*FM 3-22
Field Manual
No. 3-22
Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, D.C., 01 July 2023

Army Support to Security Cooperation

In an era of strategic competition there are times where security cooperation (SC) may become the primary effort by strategic necessity—both to deter our adversaries prior to conflict, and to strengthen our allies and partners before and during large-scale combat operations. Security cooperation is now more important than ever. Competitors at every level are leveraging trends in science, technology, and the information environment to challenge the United States and its allies and partners across the globe. The Army is adapting the way it organizes, trains, educates, and equips itself to fight these future threats structured around the multidomain operations concept, but the U.S. Army cannot do this without the assistance of allies and partners. The SC enterprise is the primary means to strengthen our alliances and partnerships by building partner capability and capacity and enabling interoperability. Going forward, the Army must expand the competitive space through activities that apply our capabilities or posture our forces in collaboration and coordination with allies and partners to achieve U.S. policy objectives while deterring escalation to armed conflict. SC is comprised of activities that support Army operations across the continuum. The entire SC enterprise must be optimized to assess, build, and leverage the capacity and capability of allies and partners while enabling and enhancing interoperability. This provides options to the joint force commander across the competition continuum. SC activities contribute significantly to obtaining information advantage through presence and access to partners. FM 3-22 provides the conceptual framework for Army support to combatant command campaign plan and theater army campaign support plan objectives. It focuses on security force assistance assessment, planning, preparation, and execution. Moreover, it provides the doctrinal guidance and direction for how the Army assesses, organizes, trains, equips, builds/rebuilds, advises, supports, and liaises with foreign security forces (FSF). The Army has a long history of conducting activities such as these. For over 100 years, providing security force assistance to partner security forces has been the rule, not the exception for the Army. +FM 3-22 contains four chapters. Change 1 updates gender verbiage in line with federal guidance. Chapter 1 begins by defining security cooperation. Next, it discusses the purpose of security cooperation, the types of security cooperation programs and activities, and the Army’s role in security cooperation. Then, the chapter discusses security cooperation planning and organizations. Finally, the chapter discusses security cooperation operational and strategic risk mitigation. Chapter 2 discusses security force assistance (SFA). First, it describes security force assistance functional considerations for achieving SFA goals and objectives. Next, the chapter discusses building partner capability and capacity and enabling and enhancing interoperability. Then the chapter discusses access, presence, influence, and partner force functions and process structure. After that, the chapter discusses SFA assessment activities, developmental activities, and planning considerations. Finally, the chapter discusses SFA advisor forces, roles, and advising considerations. Chapter 3 describes SC in the competition continuum. First, it provides an overview of the competition continuum and SC in competition below armed conflict. Next, it discusses preparing FSF for combat across the range of military operations and how the Army conducts it to set the theater for multidomain and multinational operations in competition. Then it discusses the transition to crisis or armed conflict, provides an overview of SC in crisis and the activities at echelon during crisis. After that, the chapter discusses the transition to competition or armed conflict, an overview of SC in armed conflict, and the transition back to competition and post-conflict stabilization. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on SC during post-conflict. Chapter 4 discusses legal considerations for SC. First it describes the general legal foundation for military actions and the legal authority for SC. Next, it discusses key SC funding programs and authorities. Finally, it discusses special foreign assistance authorities. This page intentionally left blank.

This chapter begins by defining security cooperation. Next, it discusses the purpose of security cooperation, the types of security cooperation programs and activities, and the Army’s role in security cooperation. Then, the chapter discusses security cooperation planning and organizations. Finally, the chapter discusses security cooperation operational and strategic risk mitigation. SECURITY COOPERATION DEFINED 1-1. Security cooperation is defined as Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. (JP 3-20). THE PURPOSE OF SECURITY COOPERATION 1-2. The purpose behind security cooperation (SC) is to enable the joint force to leverage the capabilities of our allies and partners to meet strategic objectives by building combat power and increasing available maneuver space. Strategic competition highlights the requirement for combatant commands to shape an operational environment (OE) to deter adversaries and enable U.S. forces and our allies and partners to fight from a position of advantage in conflict. By conducting SC the Army can add additional capability and create options for the joint force commander to engage, deter, and defeat adversaries through the most efficient use of U.S. resources. 1-3. Although the Department of State (DOS) leads the whole-of-government approach and provides oversight to SC, most Army activities are carried out and coordinated by, with, or through the theater army throughout the combatant command area of responsibility (AOR). These activities include—  Develop and apply capabilities and capacity.  Provide U.S. forces with access.  Build relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests. 1-4. Security cooperation missions should be tied directly to supporting theater army campaign plans and potential contingency plans. SC activities are designed to develop partner capability, increase capacity, and enable and enhance interoperability. Additionally, SC missions can be used to enable access to specific key terrain needed across domains to provide maneuver space for possible contingency plans. SHAPING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 1-5. The United States Government (USG) has worked with allies and partners in a SC context for decades, assisting partners through various activities such as exercises, training, equipping, education, conferences, and military staff talks to shape the security environment and build partner capability and capacity to prevent and deter conflict. Army support to SC plays a significant role in helping combatant commands shape the security environment by—  Building defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.  Developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.  Providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations to prevent and deter conflict. 1-6. Army forces help to shape the security environment by creating security conditions more favorable to U.S. and allied interests, even in regions in which the United States is not likely to commit large numbers of forces for major combat operations. The Army also helps shape the security environment through SC activities that enable combatant commands to assure friends, establish trust, foster mutual understanding, and help partners build the capability and capacity to defend themselves and prevent conflict. 1-7. SC activities that shape the security environment may include providing Army forces for—  Exercises and training, to include participation at Army institutional training and senior professional military education.  Security assistance (SA) teams overseas.  Security force assistance (SFA) activities that build partner capability and capacity, and enable interoperability.  Civil affairs support for stabilization, reconstruction, and development.  Foreign internal defense (FID).  Counterterrorism and support to counterterrorism.  Smaller footprint combat operations short of major conflict.  Foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  Efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction. 1-8. Army forces perform all the activities described in paragraph 1-7 while still maintaining the capability to conduct multidomain operations anywhere globally. Shaping the security environment diminishes regional tensions, enhances stability, and contributes to the security of the homeland. Therefore, as a common Army function, SC is vital to American security interests. 1-9. The Army supports the SC function through the integration of the capabilities of regionally aligned conventional forces and Army special operations forces (ARSOF). This regional alignment can enhance relationships between planning staffs while improving units’ familiarity with areas in which they will most likely be employed. This ability can be further enhanced by increasing the integration of conventional forces and special operations forces, both for the missions aimed primarily at improving the military effectiveness of partners and U.S. missions such as counter proliferation. Aligning Army forces with regions allows the integration of planning and training for combatant command contingencies, focuses language and cultural training, and provides predictable and dependable capabilities to combatant command and theater army commanders. In addition, the Army considers how to manage, train, and develop Soldiers to support regional alignment and ensure appropriate investments are made in Soldiers and leveraged by the Army. 1-10. Based on the appropriate policy, legal frameworks, and authorities, the Army supports SC in concert with partner units, institutions, and security sector functions to build partner capability and capacity and to enable and enhance interoperability. Army support to SC is derived from DOD policy guidance and helps the combatant command shape the security environment to achieve mid-to long-term objectives with partners. SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS 1-11. DOD security cooperation activities occur under the broader umbrella of DOS foreign assistance. The Office of Foreign Assistance is responsible for the supervision and overall strategic direction of foreign assistance programs administered by the DOS and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 1-12. SC programs represent established authorizations and appropriations which, when funded, joint force units, teams, and individuals can translate into specific SC activities. S ECURITY C OOPERATION A CTIVITIES 1-13. Foreign assistance is defined under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195 as amended) as any tangible or intangible item provided by the United States Government [including “by means of gift, loan, sale, credit, or guaranty”] to a foreign country or international organization under this or any other Act, including but not limited to any training, service, or technical advice, any item of real, personal, or mixed property, any agricultural commodity, United States dollars, and any currencies of any foreign country which are owned by the United States Government (see figure 1-1). 1-14. The DOS divides foreign assistance into three major areas:  Economic and developmental assistance.  Humanitarian assistance.  