FM 3-13.4
Field Manual
No. 3-13.4
Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 26 February 2019

ARMY SUPPORT TO MILITARY DECEPTION

When properly resourced and integrated, deception has the potential to deter or induce actions that are favorable to the force and can increase the success of friendly activity. In the same way that operations transition from one phase to the next, deception plans integrated into each phase and through each transition will strengthen the ability of commanders to retain initiative throughout the operation. Successfully planned deceptions give commanders the ability to act faster than the enemy can make decisions, creating positions of relative advantage. Deception, as part of a broader strategy, is present in military case studies. While deception has its roots in the earliest military strategies, the modern day practical study of deception relies largely on case studies from World War I to present day. The availability of actual participants for interviews combined with detailed after action review reporting provides an in-depth understanding of deception tactics and techniques. Deception can play a pivotal role in achieving the commander’s objectives and significantly reduce risk. Deception can conceal, protect, reinforce, amplify, minimize, distort, or otherwise misrepresent friendly technical and operational capabilities, intentions, operations, and associated activities. Deception can be a critical enabler to achieving operational surprise and maintaining the initiative during large-scale combat operations in highly contested, lethal environments. This publication is the proponent for the new Army term, tactical deception. This page intentionally left blank.

OVERVIEW OF ARMY MILITARY DECEPTION PLANNING 1-1. Military deception is actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP 3-13.4). Deception applies to all levels of warfare, across the range of military operations, and is conducted during all phases of military operations. When properly integrated with operations security (OPSECOPSECOperational Security) and other information-related capabilities (IRCs), deception can be a decisive tool in altering how the enemy views, analyzes, decides, and acts in response to friendly military operations. 1-2. Deception is a commander-driven activity that seeks to establish conditions favorable for the commander to achieve objectives. It is both a process and a capability. As a process, deception employs an analytic method to systematically, deliberately, and cognitively target individual decision makers. The objective is to elicit specific action (or inaction) from the enemy. As a capability, deception is useful to a commander when integrated early in the planning process as a component of an operation focused on causing an enemy to act or react in a desired manner. Deception greatly enhances the element of surprise. Deception aligns with surprise and the displacement of critical threat capabilities away from the friendly point of action. Due to the potentially sensitive nature of deception activities and selected means, planners must implement appropriate security and classification measures to properly safeguard deception tactics, techniques, and procedures. FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY DECEPTION 1-3. Planners must have a thorough understanding of the functions and the scope of what deception can and cannot accomplish. A deception plan serves as a part of the overall mission. Every deception plan must clearly indicate how it supports the commander’s objectives. The functions of deception include, but are not limited to—  Causing delay and surprise through ambiguity, confusion, or misunderstanding.  Causing the enemy to misallocate personnel, fiscal, and materiel resources.  Causing the enemy to reveal strengths, weaknesses, dispositions, and intentions.  Causing the enemy to waste combat power and resources with inappropriate or delayed actions. CATEGORIES OF DECEPTION 1-4. Deception activities support objectives detailed in concept plans, operation plans (OPLANs), and operation orders (OPORDs) associated with approved military operations or activities. Deception applies during any phase of military operations to establish conditions to accomplish the commander’s intent. The Army echelon that plans a deception activity often determines its type. The levels of war define and clarify the relationship between strategic and tactical actions. The levels have no finite limits or boundaries. They correlate to specific authorities, levels of responsibility, and planning. The levels help organize thought and approaches to a problem. Decisions at one level always affect other levels. Table 1-1 shows the three types of deception.

PREPLANNING 2-1. The complexity and sensitivity of deception requires detailed planning that begins with preplanning. MDOs have three preplanning considerations: capability development, planning guidance, and mission analysis. A successful deception plan incorporates preplanning considerations as well as flexibility to lessen the risk of failure. When preplanning, MDOs create a baseline analysis, prepare deception planning guidance, and complete mission analysis. B ASELINE A NALYSIS 2-2. Baseline analysis is preplanning that ensures the organization has the requisite staff, methods, and tools to plan deception. Baseline analysis entails acquiring basic information on available deception means. This includes information on friendly doctrine and tactics as well as technical characteristics of employed combat systems. It also includes basic data on friendly intelligence and counterintelligence resources and operations. D ECEPTION P LANNING G UIDANCE 2-3. When preplanning, MDOs consider how to develop deception activities within the framework of the commander’s intent and planned operations. They consider the commander’s initial deception guidance that often arrives as a separate written or verbal deception-planning directive. Deception planning efforts must be synchronized and integrated with traditional unit planning efforts at all times. The importance of the relationship between the MDO and the G-5 cannot be overstated. Early in mission analysis, MDOs begin to determine a potential deception goal. Commanders verbalize the deception goal as specific contributions to mission accomplishment (see paragraph 1-9). 2-4. During mission analysis, planners identify potential deception objectives that enable forces to reach the deception goal. The deception objective is a concise statement of how the commander plans the enemy to act or not act (see paragraph 1-10). This objective provides the MDO with a clear aim. The objective is usually stated in a positive result, such as “deception will cause the enemy to delay commitment of reserve forces in the rear.” Having decided the deception objective, the planners formulate a detailed plan. 2-5. Sometimes the commander’s initial guidance contains no specific guidance for deception planning to occur. In that case, the MDO uses the commander’s intent informed by the results of mission analysis to evaluate whether deception can or should play a role in the overall operation. That role, when identified, is then stated as a proposed deception goal and its associated deception objectives. Sometimes multiple deception goals exist based on such considerations as operational phasing, duration, or complexity. 2-6. Deception is never conducted as an end in itself; it must support real plans, operations, and objectives. Correspondingly, the success of an operation cannot be contingent on the success of a deception. Policy prohibits deception from deliberately targeting anyone outside the enemy military decision-making process without further legal review (see paragraph 2-89 for more on legal considerations). M ISSION A NALYSIS 2-7. All military planning includes mission analysis. Mission analysis involves gathering, analyzing, and synthesizing information to get oriented on current conditions of an operational environment. MDOs in conjunction with staff planning efforts conduct mission analysis to better understand the situation and problem and to identify what deception the unit can accomplish, when and where it should be done, and why to do it—the purpose of the deception operation. Deception mission analysis begins before the Army tactical deception planning process and is always properly informed by current operations and planning efforts. 2-8. The deception goal and its associated deception objectives are key outputs of deception mission analysis, and the foundation for subsequent deception planning. They provide the commander and MDOs with a solid understanding of how the deception supports the overall operation and establishes the conceptual framework for the deception plan. An effective deception does not have to be elaborate or complex. Simplicity is often preferred. 2-9. MDOs need to participate in and have their efforts informed by conventional planning efforts. Conventional and deception planning horizons occur simultaneously in parallel. During mission analysis, the MDO begins with analyzing and assessing an operational environment and information environment. Deception may be a feasible option, if appropriate to the mission, and if there is a possibility of success. Issues that planners consider when determining if deception is a viable COA include—  Availability of assets.  