*FM 3-14
Field Manual
No. 3-14
Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 30 October 2019

Army Space Operations

Over the last three decades, assumptions of individual domain supremacy and the break in great power security competition drove the U.S. joint force doctrine, equipment, and readiness posture. These assumptions have evolved when faced with recent changes to peer and near-peer nation capabilities and approaches to warfare. In order to win in a complex operational environment (OE), Army forces should provide the joint force with multiple options, integrate the efforts of multiple partners, operate across multiple domains, and present threat actors with multiple dilemmas. Army space operations provide Army and joint forces with global combat advantage using highly technical capabilities to create multiple dilemmas for threat actors on the battlefield. The space domain is a warfighting domain with different characteristics from air, land, maritime, and cyberspace domains. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America identified the space domain as a global commons—those portions of the Earth, outside national jurisdiction, all actors have rightful access to. This FM is rooted in Army operations and consistent with joint doctrine. Nearly every Army operation relies on the advantages provided by space capabilities and effects to enhance the effectiveness of combat forces. Space capabilities permit enhanced situational understanding; provides global communications; enables precise and accurate fires; supports the conduct of joint expeditionary entry, movement, and maneuver operations; and provides a conduit for cyber electromagnetic operations supporting Unified Land Operations. These capabilities directly support large scale combat operations by enhancing command and control, providing secure communications over extended distances and across areas without modern infrastructure. Potential adversaries have identified U.S. reliance on space-based capabilities as a critical vulnerability and will attempt to exploit it in order to deter and degrade our ability to act. Army space operations seek ways to maintain assured access to space capabilities, and when necessary, to achieve its objectives in spite of the adversary’s counterspace efforts. Army space operations are conducted around the globe, but engaged regionally. Army space operations often are an integral part of a joint team used to plan, fight, and adapt operations across the range of military operations. Army space operations continue to evolve to meet the requirements of a complex and rapidly changing OE. Army space doctrine refines and expands upon joint space doctrine by defining those space tactics and procedures relevant to unified land operations and applicable to large scale combat operations. Army space operations applies to the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, but the results are often challenging to quantify which level or levels benefit as modern conflict may not be easily divided into discrete levels. In an internet-connected world which often exploits social media, theater-level tactical actions may have far-reaching operational and strategic-level impacts. The space capabilities form the framework for how space operations supports the Army warfighting functions. The principles that successfully guide unified land operations are applicable to the space domain. The Army uses space-based capabilities to support its dominance in unified land operations. Space operations are critical to the range of military operations as many space capabilities are embedded in Army operations. Summary of Changes FM 3-14 was completely rewritten to document Army-centric space operations. The current manual aligns Army doctrine with JP 3-14. FM 3-14 updates terminology, highlights the critical support Army space operations play in joint operations, and links space operations with the warfighting functions. A summary of changes is below.  Adds an Army space operations overview diagram to chapter 1.  Greatly expands on operational environment and clearly identifies how space capabilities contribute to the operational environment.  Removes unit specific battalion and below material which is inappropriate to an FM.  Discusses capabilities such as positioning, navigation, and timing; satellite operations; satellite communications; and space control as integrated effects and not isolated, stove-piped functions.  Updates the operations process in chapter 5.  Renames Annex N–Space Operations as Appendix 18–Space Operations to Annex C of the base order. The following terminology is deleted per Department of Defense Dictionary.

Unified land operations and Army space operations are indivisible. A typical Army Brigade Combat Team has over 2,500 positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT)-enabled devices and over 250 satellite communications (SATCOM)-enabled devices used to conduct precision fires, movement, maneuver, communications, protection, command and control, and other mission requirements. This chapter provides a general overview of the depth and breadth of available space capabilities to conduct unified land operations. It recognizes the different career specialties the Army uses to support space operations and space-enabled operations. It identifies how the Army must plan to operate in a contested space domain which may be exploited by threat actors to create a denied, degraded, and disrupted space operational environment (D3SOE). It provides space fundamentals lists the approved Army space core competencies. 1-1. The space capabilities the Army uses are dependent on both the space domain (the physical location where space-based satellites transmit and receive signals) and Army space operations to conduct the planning, coordination, integration, and synchronization of space capabilities across all functions within unified land operations. While the Army is capable of completing its assigned mission in a D3SOE, it is more agile and efficient when using space capabilities to their fullest ability. 1-2. Space operations are inherently joint and Army space forces routinely coordinate with Army, joint, and unified action partners on the best way to employ space capabilities. U.S. Army space operations are firmly established in national, Department of Defense (DOD), and Service level policies that guide space operations. Army Space force personnel consist of trusted Army professionals who work diligently to assure continuous access to space capabilities. 1-3. Assured access to space capabilities is a framework of capabilities, actions, and processes to assure Soldiers can to shoot, move, and communicate where and when desired, to achieve the commander’s intent. The Army invests in space capabilities and its use of the space domain is broad. Space capabilities enable and enhance tactical operations across the range of military operations. Many aspects of space operations have become normalized in Army operations and are routinely integrated into mission plans. However, assured access to space capabilities is a necessity for agile and efficient mission operations. 1-4. The space domain is defined as the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible (JP 3-14). The space domain is a physical location where military, civil, and commercial space activities are conducted and the upper limit extends infinitely outward. Military activities within the space domain are conducted to achieve U.S. national security objectives. 1-5. Space forces are the space and terrestrial systems, equipment, facilities, organizations, and personnel, or combination thereof, necessary to conduct space operations (JP 3-14). A space asset is the equipment that is an individual part of a space system, which is or can be placed in space or directly supports space activity terrestrially (JP 3-14). The space forces and space assets support all warfighting functions and enable the Army to communicate, navigate, target hostiles, protect our forces, and operate in a contested OE more efficiently. 1-6. The space environment is the environment corresponding to the space domain, where electromagnetic radiation, charged particles, and electric and magnetic fields are the dominant physical influences, and that encompasses the earth’s ionosphere and magnetosphere, interplanetary space, and the solar atmosphere (JP 3-59). Space operations are those operations impacting or directly utilizing space-based assets to enhance the potential of the U.S. and unified action partners. The space joint operating area is the operational area, bounded by the space domain, assigned to Commander, United States Strategic Command, in which space operations are conducted (JP 3-14). 1-7. Space capabilities provide a global perspective as space-based sensors provide support to unified land operations. Space capabilities contribute solutions to counter theater antiaccess (A2) and area denial (AD) strategies. Antiaccess is action, activity, or capability, usually long-range, designed to prevent an advancing enemy force from entering an operational area (JP 3-0). Area denial is action, activity, or capability, usually short-range, designed to limit an enemy force’s freedom of action within an operational area (JP 3-0).