Security sector assistance. 1-15. The DOS supervises and directs USG security sector assistance programs, in consultation and coordination with the DOD, the Department of Justice, and other interagency partners. Security sector assistance refers to the strategic policies, programs, and activities the U.S. uses to engage with foreign partners and help shape their polices and actions in the security sector; help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges (JP 3-20). 1-16. Security sector reform is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice (JP 3-07). The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. Security sector reform (SSR) is an umbrella term that might include integrated activities in support of—  Defense and armed forces reform.  Civilian management and oversight.  Justice.  Police.  Corrections.  Intelligence reform.  National security planning and strategy support.  Border management.  Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.  Reduction of armed violence.  Meaningful participation of women in security sector agencies 1-17. Security cooperation program authorizations and appropriations are provided to the Secretary of Defense primarily under the annual National Defense Authorization Act. By statute or executive order, they are usually required to be exercised in coordination with the Secretary of State. 1-18. SC is comprised of three different activities:  SA.  SFA.  Military engagement. 1-19. SC is functionally and conceptually related to—  DOD stabilization activities.  FID. Security Assistance 1-20. SA is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation (JP 3-20). 1-21. SA programs are an element of security cooperation funded under Title 22, United States Code (22 USCUSCUnited States Code) and managed by the DOS. The DOD is the executive agent for SA under the DOS and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) administers the program for the DOD. SA programs are typically focused on the transfer of defense articles and services to eligible foreign governments, the provision of training and education to FSF, and the sale of construction services in support of partner nations’ military establishments. 1-22. The Army may implement elements of 22 USCUSCUnited States Code security assistance programs under the direction of DSCA and the overall management of the DOS. Examples of SA programs include— • The foreign military financing program (known as FMFP). This is an appropriated program administered by DSCA. The program consists of congressionally appropriated grants and loans which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase U.S. defense articles, services, and training through either foreign military sales or direct commercial sales. • Foreign military sales (FMSFMSFinancial management specialist) programs. These include the provision of materiel, training, medical, and construction services to a foreign country. • Foreign military construction services that provide for the construction of requisite military installations and facilities in support of a foreign military activity. • Lease of defense articles to friendly governments for specified missions and for specific periods. • International military education and training (IMET) for professional military education. • Drawdowns that allow for the transfer of DOD stocked defense articles, services, and military education and training. 1-23. Army forces may also perform additional activities related to the training of partner military forces that were equipped under 22 USCUSCUnited States Code. 10 USCUSCUnited States Code funds may be extended for this purpose consistent with legal authority, and only with Secretary of Defense approval. Security Force Assistance 1-24. Security force assistance is Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20) 1-25. Consistent with DOD policy for SFA, the Army develops, maintains, and institutionalizes the capabilities of its personnel to support DOD efforts to organize, train, equip, build and rebuild, advise, support, and liaise with FSF and relevant supporting institutions. 1-26. Security forces are duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state (JP 3-22). When directed to do so in accordance with appropriate legal authorities, Army forces conduct security force assistance activities in support of combatant command campaign plans and national objectives. Military Engagement 1-27. Military engagement is contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence (JP 3-0). 1-28. Military engagement is one of the primary ways SC practitioners achieve influence. These key leader engagements occur at all echelons up to the highest levels of the Army staff and sometimes include major combined staff talks. Although it is a common practice for military personnel to engage their counterparts in other militaries at all echelons, it is still critical for individuals and organizations conducting military engagement to understand and remember that the DOS has primary oversight for the diplomatic instrument of national power. It is also important to understand the limitations of influence achieved through military engagement. In most partner nations, major policy decisions are still reserved for political leaders, limiting the ability to influence major policy decisions through military engagement. 1-29. SC practitioners should be aware that the DOS often uses the term military-to-military engagement to refer to military exercises, where the DOD considers these exercises to be a form of SFA. DOD Stabilization Activities 1-30. Stabilization activities are the various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0). One of the guiding principles underlaying stabilization activities is that a safe and secure environment must be maintained or restored in order to provide necessary governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. 1-31. The nature of an OE may require U.S. forces to conduct several types of joint operations simultaneously, while also supporting enduring USG stabilization efforts. Although SC is not conducted exclusively within the limits of stabilization, it is a core prevention effort. Preventive activities conducted by the military often support USG diplomatic efforts before, during, or after a crisis (JP 3-07). 1-32. Stabilization activities can be conducted throughout the competition continuum. Common stability tasks include—  Establish civil security.  Conduct security cooperation.  Support to civil control.  Restore essential services.  Support to governance.  Support to economic and infrastructure development. Foreign Internal Defense 1-33. FID is a whole-of-government approach to strengthen a foreign government against ongoing or potential internal threats. FID is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). 1-34. FID includes indirect support, direct support (not involving U.S. combat operations), and combat operations. FID can occur across the range of military operations. Army FID activities may be conducted unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort or may support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts. FID under Army decisive action may be conducted to defeat an enemy or to establish conditions necessary to achieve the national strategic end state. FID is a unified action, and a synergistic application of all instruments of national and multinational power. 1-35. FID includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces. FID activities may employ the indirect use of military instruments along with the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. FID is a whole-of-government approach that nurtures partners towards democratic governance and military deference to civilian rule. FID principles intend to preclude the need to deploy large numbers of U.S. military personnel and equipment. FID involves the support of a host-nation standing government and its military or paramilitary forces. FID is a key supporting component of a host nation’s internal defense and development program. The focus of all U.S. FID efforts is to support the internal defense and development program to build capability and capacity of the host nation to self-sufficiency. Relationships Between SC and FID 1-36. SC and FID have functional—not hierarchical—relationships. The primary differences are— • FID is a whole-of-government approach while SC (to include both SA and SFA) is focused on the security sector. • FID is focused purely on internal threats while SC (to include both SA and SFA) can be focused on internal or external threats. 1-37. SC and FID overlap but neither is a subset of the other. FID can be broader than SC while including SC as part of the overall FID program. At the same time, SC can be much broader than FID because it can be focused on both internal and external threats. S ECURITY C OOPERATION P ROGRAMS 1-38. SC programs are typically accompanied by well-established planning, execution, and assessment processes, and although authorizations and appropriations for specific programs may change over time, the most enduring programs include—  Defense contacts and familiarization, which includes military staff talks, planning workshops, and similar events to facilitate exchange of best practices and the development of combined operating concepts.  Personnel exchanges, which involve the assignment of defense personnel, reciprocal or not, to partner nation defense ministries, military units, and other organizations.  Combined exercises and training, which involves multilateral exercises and/or training of U.S. forces in tandem with partner nation forces. Unlike most SC activities, their primary purpose is to enhance or maintain U.S. force readiness.  SC education programs, where the USG facilitates the participation of FSF personnel in U.S. professional military education (PME) institutions, which results in trained FSF personnel at multiple levels to perform broad tasks within an FSF and their supporting institutions.  International armaments cooperation, which comprises activities with partner nation defense sectors involving cooperative research, acquisition, development, testing, and evaluation of defense technologies, systems, or equipment.  Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief programs encourage and enable partner nation security forces to relieve or reduce human suffering, which results in higher levels of trust and confidence between FSF and a local populace.  Operational support, which entails the provision of defense articles, services, and logistical support to enable partner nation military forces to conduct or sustain active military operations.  Train-and-equip and provision defense articles programs, which allow the USG to offer training, defense articles, and defense services, which results in developed capability and capacity that a partner nation can employ to fulfill specific roles.  Defense institutional capacity building programs support partner nation efforts to improve security sector governance and core management competencies. These interactions result in sufficient partner nation oversight and accountability of a FSF and strengthen the alignment of U.S. and partner nation strategic and operational interests.  +Women, peace, and security programs, which encourage and enable partner nation security forces to consider the different security needs of men, women, boys, and girls, which results in a more capable force; reduces human suffering; and enhances engagement between FSF and a local populace. ARMY ROLES IN SECURITY COOPERATION 1-39. The Army provides forces for military missions in foreign countries to support the national interests of the United States and provides as directed, assistance in organizing, training, equipping, building and rebuilding, advising, supporting and liaising with the military forces of foreign nations. Shaping the security environment diminishes regional tensions, enhances stability, and contributes to the security of the homeland, and as a common Army function, makes SC vital to U.S. security interests. 