Understanding any potential deception targets.  Suitability.  Time.  Risk. Availability of Assets 2-10. MDOs consider the availability of assets to determine if sufficient assets exist to support both the operation and the deception. There are few assets specifically designed and designated for deception. This means plans may require shifting assets from supporting the operation to the deception plan. Commanders consider the risks to ascertain that shifting assets to support deception does not adversely affect the operation or prevent mission success. Resource development includes collecting potential target data sources, identifying potential conduit systems, and cataloging potential deception means. Resource development also includes the collection of essential foreign and friendly situation and background information needed to initially to organize operations and assess general capabilities. Understanding the Deception Target 2-11. MDOs consider the potential deception target to determine if sufficient information exists on how the target acquires information and makes decisions, what knowledge the target has of the situation, and how the target views the friendly force. Planners also determine if sufficient information exists to reveal the biases, beliefs, and predispositions of the deception target. If necessary, the staff can make assumptions about the deception target, but it must avoid mirror imaging, which is the tendency to assume a person sees the world and makes decisions in a manner similar to oneself. It is for this reason that MDOs rely heavily on human factors analysis (see paragraph 2-37). Suitability 2-12. MDOs consider suitability. Some missions are better suited to deception than others are. When a unit has the initiative and has some control over the area of operations, then deception is more suitable. In some situations, specific personnel or organizations are better suited to execute deception operations than others are. Deception planners determine if conditions are appropriate to conduct deception and make a recommendation to commander. The decision ultimately resides with the commander. Conditions in which deception are appropriate include the following:  The enemy has an advantage that cannot be overcome without using deception, for example, advantageous force strength, capability, agility, or situational awareness.  The enemy has known preconceptions that can be exploited.  The enemy has known flaws in its decision-making process.  The enemy is under pressure to act.  The enemy is susceptible to suggestion.  Deception will enhance OPSECOPSECOperational Security.  Deception will enhance the effectiveness and likelihood of success of a conventional plan. Time 2-13. MDOs consider time available. Time is a key element to consider when developing the deception story. MDOs determine how much time they have to present the deception story and to estimate how much time the deception target will use make a decision and direct the desired action. The available time may determine the scope and depth of the story. MDOs carefully time deception events to synchronize them with the approved plan. Risk 2-14. An important planning consideration is the mitigation of identified risk. Risk is a key factor that must be reexamined during all phases of deception planning and execution (see paragraph 2-126). The MDO must evaluate any substantial risk which may include—  Risk of deception failure.  Risk of compromise.  Risks associated with a successful deception.  Exposure of means or feedback channels. Information Environment Analysis 2-15. An information environment analysis is an extension of mission analysis. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13). The information environment is a subset of an operational environment. The MDO, working with IO planners, must identify the key aspects of the information environment relevant to the deception target and decision making. To influence the behavior of the deception target, the planner must understand how the target views the environment, processes information, and makes decisions. This understanding includes an analysis of the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure variables of the target’s environment. Deception Running Estimate 2-16. Once created, a mission analysis provides information that helps produce a deception running estimate. The deception running estimate is a specialized product derived from the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and from responses to situation-specific RFIs submitted by MDOs. Most information in the estimate originates from mission analysis, but much of the detail required is unique to deception. MDOs collaborate with intelligence analysts to build the running estimate. MDOs work with the G-2 to obtain information critical to effective deception planning. This information forms the basis of the deception running estimate that feeds the development of a viable deception concept. 2-17. The deception running estimate identifies deception opportunities, detects information and capability requirements, and recommends a feasible deception goal and its objectives. The MDO presents this estimate during the mission analysis briefing. The estimate considers current capabilities based on enemy susceptibilities, preconceptions, and biases; available time; and available deception means. A key outcome of the running estimate is the determination of whether or not there is a viable deception opportunity. 2-18. Preparing the deception estimate involves developing alternative approaches to reaching the deception goal. It first determines the objective of the deception and then the desired perceptions that likely lead to that objective. Developing the estimate is a critical process to prepare for a deception operation. Depending on the nature of the commander’s guidance, the deception estimate may be integrated in the operation’s running estimate, may stand alone, or may not be appropriate at that time. In the latter case, the role of deception is limited to OPSECOPSECOperational Security activities or simply to supporting one or another component of the operation. 2-19. The deception running estimate is a living product. Planners refine it as additional information and intelligence become available, or as conditions evolve and change within an operational environment and information environment. During the initial planning, MDOs and intelligence analysts often make assumptions that later require validation to continue with planning. Planners track these assumptions, align them with an open RFI, and consider them during risk analysis. During the unit’s COA analysis (war gaming), planners help refine the estimate and may add support to key planning assumptions about probable enemy responses to planned friendly activity. The greater the number of assumptions underpinning a deception plan, the higher the risk that one or more assumptions will prove false and threaten the plan’s success. 2-20. The deception running estimate identifies key enemy decision makers and develops individual or group profiles. The analysis of the enemy military decision-making structure includes identifying key decision makers who exercise some level of direct control over the enemy capabilities. These individuals or groups are potential deception targets. As such, the MDO works with the G-2 to collect as much available information relating to their backgrounds, psychological profiles, personal relationships, key influencers, known biases, predispositions or vulnerabilities, current perceptions, and previous behavior in similar circumstances. With that information, the planner identifies the enemy’s most probable and most dangerous COAs related to the deception goal. 2-21. The MDO briefs the initial running estimate to the commander in private during mission analysis to seek approval of the deception goal and its objectives, receive refined commander’s planning guidance for deception, and ensure nesting within the supported plan. The commander may provide additional guidance concerning specific deception COAs the staff should address when preparing estimates. Once approved, the deception goal and its objectives become the focus for all subsequent deception planning. THE ARMY TACTICAL DECEPTION PLANNING PROCESS 2-22. The Army tactical deception planning process nests in the steps of the Army’s military decisionmaking process (known as MDMP). The deception plan supports the OPLAN. Planners nest and integrate the deception plan with the OPLAN to achieve the deception’s desired effect. A successful deception plan unfolds logically and realistically. Deception planning is an iterative process that requires continual reexamination of its goals, objectives, targets, and means. The early integration of deception in the planning cycle ensures optimum application of resources and maximizes the potential for overall success. Table 2-1 shows the Army tactical