The Army uses space-based capabilities to support its dominance in decisive actions. Space capabilities are critical elements of Army operations. Moreover, the need for the U.S. Army to accomplish space operations is firmly established in policy and practice. Many space capabilities are well integrated into Army operations. Army space operations supports critical components of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities operations. Army space operations enable all Army warfighting functions. This chapter describes how Army space operations directly support and contribute to joint operations and the unified land operations. It also describes how Army space operations help enable the tenets of unified land operations. SPACE DOMAIN IS A WARFIGHTING DOMAIN 2-1. The space domain supports and enables all other domains—it is interdependent with the air, land, and maritime domains, and interconnected with the cyberspace domain. Space operations are fundamental to all domains. Army space operations are heavily influenced by understanding the constraints, limitations, and operational needs of the land component users. Army space operations includes all aspects of planning, preparation, integration, and execution. 2-2. The execution of Army space operations contributes to, supports, and enables Army operations. Modern warfare has forced the transition of space operations from merely an enabler to a warfighting domain prepared to assure space operations through all phases of conflict. Space operations enable force responsiveness and create potential opportunities for the Army, joint, and multinational partners. Space operations defends our space capabilities against aggressive counterspace operations of others. 2-3. Army thinking about space operations has evolved. The Army no longer regards the space domain as a permissive environment where it only considers natural factors during mission planning. When operating in the space domain, the space planner has to consider hazards (conditions), threats (hostile actions), and vulnerabilities (system characteristics) which may impact the mission. Army space operations are focused on ensuring hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities are mitigated as much as possible. 2-4. The space domain optimizes the use of functions such as PNT, beyond line of sight communications, information collection and dissemination, early warning, and environmental monitoring. Activities in the space domain enable freedom of action for operations in all other domains. Operations in the other domains may create effects in and through the space domain. Operating in the space domain grants significant operational advantage such as beyond line of sight communications, increased situational understanding, and increased navigational and targeting accuracy. Operations in all domains are positively impacted by access to the space domain. 2-5. As with other operational areas, when deliberate fires (such as electromagnetic or directed energy) are directed into or out of the space domain, the fires should be coordinated between the affected combatant commands if time permits. By honoring the boundaries of the space domain, combatant commanders help to preserve SSA, spacecraft life span, and space system performance. This facilitates freedom of action in the space domain and improves support to terrestrial operations. It is important to note missile defense operations transiting though the space domain are not pre-coordinated due to the short-notice self-defense actions required to defeat enemy missile attacks. Refer to FM 3-27 for more information on ballistic missile warning and defense. 2-6. The Army executes space operations and contributes to establishing and maintaining space superiority consistent with the needs of unified land operations. The Army continually incorporates existing and emerging space domain capabilities and effects to further improve the effectiveness of its operations. The Army’s ability to protect space forces through space control and countering enemy capabilities being used for purposes hostile to U.S. national interests yields military power and contributes to space superiority. 2-7. The Army is more lethal when enabled by space capabilities and it endeavors to preserve its combat power. The Army leverages the advantages of space capabilities and counterspace effects to accomplish a wide variety of missions. 2-8. Information operations are the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13). Space operations support information operations by using the space capabilities. Space-enable information operations uses capabilities such as SATCOM, PNT, space-based surveillance and reconnaissance, missile warning, and environmental monitoring. 2-9. Space capabilities are a significant force multiplier when integrated with joint operations. Space operations enhance many areas including situational understanding, fires, movement, cyberspace electromagnetic activities, electronic warfare, information operations, protection, and many other capabilities. Space operations aid high-tempo, noncontiguous, dispersed, and decentralized operations across the range of military operations. THE SPACE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 2-10. An OE is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). An OE includes and encompasses physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. An OE for any specific operation not only includes isolated conditions of interacting variables that exist within a specific area of operations, but also interconnected influences from a global or regional perspective, such as the political and economic influences that impact conditions and operations. Defining the OE results in the identification of significant threat characteristics which may affect friendly and enemy operations. 2-11. An OE is neither domain specific nor a Service component; however, there are domain-centric considerations that contribute to an overall OE understanding. While Army space operations are most effective when integrated into operations, it is necessary to isolate elements of a space OE to determine what the variables are and how they may be integrated into the larger battlefield OE. 2-12. A critical challenge for commanders, staffs, and unified action partners is creating shared understanding of their OE, an operation’s purpose, problems, and approaches to solving problems (ADP 6-0). A Space operations officers’ insights and understanding of how space operations enables joint and Army operations across the range of military operations are critical to developing a comprehensive space OE that contributes to a shared understanding of the overall OE. Space operations officers provide a foundation for developing shared situational understanding of the overall OE across all domains, improving awareness and understanding of friendly forces’ dependency on space capabilities, improving understanding of capabilities and limitations for friendly forces and the adversaries, and highlighting other conditions of the OE. The resulting understanding of the OE should be linked to the commander’s common understanding through the warfighting functions. 2-13. Analysis of the broad aspects of the space OE in terms of the operational variables provides relevant information senior commanders and their staff’s use to understand, visualize, and describe the OE. Operational variables are a comprehensive set of information categories used to describe an operational environment. The operational variables are political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (known as PMESII-PT). 2-14. Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, Army commanders filter relevant information from the operational variables and narrow their focus using the six mission variables. Mission variables are the categories of specific information needed to conduct operations. The mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (known as METT-TC). These variables are used by space planners during analysis to facilitate understanding. 2-15. When viewing an OE, it is important to take a holistic approach and identify friendly, neutral, and hostile actors. An OE includes the interacting variables within a specific area of operations as well as connected regional or global influences, such as politics and economics. Each commander’s OE is a sub-set of a higher commander’s OE. This is particularly important to space operations due to its global reach and tactical impact. 2-16. Understanding an OE is an on-going, iterative process that continues throughout an operation. The iterative steps are critical for a constantly evolving discipline like space operations. An OE consists of many interrelated variables and sub-variables, as well as the relationships and interactions among those variables and sub-variables. The space OE during planning will be different from the space OE at the start of operations, and will likely be significantly different from the space OE at the end of operations. C HANGING N ATURE OF AN O PERATING E NVIRONMENT 2-17. An OE is not static but continually evolves. This evolution results from opposing forces and actors— organizations and individuals—interacting and their ability to learn and adapt. As actors take action within an OE, the OE changes. It is critically important commanders and staff should not view actors as static; they constantly change over time. Actors may become less or more hostile over time. Commanders, staffs, and Soldiers must continuously reassess an OE for changing conditions. The complex and dynamic nature of an OE may make attribution and determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult. 2-18. Fundamental to mission success is the ability for space operations officers to anticipate and analyze potential space-related problems and develop solutions. Based on their understanding and analysis of a problem, space operations officers select and apply the right solutions to perform required tasks. Further adding to the challenge, the space OE remains dynamic throughout all phases of conflict. 2-19. Army space operators understand unified land operations to provide a space-focus to planning and analysis applicable to unified land operations. It is up to Army space operations officers on the staff to make sure the space OE is understood by the staff and space capabilities are planned and integrated into unified land operations in support of joint combined arms operations. 2-20. Commanders must seek opportunities for exploiting success. As the environment changes, continuous analysis of the operational variables help reveal opportunities, such as greater cooperation among the local population of a town or the ability to advance forces along a previously unsecured route. To exploit opportunities successfully, commanders and staffs should thoroughly understand and appreciate the application of the operational variables. O PERATIONAL V ARIABLES 2-21. The OE is described in terms of eight operational variables. The framework for analysis conducted for any OE should always consist of all eight variables. The operational variables are fundamental to developing a comprehensive understanding of an OE. Operational variables are those aspects of the OE which differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. Operational variables describe both the military aspects of an OE and the population’s influence on it—they help improve situational understanding. 2-22. Analysis of each variable, applied through the lens of space operations, contributes to a comprehensive understanding of the OE and how the OE may affect mission operations. By applying the operational variables to a specific OE, the space planner, in coordination with other planners, gains a holistic and detailed understanding of the OE. Analysis continues systemically to identify existing and potential relationships among aspects of each of the operational variables. A brief description, along with space-related considerations for each operational variable follows. Political 2-23. Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance – may be formally constituted authorities, informal, or covert political powers. Covers everything from recognized state leader to the tribal leader in a local village. Conducting analysis using the space capabilities framework may reveal significant insights and understanding of the leaders, population, and OE.  SSA o Attribution of actions and liability of incidents. o Reentering objects and notifications - understanding size of the reentering object (is it likely to survive) and where it will likely impact.  PNT—interruption of GPS or other GNSS signals may have an impact on political stability due to its wide use, including: o Timing signals are used by allied and threat nations’ militaries and commercial sectors such as banking, stock markets, power grids, and computer networks. o Positioning information supports targeting accuracy, troop movement and maneuver, and other operations supported by tagging, tracking, and location. o Navigation information keeps logistics and supply chain management aware of resources, fosters agile decision-making to rerouting supplies when interrupted by inclement weather or attacks. Secondary and tertiary routes are more quickly developed to help facilitate deliveries with minimal delays. Used by shipping to improve location accuracy for shipping lanes.  Space control—helps political considerations by providing attribution of related actions and activities.  SATCOM—interruptions of SATCOM may have an impact on political stability. o Political restraints placed on Army or joint operations regarding use of specific frequencies which might impact space capabilities and overall mission. o Information operations. o Internet availability for computer networks for military (NIPRNET and SIPRNET), business, and commercial or social use.  Missile warning and defense—provides protection and warning indications for political considerations. o Attribution of actions from foreign missile launches and state involvement which drives public opinion and political authorities. o Confirmation of events and battle damage assessments.  Environmental monitoring information is used by space operations to provide potential impacts to SATCOM and PNT-dependent operations as well as SSA and missile warning indications which could have wide-ranging political implications.  Space-based surveillance and reconnaissance provides information which may have significant impact on political decisions. Military 2-24. Explores the military and or paramilitary capabilities of all actors, including friendly, neutral, and enemy in a given OE. Space planners should consider how unified action partners use space capabilities and how proficient or knowledgeable other forces are at integrating space capabilities into the mission. Space operations should consider the ability of enemy military to affect mission operations by placing Army, joint, and unified action partners in a D3SOE. They should consider the dependency of enemy military on SATCOM, PNT, space control, and missile warning capabilities.  SSA—operations within the space domain are continuously being contested. The Army and joint forces require on-going awareness and assessment of the changing space environment, the changing threats, and the impacts to the forces. Attribution of actions drives military operations and assures responses are focused against the actual threats.  PNT—interruption of GPS or other GNSS signals may have an impact on mission operations: o Timing signals are used to synchronize mission operations, radios, computer networks, and many other information technology equipment. o Positioning information supports targeting accuracy, troop movement and maneuver, and other operations supported by tagging, tracking, and location. o Navigation information keeps troop movement and maneuver precise and accurate.  Space control—used to protect joint and allied space capabilities while denying space capabilities to the adversary, as situations require. The DOD employ a variety of measures to help assure the use of the space domain for all responsible parties. Consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deters others from interference and attack, and defends our space systems. NAVWAR allows the Army to take deliberate defensive and offensive actions to assure Army and joint forces have access to PNT.  SATCOM—interruption of SATCOM will have a direct and immediate impact on all military operations. Interruption of a signal can cause significant degradation to all mission operations.  Satellite operations—access to military satellites is dependent upon transmission control and payload control so military operations get a reliable satellite signal, and know the data is verified legitimate.  Missile warning and defense—provides warning indications, protection for troops, and confirmation of events for battle damage assessment. Enables attribution of actions of state involvement and specific missile launches which provides additional characteristics of threat actors’ capabilities.  Environmental monitoring information can provide significant, wide-ranging impacts due to actual or possible interruptions to SATCOM, PNT, SSA, missile warning indications, force protection, and overall on mission operations.  Space-based surveillance and reconnaissance supports information which may have significant impact on military, commercial, and civil space sectors. Economic 2-25. Encompasses individual and group behaviors related to producing, distributing, and consuming resources. Does the village have a high unemployment rate that makes it easy for the enemy to coerce villagers to perform tasks for pay or other benefits? Space operations should consider financial means available to purchase space capabilities from a third party that may provide asymmetric advantages. Space capabilities may be helpful by increasing interaction with locals or harmful as may be the case with AD capabilities.  SSA—understanding adversary intent and the stability of the host nation’s economic community contributes to the joint force commander’s situational understanding of natural resources and likelihood host nation citizens support friendly actions. Strong economies foster strong citizenship and help deter insurgent actors.  PNT—the global economy has numerous dependencies on reliable GPS signals. Interruption of GPS or other GNSS signals may have an impact on economic stability. Timing signals are used by many nations’ commercial sectors—for banking, stock markets, power grids, news media and telecommunications capabilities including cellular networks, computer networks and cloud computing, agricultural sectors for large-scale farming, construction sectors for precise survey, and transportation sectors for navigation and accurate delivery forecasts.  SATCOM—interruptions of SATCOM may have an impact on political stability, economic stability, o Interruptions to SATCOM may have economic impacts on commercial sector from lack of economic news and transfer of monetary funds. o Internet availability for computer networks for military (NIPRNET and SIPRNET), business, and commercial or social use.  Missile warning and defense—provides warning indications and protection opportunities. A missile impact could cause large scale destruction of critical infrastructure which could cripple portions or an entire economic structure. Social 2-26. Describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members. Consider who the influential people are in the village—for example, are they religious leaders, tribal leaders, warlords, criminal bosses, prominent families, or even teenagers with smart phones. Space operations should consider access to social media and world-wide influences which may garner support or drive civil unrest.  SSA o Attribution of actions and liability of incidents, such as with the Iridium 33 and Kosmos-2251 collision. o Reentering objects and notifications - understanding size of the reentering object (is it likely to survive) and where it will likely impact.  PNT—interruption of GPS or other GNSS signals may have an impact on social stability due to its wide use, including: o Disruption to timing signals used for banking, power grids, and computer networks may have unforeseen or negative consequences on social network used by unified action partners. o Navigation capabilities keeps traffic moving smoothly. Disruption to these capabilities may have negative consequences—including traffic jams, deadly accidents, and high incidents of missed work—when attributed to the specific actions of a military may be used to support or erode social attitudes.  SATCOM—interruptions of SATCOM may have an impact on political stability. o Political restraints placed on Army or joint operations regarding use of specific frequencies which might impact space capabilities and overall mission. o Political restraints placed on civilian population regarding specific frequencies for military use—including television, radio, internet, and wireless device access—which might impact public opinion of the local population and support for military action. o Information operations. o Internet availability for computer networks for military (NIPRNET and SIPRNET), business, and commercial or social use.  Missile warning and defense—provides protection and warning indications for political considerations. o Attribution of actions from foreign missile launches and state involvement which drives public opinion and political authorities. o Confirmation of events and battle damage assessments. Information 2-27. Describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. How much access to news media or the internet do the local leaders, influential persona, and general population have? Space operations should consider how access to internet and world-wide influences may be increased or decreased using SATCOM.  SSA o Attribution of actions and liability of incidents such as with the Iridium 33 and Kosmos-2251 collision. o Reentering objects and notifications—understanding size of the reentering object (is it likely to survive) and where it will likely impact.  SATCOM—interruptions of SATCOM may have an impact on political stability. o Political restraints placed on Army or joint operations regarding use of specific frequencies which might impact space capabilities and overall mission. o Information operations. o Internet availability for computer networks for military (NIPRNET and SIPRNET), business, and commercial or social use. Infrastructure 2-28. Composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society. This may include the functionality of electrical generators and similar utility systems.  SSA— intelligence outputs such as maps and knowledge of specific critical infrastructure builds a picture of critical assets to protect and likely targets.  PNT—interruption of GPS or other GNSS signals may have an impact on the infrastructure stability due to timing signals which are used by commercial sectors such as banking, stock markets, power grids, computer networks, and many other commercial endeavors.  Space operations should consider how commercial unclassified maps may help determine remaining infrastructure or how GPS may be able to help guide displaced people through the rubble of destroyed neighborhoods. Physical Environment 2-29. Includes the geography, man-made structures, climate, weather, and hazards in the area of operations. What types of terrain or weather conditions in the area of operations favor enemy operations?  Space operations should consider the possibility of GPS interference and SATCOM obscurra due to tall buildings and mountains, as well as the impact to missile warning indications and reporting. Time 2-30. Describes the timing and duration of activities, events, or conditions within an OE, as well as how the timing and duration are perceived by various actors in the OE. At what times are people likely to congest roads or conduct activities that provide a cover for hostile operations?  