1-40. At the Headquarters, Department of the Army level, the two primary organizations that provide the policy, management, and oversight for SC are the Department of the Army Management Office for Army International Affairs (DAMO-SSR) within DA G-3/5/7 and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation (DASA-DEC) within the U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology. 1-41. The DAMO-SSR mission includes developing, advancing, and integrating Army strategies and concepts to strengthen alliances and attract new partners in support of Army and combatant command objectives; developing, articulating, integrating, and advancing strategies, concepts, and policies for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational interoperability, and SC; identifying, coordinating, and facilitating multinational and coalition activities between the Army and nominated partners’ land forces in support of Headquarters, Department of the Army priorities and objectives; and providing cross-functional, directorate-wide support with multinational and coalition expertise. 1-42. The DASA-DEC mission is to manage Army security assistance and armaments cooperation programs that engage allies and partners across the full spectrum of Army acquisition to achieve force dominance. DASA-DEC leads the U.S. Army Security Assistance Enterprise–the collective Army organizations involved in security assistance–providing leadership, resource management, and policy oversight for FMSFMSFinancial management specialist, international military education and training, and DOD global train-and-equip missions. 1-43. Headquarters, Department of the Army leaders also directly conduct military engagement through both key leader engagements and staff talks. Army staff talks provide established forums to formulate bilateral action plans that develop capabilities for enabling and enhancing interoperability between the Army and the land component of its respective partners. Both DAMO-SSR and DASA-DEC are directly involved with coordinating and preparing senior Army leaders for these critical military engagement activities. Theater Army Role 1-44. The Army normally executes its 10 USCUSCUnited States Code, responsibilities to organize, train, and equip operational Army units through the theater army to support combatant command objectives. The theater army sets and maintains the theater for the conduct of multidomain operations. Setting the theater includes posturing Army forces and conducting SC activities that shape an OE and prevent conflict. Setting the theater shapes the environment and produces the conditions necessary for the joint force commander, when directed, to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and assure freedom of action. Sustained military engagement requires a combination of integrated regionally aligned conventional forces and ARSOF. Military engagement, along with intelligence collection and assured access, is critical to enabling the force to win decisively. Setting the theater includes theater opening; port and terminal operations; conducting reception, staging onward movement, and integration; force modernization and theater-specific training; Army support to other Services; as well as common user logistics to Army, joint, and multinational forces operating in the theater. 1-45. The theater army develops a theater campaign support plan in an annex to the combatant command campaign plan. The theater campaign support plan serves as the mechanism between planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes by, with, or through the theater army. It is supported by Headquarters, Department of the Army; functional Army Service component commands (ASCCs); Army commands; direct reporting units (known as DRUs); and the Reserve Component to resource SC activities that shape an OE and achieve combatant command campaign plan (CCP) objectives and joint strategic campaign plan end states. Generating Force Role 1-46. The primary role of Army generating force organizations is the long-term generation and sustainment of operational Army capabilities, as well as the development of partner defense and security establishments in support of the theater army requirements. 1-47. The future security environment requires employment of generating force capabilities in support of broader SC objectives to include— • Developing multinational partners’ security forces and defense establishments across the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P). • Repairing, developing, and managing infrastructure that supports SC programs as well as stability operations. • Adapting U.S. conventional forces across the domains of DOTMLPF-P to shape the security environment. • Providing PME to foreign security force partners through the IMET program, which is one of the primary methods by which the generating force directly supports theater security cooperation efforts. 1-48. Generating forces can often perform these types of missions with great effectiveness and efficiency. Generating forces can perform 10 USCUSCUnited States Code functions either in generating and sustaining the operational Army, or for supporting ongoing operations. Similarly, operational Army planners should reach back to Army institutions to take full advantage of generating force capabilities. Those capabilities are assembled, exercised, and employed on a regular basis to ensure they effectively support operations when required. SC planners should consider leveraging organizations from the Army generating function when tasked with developing a partner’s generating function as these organizations maintain the knowledge, skills, and expertise to affect change across the DOTMLPF-P domains. Operating Force Role 1-49. The Army provides operational forces to the joint force to meet combatant command requirements that include security cooperation. Deployed Army forces’ primary contribution to SC consists of SFA conducted under 10 USCUSCUnited States Code authorities. Conventional forces, ARSOF, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve provide the bulk of the Army’s means to support and operationalize the CCP and ASCCASCCArmy service component commander campaign support plan objectives. Executed early enough and in support of broad national interests and policy goals, SC programs and activities provide an effective means for building relationships, building partner military capability and capacity, enabling and enhancing interoperability, and providing access to reduce the risks associated with conflict and promote stability in regions. Materiel Equipping Force Role 1-50. The United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), part of U.S. Army Materiel Command, in coordination with DSCA via DASA-DEC, manages Army security assistance, providing total program management, including planning, delivery, and life-cycle support of equipment, services, and training to and in coproduction with U.S. multinational partners. USASAC negotiates and implements coproduction agreements, serves as proponent for Army security assistance information management and financial policy, and provides logistic procedural guidance to the Army security assistance community. USASAC ensures transfer of defense articles and services to international and friendly foreign governments to promote the sharing of common burdens and build allied capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. The FMSFMSFinancial management specialist program is that portion of U.S. security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and conducted on the basis of formal contracts and agreements between the USG and an authorized recipient government or international organization. FMSFMSFinancial management specialist includes government-to-government sales of defense articles or defense services, from DOD stocks or through new procurements under DOD managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. The President of the United States designates countries and international organizations eligible to participate in FMSFMSFinancial management specialist. The DOS makes those recommendations and approves individual programs on a case-by-case basis. Countries approved to participate in this program may obtain defense articles and services by paying with their own national funds or with funds provided through USG-sponsored assistance programs. In certain cases, defense articles, services, and training may be obtained on a grant basis. DSCA administers the FMSFMSFinancial management specialist program for the DOD. 1-51. The United States Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) is a subordinate organization within USASAC responsible for forming, training, and employing geographically dispersed SA teams tasked with increasing partner capability and capacity worldwide to meet combatant command requirements. SATMO provides tactical level expertise and creative training solutions to the Army security assistance enterprise in accordance with USASAC priorities to achieve operational results and strategic impacts. SATMO conducts training of allies and partners in support of FMSFMSFinancial management specialist materiel cases, via non-material (training only) FMSFMSFinancial management specialist cases, and under 10 USCUSCUnited States Code authorities (for example, Section 333). SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING 1-52. Strategic direction connects and synchronizes the joint staff, combatant commands, Services, and other supporting agency activities. The purpose of national strategic guidance is to identify U.S. interests and state policy objectives so that strategic plans can be developed that link ends, ways, and means with acceptable levels of risk. 1-53. Figure 1-2 on page 1-10 depicts how national strategic guidance informs DOS and DOD planning efforts at echelon. Army SC activities should support theater, functional command, and Army institutional and national objectives as stated in organizational plans and U.S. law. Theater objectives are stated in the combatant command theater, regional, and country planning documents. 1-54. The development of campaign and contingency plans requires strategic guidance from civilian and military policymakers. All DOD security cooperation activities are guided by national strategic direction and guidance. DOD’s planning is guided by top-down strategic direction and informed by bottom-up assessment. 