deception planning process nesting in the military decisionmaking process. Step 7—Develop Operations Security and Other Protection Measures 2-67. OPSECOPSECOperational Security and other protection measures are employed with deception to ensure that only the desired deception events reach the enemy and that actions in support of operations are concealed. Without OPSECOPSECOperational Security, the enemy may observe preparations for the supported operation. Deception activities may not convince the enemy to believe the deception story if the enemy observes preparations. Equally important is risk assessment. All deception involves risk and cost. Commanders base the decision to conduct a deception on a deliberate assessment that weighs costs (including risk) against benefits. MDOs can mitigate risk by ensuring the success of the supported operation does not hinge upon the success of the deception, anticipating conditions that could compromise the deception, and developing responses in the event of unintended effects. Step 8—Develop Feedback Criteria 2-68. Identifying (or in some cases, establishing) channels for feedback is a continuous and integral part of deception planning. Feedback is information that reveals how the target or information systems respond to the deception. The essence of feedback planning is expressed in three steps. The MDO first envisions the target’s response to each desired perception or observable. Then the MDO analyzes the target’s actions associated with the response (response indicators) that friendly resources can detect. Lastly, the MDO coordinates with or tasks appropriate friendly resources for reports on those indicators within a given period. 2-69. Although a high level of feedback is a desirable planning goal, staffs do not need dedicated feedback mechanisms for every perception or observable. Carefully designed feedback at key times during the deception can often provide information on the enemy’s reaction to multiple observables. Additionally, friendly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts often collects response indicators related to enemy operations as a part of unit intelligence collection. Where feedback relies on such information, early coordination with the intelligence officer’s collection plan can help eliminate redundant feedback mechanisms and reduce unnecessary tasking. 2-70. Feedback demonstrates that the deception story is being assembled by the targeted decision maker in the desired manner. An effective MDO plans and incorporates these feedback mechanisms into the deception event schedule to gather necessary information at critical times in the deception story’s development. Feedback enables the commander to determine whether to continue the deception story, adjust the deception events, or terminate the deception. These determinations depend on the target’s reaction to the deception events conducted by friendly forces. Feedback-related tasks and activities are also noted in the deception event schedule. Chapter 4 discusses feedback in detail. Step 9—Develop a Termination Plan 2-71. Deception does not just simply end. A commander-approved termination plan guides a coherent, structured, and implementable exit strategy. This is important because the commander terminates a deception after it meets its termination criteria, which may include success, failure, compromise, or a combination of the three. Like the deception story, the deception target must also believe the exit strategy and friendly operational profiles. Additionally, the termination plan keeps the target unaware of the deception means, techniques, and events. Otherwise, the next deception operation may not have the desired effect if the enemy gained insights into friendly tactics, techniques, and procedures. Various circumstances might create a requirement to terminate the deception completely or in part. 2-72. Termination planning ensures the controlled, orderly cessation of planned deception events, protects means and resources, and sets the parameters for any release of information relating to the deception. Planning the termination of a deception operation requires the same care and attention to details that went into planning the deception’s execution. Ideally, termination planning includes contingencies for unforeseen events such as the deception’s premature compromise. In the event of compromise, termination planning for deception includes a notification to rapidly inform forces that may be affected. The termination concept provides initial planning considerations to implement and should include the following:  A brief description of each termination scenario circumstance included in the plan.  Steps for initiating termination operations in each scenario circumstance included in the plan.  The identification of the first commander who has termination authority. 2-73. The MDO anticipates that, as the plan proceeds in execution, circumstances of termination will change. A termination concept entirely suited to the initial set of conditions often differs from what is required as the deception matures. The termination concept identifies the timing to release information about the deception. It may provide a cover story should questions arise about the role of deception in a particular operation. Controlling the exposure of the existence of a deception operation or of elements of a deception may be difficult because of the nature of the operation. A termination concept should also include classification and dissemination instructions for deception-related information. 2-74. Potential termination scenarios are illustrated in table 2-2 on page 2-14.

PREPARATION 3-1. During preparation, planners take every opportunity to refine the deception plan based on updated intelligence and friendly information. Deception plans are not static and are continually adjusted. As assumptions prove valid or invalid, staffs confirm enemy perceptions, or the status of friendly units change, the MDO adjusts the deception for the commander or recommends aborting it if the deception can no longer significantly influence the situation and achieve the deception goal. As part of the plan, OPSECOPSECOperational Security activities also continue during preparation for the deception. OPSECOPSECOperational Security is a dynamic effort that anticipates and reacts to enemy collection efforts. 3-2. MDOs coordinate the deception plan with every other aspect of the OPLAN. This coordination still occurs with those only who have a need to know. The complexity of deception, its secrecy, and its many witting and unwitting links within the staff and across operational forces requires careful coordination of the deception plan with overall planning. Coordination also occurs with specific staff entities. Close coordination with operations and intelligence planners is driven by the essential nature of their contribution to the deception planning process, but most other elements of the staff have a less direct relationship. 3-3. During deception planning, OPSECOPSECOperational Security is a necessary condition and a critical planning requirement. The planning process itself must be secure, with no inadvertent disclosures due to carelessness in staff work or coordination. At the same time, planning must ensure that security is built into and maintained throughout the deception operation. This security reduces the risk of compromise and protects activities and units involved in the deception, particularly unwitting participants. EXECUTION 3-4. The deception plan forms the basis for execution, but execution may occur in conditions more dynamic than anticipated. Consequently, the deception plan is subject to continual reassessment and refinement. By its nature, little flexibility exists in the concept of operations for deception. Successful monitoring involves knowing precisely when to take the next step in conveying the deception story. MDOs often identify specific operational feedback events identified in the plan to provide these cues. IO officers are critical in assessing and deciding the timing, frequency, and means through which an observable is transmitted to achieve the desired cognitive effect on the deception target. D ECEPTION E XECUTION 3-5. Deception execution includes the following activities:  Adjust the deception plan as necessary for changed conditions.  Sustain deception synchronization with an approved COA and OPSECOPSECOperational Security plan.  Sustain internal deception synchronization between the planning team and commander.  Sustain intelligence collection during deception execution.  Monitor, assess, and mitigate risk.  Keep the commander informed.  Maintain strict security and access controls throughout. Adjust the Deception Plan as Necessary for Changed Conditions 3-6. The cycle begins with a review of the plan. In this step, the MDO analyzes the situation and operational environment, and reviews anticipated conditions and planning assumptions against which the plan was developed. Existing RFIs are reemphasized, and new RFIs are developed to address shortfalls in necessary intelligence. 