Space operations help commanders and staffs understand their dependencies on GPS. It enables precision targeting with reduced collateral damage. GPS enables FFT, increased tactical operating ranges, rapid maneuver, unmanned aerial system, surveillance and reconnaissance support for situational understanding, and many other functions. Precision timing enhances synchronized tactical digital networks, communications, and wide area networking capabilities. M ISSION V ARIABLES 2-31. Commanders and staffs require a mission analysis focused on their specific situation. The tactical echelons translate the operational variables identified by the operational headquarters into the mission variables. Mission variables are the categories of relevant military information used for planning operations as part of the MDMP. Mission analysis uses the six Army mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil consideration. 2-32. Commanders and staffs use the mission variables to filter the broader scope of operational variables into information that directly affects a specific mission—the information staffs need to conduct an operation and commanders need to exercise command and control. Mission variables refine the understanding of a situation and describe the characteristics of a specific area of operation within the OE. Space planners use the mission variables to identify critical space-related information applicable to mission planning. These provide the baseline for selecting the right capabilities to be used. Knowing the mission, threat, and OE allows commanders to identify and plan for the optimal capability package. 2-33. An effective mission analysis considers the potential impact space capabilities have within an OE. The Army space planners participates in planning actions to help form the problem statement, mission statement, planning guidance, initial commander’s critical information requirements, and essential elements of friendly information. Failure to identify or misidentify the effect mission variables might have on operations can hinder decision making and result in the development of an ineffective battle plan. ELECTROMAGNETIC OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 2-34. Military operations are complicated by operations dependent on the EMS. The EMS is congested and military operations are contested which creates both opportunities and vulnerabilities requiring diligence to ensure operations are not compromised. The electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE) is the background electromagnetic environment and the friendly, neutral, and adversarial electromagnetic order of battle within the electromagnetic area of influence associated with a given operational area (JP 6-01). The need for military forces to have assured access to, and use of the EMS drives the conditions of the EMOE. 2-35. All mission operations, military support functions, civil sectors, and private organizations are dependent upon the EMS. Some of the functions and operations dependent on the EMS include but are not limited to:  Space operations, intelligence, cyberspace, electronic warfare, signal, and information operations;  Command and control;  Maneuvering forces;  Targeting and attack;  Communications and data transmission;  Civil infrastructure control. 2-36. The increase in portability and affordability of sophisticated electronic equipment guarantees the EMOE will continue to expand, change, and influence how wars are fought. Commanders must shape the EMOE to ensure friendly forces can operate while denying the same privilege to the adversary, when necessary. Commanders should understand the EMOE is a sebset of the overall OE—it permeates all environments, and it drives mission operations more intrinsically than tanks, mortars, and bullets. 2-37. Maneuver in the EMS is similar to the physical domains, but more complex. For instance, maneuver in the air domain requires three-dimensional positioning and time, while EMS maneuver requires the ability of military forces to adapt or adjust EMS operating parameters (e.g., frequency, power, modulation) to gain an advantage over the enemyo (JP 6-01). 2-38. EMOE is a unique maneuver environment upon which all five warfighting domains depend. Commanders must focus achieving control of, and freedom of maneuver within the EMS. The military’s dependency on the EMS is a reality of the modern battlefield. The electromagnetic environment (EME) is the resulting product of the power and time distribution, in various frequency ranges, of the radiated or conducted electromagnetic emission levels encountered by a military force, system, or platform when performing its assigned mission in its intended operational environment (JP 3-13.1). F REQUENCIES 2-39. The EMS is the range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. It is divided into 26 bands, each designated by an alphabetically designate bands (JP 3-13.1). The EMS crosses all domains, and it provides a vital link between the cyberspace and space domains. 2-40. Frequency band designation are often confusing as the military, the International Telecommunication Union, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and traditional bands use the same designation to represent different frequency ranges. These differences cause confusion as bands often overlap the boundaries between two frequency segments. Refer to table 2-1 for a comparison of bandwidth frequencies. 2-79. The effects generated against opposing forces using the EMS may be felt nearly instantaneously. Effects delivered with precision and simultaneity, compress the amount of time the enemy has to respond— it causes confusion to the enemy and gives joint and unified action partners the advantage. The results are a convergence of effects, synchronized across all domains, where effects in the deep area may immediately influence the close fight, where the dominate phase influences the shape phase and the battlefield shrinks immensely for both time and battlespace Creating and exploiting short windows of advantage is essential for success on the modern battlefield. HAZARDS, THREATS, AND VULNERABILITIES 2-80. A hazard is a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation (JP 3-33). Hazards are different from threats—they are usually predictable and preventable, and may be reduced through effective risk management efforts. Hazardous conditions are able to destroy life, damage vital resources, and prevent mission accomplishment. Understanding hazards and their effects on space operations allows the commander to better understand the terrain, weather, and other factors that support the mission. Understanding hazards also helps the commander visualize potential impacts on operations, if they occur. Successful interpretation of the environment aids in correctly opposing threat courses of action within a given geographical region. 2-81. Naturally occuring hazards in the space environment are the result of electromagnetic interference, which is the result of complex interactions between the Sun’s electromagnetic energy and the Earth’s magnetic field. Electromagnetic interference can create hazards on a variety of a spacecrafts’ subsystems. Geomagnetic storms and energetic particle events cause ionospheric scintillation, coronal mass ejections and solar flares which cause radio bursts, x-rays, and electronic ultraviolet radiation; all are sources of naturally occuring electromagnetic interference. These can result in a variety of impacts.  Interference to SATCOM signals which results in distorted and intermittent signals.  Distorted or interrupted high frequency ground and aircraft radio communications, which includes radio propagation errors, short wave fade, and blackout.  Radar interference which leads to false returns, inaccurate ranging, and observation of reflected objects outside system characteristics.  Induced accuracy errors on GNSS.  Drag, excess charging, and damage on a spacecraft which shortens the spacecraft life.  Trajectory errors on satellite launches.  False readings from spacecraft sensor payloads. 2-82. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm U.S. forces, U.S. national interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). A threat is a fundamental part of an overall OE for any operation. Threats actors may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. 2-83. When assessing a threat, it is helpful to sort the possible threat types into the four distinct categories, summarized in figure 2-2:  Lethal physical weapons attempt to strike directly or create a detonation near a satellite or ground station. These include— o Direct ascent anti-satellite weapons—a sub-orbital missile launched directly at a satellite. o Co-orbital anti-satellite weapons—a weapon launched into orbit and maneuvered to the target at a time chosen by the owner. o Attack on a satellite ground station using a variety of weapons such as guided missile, rocket, artillery, or improvised explosive device.  Non-lethal physical weapons such as electromagnetic emitters may have physical effects on space systems without making physical contact. o Lasers—may be used to temporarily dazzle or permanently blind mission-critical sensors on a satellite. o High powered microwave weapons—may be used to disrupt a satellites’ electronics or cause permanent damage to electrical circuits and processors. o Electromagnetic pulse weapons—may be used to create high radiation levels in the space domain used to damage unshielded satellites in the affected and nearby orbits.  Directed energy attacks target the means by which space systems transmit and receive data by electromagnetic jamming or spoofing radio frequency signals. o Electromagnetic jamming is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy’s effective use of the EMS, and with the intent of degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability (JP 3-13.1). an emulated signal with false and misleading information o Spoofing is a technique of broadcasting an emulated signal with false or misleading information in an attempt to deceive a receiver or system into processing the fake data. Spoofing is designed to provide incorrect results to mislead users, discredit the receiver, or corrupt the data.  Cyberspace attack targets the data and the systems dependent upon the data rather than the radio frequency band in which the information is transmitted. Cyberattacks may target the ground stations, end-user equipment, or the satellites. 2-84. Commanders and staffs should understand how current and potential threat actors organize, equip, train, employ, and control their forces. They must continually identify, monitor, and assess threats as they adapt and change over time. The techniques for evaluating the threat (as described in ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01.3) provide a standardized model to articulate various threat capabilities, analyze a threat actor's intent to determine possible enemy courses of action, and identify threat vulnerabilities to support mission analysis and operations. When a commander understands the threat, they can visualize, describe, direct, and assess operations to seize, exploit, and retain the initiative. 2-85. A vulnerability is the characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural (man-made) hostile environment (JP 3-60). Space control measures help mitigate risks and defend against threat actors taking advantage of the vulnerabilities. A few of the possible system vulnerabilities to space operations include:  Making required ground station or stations unusable by means such as using a bomb to destroy all or part of the facility, or cutting the power supply.  Jamming a ground station, link, or user’s equipment.  Cyberspace attack. RISK MANAGEMENT 2-86. Risk management is all about mission assurance and success—it is the logic behind identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. The Army uses risk management to help maintain combat power while ensuring mission accomplishment in current and future operations. Risk management applies to operational and nonoperational activities. Army leaders must take prudent risks and make decisions based on informed judgment, risk management principles, and intuition. Failure to include space capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities during mission assessment may lead to an inaccurate risk assessment for the overall mission. Risk management is a function of the probability of an event occurring and the severity of the event expressed in terms of the degree to which the incident affects combat power or mission capability. 