1-55. The National Security Strategy outlines the President’s vision for providing enduring security for the American people. National strategic guidance identifies the importance of allies and partners to help build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance collective influence, shape the global strategic environment, and to solve shared challenges. DOD P LANNING 1-56. DOD strategic guidance and planning documents provide and describe the nation’s defense priorities and objectives and implementation strategies to balance the joint force to meet future contingencies. The National Defense Strategy 1-57. The Secretary of Defense prepares the National Defense Strategy. This document stems from the National Defense Strategy (NDS) The National Defense Strategy encompasses the Secretary’s vision for DOD’s role in protecting the American people and U.S. interests. The National Military Strategy 1-58. The National Military Strategy applies the considerable body of policy and strategy direction provided in the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy, and other documents into an overarching military strategic framework. The National Military Strategy is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)’s military advice for how the joint force accomplishes the defense objectives set forth in the National Defense Strategy and from the direction provided by the President and Secretary of Defense. Joint Strategic Campaign Plan 1-59. The Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) is a five-year global strategic campaign plan (reviewed every two years) that operationalizes the National Military Strategy. It is the CJCS’s primary document to guide and direct the preparation and integration of joint force campaign, contingency, and support plans. The JSCP establishes a common set of processes, products, priorities, roles, and responsibilities to support the integration of the joint force’s global operations, activities, and investments from day-to-day campaigning to contingencies. The JSCP is the primary means by which the CJCS provides strategic and operational guidance in the preparation of joint plans. Combatant Command Campaign Plan 1-60. The CCP is the combatant command’s primary instrument for operationalizing a theater strategy. The CCP consists of all plans contained within the established theater or functional responsibilities, to include contingency plans, subordinate and supporting plans, posture plans, and country-specific SC sections for country plans and operations in execution (JP 5-0). The CCP typically contains a country-specific SC section, or simply “country plan,” for the partner nation that generally contains the SC-specific intermediate military objectives that enable the accomplishment of larger strategic objectives and end states. Combatant commands have the primary responsibility for developing country plans. While the processes and contents for country plans vary with each combatant command, they all focus on establishing country objectives that support the CCP and associated regional campaign plans and functional campaign plans. Those objectives are often stated as broad goals linked to the DOD security cooperation focus areas, and depending on the combatant command, objectives may be stated as objectives, lines of effort, end states, or key tasks. Regardless of the term used, they express the key effect or outcome that the combatant command seeks to achieve in each country. 1-61. Based upon SC goals and objectives, as outlined in SC planning guidance, significant security cooperation initiatives are identified and generally led by the combatant commands. The significant security cooperation initiatives are coordinated with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the joint staff and involve applying multiple security cooperation tools and programs. Significant security cooperation initiatives may be overseen and managed by various DOD components and the DOS over multiple years to realize a country or region-specific objective or functional objective and involve several interagency actors. Often, a specific line of effort in the country-specific SC section of a CCP articulates the significant security cooperation initiatives. Army Campaign Support Plan 1-62. The Army campaign support plan and its supporting theater army security cooperation plans identify the combatant command objectives and the supporting Army lines of effort, tasks, subtasks, activities, and resources required to support those objectives over a 5-year time horizon and synchronized with the program objective memorandum. Country support plans reflect a situational understanding of the whole-of-government effort in a partner country, incorporate Service-specific equities, and are developed in coordination with the country team’s integrated country strategy and informed by DOS and DOD regional goals and overall U.S. policy. DOS P LANNING D OCUMENTS 1-63. Strategic planning is carried out by the DOS at the departmental, bureau, and country levels. These plans are used to establish budgets for all department activities, including foreign assistance. The most influential DOS planning documents that support SC are the joint strategic plan, joint regional strategy, and the integrated country strategy. Joint Strategic Plan 1-64. DOS in conjunction with the USAID develop the Joint Strategic Plan, using higher level guidance (such as the NSS), that outlines the goals, objectives, and performance requirements for both agencies in support of Administration priorities. The Joint Strategic Plan sets forth the vision and direction for both the DOS and USAID and presents how they will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance. Joint Regional Strategy 1-65. The joint regional strategy is designed to articulate priorities within a region or sector and lay out specific tradeoffs necessary to bring resources in alignment with the highest potential for impact. The joint regional strategy is also used to inform and advise integrated country strategies and shape performance reviews. For the joint regional strategy, the DOS partners with USAID to develop a joint strategy that articulates shared DOS-USAID priorities to guide missions as they prioritize engagement and resources and respond to unanticipated events. Integrated Country Strategy 1-66.. The Joint Strategic Plan informs the development of an embassy’s integrated country strategy. The Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) is an embassy product that reflects the ambassador’s plan. It describes the whole-of-government approach and establishes a common set of mission goals and objectives to promote U.S. priorities within a host country. S TRATEGIC G UIDANCE D RIVES A RMY C AMPAIGN S UPPORT P LANNING 1-67. Figure 1-2 depicts how national strategic guidance, along with other DOS, DOD, and other supporting agency guidance, informs and influences the Army campaign support plan. Army SC activities should support theater, functional command, Army institutional or national objectives as stated in organizational plans and U.S. law. Theater objectives are stated in the combatant command theater, regional, and country planning documents. ASCCASCCArmy service component commander SC Planning Considerations 1-68. ASCCASCCArmy service component commander security cooperation country support planners attempt to understand each assigned combatant command objective as it relates to authoritative sources such as multinational standardization agreements, partner country doctrine, or U.S. Army doctrine, depending on the agreed standard for achieving the intended effect or capability. Against these requirements, ASCCASCCArmy service component commander security cooperation planners assess partner country DOTMLPF-P related to the objective through home station research and in-country visits. U.S. Embassy cables, civil affairs assessments, and intelligence community reports can be valuable resources to support this assessment. Finally, mission analysis considers applicable U.S. policy; available SC resources; time considerations; religious, cultural, regional political-military environment; and the SC efforts of other countries with the partner country. The combatant command country plan, the embassy’s ICS, and the CCP are important references in this analysis. ASCCs coordinate a process whereby combatant command planners and country team officials review and concur with the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander’s assessment of requirements and plans. Army SC Practitioners 1-69. Planners within Army organizations who are tasked to conduct SC must understand and nest their plan with the strategic guidance they receive from both the DOD and DOS. Specifically, Army SC practitioners must look at both the theater army security cooperation plan and the ICS for the country they are operating within. Army SC practitioners can expect these plans to generally align, however different publishing timelines will mean that one of the two plans will always be more current. Army SC practitioners must also remember that, outside of a joint operational area, the DOS has primacy for all USG activities. SFA will most often be conducted in this context. KEY ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN SECURITY COOPERATION 1-70. Several agencies and organizations play a role in executing the multiple facets of SC. Roles and relationships among USG agencies and organizations, state, tribal, and local governments, and the U.S. chief of mission and country team in a U.S. embassy overseas must be clearly understood. SC organizations traditionally respond through two chains of command: one through the embassy country team and the other through the combatant command. U. S. A MBASSADOR 1-71. The U.S. diplomatic mission includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies physically present in the country. The U.S. ambassador (chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission), often referred to as the chief of mission, is the principal officer in the embassy. This person oversees all USG programs and interactions with and in a host country. The ambassador derives authority and responsibilities from the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-465), Section 207. 1-72. The U.S. ambassador is the personal representative of the President and the Secretary of State and reports to the President through the Secretary of State. The U.S. ambassador leads and is part of the country team, ensuring all in-country activities best serve U.S. interests, as well as regional and international objectives. Depending on the size or economic importance of a country, the United States may maintain only an embassy and no consular offices. However, the United States may maintain one or more consular offices in some countries. Typically, Army elements conducting SC activities coordinate with embassy officials, even in nations with a consular office. Relationships with consular offices are determined on a case-by-case basis. The same basic entities and offices existing in the embassy are present or liaised at the consular offices. C OUNTRY T EAM 1-73. The country team is the point of coordination within the host country for the diplomatic mission. The members of the country team vary depending on the levels of coordination needed and the conditions within that country. The country team is usually led by the chief of mission, and it is made up of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of mission. The team may include the senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT), the security cooperation organization (SCO), the political-military affairs officer, and any other embassy personnel desired by the ambassador. 