3-7. During this step, the MDO reviews and identifies any changes to the enemy situation. Changes can include—  Adjustments to the enemy decision-making process or key military decision makers.  Changes in enemy force structure, capabilities, disposition, and intelligence collection efforts (conduits or information pathways) to best facilitate the effective delivery of the deception story.  Changes in third-party intelligence support.  Potential new sources of open-source intelligence based on rapidly evolving social media or other networks. 3-8. The MDO also reviews and identifies changes to the friendly plan. Changes can include—  Revised strategic or commander’s guidance.  Changes to allocated forces.  Changes to relationships with multinational partners.  Changes to basing or adjustments to operational phasing or timing. The MDO coordinates with the G-3 on initial deception and operations execution timing to ensure a synchronous, supporting relationship exists that will aid the deception, the operation, or both. 3-9. Once the MDO has updated knowledge of the enemy and friendly situations, all key elements of the plan—from the deception goal and objectives through the final deception event schedule—are validated or adjusted as required. While this is the first step in deception execution, this process of analysis and adjustment continues as conditions evolve and change over the course of mission execution. Sustain Deception Synchronization with the OPSECOPSECOperational Security Plan 3-10. The MDO continuously coordinates vertically and horizontally with commanders and staffs to synchronize real-world operations and deception operations. This coordination helps portray a credible, believable, and realistic deception. Changes to any operational aspect—such as presence, capability, strength, intent, readiness, future location, timing, or method of planned friendly operations—require accountability in the scheduled execution of deception activities. Such accountability requires the MDO to maintain situational awareness, participate in meetings that address targeting and assessments, and provide routine updates and operational analysis to the commander. The MDO works with the OPSECOPSECOperational Security planner to monitor critical information and indicators throughout the operations as well as recommend changes to DISO plans. 3-11. MDOs have a special responsibility to keep deception and OPSECOPSECOperational Security closely synchronized. Both deception and OPSECOPSECOperational Security work closely together in the holistic portrayal of friendly activities. Deception activities often receive support from focused OPSECOPSECOperational Security measures and countermeasures that protect their existence. This support includes close cooperation in the targeting or exploitation of enemy conduits so they are either neutralized or available as required to create the desired OPSECOPSECOperational Security and deception effects. Sustain Internal Deception Synchronization Between the Planning Team and Commander 3-12. Deception executions, while planned in detail, do not remain static activities on an access-controlled deception event schedule or operational-level synch matrix. The MDO maintains constant communication with internal components, capability owners, and other resource providers tasked to execute or support each event so the portrayal of the deception story proceeds as planned. This includes operational-level tasks— such as synchronizing different deception lines of effort and balancing or shifting lines of effort as appropriate—to sustain the desired story progression. Based on feedback, the MDO may adjust, repeat, postpone, or cancel some planned executions or event series. Sustain Intelligence Collection during Deception Execution 3-13. Working with the G-2 collection manager enables internal synchronization of the deception plan. This helps ensure information collection assets are in position to collect MOPs and monitor MOEs and indicators as outlined in the plan. This synchronization also informs the commander on its status, current levels of success, and revised risk. During combat operations in particular, the MDO actively monitors intelligence collection. Monitor and Assess for Compromise and Counterdeception 3-14. Using the target feedback provided by MOEs collection, in conjunction with the assessment process, the MDO determines the current progression and success of the deception plan. Specially trained intelligence analysts, supported by MDOs, remain alert for indicators of compromised components of a deception story. Compromise includes the identification of any possible enemy counterdeception efforts. Deception compromise, when detected, may lead to one or more termination or exploitation scenarios. Keep the Commander Informed 3-15. The status of the deception operation is part of the commander’s routine battlefield update and assessment processes. As the principal authority for the execution of the plan, the commander has responsibility for any decision to alter, terminate, or change the deception or primary COA to exploit changing conditions. Deception also factors largely in the overall computation of operational risk. Increased risk might generate a requirement for adjustment to the plan in other areas. Maintain Strict Security and Access Controls Throughout 3-16. Effective forces practice tight security throughout execution to protect the deception plan and its execution. While commanders make many decisions in the planning process on a need to know basis, situations can arise that require external expertise or input, such as legal and policy interpretations. The commander decides who has a need to know and applies appropriate controls to limit the compromise of any deception. To decide, the commander, informed by the MDO, balances mission against prudent risk to determine security limits and parameters. In the intense and fluid activity of managing complex military operations, it becomes even more critical for all involved personnel to apply appropriate classification, handling, and access controls on a daily basis. Staffs should immediately report any OPSECOPSECOperational Security or other security violations of the deception plan at any level (strategic, operational, or tactical) to the MDO and OPSECOPSECOperational Security planner. They will evaluate the violation for potential impact. M ANAGING THE E XECUTION OF THE D ECEPTION P LAN 3-17. Once the commander orders the execution of the deception, staffs begin implementing the plan in a dynamic environment. The implementing order can require immediate execution, or it may provide an effective start date in coordination with other operations or events. 3-18. The MDO is the controlling planner for its execution. Continuity of key personnel as the deception moves from a plan to an actual operation ensures that the people executing the deception understand all its conceptual nuances, the inherent risks, and the underlying intentions and techniques behind each planned deception event. The controlling planner oversees the implementation of the specific deception events in accordance with the deception event schedule and continuously monitors the deception operation as part of the developing situation, evaluating the deception at each stage. The planner responds to developments with recommendations as to how the operation should proceed. As a result of the recommendations on the actual situation, the commander can add, delete, or modify scheduled deception events. 3-19. Because of the extreme sensitivity of deception plans, if the plan requires more than minor adjustments, the original approving authority must approve the revised plan before execution begins. Changes that impact the deception goal, the deception objective, or the commander’s guidance should not be considered as minor. Before initiating the plan, planners refer any requirements for plan changes that affect earlier assessments of the probability of deception success or alter the degree of risk initially associated with the operation to the commander. However, planners can consider minor changes that involve the timing or sequence of individual deception events based on actual operational conditions so long as they do not significantly alter the basic operational flow of the deception. 3-20. Once planners review and validate the deception event schedule and supporting worksheets, the controlling planner synchronizes the implementation of the plan. During implementation, participating units and resources normally receive tasks through traditional command operational and intelligence tasking channels. Occasionally, the controlling planner may directly engage participants outside the normal tasking channels when special communications channels are required to protect sensitive means and sources that reside outside normal command channels. 