2-87. Risk management does not eliminate a risk, but will reduce or offset risks when applied properly. Using risk management processes increases operational effectiveness and the probability of mission accomplishment. It is a systematic way of identifying threats and vulnerabilities, assessing them, and managing the associated risks. Commanders, staffs, Army leaders, Soldiers, and Army Civilians are all responsible to conduct risk management. 2-88. Risk management is a continuous process. Risks should be monitored throughout an operation to assess the likelihood of occurrence for each risk and develop new risks as the OE changes. Risk management practices are applied across all Army space operations, day-to-day activities, events, and training functions. Space operations Soldiers use this continuous process to identify vulnerabilities and assess threats; develop and recommend controls to minimize the impacts to operations; and continuously evaluate risks as conditions change. 2-89. Some space-related items to consider during a mission execution risk assessment should include, but not be limited to, SATCOM availability and security; PNT accuracy for fires, movement, and maneuver; NAVWAR implications; and identification of terrestrial and space weather with the impacts on unified land operations. In addition to identifying hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities, general categories for risk management associated with space operations include policy, planning, operational, and technical. 2-90. Policy risk. This pertains to adherence to the many levels of National, DOD, and Service policy, appropriate authorities, legal guidance, and international law. Policies address space boundaries, authorities, and responsibilities. Commanders and staffs should conduct risk assessments and consider potential cascading and collateral effects due to the military’s distributed use of national, military, and commercial SATCOM systems, PNT use, and NAVWAR effects. 2-91. Increased risk occurs where policy fails to address operational necessity. If policy fails to keep pace with peer capabilities, our Soldiers may not be able to conduct the appropriate responses in a timely manner. For example, using the space domain for only peaceful purposes may prompt concerns for our ability to thoroughly protect ourselves, our space capabilities, and deliver necessary capabilities and effects. 2-92. Planning risk. This risk pertains to the consequences of not fully integrating space capabilities and effects into all aspects of mission plans. Examples include failure to integrate space capabilities and effects across all mission areas, over-stating the expectation of a space capability, and over-classification which may prohibit key players from actively participating in space planning. 2-93. Operational risk. This pertains to the consequences threat actors pose to space operations which may impact mission effectiveness. Operational consequences may result in joint forces and unified action partners operating in a D3SOE. An attack on space forces may be targeted toward a ground facility or an on-orbit asset and may damage equipment which could cause impacts from degraded capabilities to mission failure. 2-94. Technical risks are exploitable weaknesses in systems. Many weapon system within the Army is enabled or enhanced in some way by space capabilities, creating potential vulnerabilities. These potential vulnerabilities may directly impact the Army's ability to project military power to support missions. Space operations Soldiers examine the technical risk when planning mission operations to ensure risks are properly assessed and minimized in operations. Refer to ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 5-19, Risk Management for more information. SPACE POLICY 2-95. All levels of the U.S. space policy–national, DOD, and Service–have direct and influential impacts on defining the space OE. Army space operations derives its authorities from these policies. It draws a clear linkage from strategic national policies to the Army’s operational space forces. As part of the ‘Preserve Peace Through Strength’ pillar, the National Security Strategy identifies access to the space environment as a vital interest and clearly identifies the U.S. must maintain our leadership and freedom of action in the space domain. “ The United States considers unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space to be a vital interest. Any harmful interference with or an attack upon critical components of our space architecture that directly affects this vital U.S. interest will be met with a deliberate response at a time, place, manner, and domain of our choosing.” National Security Strategy 2-96. The National Space Policy clearly articulates the policy of the U.S. is to conducts space operations deemed necessary for national security. Space operations are used for peaceful purposes while developing civil and commercial use of the space environment. National, DOD, and Army space policies embrace the prudent use of the space environment for security purposes. These policies make it clear space operations are a critical element of defense capabilities and should be carefully and purposefully developed by each Service, as appropriate, to help provide a balanced overall capability for the range of military operations. The national-level policies and joint directives have a direct bearing on Army space operations in support of unified land operations. N ATIONAL S PACE P OLICY 2-97. The National Space Policy commits the U.S. space program to a leadership role in the world. The U.S. will use the space domain to preserve peace and protect national security, civil, and commercial interests. The National Space Policy has specific guidelines for DOD and are directly applicable to DOD and Army space operations. The Army should:  Be responsible, with support from the Director of National Intelligence, for the development, acquisition, operation, maintenance, and modernization of SSA capabilities;  Develop capabilities, plans, and options to deter, defend against, and, if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with or attack U.S. or allied space systems;  Maintain the ability to execute space capabilities; and 2-98. The policy identifies a set of guidelines that apply to all federal departments, agencies, and activities conducted in the three distinct but independent sectors of commercial, civil, and national security space capabilities. Some prominent national security space activities Army operations supports are identified in the ‘National Security Space Guidelines’ section of the document.  Develop, acquire, and operate space systems and supporting information systems and networks to support national security, and enable defense and intelligence operations during times of peace, crisis, and conflict.  Ensure cost-effective survivability of space capabilities, including supporting information systems and networks, commensurate with their planned use, the consequences of lost or degraded capability, the threat, and the availability of other means to perform the mission.  Develop and implement plans, procedures, techniques, and capabilities necessary to ensure critical national security missions. Options for mission assurance may include rapid restoration of space assets and leveraging allied, foreign, and or commercial space and non-space capabilities to help perform the mission.  Maintain and integrate space surveillance, reconnaissance, and other information to develop accurate and timely SSA. SSA information should be used to support national and homeland security, civil space agencies, human space flight activities, and commercial and foreign space operations.  Develop and apply advanced technologies and capabilities that respond to changes to the threat environment. D EPARTMENT OF D EFENSE S PACE P OLICY 2-99. DOD directive (DODDDODDDepartment of Defense directive) 3100.10, Space Policy implements the National Space Policy, establishes DOD space policy, and assigns DOD responsibilities for space capabilities. It addresses the need to deter aggression, promote stability and responsible use of the space domain, integrate space capabilities, and improve mission assurance. The National Military Strategy recognizes space domain as one of the global commons and notes our ability to project power from this global commons may be at risk. The space domain is critical for Army operations, yet it is becoming increasingly more vulnerable to malicious actions. Space capabilities and applications will be integrated into the strategy, doctrine, concepts of operations, education, exercises, operations, and contingency plans of joint forces. DOD space capabilities will be sufficiently robust, ready, secure, survivable, resilient, and interoperable. 2-100. The Services should act in accordance with DODDDODDDepartment of Defense directive 3100.10.  Integrate space capabilities and applications into all facets of their strategy, doctrine, education, training, exercises, wargames, experiments, and operations.  Organize, train, equip, and provide forces for space operations, including operating in a D3SOE. D3SOE is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of space capabilities and effects. D3SOE applies to physical assets and the EMS, and an impact to either may seriously test the limits of adaptability for all mission operations. 2-101. DOD space capabilities, effects, and activities contribute to national security by:  Providing support for the inherent right of self-defense and defense commitments to allies and partners;  Deterring, warning, and, if necessary, defending against enemy attack;  Ensuring hostile forces cannot prevent U.S. use of space capabilities;  Countering, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile purposes;  Enhancing operations of U.S. and allied forces;  Ensuring U.S. ability to conduct military and intelligence space capabilities;  Satisfying military and intelligence requirements during peace and crisis as well as through all levels of conflict; and  Supporting the activities of national policy makers, the intelligence community, the President of the U.S., Secretary of Defense, combatant commander, military Services, other federal officials, other government agencies, and continuity of government operations. A RMY S PACE P OLICY 2-102. The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army approved AR 900-1, Department of the Army Space Policy in April 2017. Space capabilities are critical enablers to projecting land power and winning in close combat. The Army’s warfighting functions (mission command, intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment) are all enhanced by incorporating space capabilities. Army Space Policy 2-103. The Army’s space policy clearly recognizes the Army’s dependency on space capabilities and continuing commitment to space operations. Army strategic space goals are explicitly echoed in AR 900-1. The Army’s has four broad space-related objectives.  Maximize the effectiveness of current space capabilities in support of operational and tactical land warfighting needs.  Influence the design, development, acquisition, and concepts of operation of future space systems that enable and enhance future land forces.  Advance the development and effective use of responsive, timely, and assured joint interoperable space capabilities.  Seamlessly integrate relevant space capabilities into the operating force. 2-104. The Army space policy confirms access to, and use of space capabilities are essential to operational success. Army space capabilities provide effects on the battlefield, enhance operational support to operating forces, and contribute to successful execution of Army missions. 2-105. The National Space Policy, DOD Space Policy, and Army space policy reflect the critical aspect space capabilities serves for current and future military operations. Space capabilities are an integral part of Army operations and necessary to achieve and maintain Army and joint land warfighting dominance.