1-74. The country team informs various organizations of operations, coordinates elements, and achieves unity of effort. Usually, the primary military members are the SDO/DATT and the SCO. Military engagement with a host country is conducted through the SC organization. However, several other attachés and offices may be integral to SC activities, programs, and missions as well. The country team provides the foundation of local knowledge and interaction with the host country government and population. As permanently established interagency organizations, country teams represent the single point of coordination, integration, and synchronization of SC activities supported by combatant commands and the theater army. P OLITICAL -M ILITARY A FFAIRS 1-75. The political-military affairs office within the country team is the DOS’s principal link to the DOD. This office provides policy direction in the areas of international security, SA, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade by— • Ensuring commercial exports of defense articles and services advance U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. • Promoting and facilitating closer synchronization and coordination between DOS and DOD through the management of the foreign policy advisor and military advisor programs. • Managing 22 USCUSCUnited States Code military grant assistance and concurrence/coordination on various DOD 10 USCUSCUnited States Code authorities. • Coordinating, negotiating, and concluding international agreements to meet U.S. security requirements. SDO/DATT 1-76. DODDDODDDepartment of Defense directive 5205.75 assigns the responsibilities for the operation of the DOD elements at U.S. embassies. This directive creates the position of SDO/DATT as the principal DOD official in a U.S. embassy as designated by the Secretary of Defense. Joint responsibility for the oversight and management of the SDO/DATT is delegated to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 1-77. The SDO/DATT is the chief of mission’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues. The SDO/DATT is also the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission and serves as the single point of contact for all DOD matters involving the embassy or DOD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. 1-78. The SDO/DATT is the key figure within the embassy and the combatant command for establishing and fostering the SC relationship with the host country. This is best accomplished through influence, advice, and expertise—and not necessarily through established authority. Establishing a good relationship begins with a sharing of interests and ideas. The SDO/DATT should recognize that there is a common foundation upon which to build rapport with host-nation military counterparts, namely the responsibility to provide for internal and external security and be a responsible member within the existing regional security architecture. The problems of DOTMLPF-P are common to the armed forces of all nations. The successful SDO/DATT will take a sincere personal interest in the host nation’s culture, history, customs, and religion, and likewise will cultivate both personal and professional relationships with local counterparts, which often forms the basis of life-long contacts and friendships. S ECURITY C OOPERATION O RGANIZATIONS 1-79. These organizations include all DOD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SC management functions. Security cooperation organizations work under the authority of the COM. Security cooperation organizations may be referred to as military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel who have been designated to perform SC functions. 1-80. The SCO has the greatest visibility over the coordination and execution of SC activities and the partner nation’s ability to build and sustain enduring capacity. Generally, the SCO has responsibility for monitoring and evaluating the results of SC activities to inform COM and combatant command decision making. Title 22 USCUSCUnited States Code, Section 2321i outlines the seven legislated SCO SA functions as follows:  Equipment and services case management (for example, FMSFMSFinancial management specialist case management).  Training management.  Program monitoring.  Evaluation and planning of the host-nation government’s military capabilities and requirements.  Administrative support.  Promoting rationalization, standardization, enhanced interoperability, and other defense cooperation measures.  Liaison functions exclusive of advisory and training assistance. C OMBATANT C OMMAND 1-81. In accordance with the Unified Command Plan, combatant commands are established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Combatant commands are assigned AORs and work in support of, and in close coordination with U.S. embassies within their AORs to achieve U.S. national interests and global end states as detailed in the NSS and other guidance documents. This operational relationship is primarily related to the SC organization’s execution of the combatant command’s theater campaign plan with the host country’s military. The combatant command and the ambassador ensure that the SDO/DATT does not receive conflicting guidance, instructions, or priorities. If conflicting guidance occurs, the SDO/DATT must seek clarification or resolution. The SDO/DATT chief is uniquely able to understand both the combatant command and the ambassador, balance their respective priorities, and leverage their resources. A key challenge for the SDO/DATT is to respond to the direction of the ambassador while at the same time satisfying coordination and support requirements from the combatant command. 1-82. DOD’s strategic end states support the NSS to ensure the strategic end states complement and support foreign policy objectives. As part of theater campaign planning, combatant commands develop country plans that align with each ambassador’s goals within the AOR because the activities and investments typically occur at the country level. Combatant commands exercise authority for force protection over all DOD personnel (including their dependents) assigned, attached, transiting through, or training in the combatant command’s AOR, except for those for whom the COM retains security responsibility. This force protection authority enables combatant commands to change, modify, prescribe, and enforce force protection measures for covered forces. Combatant commands also provide directive authority over forces conducting exercises in that AOR. T HEATER A RMY 1-83. The theater army is the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander to the combatant command and fulfills all requirements of a Service component for Army forces assigned or attached to the combatant command. The theater army’s primary responsibilities are—  Execute combatant commander’s daily operational requirements.  Provide administrative control of Army forces.  Set and maintain the theater.  Set and support the operational areas.  Plan and coordinate the consolidation of gains in support of joint operations.  Exercise command and control over Army forces in theater.  Perform joint roles in limited scope, scale, and duration. 1-84. ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-93 depicts the organization of the theater army main command post. The theater army SC division normally resides within the assistant chief of staff G-3. It normally consists of a headquarters section, a plans and exercises section, and an international military affairs section with the total division consisting of eight to ten personnel and normally led by a colonel or lieutenant colonel (See figure 1-3 on page 1-16). D EFENSE S ECURITY C OOPERATION A GENCY 1-85. DSCA is a separate agency of the DOD under the direction, authority, and control of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P). It is important to understand that the OUSD(P) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. OUSD(P) authority derives from Section 134 of 10 USCUSCUnited States Code; and other responsibilities are detailed in DODDDODDDepartment of Defense directive 5205.75. DSCA responsibilities include, but are not limited to—  Establishing overall requirements, criteria, and procedures for the selection and training of personnel engaged in SC activities.  Administering and supervising SA planning and programs.  Coordinating with the combatant command to establish appropriate agreements and procedures to provide guidance to and ensure oversight of SDO/DATTs in discharging SC and SA programs in accordance with applicable law, regulations, and directives.  Conducting periodic reviews to ensure that Service, inter-Service, and interagency training available for SC and SA personnel are adequate. This includes the periodic curriculum review and update of Defense Security Cooperation University courses.  Conducting international logistics and sales negotiations with foreign countries.  Serving as the DOD focal point for liaison with U.S. industry with regard to SA activities.  Administering assigned SC programs. (See DODDDODDDepartment of Defense directive 5105.65 for more information about DSCA.) OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC RISK MITIGATION 1-86. Effective SC activities involve mitigating and managing strategic and operational risk from force generation to mission employment. Risk mitigation does not rely on the maturity of the force or supporting institutions as a whole but is focused on the foreign element in question. Conditions determine when to use an element of FSF. Commanders and staffs use assessments obtained from Army forces to determine objectives and requirements for mitigating and managing risk. Risk applies to how well FSF, USG agencies, and other host-nation and partner organizations can tolerate changes in an OE, as well as the challenges and conditions inherent to the operation. Leaders of U.S. forces and FSF assess the risk associated with employment and mitigate that risk as much as possible. 1-87. Risk reduction measures identified in SC planning add to the plan’s flexibility during execution. A flexible plan can mitigate risk by partially compensating for a lack of information. SC planning requires a thorough, comprehensive approach to analyzing and agreeing upon risk reduction measures. Each SC activity is distinct based on context and changes over time. There is a risk of focusing SC efforts in one area or type of relationship at the expense of others based on short-term goals. To mitigate this risk, SC activities should be regarded as providing the means and ways to achieve meaningful mid-to long-term objectives with partners as well as the global end states. During the Cold War, SC primarily focused on interoperability programs with core partners and less frequently on building military capabilities of a weak and fledgling nation. S TRATEGIC R ISK M ITIGATION 1-88. SC activities in one country can affect the regional and global security environment. SC can complicate relationships with other regional partners, especially when there is tension between states within a region. Commanders and their staffs should be aware of the possible strategic risks of SC to inform decision makers and to mitigate the risk where possible. This could affect the planning and execution of SC in other countries in the region. O PERATIONAL R ISK M ITIGATION 1-89. Operational risks are those associated with the Army’s ability to execute strategy successfully within acceptable human, materiel, financial, and strategic costs. Consideration of operational risk requires assessing the Army’s ability to execute current, planned, and contingency operations in the near term. Key issues that pose risk to Army SC activities in the near term include limited SFA authority, limited ability to work with forces outside the ministry of defense, and partner will. 1-90. As a FSF capability matures, and FSF successfully completes more autonomous operations, the echelon and degree of partnering may decrease depending on the relationship with a particular country and the strategic objectives. While effective coordination is always required and initial efforts may require completely fused efforts, the objective is to build the capability and capacity of FSF to conduct all efforts autonomously. Operations and plans are always at risk of compromise, and prudent operational security and foreign disclosure policies and procedures should be taken when sharing information and intelligence.