3-21. The controlling planner monitors feedback indicators at each stage and regulates the scheduling and intensity of deception operations. At times, the controlling planner may need to delay or accelerate planned deception events or, if the situation requires, add measures to achieve desired enemy perceptions in the time indicated by the commander’s overall plan. The controlling planner informs the commander and the chief of operations of the status of all synchronization requirements associated with the execution of the deception. An inability to execute the deception with timing needs of other operations may prompt termination of a deception operation. Monitoring the Deception Operation 3-22. As with most plans, the quality of a deception plan directly relates to the validity of assumptions concerning the situation at the start of the operation. Validating such assumptions with current information is essential to any monitoring activity. Before starting the operation, staffs continually monitor the general situation and submit RFIs to confirm or deny assumptions concerning the conditions under which forces initiate the deception operation. Such pre-operational monitoring may prompt the start time for execution. 3-23. Four types of monitoring activities occurs for a deception operation (see figure 3-1). Monitoring the developing situation to ensure that the deception concept continues to correspond to actual conditions is the first activity. A second type of monitoring involves observing the effects of the deception operation at each stage of execution. This monitoring consists of obtaining the necessary feedback to trace the progress of the deception in line with the deception event and execution schedule. The third type of monitoring provides the means for assessing the need to terminate the deception operation for reasons other than mission accomplishment. The fourth type of monitoring activity detects and traces unintended consequences of the deception operation. Such consequences can be positive or negative and may involve either the deception itself or other operations. MDOs may use data on unintentional effects to adjust the deception or take advantage of new opportunities.  Monitor developing situation  Observe the effects  Provide assessment means  Detect and trace consequences 3-24. To achieve the level of synchronized activity that the deception operation demands, the controlling planner monitors the general military situation together with the systematic execution of the deception. The controlling planner also understands and evaluates the status of the deception operation in the full context of the overall operation as well as how deception activities are proceeding. At the same time, MDOs keep higher command echelons that direct and coordinate theater-wide and strategic deception operations informed regarding the execution of the command’s deception. Controlling the Deception Operation 3-25. Although monitoring requirements are extensive, control remains the central issue of execution. Control involves making decisions to conduct each activity as specified by the plan or to change the plan to align it to changes in the situation or the target’s responses. Terminating the deception is the final control action in the execution of the operation. 3-26. Control consists of the series of implementing decisions and actions undertaken during the course of a deception operation. MDOs project many of these activities during the planning stage as a part of the natural progression of events envisioned in the deception event and execution schedule. Other decisions are dictated by the course of events revealed during monitoring. Centralized control over deception activities is imperative to ensure synchronous operations and the integration of deception in a manner that does not conflict with other operations. This principle requires close coordination among deception support elements operating at various levels of command. Authority to implement changes to various aspects of the deception operation must be specified in the deception plan. 3-27. Throughout the execution of the deception plan, the controlling planner remains prepared to support the commander with sound recommendations when operations reach decision points. If the deception plan has a progression of specific phases, with each new phase contingent on the success of the preceding phase, and the commander’s approval is required for the execution of each phase, then the commander will need to know the specific status of the deception operation at each approval phase. If it becomes apparent that the deception story is not being successfully transmitted, the deception story is not eliciting the desired action from the target, or the deception is not synched with larger operational requirements, then the controlling planner may recommend to the commander to adjust the operation to fit alternative opportunities or to terminate it. If the assessed operational risk increases during the execution, the controlling planner addresses this change with the commander and provides a recommendation as to how the operation should proceed. T ERMINATING M ILITARY D ECEPTION O PERATIONS 3-28. The termination of a deception is concerned with ending the deception in a way that protects both the short-and long-term interests of the command. Planners rarely know in advance the exact circumstances that will require termination of a deception plan. Consequently, termination preparations are a continuous process that span the planning and execution of the deception. When the commander decides to terminate, the termination concept that planners developed and refined during previous phases becomes the basis for a deliberate series of termination actions. These actions are designed to advantageously end the operation while protecting employed means and techniques. 3-29. The actions involved in termination include—  The organized cessation of deception activities.  The protected withdrawal of deception means.  After action assessments and reports. All three actions of termination occur whether or not the operation achieves its objective and whether or not the deception plan remains concealed. In developing the deception plan, planners determine conditions and provisions for the termination of the operation. The termination concept outlines alternative reasons and methods for terminating the operation, such as indications that the deception objective will not be reached or operational situations indicating that the goal is no longer valid. Termination planning anticipates the commander’s need to avoid the compromise of deception means and methods, and it anticipates the levels of risk acceptable to sources and means before recommending termination. 3-30. When the commander orders termination, the selected termination concept becomes the basis for final termination actions. These actions conclude the operation in line with the deception events that have been executed, the assessed state of awareness of the target, and the commander’s specific termination objectives at the time. Termination of a deception also encompasses evaluation and reporting. After action assessment should be conducted by the MDO. This assessment provides the commander with an objective basis for determining the degree of mission success and for improving future deception plans. Because important information on various elements of the deception may continue to become available over a long time, a series of interim after action reports may be required before making a final assessment. The after action report provides a comprehensive overview of the deception as it was planned to work and actually conducted. This page intentionally left blank.

ASSESSMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 4-1. One primary responsibility of the MDO involves assessing the effectiveness of deception and DISO in achieving supported command objectives. Assessment is the continuous monitoring—throughout planning, preparation, and execution—and evaluation of the current situation to measure the overall effectiveness of the operation. An essential and resource-intensive aspect of any successful deception, MDOs consider assessment from the initiation of planning. Planners avoid developing deception objectives that cannot be associated with a progressive and observable enemy response into a more detailed deception concept or subsequent execution. Deception is assessed in the same manner as other operations: using MOPs to determine if a deception event was executed according to plan and using MOEs to determine if the event created the desired impact or effect. In deception, MOPs involve everything up to and including delivery of the observable (filtered or unfiltered) to the deception target. 4-2. Accurately assessing MOEs for deception is complicated by the fact that MDOs need to measure desired changes in perception, as well as the action or inaction manifested by their success. MDOs develop MOEs that measure effectiveness, efficiency, and adaptability using the following guide:  Appropriate : MOEs should correlate to the target’s objectives.  Mission-related : MOEs must correlate to the mission.  Measurable : Quantitative MOEs reflect reality more accurately than qualitative MOEs, and hence, are generally the measure of choice when the situation permits their use.  