The Army maintains deployable elements, capabilities, and provides effects to Army and joint forces. These capabilities and effects are available continuously for planned operations, contingencies, and other surge requirements and operations. They are intended to support planned, crisis, contingencies, and other surge requirements. Section I discusses the Army space capabilities, and how they are used to support mission operations. Section II provides an understanding of the space enabled capabilities used within the Army. Section III addresses the unique responsibilities of those Army Proponents who have specified roles in space operations. 3-1. The Army relies on space capabilities and systems to provide global positioning, SATCOM, weather and related environmental conditions, and intelligence collection platforms. These systems are critical enablers used by the Army to plan, communicate, navigate, maneuver, engage the enemy, provide missile warning, maintain situational understanding, protect, and sustain forces. Space capabilities are ubiquitous, and regularly used by every element of the Army and the joint force. Planning and coordination with national, Service, joint, and theater resources takes place through liaison with space operations officers. 3-2. Space capabilities increase force effectiveness across the range of military operations through improved SSA, increased efficiency with which units employ fires, maneuver, and other capabilities. The space domain affords commanders near-persistent access to A2 and AD, which is an important characteristic not always afforded to air, land, or maritime operations. 3-3. Space capabilities may be provided to Soldiers by the Army, other Services, civil agencies, and commercial entities. Units plan, coordinate, and integrate space capabilities into their operations through organic coordinating staffs. SSEs or other attached Army space forces provide space operations expertise to organizational staff and units as directed by the unit commander. 3-4. Many command and control systems rely heavily upon space operations, and that reliance carries with it an inherent vulnerability when conducting operations. Units train to maximize the capabilities space assets provide in a permissive environment; they also train to operate in the hostile environment of a D3SOE. All Soldiers receive training to recognize when they are operating in a D3SOE and the tactics, techniques and procedures to apply to work through the conditions and successfully complete their mission.

Section I discusses Army space operations, roles, and responsibilities at Army, corps and division headquarters levels. It provides an understanding of the specific roles and functions of Army space elements, which includes SSEs, ARSSTs, and other elements providing support to operations. The SSE is the commander’s primary advisor on Army space operations at the Army, corps, and division level. The SSE plans, integrates, and coordinates space support to operations across all warfighting functions. The final part of this section identifies how Army space operations supports each of the six warfighting functions, and special operations forces Section II addresses the unique space operations coordination requirements of joint space operations.

The operations process describes the activities performed by any military unit to accomplish a mission. This chapter discusses how space operations are incorporated into the operations process. It provides the processes and outputs of the seven MDMP steps with corresponding Army space specific examples. Space planners and space operations play a substantive role in targeting activities, which are one of the several integrating processes to synchronize specific functions throughout the operations process. Finally, the space planner’s role in preparing, executing and assessing space operations is provided. Note : There are no space planner positions identified on Army, corps, or division staffs. The SSE or assigned space operations officers have responsibility for integrating space operations into mission planning. Reference to a space planner refers to the organic SSE or space operations officer conducting staff planning responsibilities. ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY 5-1. The two primary methods planners use for collaboration on space operations are the Army design methodology and the MDMP. The Army’s design methodology and the MDMP do not address the full scope of space operation planning. Both may determine times and locations space operations are integrated to support the concept of operations. 5-2. The Army design methodology is a method for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. The Army design methodology is used to assist commanders and staffs with planning. Given the unique and complex nature of space operations, commanders and staffs benefit from implementing the Army design methodology to guide more detailed planning during the MDMP. This entails framing an OE, framing a problem, and developing an operational approach to solve the problem. See ADP 5-0 for additional information on the operations process. 5-3. Framing an OE involves critical and creative thinking by a group to build a model that represent both the current state of the OE and the desired end state the OE should resemble at the conclusion of an operation. A planning team designated by the commander will define, analyze, and synthesize characteristics of the operational and mission variables to develop desired future end states. During the framing process, the staff considers opportunities and support provided by space operations. 5-4. Framing a problem involves understanding and isolating the root causes of conflict discussed. Actors may represent obstacles for commanders as they seek to achieve desired end states. Creating and employing space capabilities shapes conditions in the OE supporting the commander’s objectives. 5-5. Collaboration is much more than coordination. Collaboration occurs between multiple people or organizations working together towards a common goal by sharing knowledge and actively building consensus. Throughout the operations process, the space planner must actively and continuously collaborate with commanders, subordinate commanders, staffs, and unified action partners to ensure space capabilities and effects are being efficiently integrated into all aspects of operations. PLANNING FOR SPACE OPERATIONS 5-6. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning is one of the four major activities of command and control that occurs during the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess). Commanders apply the art of command and the science of control to ensure space operations support the concept of operations. 5-7. The space planner is the subject matter expert on capabilities and creating effects from the space domain. The space planner ensures all COA meets the requirements for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability regarding the integration of space capabilities and effects. The space planner should understand the level of knowledge partner nations’ Soldiers have regarding the use space products and services. 5-8. Involving space planners early in development of the commander’s vision and planning allows for collaboration and integration with missions, functions, and tasks. A consideration of space operations is the lead-time required for capabilities and effects. Space planners should be involved early in the OPORD preparation and effects approval process to enhance the integration of space capabilities and effects. 5-9. The space planners develop Appendix 18–Space Operations to Annex C of the base order. They use Appendix 18 to describe in detail how space operations will support the concept of operations outlined in the base order. 5-10. Space planners utilize a variety of working groups when conducting planning for operations, including the cyberspace electromagnetic activity. The cyberspace electromagnetic activity working group is accountable for integrating space operations, cyberspace, and electronic warfare operations and related actions into the concept of operations. The cyberspace electromagnetic activity working group is a critical component of space operation planning and integrates within the staff’s battle rhythm. Conducting space planning separately from cyberspace and electronic warfare operations may diminish efficient employment of all three. If uncoordinated, these activities may result in conflicts, mutual interference internally, inability to communicate, loss of intelligence, the degradation of systems capabilities, and other EMS-related anomalies. The cyberspace electromagnetic activity working group will primarily deconflict detection and delivery assets through the planning and targeting processes. 5-11. Space planners participate in all aspects of COA development, analysis, and comparisons. The principle focus a space planner has in the COA process is:  Determine how space operations can best support commanders intent;  Determine how space operations can be integrated into mission operations; and  Provide input on which COA is most supportable and effective. S PACE P LANNING IN THE M ILITARY D ECISIONMAKING P ROCESS 5-12. MDMP is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a COA, and produce an OPLAN or OPORD (ADP 5-0). Space planners and staff are responsible for integrating space operations throughout the MDMP. Members of the SSE are responsible for planning by recommending specific tasks, actions, and methods to integrate space operations into the plan. 5-13. The MDMP consists of seven steps:  Step 1: Receipt of mission.  Step 2: Mission analysis.  Step 3: COA development.  Step 4: COA analysis (war game).  Step 5: COA comparison.  Step 6: COA approval.  Step 7: Orders production, dissemination, and transition. Receipt of Mission 5-14. Commanders initiate the MDMP upon receipt or in anticipation of a mission. Space planners and staff members responsible for planning and integrating space operations initiate coordination with higher headquarters staff counterparts to obtain information on current and future space operations, running estimates, and other space planning products. 5-15. The space planners proceed with analysis and assessment of the relevant aspects of the space OE within the area of operations, emphasizing the space environment and friendly, neutral, and enemy space capabilities. Based on the commander’s guidance, planning includes formulating one or more supportable space operations COAs to accomplish the mission. Space-specific planning considerations for the receipt of mission steps are in table 5-1 (below and page 5-4).