This chapter discusses SFA. First, it describes SFA functional considerations for achieving SFA goals and objectives. Next, the chapter discusses building partner capability and capacity and enabling and enhancing interoperability. Then the chapter discusses access, presence, influence, and partner force functions and process structure. After that, the chapter discusses SFA assessment activities, SFA developmental activities, and SFA planning considerations. Finally, the chapter discusses SFA advisor forces, roles, and advising considerations. SFA SUPPORT TO SECURITY COOPERATION 2-1. SC planners at the joint level develop theater SC plans that focus on deterring or countering adversary actions or set conditions to enable the joint force to fight from a position of advantage in conflict should deterrence fail. 22 USCUSCUnited States Code security assistance is executed by SCOs located within each embassy country team. DOS has the lead for these actions and executes them in accordance with the ICS. The Army supports these SA efforts through the USASAC, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Security Assistance Training Field Activity, and by assigning Army personnel to SCOs. 2-2. 10 USCUSCUnited States Code security force assistance is executed by component commands from every branch of the military. SFA is the primary tool for executing the theater army strategy across the competition continuum. The bulk of Army support to SC is accomplished through SFA under the direction of the theater army. FUNCTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ACHIEVING SFA GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 2-3. The doctrine in this field manual emphasizes conducting SFA developmental activities because of their relationship to other SC activities, strategic goals, and objectives. Synchronizing SFA activities with other SC efforts is critical to the success of achieving strategic end states. U.S. forces may achieve regional security through partnerships with a particular country, by building its capability and capacity to provide for internal and external defense. Actions that provide a particular country with an internal and external defense capability contribute to the goal of maintaining stability in a region. The ultimate goal of security force assistance is to create FSF that are competent, capable, committed, and confident, and that have a security apparatus that supports U.S. policy related to achieving regional stability. 2-4. While few foreign defense establishments and FSF are organized in the same manner as U.S. forces, they are likely to have organizations and forces that fulfill the executive, generating, and operating functions. In many FSF, the same organization tasked with executive direction will fulfill functions in the operational force as operational and tactical headquarters, and operating forces will be organized to fulfill the organization’s generating requirements. 2-5. SC planners require some knowledge of how the U.S. Army executive, generating, and operating functions work to recognize the process gaps that should be addressed to support development of specific FSF capabilities. Building sustainable capacity among allies and partners at the operational level requires enduring strategies that draw from equally developed institutional support systems at the generating and executive functions and should be executed and synchronized in a manner that achieves lasting effect. 2-6. In SFA, relationships with the partner force are the “advisors pacing item.” In military parlance, a pacing item is a vital piece of equipment that has been designated as critical for a unit to accomplish its mission. Relationships are built on trust, and trust requires a certain level of influence. Where persuasion may rely on peer pressure, coercion, or ignorance to compel action (good or bad) in the short term, influence is much more enduring and requires a track record of positive interactions, shared risk, and inspiring leadership that develops into trust over time. BUILDING PARTNER CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY 2-7. SFA consists of those SC activities tied directly to the security capability and capacity of a partner FSF. Army SFA activities develop the capability and capacity of partner nation security forces to defend against internal and external security threats, contribute to and enable multinational and multidomain operations and interoperability, and assist other countries to provide for their own security. Capability is the ability to complete a task or execute a course of action under specified conditions and level of performance (JP 3-20). In this case, it would be the ability of foreign security forces or their supporting institutions to execute a given task under specified conditions and levels of performance (for example, outputs). 2-8. Capacity is the extent (scale, scope, and duration parameters) to which a task can be performed. Capacity is the measurable aspects of a capability (JP 3-20). Capacity describes the scale and duration to which a task can be performed (for example, outcomes). 2-9. Developing partner capability is not an end state but rather an interim step toward building partner capacity. Developing partner FSF capabilities can affect a region’s balance of power and building a partner FSF’s capacity to permanently maintain that power may or may not be a desired strategic end state. For example, a partner FSF trained to defeat an insurgency, once defeated, may turn on a bordering neighbor or launch a military coup to overthrow the existing government. Therefore, depending on U.S. strategic objectives, SFA activities may be planned and executed to provide a temporary or limited enhancement of partner FSF capability in the near term, a more involved institutional program that builds enduring capacity over the long term, or a hybrid combination of both. In any scenario, SFA planners and practitioners should have a clear and thorough understanding of strategic guidance and intent, partner nation requirements, and U.S. legal authorities for developmental activities. C APABILITY C ONSIDERATIONS 2-10. Partner nation capability development strategies must nest with the ICS, country team objectives, the combatant command’s country plan, and the partner nation’s objectives and stated mission requirements. The development strategy should have an effects-based approach where planners seek to understand both the effect they are trying to achieve, as well as potential negative effects that could occur from changing any existing capability residing with the partner FSF. The ability to assess the effort and the incorporation of the assessment criteria into the initial creation of the operational approach are both important. 2-11. The initiative design document assists SFA planners and practitioners in identifying and selecting the partner nation capability gaps that need to be addressed (for more information on initiative design documents, see DODIDODIDepartment of the Defense Instruction 5132.14 and JP 3-20). Typically, the initiative design document will include—  A description and analysis of an OE for a given partner nation.  The desired environment (strategic goals and intermediate military objectives).  The partner nation capability gaps (across the executive, generating, and operating levels) preventing the desired end state.  The partner nation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation methodology.  The operational timeline, to include phasing, if required. 2-12. Partner nation capability development strategies should be analyzed for feasibility, acceptability, and suitability. They should be feasible in terms of methods and resources, acceptable in terms of results and repercussions, and suitable in terms of quantity, actions, and goals. DA PamDA PamDepartment of the Army Pamphlets 11-31 provides more detailed information on delineating capability levels of the partner force. 2-13. When planning partner nation capability development programs that build capacity, SFA planners and practitioners should first consider whether the partner nation will be able to sustain U.S.-led capability efforts across the executive, generating, and operating functions, and to the extent necessary to achieve the strategic goal(s). Next, they should question if the partner nation governance function has the political will and authority to sustain an institutionalized capacity program across the executive, generating, and operating force levels once developed. SFA planners and practitioners should also consider the potential for the partner nation to abuse developed capabilities or use them counter to their original purpose. Finally, they should consider if this enhanced capability and capacity in the partner force has the potential to create more problems than they were meant to solve. C APACITY C ONSIDERATIONS 2-14. The partner nation may possess a base level of capability but lack the requisite level of capacity to sustain that effort over a longer period. Capability is an interim step toward capacity and building sustainable capacity among allies and partners at the operational level requires enduring strategies that draw from equally developed institutional support systems within the generating and executive functions. SFA capacity building activities will have the greatest return on investment when U.S. and partner FSF objectives and security interests are in alignment, and the partner nation can sustain the increase in capacity. 2-15. SFA planners and practitioners should be aware of the various authorities, agencies, and programs that are available for building partner capacity. DSCA is the lead agency for building partner capacity, and the focal point within DOD for the planning, execution, management, and oversight of building partner capacity programs which include—  Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity. An authority under 10 USCUSCUnited States Code, Sec 333, that provides training and equipment to partner nation security forces for the purpose of building capacity (10 USCUSCUnited States Code authorities are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4).  Friendly Foreign Countries; International and Regional Organizations: Defense Institution Capacity Building. An authority under 10 USCUSCUnited States Code, Sec 332, that assists allies and partners in examining and addressing broader, systemic factors essential to delivering what is needed (for example, money, things, people, ideas, decisions) to build capacity. Note. At the strategic level, combatant commands and the theater armies should prioritize the planning of partner nation institutional capacity programs that link U.S. engagement efforts with national security objectives if building enduring partner capacity is the goal. A strategy to achieve sustainable partner capacity may never actualize if the approach is too narrow or tactical in scope. For example, short-term tactical equipping and training programs that ignore institutional support mechanisms to support enduring capacity are likely to fail.  International military education and training. Military education and training programs funded through both DOS and DOD and provide skill-focused training as well as PME. DOS’s IMET focuses on PME for foreign military officers and other select personnel. DOD-funded engagements include opportunities through the Regional Centers for Security Studies, Regional Defense Fellowship Program, Defense Institute for International Legal Studies, Institute for Security Governance, Section 333 •Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity, and a variety of other opportunities and exchange programs. Note. For SFA planners and practitioners, the presence and nature of a partner nation’s PME system is a key component to and an indicator of long-term institutional capacity potential. PME, quite simply, enables the professionalization and modernization of a military force, and is a key driver of sustained security and stability within a region. PME establishes a common lexicon of references, doctrines, and approaches to problem solving, as well as a transformative and progressive process to develop these principles and institutionalize capacity across the executive, generating, and operating functions. This is especially true within the generating function where identifying, resourcing, and resolving partner nation capability gaps across DOTMLPF-P are instrumental to improving how a partner force is organized, trained, equipped, led, and resourced.  Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. A set of programs that build the capacity of partner nation civilian and military institutions to provide essential services to civilian population. ENABLING AND ENHANCING INTEROPERABILITY 2-16. According to Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 1, “the effectiveness of allied forces in peace, crisis or in conflict, depends on the ability of the forces provided to operate together coherently, effectively and efficiently. Allied joint operations should be prepared for, planned and conducted in a manner that makes the best use of the relative strengths and capabilities of the forces which members offer for an operation. At the operational level, emphasis should be placed on the integration of the contributing nations’ forces and the synergy that can be attained; the success of the process will determine the ability of a joint force to achieve its commander’s objectives.” 