Useful : MOEs should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable the commander to immediately and effectively respond at decision points identified in the deception plan. 4-3. Because of this complexity, a detailed assessment plan accompanies each planned deception event. A detailed assessment plan includes MOPs, MOEs, and coordination with the G-2 for information collection assets to collect and report indicators in real time. Every assessment plan begins with a baseline—the point from which assessments are measured. Planners can generate a baseline from an initial survey, poll, or estimate or establish a baseline from a specific time or event. 4-4. The MDO also has responsibility for continually reassessing the deception objective, target, story, and events to ensure they are still important to the achievement of the mission objectives. Monitoring activities include, but are not limited to—  Monitoring and evaluating the deception to ensure it continues to support operations.  Evaluating how the target is acting or not acting in response to the deception story.  Monitoring for unintended consequences resulting from the deception.  Determining when termination criteria are met. 4-5. Planners consider how to assess a deception plan at the start of the planning process. A plan to assess a deception informs the commander if the operation is being executed as planned and achieving the desired results. As part of the evidence-based approach to decision making, assessment is integral to the planning process, and it must be designed as part of the initial planning process once the commander’s intent has been articulated. By integrating assessment into the planning cycle, staff can identify potential second-and third-order effects and unintended consequences. ASSESSMENT PLAN 4-6. An MDO develops an assessment plan using the following steps:  Design an assessment plan.  Develop a data collection plan and an analysis plan.  Collect and treat data.  Analyze, interpret, and make recommendations. D ESIGN AN A SSESSMENT P LAN 4-7. An MDO designs an assessment plan at the initial planning phase of the operation. This should be integral to the planning process. Assessment design typically uses two types of feedback:  Target feedback : information, analytical determinations, and evidence (MOEs) that the target is acting or preparing to act on the deception.  Conduit feedback : information and evidence (MOEs) that the conduits receive, process, and transmit to elements of the deception. This feedback is also referred to as operational feedback. An effective design includes indicators of whether the target is receiving the deception story as planned. It also includes indicators of whether the target is acting in accordance with the deception objective. D EVELOP A D ATA C OLLECTION P LAN AND AN A NALYSIS P LAN 4-8. An MDO designs a collection plan during the planning phase of the operation. This not only articulates the procedure by which indicators should be collected, but also the time-sensitive monitoring of indicators as they relate to the measurable outcome. Alongside the collection plan, MDOs design an analysis plan at the initial stage of deception planning. This analysis plan identifies the analytical techniques used to analyze the collected evidence. C OLLECT AND T REAT D ATA 4-9. The DWG continuously collects and treats data during the execution phase of the operation. First, the group establishes a baseline prior to the execution phase beginning and continuously monitors the collection plan. All assessments require a baseline. A pre-operation baseline is used to gauge progress during the operation against eventual outcomes post-operation. If the deception plan does not establish a baseline, the staff cannot determine what has changed as part of the deception plan or understand eventual success or failure. A NALYZE, I NTERPRET, AND M AKE R ECOMMENDATIONS 4-10. The DWG continuously analyzes, interprets, and makes recommendations during the execution phase of the operation, but a final assessment after the operation is required. If the MDO designed the deception plan correctly—with a robust analysis plan based on a mixed methods approach to collect and monitor the necessary evidence—then the final assessment should be robust. This is important as the final assessment informs the realization of the effect being sought as part of the overall OPLAN. The deception assessment contributes to the overall evidence that informs the commander’s decision-making process. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE DEVELOPMENT 4-11. The development of deception MOEs and MOPs differs slightly from similar processes for other capabilities. One way to easily conceptualize MOEs and MOPs for deception involves using the see-think-do methodology. MOEs are associated with think and do : what perceptions and conclusions did the enemy draw from a particular observable (alone or in the context of other observations)? Are those perceptions leading toward the desired action or inaction captured in a deception objective? MOPs are most closely associated with see : did friendly forces portray the planned indicator? Did the enemy see the execution and transmit the desired message to the deception target creating an observable? 4-12. MOE development and collection for deception focuses on the current cognitive state of the deception target. The enemy’s cognitive state can be measured in one of two ways. First, it uses the evaluation of known comments or public statements by the decision maker. Second, it identifies and monitors the flow of enemy (particularly the target’s) activity to determine patterns of behavior that indicate the deception target’s susceptibility to being moved toward the desired perception and subsequent action or inaction. The baseline provides the first indication that friendly forces can affect the target in the manner that meets the desired effect. However, the knowledge of this activity occurring or not occurring may not be easily available or discernible. Sometimes, it will manifest itself at the very moment a particular effect in the deception plan is required; thus, the controlling planner remains vigilant to indicators that suggest the current cognitive state of the target has in some manner changed. 4-13. MOP collection for deception involves two conceptual steps:  Determining that the tasked friendly unit or capability employed the desired means to create an indicator at the appropriate time and location.  Verifying that the intended enemy conduits cued on the friendly signature, transmitted the collected data, and delivered the information to the deception target in a discernable context. These two steps define the difference between a deception MOP and a traditional MOP (one that asks if friendly forces performed the directed action). Part of every successful deception execution involves action by the enemy. The conduit that the deception seeks to exploit must function. 4-14. MDOs determine a deception event schedule from reporting channels. The MDO coordinates this reporting with the element controlling a particular execution as a part of finalizing the plan for appropriate access and security controls. Verifying that the enemy conduit functioned as planned and that the desired information reached the deception target requires focused and coordinated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. Using their previous conduit analysis work, MDOs, supporting intelligence analysts, and the intelligence collection manager collaborate. They identify points at which the information transmission might fall susceptible to enemy monitoring and analysis. The presence of filters in the conduit pathway makes this verification process difficult because predicting the level of data aggregation or synthesis with other friendly observables is subjective at best. In some cases, the appearance of an anticipated MOE might be the only validation that a persuasive observable was accurately received and perceived. 4-15. To provide the commander with the information to adjust plans as needed based on timely MOEs, the G-2 and MDO coordinate. For example, if one deception objective is for the enemy to hold the armored reserve away from the decisive point of ground action, then MDOs develop MOEs related to achieving that objective. MOE examples related to the action or inaction of the reserve might include such things as—  An increase or decrease in preparation of defensive positions (implying a period of static activity).  An increase or decrease in enemy intelligence collection in the vicinity of a friendly main axis of advance at the expense of other sectors (is the enemy “telegraphing” an interest?).  An increase or decrease in route reconnaissance toward the friendly sector by armored reserve units or leadership (is this pending or an active branch plan?).  An increase or decrease in battle drill or movement rehearsal by the enemy reserve. 4-16. Without the close support of the G-2 and a deliberate focus on the development of viable MOEs and MOPs as part of the deception plan, the success or failure of the deception might not be known until the moment that a planned enemy action or inaction is turned against friendly forces. This could result in a loss of initiative or increased friendly loss of life. This page intentionally left blank.

