose an internal hazard if taken into the body. • Neutrons. Neutrons originate in the nucleus of an atom. They have no charge, but they do have a substantial mass, travel long distances, and are slowed and absorbed by a significant portion of hydrogenated materials (water and plastics). Neutrons pose variable hazards based on energy. They may activate nonradioactive material into radioactive material, they may be captured and emit other types of hazardous radiation, and they are not detected as easily as other radiations. • Gamma particles and X-rays. Gamma particles and X-rays are electromagnetic energy with no mass and no charge. Gamma rays originate in the nucleus of the atom, while X-rays originate from an electron change in energy. They can travel large distances (hundreds of meters), have no defined maximum range in material (like alpha or beta particles do), and are more effectively attenuated to lower levels by high density materials. Note. See TM 3-11.91 for more information. R ADIOLOGICAL D EVICES 1-58. A radiological dispersal device is an improvised assembly or process used to disseminate radioactive material to cause destruction, damage, or injury (JP 3-11). In a radiological dispersal device, conventional explosives are bundled with radioactive materials. The intent of a radiological dispersal device is to contaminate an area with radioactive material, cause avoidance and evacuation of the area, and induce terror and anxiety. This can be done with conventional explosives, otherwise known as a dirty bomb. 1-59. A radiological exposure device is a penetrating radiation source (gamma or neutron) that is placed or buried where people may be exposed to the radiation emitted (JP 3-11). A radiological exposure device uses a conventional explosive to disseminate radioactive material. If it remains undetected, the potential dose to the intended target increases. 1-60. Adversaries can disperse radioactive material in many ways; for example, they can use a conventional platform to deliver radioactive materials that may be obtained from industrial sources, such as radioactive material from a power-generating nuclear reactor or from use in industry, medicine, or research. Unless radioactive sources are thoroughly shielded, improvised devices employing these materials will likely have a significant radiological signature that can be detected before detonation, dispersal, or deployment. The dispersal of radioactive material represents an inexpensive capability that requires limited resources and technical knowledge. N UCLEAR H AZARDS 1-61. The severity of nuclear hazards depends on the weapon yield, intervening terrain, and distance to the target. Severity also depends on the height of burst, especially for fallout production and electromagnetic pulse. Residual radiation effects are due to emissions (typically alphas, betas, and low-energy gammas) from fission fragments (atoms produced during fission) and activated environmental materials (material that absorbs radiation and becomes radioactive itself). Collectively, these sources are called fallout. 1-62. Nuclear hazards are the applied effects on personnel, equipment, units, and systems. Nuclear hazards are produced by the energy released from a nuclear weapon employed offensively or defensively. When detonated, a typical nuclear weapon releases its energy as blast, thermal radiation, nuclear radiation (including prompt radiation-gamma, X-rays and neutron, and alpha and beta particles), and electromagnetic pulse. 1-63. Nuclear weapon effects are qualitatively different from biological or chemical weapon effects. The nature and intensity of nuclear detonation effects are determined by the type of weapon, its yield, and the physical medium in which the detonation occurs. Weather conditions affect fallout immensely. Some characteristics of nuclear weapon effects include the following: • The distribution of energy and the relative effects of blast, heat, and radiation depend largely on the weapon and the altitude at which it is detonated. • A typical nuclear detonation releases most of its yield as blast energy, followed by thermal pulse and initial radiation. • The amount of fallout depends on the weapon yield, weapon type, and height of the burst. • The area affected depends on geography and environmental conditions. • Surface bursts produce the most fallout. • The hazard to personnel primarily depends on the level of radiation present and the duration of exposure. Note. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-72 for more information on how to understand and mitigate nuclear hazards.

This chapter discusses how CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations enable Army operations in the operational framework. It describes the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear core functions within support to large-scale combat operations.

This chapter is divided into two sections that describe United States Army CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear organizations and capabilities and the training that supports the sustainment of those capabilities. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units and staffs provide a mix of expertise and capabilities to commanders in support of joint and Army operations during complex CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments. To provide these capabilities across the Army, the Chemical Corps provides an echeloned array of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear Soldiers, staffs, and units that integrate with maneuver forces and provide the necessary expertise and capabilities. Section I provides information for commanders and staffs at all echelons to help them understand the organization, capabilities, and limitations of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear organizations. Section II provides information on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear training.