2-17. The foundation of interoperability is broad, spanning all Army warfighting functions, with human, procedural, and technical domains. Interoperability is often associated with technical issues; however network and information technology systems are not the sole components. Human and procedural aspects must also be considered in developing interoperability. The human dimension builds the basis of the mutual understanding and respect that is fundamental to unity of effort and operational success. The procedural dimension ensures that the Army achieves sufficient harmony in policies and doctrine that will enable it to operate effectively with unified action partners (AR 34-1). 2-18. Multidomain operations fracture the coherence of threat operational approaches by destroying, dislocating, isolating, and disintegrating their interdependent systems and formations, and exploiting the opportunities these disruptions provide to defeat enemy forces in detail (FM 3-0). By supporting the joint force in four strategic roles—shaping operational environments, preventing conflict during crisis action, winning during large-scale combat operations, and consolidating gains—the Army fulfills its mission and clarifies the overall goals for which Army forces engage in multidomain operations with allies and partners. 2-19. Because most operations in support of joint campaigns occur in a coalition effort, Army forces will be required to employ and leverage the capability and capacity of allies and partners in an integrated and interoperable manner, and to the highest extent possible. The planned missions the partner is likely to carry out, the partner’s current and future military capabilities, and the partner’s own objectives will all influence the desired level of collective interoperability in multidomain and multinational operations. 2-20. The use and exchange of technology, information, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and the employment of support and liaison elements during crisis and conflict can enhance the integration of lethal and nonlethal effects to enable and enhance interoperability. To standardize interoperability planning, the Army recognizes four levels of interoperability with unified action partners: Level 0 (Not Interoperable), Level 1 (Deconflicted), Level 2 (Compatible), and Level 3 (Integrated). 2-21. The Army uses priority focus areas and interoperability levels to define realistic and prioritized objectives for achieving interoperability within the Army and with unified action partners. The Army’s interoperability primary focus areas comprise the following functional areas: communication and information systems and information management; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and intelligence fusion; fires; and sustainment. The Army level of ambition for achieving interoperability with a particular partner will depend on the Army-partner relationship; combatant command and ASCCASCCArmy service component commander interoperability objectives; the type of operations the United States is likely to conduct with the partner; and the partner’s capability, willingness, and ambition for interoperability with the Army. Interoperability levels across the primary focus areas with unified action partners is depicted in table 2-1 and described in more detail in AR 34-1. ACCESS 2-24. Physical access is the ability to project military force into an operational area with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. National security strategy requires the United States to maintain access around the globe, including access to information and intelligence (JP 3-20). 2-25. SFA and other SC activities represent an important investment and commitment by the United States into the security apparatus of the partner nation. The willingness of the United States to commit resources encourages partner willingness to provide access in support of U.S. strategic requirements. Examples of partner nation access activities from JP 3-20 include—  Providing a forward basing agreement, including access, permissions, and overflight of sovereign territory, airspace, territorial waters, bases, and facilities (for example, a secure port or airfield) to include enabling host-nation reception and onward movement distribution processes.  Sharing information on internal security challenges.  Providing permission for entry of U.S. forces through a defense cooperation agreement, diplomatic note, or status-of-force agreement with the USG.  Sharing resources and technology via DOD international armaments cooperation programs.  Supplying intelligence in support of U.S. requirements.  Providing access to a training facility for U.S. military forces.  Coordinating the use of host-nation electrical power, fuels, and other sources of energy in support of joint operations.  Signing an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement to enable logistics process integration and interoperability. 2-26. Access enables agility for the combatant command below the threshold of armed conflict. Forward stationed SFA teams, SA training teams, regionally aligned, and rotational forces are able to perform a broad range of missions that contribute to the development of partner FSF capability and capacity, and to the operational preparation of the environment (OPE) for large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Access allows these forces to continuously set the theater, expand situational awareness, maintain deterrence, and create a myriad of options for the combatant command in the rapid transition to crisis or armed conflict. PRESENCE 2-27. The forward presence or projection of Army formations into a theater of operations provides capabilities that create tactical and operational dilemmas for threat forces, enabling the joint force commander to seize and retain the initiative (FM 3-0). A continuous U.S. presence (such as, cooperative security locations, forward operating stations, main operating bases) is fundamental to the capability and capacity development of the partner FSF and is critical to building and maintaining trust and rapport with the host nation. SFA activities provide the “ways” to accomplish this end state by nurturing current alliances and building new partnerships designed to build partner capability and capacity through continuous engagement. 2-28. Access and presence are inextricably linked to one another. Army forces consolidate gains most effectively by maintaining a persistent or permanent presence in a theater of operations, and this presence enables the cultivation of relationships on a predictable and reliable basis providing Army forces a high degree of regular access to allies and partners (FM 3-0). INFLUENCE 2-29. Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, and threat audiences through messages, presence, and actions (FM 3-0). Identifying all actors influencing the environment (friendly and adversarial) and their intent will help SFA planners and practitioners define the goals and methods for developing the partner FSF and their supporting institutions. To prioritize and focus the SFA effort, it is equally important to understand the regional players and transnational actors who may influence the security environment. FSF FUNCTIONS AND PROCESS STRUCTURE 2-30. The efficient distribution of essential organizational functions is critical to the success of any security establishment. These four essential and interdependent functions are governance, executive direction and oversight, generation and sustainment of forces, and operational employment. Elected officials through policies, authorizations, and appropriations generally administer partner nation governance, with the FSF performing the other three functions. The Army generally does not interact or aid the governance function of a host nation. The Army can expect to coordinate SFA with U.S. interagency (such as USAID) activities in the governance function to address FSF requirements. In some cases, Army personnel may advise FSF senior leaders that perform roles within or support the national security and foreign policy mechanisms of the governance function. There may be instances of overlapping roles and responsibilities in the partner FSF structure, but in general, the executive function is the entry point for SFA. The executive function represents the ministry equivalent, the generating function represents the Service component equivalent, and the operating function represents the tactical, operational, and strategic equivalent roles within the process structure. 2-31. SFA planners and practitioners need to know how their own organization carries out these functions and how the partner FSF applies them within its own system. This knowledge will allow planners to better identify requirements in which to execute partner FSF developmental activities, rather than simply mirroring a U.S. model onto the partner FSF organization. Figure 2-2 from JP 3-20 illustrates the core processes that provide capability and capacity within each function. SFA AND THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION 2-32. The executive function of the partner FSF generally resides at the ministry of defense or its equivalent and enables the generating and operating functions. The executive level directs, develops, and provides oversight to host-nation security policy and resources. Core developmental activities within the executive function may include organizing, training, equipping, building, advising, supporting, and liaising with the partner on—  Strategy and policy.  Human resource management.  Force management.  Resource management.  Acquisition and logistics.  Inspector general processes (for example, monitoring, oversight, and accountability). SFA AND THE GENERATING FUNCTION 2-33. The generating function of the partner FSF usually resides at the Service component level and develops and sustains the operating forces. Many partner nations do not organize their armed forces with as clear a delineation between the generating and operating functions as the United States. As such, SFA planners and implementers must recognize that, with some partners, generating and operating functions may be executed by the same headquarters. The military schools, training centers, and arsenals of the host nation generally perform generating function processes. Core developmental activities within the executive function may include organizing, training, equipping, building, advising, supporting, and liaising with the partner on—  Doctrine.  Organization.  Training.  Materiel.  Leader development and education.  Personnel.  Facilities. SFA AND THE OPERATING FUNCTION 2-34. The operating function generally resides in the strategic, operational, and tactical formations of a security force. The operating function is concerned with the employment of military capabilities through the warfighting functions in support of joint operations. Core developmental activities within the executive function may include organizing, training, equipping, building, advising, supporting, and liaising with the partner on—  Command and control.  Movement and maneuver.  Intelligence.  Fires.  Sustainment.  Protection.  Information. SFA ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES 2-35. The Army uses the operation assessment activities of monitor, evaluate, recommend, and direct during the planning and execution of SFA. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations (JP 3-0). Army forces use the operational assessment to monitor and evaluate U.S. and FSF performance and effectiveness, influence decision making at appropriate levels, and to initiate leader action to change or terminate developmental activities. The operation assessment reinforces assessment, monitoring, and evaluation requirements for SC initiatives and indicates returns on investment, allows policymakers to identify and improve or eliminate ineffective initiatives, and provides credible information in support of policy and legislation (DODIDODIDepartment of the Defense Instruction 5132.14). 2-36. Properly planned and executed assessment processes generate information and decisional advantages. These advantages include improving the understanding of a partner force’s capacity and capability across the entire governance, executive, generating, and operating construct and the operating environment. A SSESSMENT O VERVIEW 2-37. Assessment precedes and guides the other activities of the operations process. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. Assessments are conducted throughout the range of military operations, and therefore require continuous monitoring and evaluation from planning through execution to measure the overall effectiveness, and to help commanders and their staffs understand the current situation and its evolution during operations. 