COUNTERDECEPTION PLANNING A-1. Enemies can use deception to mislead friendly analysts and decision makers about their activities, capabilities, or intent to offset a friendly superiority or gain some other operational advantage. Counterdeception is efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from a foreign deception operation (JP 3-13.4). Successful friendly decision makers know of enemy deception activities to formulate informed and coordinated responses and, more importantly, avoid placing friendly forces at an operational disadvantage. Counterdeception contributes to situational awareness by protecting friendly systems and decision makers from responding to deceptive manipulation or faulty analysis of an operational environment. Counterdeception applies across the range of military operations in which enemies might use deception in an attempt to alter friendly activities or even achieve operational surprise during hostilities. A-2. Knowledge of an enemy’s deception plan enables a commander to act appropriately against the deception. It provides friendly forces an opportunity to gain valuable insight into the means used to portray the deception. It also provides friendly forces a chance to analyze enemy deception targets and objectives as indicators of the broader context in which the enemy views friendly forces and operations. Counterdeception becomes a tool for influencing those perceptions and could subsequently be turned effectively against the enemy. DETECTING ENEMY DECEPTION A-3. The intelligence warfighting function plays a central role in identifying enemy deception operations. MDOs can assist in this effort. Trained deception personnel should be postured and have access to information, intelligence data, analytical support, and intelligence products during the deployment and execution of friendly operations. To identify enemy deception, trained deception personnel must first understand the enemy’s deception doctrine, techniques, capabilities, and limitations. Knowing previous methods the enemy has used deception is also important. The MDO collaborates with the G-2 to collect and provide this information as part of the deception running estimate. Understanding the enemy’s operational objectives; normal operational profiles; posture; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and intent are also crucial to identifying tactical or operational indicators of possible deception. The MDO can use the friendly OPSECOPSECOperational Security doctrinal construct of signature, association, profile, contrast, and exposure to assess enemy activity for its congruency with known patterns or expectations based on the evolving operational situation. Indicators of potential deception can range from a dedicated analyst’s intuitive sense that “something is amiss” to the outright compromise of deceptive means, methods, or activity by friendly intelligence collection assets. Properly balancing tactical and operational indicators with strategic assumptions is also important. Planners can reduce potential surprise if their estimates weigh tactical indicators more heavily than strategic assumptions in some phases of the operation. Dismissing tactical indicators or other minor contrasts because they conflict with friendly biases and preconceptions may allow a hostile deception to succeed. CONFIRMING ENEMY DECEPTION A-4. If intelligence reveals or suggests an enemy deception activity, the staff must fully analyze the situation and ensure that this intelligence and its potential impact on the friendly operation are presented to the commander. One method to analyze the situation involves forming a working group to analyze, review, and determine the deceptive activity. This working group could include the MDOs, G-2 analysts, red team members, G-3 planners, and others with knowledge of suspected enemy deception means or methods. If it has not already been done, the working group analyzes vulnerability to enemy deception using the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions. The group then uses information and intelligence available through the intelligence enterprise to determine the enemy deception plan. Using the deception planning methodology of see-think-do, the working group might use an abbreviated war-gaming process to construct enemy deception goals and objectives, targets, desired perceptions and deception story narrative, probable events and means, conduits, and anticipated MOEs. Deception planners then use outputs of this technique to focus friendly intelligence collection assets that confirm or deny the existence and scope of an actual enemy deception plan and related executions. COUNTERING OR EXPLOITING ENEMY DECEPTION A-5. After confirming an enemy’s deception operation, the working group has two primary functions. It first examines past information collection, intelligence production, and intelligence analysis to determine the impact the deception may have had on friendly planning, decision making, or current operational activities. The outputs of the working group inform future COAs or counterdeception planning. Second, the working group develops and presents proposed counterdeception COAs to the commander. Each COA involves a different level of risk or opportunity that must be weighed in the overall context of the operation and commander’s desired end state. Based on risks, commanders can ignore, expose, exploit, or defeat enemy deception efforts. A-6. Commanders ignore the deception if acknowledging the deception compromises friendly deception identification capabilities. Such a compromise of friendly capabilities might lead to future improvements in enemy deception capabilities. This scenario requires a working group to continue to identify deceptive indicators and base the friendly force operational decision making and subsequent activity on actual enemy capability, activity, or intent. A-7. Commanders might choose to publicly expose the deception to embarrass the enemy or increase risk within an enemy’s operational cost and benefit analysis. Through exposure, the enemy might be persuaded that its deception operations are futile, too costly, or too risky to continue. Exposure of a deception prior to combat operations might also serve to weaken the enemy’s political or military position with allies or domestic audiences. A-8. An exploitation of enemy deception focuses on forcing an enemy to expend resources and continue deception operations by reinforcing the perception that friendly forces are unaware of the deception. In this scenario, friendly forces provide positive MOEs that the deception is having the desired effect until the culminating point of the enemy’s deception (their desired “do or not do” for one friendly operational capability) and then reacting in an unexpected manner that turns the enemy’s anticipated advantage against itself. A-9. Defeating the enemy deception effort could involve destroying or degrading the enemy’s deception capabilities and resources so it cannot sustain its portrayal of the deception story. Like the other potential COAs, this outcome ideally includes a war-gaming step to identify possible second-and third-order effects and associated risk.

(OPERATIONS) DIRECTIONS B-1. Appendixes are information management tools. They simplify orders by providing a structure for organizing information. FM 6-0 discusses the organizational structure for appendixes to Army to OPLANs and OPORDs. Staffs list appendixes under an appropriate heading at the end of the document they expand. For example, Appendix 14 (Military Deception) is to Annex C (Operations). This appendix describes how deception supports operations described in the base plan or order. Some additional considerations for writing the Appendix 14 include the following:  Access to Appendix 14 is typically on a need to know basis, which means limiting access to those individuals who are involved in planning, approving, or executing deceptions and must have knowledge of the military deception to perform their duties.  The deception appendix will normally be developed, published, distributed, and maintained separately.  Staffs do not use normal administrative procedures to distribute or staff the deception appendix. Only positive control means, such as hand-to-hand delivery, will be used to distribute deception related material. APPENDIX TEMPLATE B-2. Commanders and staffs use Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations) to OPLANs and OPORDs to describe how deception will support operations described in the base plan or order. See figure B-1 for a sample format instructions. The italicized font in figure B-1 explains the information that commanders and staffs complete. MILITARY DECEPTION References : List documents essential to this tab. Task Organization: (If applicable) Information and intelligence provided here must be focused and plan-specific. Do not reiterate information available in the base plan. commander’s intent in employing deception—what the deception plan is designed to accomplish. Specifically identify the friendly operation it will support. Identify any phasing for the conduct of operations. Briefly state the expected results if the plan is successful. through the opponent’s perspective) that this deception plan is designed to counter or exploit. operations in general and the deception plan in particular. for covert and clandestine operations. Include collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. Specifically note those organizations most likely to provide intelligence to the targeted decision maker and those tasked with exposing deception. operations. available to the enemy, the nature of intelligence exchange, and the potential for using that relationship for the deception. contacts that might act as information conduits. and denial supporting its political and military goals. Identify the enemy’s deception and denial methods as well as current deception and denial activities. strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and people or factors known to influence decisions. the deception plan is targeting for exploitation. the enemy has previously responded to similar events, conditions, and circumstances. and their possible results if deception is not used. Compare the time necessary to collect, process, report, and analyze intelligence (in support of deception) with the plan’s operational timeline. Assess the impact here. collectors’ actual capacities in relation to the projected volume of information requirements. or courses of action. State conditions that the commander believes will exist during execution. phases of the planned operation. become relevant upon execution. (Use additional paragraphs if necessary to reflect differing requirements during planned phases of the operation.) actions that the deception target is expected to take. Identify how friendly capabilities, situations, conditions, or operations will be improved or protected if the target commits the desired actions. to the command’s mission objectives. the specific action or inaction the deception operation is expected to elicit from the target. State, exactly, what friendly forces want the target to do or not to do with its forces, capabilities, and operations. will have to accept as being true in order for it to act in accordance with the deception objective. acquire the desired perceptions. The deception story is presented in a style that replicates what the target would expect to read in his own intelligence estimates of the “enemy” situation (typically no more than a short paragraph). operations. Describe how the deception is integrated into the supporting plan. If applicable, list how the deception operation will be phased. phases of the deception. deception plan. Discuss all other capabilities and activities plans and operations pertinent to the deception. Include coordination required to deconflict if necessary. how it will be collected (monitored). Identify the effect of no feedback. Identify the friendly capability to identify and collect plan-specific feedback information. monitored to determine if deception events are being sensed by enemy intelligence collection, analytical, or dissemination systems. operation and the means to employ. Identify and provide a general description of the types of executions and means used to portray them for each operational phase. If applicable, include the timelines for major phase executions. Use the deception event schedule to describe specific executions and events in order. each category. enemy intelligence sharing. take the actions intended. intelligence compromise. be reflected in Exhibit 2 (Execution Schedule)), or emergency if there is unintended disclosure or compromise. Focus on the termination “story” to be used if the deception succeeds, is compromised, or is ended by the friendly commander. Identify how collection managers will support planners and analysts. the preceding subparagraphs. List the tentative D-day and H-hour, if applicable, and any other information required to ensure coordinated action between two or more elements of the command. used in developing, coordinating, and implementing the deception plan. Do not include those administrative, logistics, and medical actions or ploys that are an actual part of the deception operation. implementation of deception activities. material or provision of printing equipment and materials. Do not include executions conducted by logistics elements as part of the portrayal of observables. applicable. organizations outside the chain of command. and execution feedback. Address in-theater and out of theater requirements. procedures to be used by control personnel and participants in the deception plan. Include all reporting requirements. of deception activities. appendix or plan. Describe use of cover stories if applicable, code words, nicknames, and procedures for planning and execution documents. If required, place access rosters and other detailed security considerations in a separate document. As a general policy, any material related to planned, ongoing, or completed deception is accorded controlled access. Address essential elements of friendly information, indicators to be managed, and protective measures. This page intentionally left blank.