The three separate products a space operations officer prepares are the space-unique inputs to the IPB, the space running estimate, and Appendix 18–Space Operations to Annex C of the base order. The space running estimate is prepared as a tab to the Appendix 18 to the OPLAN, while the SSE provides space input to the intelligence cell’s IPB activity. Both the space running estimate and space input to IPB process are systematic, continuous methods of analyzing and documenting factors affecting space capabilities that affect the OE. These space products present the supported commander and staff with information about the space situation that pertains to accomplishing the unit mission. These products are designed to support other estimates and the MDMP. The purpose of the space running estimate is to systematically consider the space dimension of the area of operation. This chapter outlines the necessary content of space analysis as a tool to identify how space capabilities influence the operations. PURPOSE OF THE SPACE INPUT 6-1. The purpose of space input to the IPB process is to provide the intelligence cell and other staff elements, with a highly detailed analysis of the space domain and its capabilities and effects within the OE. IPB is an analytical methodology to reduce uncertainties about the enemy and the OE, and fuses the air and space domain, terrain, and weather into a consolidated, coordinated assessment. IPB is the key to preparing for the next engagement and, during peacetime, builds the foundational data that will be updated and enhanced continuously and simultaneously during operations. 6-2. An enemy’s access to space domain or space control capabilities can generate effects with impact across all levels of war. Space-related inputs to the IPB are conducted at the tactical level to support combat operations. It needs to be a focused effort directly impacting the mission or operations that leverage the results of the USSPACECOM space IPB program. This multi-agency intelligence production effort is designed to augment a combatant command’s joint IPB tailored to assessing enemy usage of the space domain with predictive courses of action. The USSPACECOM IPB process is a continuous all-source intelligence production effort tailored to support combatant commander contingency plans and OPLAN in existence. 6-3. The SSE should coordinate through the intelligence cell for access to existing USSPACECOM IPB products during mission analysis. If the SSE’s area of responsibility doesn’t have an available space input to the IPB product, or if further tailoring is necessary, the SSE should submit an intelligence requirement through the collections manager to USSPACECOM. The SSE and intelligence cell should review the joint space IPB to understand the enemy’s use of the space domain, space order of battle, and space control courses of action to integrate into the unit IPB process. Based on the intelligence cell’s limited capacity to focus on the space domain, the SSE should lead the space threat analysis effort, which will eventually be incorporated into the overall intelligence estimate. 6-4. Based on mission variables, staffs down to brigade level need to determine how best to integrate space capabilities and vulnerabilities into their mission analysis process. This effort supports all facets of MDMP and is the key space situation analysis tool used during the operation. The use of space systems may significantly affect operations involving communications, navigation, threat warning, weather monitoring, reconnaissance, and surveillance. Throughout all phases of an operation (from pre-deployment to mission completion), the space domain impact on military operations is a key factor for which the commander must plan. The SSE, in coordination with the rest of the staff, conducts the space running estimate process and space input to IPB, and makes the products available to the staff and the commander. SPACE INPUT TO THE INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD PROCESS 6-5. The SSE provides all space unique IPB products for integration to the intelligence cell. These space products are incorporated into the IPB products generated by the intelligence cell for use in the planning, preparing, and executing of all operations. The SSE coordinates closely with the intelligence cell to reduce the potential for redundant analysis. 6-6. The four steps of IPB (per ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01.3) adequately describe the process required for the SSE to provide the space operations input to IPB. However, as part of the overall mission analysis effort, step 4 also supports the space running estimate with linkage to the army warfighting functions. This is done because the SSE must evaluate the overall capability of the threat to attack or degrade space operations, and this needs to be reflected in graphic format as part of the space input to the IPB. The four IPB steps are:  Define the OE;  Describe environmental effects on operations;  Evaluate the threat; and  Determine threat courses of action. S TEP 1—D EFINE THE O PERATIONAL E NVIRONMENT Identification of Space Area of Interest 6-7. Step 1 begins with identification of the supported unit area of operations. Once the area of operations is identified, the area of interest is coordinated with the intelligence cell. Based on a clear understanding of the operational commander’s area of operations, the intelligence cell specified area of interest, and the supported unit mission, the SSE determines a separate and distinct space area of interest. The space portion of the area of interest supports and complements the total intelligence cell and movement and maneuver cell effort and is designed to depict the relevance of space to the maneuver commander’s engagement. 6-8. The space portion of the area of interest includes the region above and adjacent to the ground portion of the area of operations as illustrated in figure 6-1. The SSE may further subdivide the space area of interest in named area of interests that roughly correspond to low, medium, geosynchronous, and highly elliptical orbits. It starts at ground level, continues through LEO, and terminates with the GEO and above. Satellites moving through the identified space area of interest, space weather, and key terrestrial space-related locations (and associated terrestrial weather) are all considered in the space input to IPB. Space-related activity occurring anywhere outside of the designated space area of interest (such as space weather, space launches, and ground station activity) needs to be considered in this effort only if it directly impacts the operational mission. Identification of the space area of interest should help answer questions, such as:  What is the status and capabilities of U.S. satellites to support the mission?  Is the satellite orbit conducive to support operations within the area of operations? Initial Examination 6-9. Once the space area of interest is identified, the SSE begins an initial examination, in conjunction with the other staff elements, of available information and knowledge gaps that need to be addressed. During the initial examination, the following issues may help determine the information and knowledge gaps and areas where space assets may be requested:  The operational status of friendly space systems, availability, and importance to mission accomplishment.  Initial assessment of commercial space, and how it may impact both enemy and friendly operations;  Impact of terrestrial and space weather on mission operations; and  Initial assessment of enemy space capabilities; S TEP 2—D ESCRIBE E NVIRONMENTAL E FFECTS O N O PERATIONS 6-10. Step 2 includes terrestrial and space weather and terrain analysis relevant to space capabilities. Care is taken during this step to limit the focus to the weather and terrain impacts on space operations; otherwise there is duplication with the intelligence cell effort. In fact, this step is conducted in close coordination with the intelligence cell staff weather officer and terrain team to ensure a complementary effort. Impact of Space Weather 6-11. The first task of step 2 is to examine the impact of space weather on mission operations. The space environment consists of the full range of electromagnetic radiation and charged particles (electrons and protons, which constitute solar wind) that continually flow from the sun at varying intensities. Several types of solar activity cause energetic particle streams to intensify the normal (or background) levels of solar wind. These changes in solar wind speed and density disturb the Earth’s magnetic field as they sweep by, creating geomagnetic and ionospheric storms. The fundamental drivers of space weather activity include solar flares (a rapid, intense variation in solar brightness, including a release of radiation across the EMS) and coronal mass ejections (huge bubbles of plasma ejected from the sun which may reach Earth in as little as 15 hours). These space weather disturbances may potentially degrade both commercial and military capabilities for periods ranging from several minutes to a few hours. More extreme impacts such as loss of system performance are less likely. The potential for space weather to disrupt friendly, civil, commercial, and enemy space systems needs to be integrated early during step 2. Impacts may include space-to-space, space-to-ground, and ground-to-ground communications, radar, and optical sensors across all portions of the EMS. Table 6-1 (page 6-4) is a summary of a space running estimate product reflecting the space weather effects in an area of operation, and may not be all inclusive.