Commanders make use of warfighting functions to generate combat power and conceptualize capabilities. The warfighting functions are command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. Commanders use leadership and information to integrate capabilities to generate combat power. The warfighting functions are not specific to an organization or branch but are an intellectual way of understanding how groups of tasks and systems come together to provide an element of combat power. Each of the warfighting functions have unique CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear considerations. COMMAND AND CONTROL A-1. The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to exercise authority and direction to accomplish missions. The command and control warfighting function is unique in that it integrates the activities of the other warfighting functions. A-2. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units integrate command and control and operations process activities for the unit while interacting with the command activities of the unit being supported. The interaction may be primarily through a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff assigned to the supported unit or through staff counterparts. If a supported unit does not have assigned CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff, then the supporting unit provides this support as well. Many factors determine this relationship and the degree of integration, including the type of unit and echelon being supported and the command or support relationship being established. For example, an ABCT may have tactical control of a hazard response company. If that is so, the brigade CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear officer and hazard response company commander collaboratively plan, coordinate, and synchronize CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear efforts across the brigade. The BCTBCTBasic combat training may control and direct the application of the hazard response company’s capabilities while providing sustainment support. A-3. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units are generally task-organized as members of combined arms teams. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units are designed for specific tasks, so capabilities must shift within the AO to match the requirements with the capabilities of modular CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units. Transitions occur at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and flexibility in the task organization is required to permit the shifting of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities. A-4. Control measures are tools that help units identify key points. A few examples for consideration include decontamination points, NAIs with potential for TIMs that may need to be designated as no-fire areas, and coordination points for linkup between units and CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear elements. Postincident, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs mark contaminated areas and distribute information across the force for situational awareness. A-5. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff work with medical, public affairs, and information operations personnel to achieve the commander’s communication and other nonlethal objectives. One measure of success is how well CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs work together with these staff sections to develop and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information on the implications of WMD in the AO. This information flow, often disseminated through Solider and leader engagements, is used to shape and influence foreign populations by expressing information subjectively to influence perceptions and behaviors and to obtain compliance, noninterference, or other desired behavioral changes. MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER A-6. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage with respect to the enemy. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units and staffs support movement and maneuver warfighting functions through the Chemical Corps core functions. A-7. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear supports the movement and maneuver warfighting function through mobility and survivability. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance supports mobility operations by locating and marking contaminated areas and routes, allowing maneuver forces to avoid unnecessary exposure. Protection from CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards allows maneuver forces to fulfill their primary mission. Decontamination increases the ability of maneuver forces to withstand CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear conditions in the environment. A-8. Operating in close combat support to maneuver forces requires that CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance elements integrate and coordinate actions within the fires and maneuver plans. To give the command decision space, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance should not held in reserve—they should lead efforts to identify potential threats before they become hazards. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance capabilities are in limited supply, so commanders must weigh the costs and benefits of employing this limited asset in terms of the battlefield framework. A-9. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces prevent loss of combat power of movement and maneuver by assessing clean and dirty routes through the battlespace. The employment of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance elements reduces the risk of traveling through contaminated areas and spreading contamination. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces present the commander with options for understanding the hazard protection that is required and reducing the impact of protective equipment on the speed of movement. INTELLIGENCE A-10. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the OE. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces make critical contributions to this warfighting function through the core function of assessing CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards and the integrating activities of HAU. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff and planners provide a predictive and deductive analysis of enemy CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities to intelligence. A-11. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs contribute their knowledge and understanding of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards. They assist the G-2/S-2 in developing an understanding of enemy CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities, and work with the G-2/S-2 during planning to analyze potential threats and to evaluate how the enemy might use CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards to impact operations. They collaborate with the G-2/S-2 to provide estimates for the unconventional use of TIM to create hazards for U.S. forces. They advise commanders on the influences that terrain and weather have on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards. A-12. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance provides data that contributes information about CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards through their information collection efforts, which contributes to answering PIR. Specialized CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear assets may need to be available to collect the information needed to answer these requirements. Reconnaissance teams focus on the collection of tactical and technical information to support the BCTBCTBasic combat training freedom of maneuver and the survivability of friendly forces and facilities. A-13. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs at the division, corps, and theater army echelon and in-theater CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear headquarters determine CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-related intelligence requirements in a potential AO. They collect and analyze CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-related intelligence data in coordination with the respective G-2. A-14. The integration of intelligence into operations facilitates the understanding of OEs and assists in determining when and where to employ capabilities against adversaries and enemies. IPOE is an integrating process that results in the creation of intelligence products that are used during MDMP to aid in developing friendly COAs, depicting enemy COAs, and facilitating decision points for the commander. The G-2/S-2 and the intelligence staff lead the IPOE process. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear officer is the staff subject matter expert on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and assists the G-2/S-2 in determining the locations of threat CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear assets and potential areas of employment. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs contribute to the IPOE process by helping the G-2/S-2 staff understand enemy CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities, release authorities, terrain and weather effects on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear employment, enemy doctrine, and possible COAs. Conclusions reached during IPOE are critical to planning information collection and to planning targeting operations. A-15. The G-2/S-2 staff provides the most likely (and the most dangerous) COAs based on threat intent and capabilities. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs are involved in the IPOE process with intelligence sections. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff and the intelligence section provide input into enemy CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities, release authorities, terrain effects on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear use, enemy doctrine, and COAs. To gain full understanding of the operational variables needed to advise the G-2/S-2, the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff leverages information from CWMD working groups, information operations, civil-military operations, and civil affairs operations. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff also uses this information to advise on CCIR development and targeting. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff input (such as operational variables; areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events analysis; and sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations) provides a holistic approach to understanding a complex environment by analyzing the factors and systems. These intelligence products are then added to the existing targeting packets. The staff establishes an effective process that integrates, fuses, and continuously analyzes all sources of available threat information, identifying the full range of known or estimated terrorist threat capabilities, intentions, and current activities. FIRES A-16. The fires warfighting function is related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the threat to enable actions across the range of military operations. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities, when used to facilitate targeting, significantly contribute to this warfighting function. A-17. The integration of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and fires provides valuable information toward understanding the enemy’s WMD capabilities. Information from radar analysis aids in identifying missiles filled with chemical agents. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs provide advice to planning fires so as not to cause collateral damage that increases the hazard. A-18. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs provide their subject matter expertise for the development of targeting packets during the targeting process. When the potential to encounter WMD sites exists, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear subject matter experts provide information on the potential materials that may be found at a site, the threats posed by those materials, and the impact of those threats on future operations. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs advise the targeting team on the impacts of WMD employment and on targeted storage or production sites. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs prepare to provide data for the development of COA (assess COA feasibility, acceptability, and suitability). For an example of COA development, see figure A-1. A-19. The targeting cycle is an iterative process that is not time-constrained nor rigidly sequential. It supports both deliberate and dynamic targeting and provides the flexibility required when the concept of the operation, commander’s intent, or plans change. During the targeting cycle, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff provides data and makes recommendations for further actions. They continually refine and modify COAs with additional information collected from the running staff estimate. The updated running staff estimate prepares the way to start the next targeting cycle. Note. For more information on the targeting process, see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-90.40 and FM 3-60. Legend: CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear IED improvised explosive device TIM toxic industrial material WMD weapons of mass destruction SUSTAINMENT A-20. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. Continuing operations in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments creates a reliance on sustainment capabilities. The sustainment of protection capabilities (MOPP suits and filters for COLPRO), consumables for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detection, and identification equipment requires detailed planning. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations require intense water sustainment, resupply of decontaminants, vehicle replacement parts, and medical chemical defense material. A-21. The lowest echelons report readiness by using chemical defense equipment reports. These reports incorporate information obtained at in-processing, including individual protective equipment sizing, optical inserts, equipment readiness, manning, and training. The information is forwarded to the battalion level for consolidation and is submitted alongside the Defense Readiness Reporting System–Army. The Defense Readiness Reporting System–Army gets further consolidated at higher echelons. A-22. In addition, medical and sustainment unit's posture to support units conducting detailed troop decontamination, and mortuary affair units posture to process contaminated human remains through the mortuary affairs contaminated remains mitigation site. Planning between CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces and mortuary affairs units occurs to ensure the duplication of fatality collection points so that contaminated and uncontaminated fatalities are not mixed. The logistics ability to resupply impacts the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capability to protect or conduct decontamination to sustain in contaminated environments. Requirements for the repair and replacement of systems increase while executing large-scale combat operations. Note. For additional information on mortuary affairs planning, see JP 4-0. A-23. Sustainment operations are challenged in large-scale combat operations in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments due to the frequent cross contamination of main supply routes and alternate supply routes and to the enemy targeting of large sustainment nodes. It is critical to the success of sustainment operations that sustainment units frequently incorporate CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear conditions in mission essential tasks. A-24. The health service support mission integrates with CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear to support the treatment of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear casualties. Casualties that are contaminated can put entire health service support systems at risk if the proper precautions are not undertaken to prevent the contamination transfer. Planning between CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces and health service support occurs to ensure that contaminated casualties do not mix with uncontaminated casualties. PROTECTION A-25. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks, systems, and methods that prevent or mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve the fore, deny the enemy freedom of actions, and enable commanders to apply combat power (ADP 3-0). Conducting CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations is one of the key protection tasks. Tasks and systems of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units and staffs are linked to the protection warfighting function. For example, the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff at a brigade must be able to execute the task (which is to prepare the brigade for operations under CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear conditions) to ensure that the brigade combat power is not degraded while executing a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack. A-26. Antiterrorism and force protection is extremely important given the ever-present threat of terrorist attacks, insider threats, and the need to protect our forces from becoming targets of opportunity. As the force protection condition level changes, protection against CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards is accomplished through an interoperable system of surveillance, monitoring, and response. Therefore, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff must be familiar with DOD force protection condition levels prescribed in DODIDODIDepartment of the Defense Instruction O-2000.16, Volume 2 to ensure an appropriate measure of protection against CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear effects is addressed for each level. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff will serve as the subject matter expert for the commander to assess compliance, effectiveness, and adequacy of subordinate organizations and provide recommendations to enhance the overall antiterrorism/force protection program. A-27. Force health protection and CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff coordinate efforts to promote, improve, or conserve the health of Soldiers when the threat of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards exists. The functions of force health protection and CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear intersect in areas of preventative medicine, medical surveillance, veterinary services, and laboratory support. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and medical personnel combine their knowledge to provide commanders with medical advice on preventive measures that can be taken to reduce the risks of chemical, biological, or radiological hazards. The environmental and biological surveillance of outbreaks provides indicators of attack. Laboratory support for environmental samples taken by CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance teams requires prior planning. P ROTECTION D URING O FFENSIVE O PERATIONS A-28. While executing the four types of offensive operations (movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit), CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities assess threats and hazards, protect personnel and equipment in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments, and mitigate the potential for or effects of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. Commanders develop a scheme of protection for the transition of each phase of an operation or major activity. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting protection priorities between offensive, defensive, and stability tasks involves a transition. Transitions require planning and preparation well before they are executed so that forces can maintain the momentum and the tempo of operations. A-29. During the offense, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalions are assigned within the division rear support operations to provide the sustainment of subordinate units and the oversight of laboratory support, as required. Hazard response companies provide CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear route reconnaissance from the brigade rear operations to the forward edge of the battle operations. They provide thorough decontamination support, as required. Maneuver units use organic decontamination assets for operational decontamination, but they can request that CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units augment personnel to support them. Brigade organic CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance units conduct screening within the enemy disruption zone to provide early warning of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear at NAIs. A-30. Accomplishing movement and maneuver in a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment is difficult and, during some situations, the commander may direct movement and maneuver to avoid areas contaminated by CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear elements. Preserving combat power from the effects of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents is essential for the commander to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. P ROTECTION D URING D EFENSIVE O PERATIONS A-31. All units have an inherent responsibility to improve the survivability of their own fighting positions, bases, or base camps. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear personnel contribute to unit protection by performing vulnerability assessments. These assessments provide a list of recommended actions, ranging from CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection to contamination mitigation, for commanders to consider: • Vulnerability assessments. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear vulnerability assessments provide insight into the ability of the unit to mitigate likely CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events and prompt it to develop procedures, acquire equipment, and correct vulnerabilities. • COLPRO. In preparing for the defense, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs consider plans for the use of COLPRO. They consider the—  Limitations.  Resources required.  Necessary preparations. • Warning and reporting. Early warning of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards alerts that an attack has occurred so that the correct protective measures can be taken. • Decontamination. The preparation for operations in a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment requires planning for immediate or operational decontamination. Battle drills for the immediate measures to take after CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks occur increase the ability of the force to survive CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear conditions. T HREAT R EDUCTION A-32. Threat reduction cooperation includes those activities undertaken with the consent and cooperation of host-nation authorities in a permissive environment to enhance physical security and to reduce, dismantle, redirect, and/or improve the protection of a state’s existing WMD program, stockpiles, and capabilities. Tactical commanders provide threat reduction cooperation activities in support of CWMD objectives. The principal purpose of these activities is to deny rogue states and terrorists access to weapons, material, and expertise. Other states may need assistance with more discrete requirements to dismantle or destroy WMD in excess of defense needs; to comply with international treaty obligations (such as the Chemical Weapons Convention); or to impose export control, border control, law enforcement, and antismuggling capabilities. A-33. Threat reduction cooperation responds to opportunities that roll back or eliminate the WMD programs and capabilities of a state on cooperative terms—for example, Libya's decision to voluntarily dismantle its WMD programs. Another challenge is the safety and security of WMD inventories of friendly or nonhostile states. Existing security arrangements may be viewed as inadequate to prevent theft, sabotage, or accidental release. Threat reduction cooperation occurs in a permissive environment, and while they are not primarily a CCMD responsibility, combatant commands maintain visibility of these efforts to ensure that theater security cooperation plans and security measures are consistent with threat reduction initiatives. The following military tasks directly or indirectly support threat reduction cooperation in a permissive environment: • Providing security for current WMD, related materials, and systems from theft, sabotage, or unauthorized use. • Supporting efforts to ensure the safety of WMD and delivery systems from accidental or inadvertent release. • Maintaining situational awareness of WMD safety and security issues, and communicating concerns to senior leaders. • Integrating the commander’s safety/security concerns and threat prioritization with operational-level guidance. • Assigning responsibilities for threat reduction cooperation, and coordinating efforts with other commands. A-34. Tactical nonproliferation activities are not conducted sequentially and discretely in the prosecution of tactical-level military operations, but they occur independently or simultaneously in response to security cooperation, partner activities, and threat reduction cooperation. Tactical commanders stand prepared to provide short notice support to cooperative WMD threat reduction efforts. Supporting tasks that directly or indirectly relate to cooperative WMD threat reduction efforts include emplacing sensors and conducting monitoring, detection, and security operations.

CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response minimizes the effects of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, regardless of who is the designated lead, and includes responses to both deliberate and inadvertent CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. Response techniques generally fall within existing CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense doctrine. This appendix describes domestic and international responses. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear RESPONSE B-1. Regardless of the lead agency for a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response effort, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units and staffs provide support through the core functions of assessing threats and hazards, providing protection, and mitigating CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. Figure B-1 depicts the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response environments. Legend: CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear DOMESTIC RESPONSE B-2. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities manage the consequences of natural or man-made disasters, accidents, terrorist attacks, and incidents in the United States and its territories. Formerly called consequence management, the term CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response is characterized as a unique DOD response capability and responsibility. Domestic CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response is a type of support provided within the DSCA mission conducted by DOD forces to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs. The U.S. military conducts DSCA missions following a request for assistance from civil authorities. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE B-3. DOD-led CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response capabilities are primarily designed for use in support of military operations. The U.S. military maintains the majority of the capability to lead CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response operations and conducts it concurrently with military operations. The preponderance of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear doctrine provides information for conducting DOD-led CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE B-4. ICBRN-R is assistance provided by the U.S. government to an impacted nation to respond to the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident on foreign territory. The DOD contribution to international CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response includes immediate life-saving measures for affected host-nation populations, for U.S. citizens and the armed forces abroad, and for the friends and allies of the United States to minimize human casualties; and to provide temporary associated essential services. ICBRN-R applies to international incidents involving the deliberate or inadvertent release of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials, including TIMs. Vignette Domestic and international CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response discussions have moved to center stage nationally and internationally. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events have transitioned from a footnote in history to plausible, viable domestic and international threats. This transition has triggered— in the minds of senior leaders—the necessity and significance of interoperability among allies, interagency, and the joint force. Interoperability solidifies methodology, collaboration, and agreements to address CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events. Allies and coalition partners in the United States Central Command and United States Pacific Command areas of responsibility have precipitated a discussion with leaders in the U.S. military and Department of State due to threats, demonstrations, and/or use of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear material in the region. International diplomatic and military leaders intent on protecting their countries foster relationships with the United States and/or acquire a myriad of U.S. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities. Considerations must be accounted for with U.S. allies due to the variance of integration of U.S. military material and doctrine. Some components or capabilities may be interoperable, but not in all cases. Leaders of various homeland defense agencies, regions, states, the DOD, and the U.S. government have pursued variations of collaborative forums to share ideas, draft memorandums of understanding, and conduct training exercises to validate plans. Agencies acknowledge the significance of National Security Strategy directives, preparing in advance for potential threats, mitigating the pain and suffering of the American people during an event, and reducing vulnerabilities within U.S. borders. These efforts protect the Nation and maintain readiness of the emergency response support infrastructure. Each component of the joint force retains an internal CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capability. While executing protracted land operations, the Army provides the way ahead and synchronizes the efforts of the joint force.

CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff activities at all echelons are critical to developing and sharing HAU. Shared HAU allows commanders to make informed decisions, which increases survivability and the ability to exploit opportunities. This appendix provides information on how CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff contribute to the protection working group, other staff functions, basic functions of a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center, and CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reports. PROTECTION AND PROTECTION WORKING GROUP C-1. The protection working group brings together the representatives of all staff elements. The protection working group plans, coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes protection tasks, systems, and methods for each phase of an operation. Army structure provides protection cells at division and above. At division and higher, the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff integrates CWMD operations, defense, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response, WMD tactical disablement, and consolidation. The integration occurs more informally at brigade level and below, with the designation of a protection coordinator from among the brigade staff or as an integrating staff function assigned to a senior leader. P LANNING C-2. Initial assessment supports the prioritization of protection, threats and hazards, criticality, and vulnerability. The scheme of protection describes how protection tasks support the commander’s intent and concept of operations, and it uses the commander’s guidance to establish the priorities of support to units for each phase of the operation. C-3. The protection working group uses information derived from the commander’s guidance, scheme of maneuver, IPOE, targeting, risk management, critical and defended asset list (division and higher), and mission analysis to identify critical assets. Corps and division protection working groups coordinate closely with the staff to identify information and assets that need protection, and to apply appropriate protection and security measures consistent with their collective threat analysis. C-4. Commanders at all echelons maintain the effectiveness of their force in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments by establishing CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense plans that— • Estimate enemy intent, capabilities, and effects for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear. • Provide guidance to the force on necessary protective measures. • Apply the IPOE output to develop CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance plans to answer PIRs. • Establish the employment criteria for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units to counter CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. • Establish a sustainment plan for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations. • Establish CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear warning and reporting requirements. • Recommend minimum MOPP level and automatic masking thresholds. C-5. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense plans provide detail to subordinate units, including preattack preparations and postattack execution measures. Staffs at every echelon understand the mission, capabilities, and current situation to ensure that their assessments and recommendations provide meaningful operations for action by the commander. C-6. Conducting IPOE is fundamental to the understanding of enemy CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capability and intent. The IPOE process accounts for confirmed and plausible enemy capabilities, plans, and actions. When focused on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear effects, the information collection plan prioritizes CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance assets to areas of greatest importance. Overall, success in a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment depends on the effective integration of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear equipment; training; and CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear tactics, techniques, and procedures while preparing for and executing operations. P REPARATION C-7. The protection working group ensures that controls and risk reduction measures developed during planning have been implemented and are reflected in plans, standard operating procedures, and running estimates (see figure C-1), even as threat assessments are continuously updated. Legend: AO area of operation ASC area support company CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive Decon decontamination HDR heavy decontamination and reconnaissance HRCHRCU.S. Army Human Resources Command (both RA and USAR) hazard response company MOPP mission-oriented protective posture NUC nuclear Recon reconnaissance RFI request for information TIM toxic industrial material C-8. Commanders determine the optimal protection for their units by assessing the scheme of maneuver, enemy capabilities, and friendly vulnerabilities. They estimate the likely impact of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards and, based on the concept of operations, determine methods to mitigate the impact in order to accomplish the mission. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear vulnerability assessment considers the potential impact from a successful attack and the vulnerability of the friendly forces. The vulnerability assessment provides insight into the ability of the unit to mitigate risks. An accurate assessment of the preparedness of the unit to operate in a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment mitigates failures during execution. C-9. Implementing many CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defensive measures may slow tempo, degrade combat power, and increase logistics requirements. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear R&S consumes resources, especially time. Personnel in protective equipment find it more difficult to work and fight. However, countering the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat with such measures is an essential component of preserving the force, assuring mobility, and protecting the scheme of maneuver against CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-related vulnerabilities. C-10. Integrating CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defensive considerations into rehearsals is central to mitigating CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-specific risks. As units prepare to execute, they consider how operating in MOPP 4 may impact operations. Movement and maneuver and fire support are harder to synchronize, speed decreases significantly and leads to increased fuel usage, and many tactical tasks take longer to perform. Before initiating operations, commanders develop a thorough understanding of individual and collective proficiencies in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense tasks. If units are not trained in these tasks, it may be necessary to generate branch plans to mitigate deficiencies. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff and leaders at echelon that integrate CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense into combined arms and battle-drill rehearsals identify risks and the required actions to mitigate these risks in order to enable mission success under CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear conditions. C-11. Considerations for commanders preparing for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations include the— • Proficiency of individual Soldiers to perform mission essential tasks. • Proficiency of the unit in CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear collective skills and mission-essential tasks under CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear conditions. • Understanding by subordinate leaders of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards. • Ability of the unit to perform operations in MOPP 4. • Ability of the unit to continue the mission following a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack. E XECUTION C-12. Protection activities are continuous and enduring actions during execution. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear tasks and activities are conducted in all operations of offense, defense, and stability. Protection is deliberately applied as commanders integrate and synchronize tasks and systems that comprise the protection warfighting function. C-13. Units in MOPP 4 suffer degradation when executing tactical operations that can be mitigated through training. Due to reduced situational awareness, disorientation, and difficulty communicating, units may operate in closer formations and take easier routes when maneuvering. When Soldiers operate in MOPP 4 for extended periods of time, their mission performance degrades due to dehydration, fatigue, and the inability to eat and perform bodily functions. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reaction drills must be understood and rehearsed to be effective and prevent unnecessary casualties due to inadequate protection measures. C-14. Donning the protective mask, alerting others of a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard, reacting to a nuclear attack, and wearing individual protective equipment are basic tasks, yet units often fail to adequately train on them. Units training as they fight under CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear conditions enables operations and mission accomplishment. Units execute mission essential tasks at the platoon, company, and battalion levels. Soldiers become accustomed to communicating, managing work-rest cycles, and adjusting tempo in a contaminated environment. C-15. The proper employment of organic CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear decontamination and detection systems must be maximized at echelon. The modified table of organization and equipment authorizations include detection systems at the platoon level and above that are capable of identifying chemical warfare agents and radiation. Platoon level chemical detection equipment, employed by trained Soldiers, are valuable tools for early warnings and identification. Battalions organically possess systems to conduct operational decontamination for their subordinate units. They man and train an additional duty team to employ these resources to form an effective capability. Battalion decontamination equipment enables freedom of maneuver and protects the force. Battalions that have effective decontamination capability do not require external enablers, which enable rapid regeneration of combat power. C-16. Improving operational decontamination capability starts through the continual verification of the maintenance status of decontamination equipment and the implementation of a battalion training program for operational decontamination teams. Formalizing this requirement with emphasis from battalion leaders and identifying specific individuals to execute operational decontamination (usually from the headquarters and headquarters company) is important as it competes with other training requirements. A SSESSMENT C-17. Leaders and staffs conduct continuous assessments of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear activities throughout the operations process, regardless of the echelon of command, OE, or operational phase. Protection assessment is an essential, continuing activity that occurs throughout the operations process. Activities include maintaining situational understanding through monitoring and evaluating running estimates. The protection working group continually assesses threats to protection priorities. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CONTROL CENTER C-18. When operating in a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs at division and higher echelons organize a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center. This control center operates under the guidance and supervision of the protection functional cell but shares information and makes recommendations to the current operations, future operations, and plans integrating cells. C-19. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center enables the current operations cell by processing CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reports, providing CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear updates to the common operating picture, and recommending immediate response options based on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear support requests. C-20. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center enables the future operations cell by advising how the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment may impact operations. This includes recommendations for MOPP level, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance and surveillance asset utilization, preplanned decontamination points, and designated clean and dirty routes. C-21. Finally, the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center enables the plans integrating cell by identifying TIM sites and their potential impacts on missions, advising how the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environment may impact operations, and providing advice on CWMD mission planning. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear WARNING AND REPORTING SYSTEM C-22. Post CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident, one of the primary functions of the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center to receive and to process reports. Information from these reports helps create a shared understanding of an incident’s severity and helps build the COP. Capabilities for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reporting exist at all echelons down to the company level. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control centers are required to report CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear messages in all formats (voice and digital). The CBRNWRS allows commanders and CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs to determine required contamination avoidance measures and to plan operations accordingly. C-23. The reports are scaled (CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 1-6) in terms of information and time. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 1 observer’s initial report typically stops at the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 1 report is created by the initial observer of the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident and is sent through mission command nodes from the controlling unit headquarters to the division CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center. Figure C-2 depicts the routing of a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 1 report. Legend: CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CC chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center HQ headquarters C-24. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 2 evaluated data report is completed by the controlling headquarters. They distribute laterally to adjacent units and submit to the division CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center to prevent cross contamination while executing unit maneuver. Figure C-3 depicts the flow of the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 2 report. Legend: CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CC chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear control center HQ headquarters C-25. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 3 immediate warning of expected contamination or hazard area report is disseminated to all units that have been or may be affected. It is primarily prepared and distributed by the division CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center. The battalion and brigade are capable of preparing a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 3 report, but they may not have the time or capacity to do so. A subordinate unit may be ordered to move instead of receiving a full hazard area plot. For an example of the flow of a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 3 report, see figure C-4, page 90. Note. For more detail regarding reporting at higher echelons, see STANAG 2103 or TM 3-11.32. C-26. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 4 reconnaissance, monitoring, and survey report is sent to higher headquarters or the controlling CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff in accordance with mission orders for the R&S element. It is used to report specific contaminated areas from reconnaissance, survey, or monitoring data. The data from reconnaissance and surveillance is reported to the division CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center for processing, but the communications may route through the chain of command for situational understanding. Figure C-5, page 90, depicts the flow of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 4 reports. C-27. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 5 areas of actual contamination report is used for areas of actual contamination. It is prepared by the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center to be distributed to major subordinate commands and to corps and theater operations centers. Units use the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 5 report to report contaminated areas left behind by decontamination. Figure C-6, page 91, depicts the flow of the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 5 report. C-28. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 6 report is a narrative report that provides identified information about a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident. It consists of general text and is provided only on request for more detailed information. A CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 6 detailed information of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear report is prepared as needed, so is not depicted. Legend: CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CC chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear control center HQ headquarters Legend: CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CC chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear control center HQ headquarters Legend: CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CC chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear control center DCN decontamination HQ headquarters O operational CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear SUPPORT REQUESTS C-29. In preparation for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations or following a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident, the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control center may receive support requests. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear support center processes all support requests by collecting requests, evaluating available support resources, and recommending immediate response options to the commander or the current operations cell lead. To maximize support and minimize disruption to operations, the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear support center understands the overall mission plan, command relationships for task organized CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units, the units prioritized for support, and what support options are available from higher echelons. C-30. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear support requests prior to mission execution may request— • Task organization changes to attach CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces for a specific capability. • Task organization changes to detach CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear forces for capabilities no longer required. • CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear route or area reconnaissance to validate clean lines of communication or areas to occupy. C-31. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear support requests during mission execution may request— • Decontamination support to a non-CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear force following a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident. • CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear route or area reconnaissance post incident to map the extent of contamination. • Decontamination support to CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear force following a reconnaissance mission. • CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear assessment pre-planned or previously unknown CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear site of potential interest. • Site characterization or exploitation for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear site of potential interest. • A sample transload from CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance forces. C-32. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear support center CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staff ensures that their organizations understand reporting procedures and the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities available to request. Regular integration in training prior to combat is the best time to establish these procedures. Figure C-7, page 92, provides an example CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear support request that identifies basic information required from the requesting unit to provide accurate support. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear Support Request Line Contents Example LINE 1 - DTG Discovered: DTG 081200ZAPR2023 LINE 2-Grid Location of Hazard: GRID MGRS: 32UNB058640 LINE 3-Radio Freq/Call Sign: Freq: Call Sign FREQ: 234 Call Sign: Dragon LINE 4-Hazard Description: (select all that apply) A: Contamination Release B: Munitions C: Containers D: Facility E: Other (describe) C LINE 5-Capability Requested: D: Decontamination R: Reconnaissance & Surveillance O: Other (describe) R LINE 6-Hazards Present: (select all that apply) C: Chemical Warfare Agent B: Biological Warfare Agent R: Radiation N: Nuclear Device T: Toxic Industrial Materials U: Unknown O: Other (describe) T LINE 7-Assets Threatened: (select all that apply) A: US Military B: Non-US Military C: Civilians D: Infrastructure A LINE 8-Impact to Assets Threatened: A: Critical – Mass Casualty/Death B: Severe – Severe Symptoms of Exposure C: Minor – Minor or Possible Exposures D: None – No Observed Exposures C LINE 9-Security at Hazard Site: A: Will Remain on Site B: Will Not Remain on Site A Legend: CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear DTG date time group Freq frequency MGRS military grid reference system US United States

The Army trains in the manner it expects Soldiers to fight. The threat of conducting operations within CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments necessitates proficiency in basic CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear skills. This appendix outlines the tasks for individuals, units, and CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs. ESSENTIAL CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear PROFICIENCY SKILLS D-1. Officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian support personnel whose primary duties are concerned with the planning, coordination, supervision, and conduct of unit CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense activities require essential CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear proficiency skills. These personnel attend formal training that meets the requirements consistent with those duties. (Log into the Army Training Network to download collective and individual tasks.) These tasks have been developed and approved by the Army Training Development Capability and hosted on the Central Army Registry to develop unit training plans. Table D-1 identifies individual tasks for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense specialists, including unit CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense officers, enlisted personnel, and DOD civilians (such as private contractors) assigned on an additional-duty basis to form the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear control party. These personnel normally operate at the company, battery, or troop task unit, but they may be at a higher level, depending on the organizational structure.

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which FM 3-11 is the proponent manual are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

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