G-3 EVALUATION CHECKLIST C-1. The G-3 completes an evaluation after a deception. The evaluation checklist can include the following questions:  What integration of deception operations into tactical maneuvers occurred?  Did the OPSECOPSECOperational Security annex support the deception annex?  Was the deception annex to the OPLAN written to support tactical operations?  Were individuals at all echelons identified and aware of their responsibilities in relation to deception activities?  What were the required unit tasks?  How was the deception annex coordinated? Was it complementary?  Did it address a common list of indicators that required either display or concealment?  Did other supporting annexes contain option choices addressed in the deception annex without alluding to deceptive intent?  Does the deception annex address main and alternate COAs in the basic operational concept?  Were surveys conducted of both concealed sensitive indicators (OPSECOPSECOperational Security) and displayed deceptive indicators to access visibility?  What was the deception objective?  Did the deception objective closely support the objective of the tactical operation?  Did the deception objective support corresponding OPSECOPSECOperational Security objectives?  Were phase-out actions planned to disguise that deception was used?  Was an implementing schedule prepared?  Did the implementing schedule identify the start and finish times of event, location, unit involved, and means to be used?  What was the deception story?  Was it employed as planned?  Did the deception story provide adequate information to deter the enemy from taking undesirable actions?  Was the story flexible enough to allow changes during its execution to take advantage of unexpected enemy actions?  Did compromise of intent of deception or OPSECOPSECOperational Security activity occur?  If yes, what was the compromise?  If yes, did the compromise degrade the overall success of the operation?  What were the essential elements of friendly information and were they integrated into the plan as specific, inherently low-visibility options? What options were chosen?  What deception technique was employed?  Were communications-electronics deception and electronic counter-countermeasures or command, control, and communications protection measures planned for and used? What was the desired effect?  Were non-communications-electronics deception and electronic counter-countermeasures planned for and used? What was the desired effect?  If non-electronics deception techniques (reconnaissance, engineer activities, and so forth) were used, what was the desired effect of the techniques?  What resources (personnel, equipment, and time) were tasked to conduct operations with deceptive intent?  Were sufficient resources available?  What was the experience level of deception element personnel?  What specific deception items (dummies, decoys, and so forth) were constructed, used, and how? How many were used?  What other resources or services were required? Were they available?  What real missions could not be accomplished because these resources were being used for deception?  Do the benefits of deception justify any loss of operational resources?  Were dedicated, secured communications lines and other means of transmission of the plan available? Were they adequate?  Was sufficient time available to formulate, write, and execute the deception and OPSECOPSECOperational Security plans?  What were the results of deception activities?  Did the deception assist in the successful execution of the overall operation? G-2 EVALUATION CHECKLIST C-2. The G-2 completes an evaluation after a deception. The evaluation checklist can include the following questions:  Were deception and OPSECOPSECOperational Security annexes to the OPLAN written to support tactical operations?  Does intelligence have an established enemy database and an understanding of enemy doctrine?  Was there awareness of enemy intelligence capabilities and collection schedules?  What were the priority intelligence requirements and information requirements for the deception and OPSECOPSECOperational Security plans?  What intelligence activities were targeted at discovering deceptions in progress against friendly forces?  What intelligence activities were targeted to determine enemy reaction to friendly deceptions?  What enemy activities were identified as being deception related? Why?  What was the deception story?  At what level of the enemy organization was it focused?  Did the deception story cause the enemy decision maker to make the desired decision?  Was the story consistent with the friendly unit’s tactical doctrine, established patterns, and normal operational sequences?  Was the story consistent with the target’s perception of the friendly unit’s real capabilities?  Did the story permit verification by various enemy collection systems?  What countersurveillance techniques were used to deny the enemy knowledge of true intentions and evaluate indicator visibility?  What were the essential elements of friendly information and were they integrated into the plan as specific, inherently low-visibility options? What options were chosen?  What deception steps were employed?  If communications-electronics deception and electronic counter-countermeasures or command, control, and communications protection measures were planned for and used, what was the actual effect of these measures?  If non-communications-electronics deception and electronic counter-countermeasures were planned for and used, what was the actual effect of these measures?  If non-electronics deception techniques (reconnaissance, engineer activities, and so forth) were used, what was the desired effect of the techniques?  Did the enemy’s intelligence estimate of friendly capabilities warrant the use of deception with the expected expenditure of personnel and equipment?  Was there adequate time for the enemy to observe the deception and react in a desired manner?  What were the results of deception activities?  Were intelligence means and indicators established to measure enemy reaction to the friendly unit’s deception? This page intentionally left blank. Source Notes This division lists the source by page number. 1-8 Examples given in paragraphs 1-42 through 1-60 originated in the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Research and Development, Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), 9–40. This page intentionally left blank.

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. The proponent publication for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition. The term for which FM 3-13.4 is the proponent is marked with an asterisk (*).

Entries are by paragraph number.