Operations to of the base order. This appendix provides a format for Appendix 18 in Army plans and orders. The format for the annex can be modified to meet the requirements of the base order and operations. This chapter also includes an example information collection plan. A-1. Appendix 18–Space Operations provides fundamental considerations, detailed information, and instructions on space forces and capabilities to Annex C of the base OPLAN or order the supported commander can use throughout the operation. Appendix 18 is used to coordinate early with the staff, to include the G-2, G-6, air defense artillery officer, and the special technical operations cell to synchronize efforts and avoid duplication of information. A-2. Appendix 18 is the primary location for space operations, but space operations information may be found in other annexes and appendices. Complete Appendix 18 as required for amplifying details. For example, SATCOM requirements would normally be covered in Annex K by the J6 and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance requirements would normally be covered in Annex B by the J2. While the G-2 is responsible for producing a space threat portion in the intelligence estimate to Annex B, the SSE may contribute to this product such as providing impacts of space weather on operations. The SSE is responsible for preparing Appendix 18 to the OPLAN or OPORD. Commanders and staffs use Appendix 18 to describe how space operations support the concept of operations described in the base plan or order. A-3. Appendix 18 uses the standard five-paragraph OPORD format and contains the information indicated in figure A-1 on pages A-2 thru A-5. All references in the content, such as Appendix 2–Operation Overlay to Annex C–Operations refer to the base plan or order. Italicized text is recommendations or amplifying information. Note : CJCSM 3130.03A is the source document for Appendix 18 material—it takes precedence over this template if any discrepancies exist. Refer to source for additional guidance. [CLASSIFICATION] Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the attachments. Place the classification marking at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph in parentheses. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions. Copy ## of ## copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue Date-time group of signature Message reference number Include heading if attachment is distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachment. ORDER (OPORD) [number] [(code name)]—[issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)] (U) References: List documents essential to understanding the attachment. edition, and scale. Policy. (U) Time zone used throughout the Order: Write the time zone established in the base plan or order. 1. (U) Situation. Include information affecting space operations that paragraph 1 of the OPLAN or OPORD does not cover or that needs expansion. mission requirement, the likelihood of operating in a denied, degraded, and disrupted space operational environment, the impact on equipment and to the mission, risk mitigation actions, and how to counter enemy actions to place friendly forces in this environment. Annex B–Intelligence as required. masking. Refer to Annex B–Intelligence as required. operations. Refer to Annex B–Intelligence as required. enemy space capabilities that can impact friendly operations. State expected enemy courses of action and employment of enemy and commercial space assets. Refer to Annex B–Intelligence as required. teams including but not limited to space support elements, Army space support teams, and an organic space weapons officer. List designation, location, and outline of plans of higher, adjacent, and other space operations-related assets that support or impact the issuing headquarters or require coordination and additional support. For example, the space coordinating authority and specified processes established for the area of responsibility. [page number] [CLASSIFICATION] [CLASSIFICATION] [issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)] describe other organizations in the area of operations that may impact the conduct of space operations or implementation of space-specific equipment, tactics, and capabilities. Consider all multinational, civil, and nongovernmental organizations such as civilian relief agencies and other customers and providers of space-based capabilities. Refer to Annex V–Interagency Coordination as required. operations. Refer to Annex B–Intelligence and Annex K–Civil Affairs Operations as required. task organization. Refer to Annex A–Task Organization as required. 2. (U) Mission. State the mission of space operations in support of the base plan or order. 3. (U) Execution. (U) Concept of Space Operations. Describe how space capabilities support the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Establish the priorities of space support to units for each phase of the operation. For example, electromagnetic interference resolution and defended asset list. Also address unique space reliances or vulnerabilities related to unit systems and capabilities. Refer to Annex C–Operations as required. Emphasize the aspects of the Base plan that will require/affect space capabilities and services. Consider deployment timelines when on-orbit assets must be moved or deployed into the AOR. phase. Include discussion of priorities of access, usage, and capabilities in each phase. (U) Tasks. Identify space tasks assigned to specific subordinate units, supporting command, or agency that provides support to the plan. Refer to any tasks in base order. Provide a concise statement of the task with sufficient detail to ensure that all elements essential to the operational concept are described properly. If the operation is phased, discuss the tasks of both supported and supporting commands/agencies during each phase. Identify space capabilities required to support the OPLAN, including the following specific areas as applicable: awareness [understanding] requirements. transit of ships, aircraft, personnel, or ground vehicles and determine the course and distance traveled or position location. Provide Global Positioning System (GPS) accuracy to support GPS-aided munitions. assets, or surface assets that ensure friendly forces and deny enemy forces the unrestricted use of space and space capabilities. Identify targetable enemy assets and limitations of targeting. Address all capabilities, effects, and limitations, related to offensive or defensive space control and navigation warfare requirements. Coordinate all plans and activities with cyberspace and electronic warfare to ensure complimentary, not redundant operations, including: [page number] [CLASSIFICATION] [CLASSIFICATION] [issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)] communications plan. Ensure defensive space priorities for satellite communication links are established and coordinated based on operational priorities. Refer to Annex H–Signal as required. or space-weapon attacks evaluated from available sensor and sources and the possible effect on the operational area. Provide notification of friendly ballistic missile launches and the impacts on the operational areas that would require early warning of affected friendly forces and an estimated point of impact for each launch. Establish provisions, in coordination with the air defense artillery officer, to disseminate information quickly throughout the operational areas. Refer to Annex B–Intelligence, Annex D–Fires, and Annex E– Protection as required. Remote Sensing/Environmental Monitoring. Identify and list meteorological, oceanographic, geodetic, and other environmental support information provided by space capabilities which affect space, air, surface, or subsurface activities and assets. Refer to Annex G–Engineer as required. external to the operational areas that would aid in operations and force positioning. Refer to Annex L– Information Collection as required. of the integrated Army and integrated joint special technical operations and alternate compensatory control measures plans in support of the commander’s objectives. Refer to Annex S–Special Technical Operations as required. that might affect the operation and require evaluation as to yield and location. Refer to Annex B–Intelligence as required. upon satellite communications, missile warning, and network architectures. Determine how organic unit systems and equipment rely upon these communications paths (architectures) optimally synchronize their effects. Refer to Annex C–Operations as required. covered in the base plan or order. Document coordination and reachback support requests in accordance with space coordinating authority guidance such as “Space Coordinating Plans” and other directives for the area of responsibility; include unique equipment sustainment and technical points of contact. 4. (U) Sustainment. Identify priorities of sustainment for space operations key tasks and specify additional instructions as required. Refer to Annex F–Sustainment as required. operations teams and operations. Specify procedures for specialized technical logistics support from external organizations as necessary. Use subparagraphs to identify priorities and specific instructions for space operations logistic support. Refer to Annex F–Sustainment and Annex P–Host-Nation Support as required. [page number] [CLASSIFICATION] [CLASSIFICATION] [issuing headquarters] [(classification of title)] support, financial management, legal support, and religious support. Refer to Annex F–Sustainment as required. to Annex F–Sustainment as required. 5. (U) Command and Signal. (U) Command. space leaders such as the space coordinating authority, Combined Space Operations Center, electronic warfare officers, and other key reachback leaders. standard operating procedures. standard operating procedures, such as air component coordination element or multinational space officers. (U) Control. chains including their location and contact information. any space coordinating authority concept of operations or guidance and Annex R–Reports as required. (U) Signal. Address any space-specific communications requirements such as secure chat communications applications. These often require a lengthy approval process to tunnel through existing networks and should be specified well in advance. Refer to Annex H–Signal as required. ACKNOWLEDGE : Include only if attachment is distributed separately from the base order. [Commander’s last name] [Commander’s rank] The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase “For the Commander.” The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarters’ files. OFFICIAL : [Authenticator’s name] [Authenticator’s position] Use only if the commander does not sign the original attachment. If the commander signs the original, no further authentication is required. If the commander does not sign, the signature of the preparing staff officer requires authentication, and only the last name and rank of the commander appear in the signature block. TABS : List lower-level attachments (tabs, and exhibits). DISTRIBUTION : ONLY if distributed separately from the base order, Annex C, or higher-level attachment. 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The glossary lists acronyms and abbreviations and terms with Army or joint definitions, and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) follows the term. Terms for which FM 3-14 is the proponent (authority) manual are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

Entries are by paragraph number, unless otherwise indicated.