2-38. SFA activities by themselves are not likely to achieve a strategic end state. To make progress towards a strategic end state, multiple complementary SC activities must be conducted over time to achieve a desired result. Assessments are performed in close collaboration with the U.S. country team, the host-nation government, and other multinational partners. It is important that SFA planners become involved in assessment working groups to help determine whether SFA activities are contributing to the achievement of the strategic end state, or if they need to be modified or reconsidered. 2-39. Performing an initial assessment informs the combatant command on host-nation willingness and inclination to implement and sustain SFA activities. It also identifies and informs the planning team on partner FSF capability and capacity requirements, gaps, and potential risks. A SSESSMENT A CTIVITIES 2-40. The assessment process consists of four major activities that include—  Monitoring activities to collect relevant progress data (should be sex disaggregated).  Evaluating progress data to determine end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks to a measurable standard.  Recommending action for improvement, modification, or termination of activities.  Directing changes to SC plans or activities. +2-41. Monitoring is a continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation. It involves monitoring, collecting, and analyzing relevant indicators of performance or effectiveness and conditions in an operational environment that affect those indicators. Monitoring within the assessment process allows staffs to collect relevant information, specifically that information about the current situation that can be compared to the forecasted situation described in the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Progress cannot be judged, nor effective decisions made, without an accurate understanding of the current situation including sociocultural information. Monitoring enables evaluation and measurement of developmental activity progress toward a desired end state. 2-42. Evaluating is using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists. Evaluation is at the heart of the assessment process where most of the analysis occurs. Evaluation helps SFA planners and practitioners determine what is working and what is not working and helps them gain insights into how to accomplish the mission. 2-43. Recommendations provide ways to improve the effectiveness of operations and plans by informing all decisions. The assessment process is incomplete without recommending or directing action. Assessments may reveal problems, but unless it results in recommended adjustments and directed action to improve progress, its use to the commander is limited. 2-44. As SFA forces and planning staff continue to assess changes in the environment and chart the progress of the partner FSF, they must continually challenge their original framing of the situation to ensure the operation is meeting the stated objectives and end state. Further, they must assess whether the envisioned objectives continue to be appropriate to meet the end state. Finally, they must know if the intended end state still makes sense. While measures of effectiveness and measures of performance help assess effectiveness and performance of the plan, it is critical to assess the strategic objectives and end state. The assessment working group informs the commander’s decisions by evaluating and re-evaluating the stated objectives and end state against other possibilities and outcomes. M EASURES OF P ERFORMANCE AND M EASURES OF E FFECTIVENESS 2-45. Indicators in the forms of measures of effectiveness and measures of performance aid in determining progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. Measures of performance (MOPs) help determine if a task has been performed properly. Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) help determine if a task is achieving its intended results. MOPs and MOEs are simply indicators, and do not represent the assessment itself. 2-46. MOPs are indicators used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 5-0). MOPs answer questions such as “Was the action taken?” or “Were the tasks completed to standard?” In SFA, MOPs focus on the partner FSF, and can help determine if the tasks are being done correctly. 2-47. MOEs are indicators that help measure a current system state with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time to gauge the achievement of objectives and attainment of end states (JP 5-0). MOEs help the SFA planner and practitioner determine if the partner FSF is “doing the right things,” to create the effects or changes in the conditions that achieve U.S. objectives and what was the “return on investment.” By determining the relative return on investment, SFA planners can help determine how resources might be better allocated and expended across the plan. In this regard, this aspect can be especially useful in identifying how resources could be redistributed to mitigate the most serious risks associated with plan shortfalls. 2-48. MOEs help measure changes in conditions, both positive and negative. MOEs are commonly found and tracked in formal assessment plans. SFA planners and practitioners use MOEs in execution matrices and estimates to track completed SFA developmental activities to help inform the formal assessment. 2-49. Assessments must be integrated into the planning and executing phases of SFA. While planning is a top-down process, assessments are conducted bottom-up. A SSESSMENT I NTERACTION 2-50. It is essential for SFA planners and practitioners to work together during the planning phase to ensure the right MOEs and MOPs are assigned to developmental activities. Ideally, these indicators will reflect the desired effects that the activities are designed to accomplish, and ultimately enable the achievement of larger strategic objectives and end states. Figure 2-3 on page 2-12, from DA PamDA PamDepartment of the Army Pamphlets 11-31 provides a useful depiction of the assessment interaction framework. SFA A SSESSMENT C ONSIDERATIONS 2-51. There is a cultural dimension to assessing a partner FSF. When measuring the effectiveness of a partner security force, it is imperative for the SFA planner and practitioner to remain aware of the cultural divisions separating USG standards and the cultural norms of a host nation. Failure to consider these cultural differences potentially disrupt progress and obscure results when assessing capability. Capability and capacity standards that theater army planners may perceive as inadequate might be perfectly acceptable to the partner force. 2-52. Determining the appropriate balance of qualitative and quantitative assessments of the partner FSF within the CCP and country plans is critical. At the strategic and operational levels, assessments generally become more qualitative, and availability of hard data may drive the balance of quantitative assessments. 2-53. Assessing a partner nation force’s “will to fight” is critical across the competition continuum, but especially so in crisis and conflict. A partner nation’s military leaders, morale, cohesion, discipline, culture, and history are all important factors to consider when gauging will to fight. Understanding these factors is essential to assessing combat effectiveness because it may directly influence U.S. national and theater strategy and the commitment of future resources. Assessing will to fight is largely subjective as it deals with the very complex phenomenon of human nature. As such, the assessment process may require a mixed-method approach that uses a variety of tools, techniques, and metrics that may include simulations, modeling (including agent-based and parametric), forecasts, experimentation, wargames, case studies, data from one-on-one interviews, focus groups, surveys, and direct observation. 2-54. SFA planners and practitioners must also account for the “lag time” in the assessment process, the methodology, and the causal link between an effort or set of efforts (the cause) and the results achieved (the effect). It is important to understand that conclusions on causal linkages should not be drawn prematurely, and the combatant command’s expectations for progress should be realistic in terms of when outcomes and end states will be realized. 2-55. It is important to remember that assessments not only drive activity development by the theater army SFA planners, but ultimately serve to inform decision making by the combatant command and country team. Commanders must provide guidance and provide buy-in to the methodology. SFA planners within the combatant commands and theater armies will need to maintain flexibility, conduct proper assessment training across all staff elements, and invest extensive time and effort in assessment resources to ensure success. SFA DEVELOPMENTAL ACTIVITIES 2-56. The United States provides a capability that a foreign defense establishment may not have the ability to provide on its own. SFA activities and missions are planned, coordinated, and executed across the executive, generating, and operating functions in permissive and uncertain environments. In some cases, the United States provides SFA as a bridging solution until the host nation organizes and develops the capability on its own. The United States can provide SFA until U.S. objectives are met, or until the foreign defense establishment develops the capability shortfall. In other instances, the United States may provide SFA to meet specific U.S. and foreign defense establishment requirements without the intent of organizing that capability within that partner nation’s foreign defense establishment. In these cases, an enduring foreign defense establishment capability is neither required, nor is it in the best interest of the United States. 2-57. General SFA developmental activities are organize, train, equip, build, and advise (OTEBA). Each element of these activities can be used to develop, change, or improve the capability and capacity of the partner FSF, as well as enable overall interoperability. By assessing the FSF through the lens of U.S. interests and objectives, coupled with shared interests of multinational partners, U.S. forces can determine which areas within the OTEBA construct to use to improve the FSF to the desired level of capability and capacity. SFA planners should determine what is in the best interests of the multinational partners involved, or “what is good enough” to achieve shared objectives. In essence, U.S. forces assess the partner FSF against desired capabilities and then develop an OTEBA plan to help a partner FSF build that capability and capacity. 2-58. An initial baseline assessment of partner FSF capability and capacity is essential to the development of initial OTEBA activity design. Assessment activities are critical in determining quantitative and qualitative progress of the partner FSF toward a desired end state. O RGANIZE 2-59. Organization of a partner FSF includes all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, and personnel management. This may include doctrine development, unit or organizational design, command and control staff processes, and methods and policies for recruiting and manning, including adopting policies and plans that allow for meaningful participation of women in the FSF. 2-60. The organize activity should address the whole of the partner FSF from the executive level to the smallest tactical formation. The goal of the organize activity is to improve the partner FSF organizational structure, processes, institutions, and infrastructure. To meet this end state, SFA planners and practitioners should understand the existing FSF organizational structure. Consideration should be given to how the partner FSF currently conducts operations before determining the best methods to address new and emerging security requirements. SFA planners and practitioners should be knowledgeable in all aspects of OTEBA, as these related activities will likely play an important role in the organizational development of the partner security establishment. 2-61. SFA can be used to develop the capability and support the development of the foreign defense establishment’s ability to generate forces through the establishment of processes, institutions, and infrastructure. SFA can also be used to develop and improve partner FSF organizational processes in force development, force integration, capabilities integration, budgeting, and personnel management. T RAIN 2-62. Train refers to all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education across the executive, generating, and operating functions. These may include SFA activities to develop partner FSF execution of programs of instruction, training events, and leader development activities. 2-63. SFA training activities develop partner FSF training programs and enable sustainability in training and leader development institutions. These training efforts should consider the unique character and leader requirements of the host nation. The training approach should be tailored to meet partner FSF objectives and priorities and should also consider the preservation of the partner’s own DOTMLPF-P system versus recreating an unfamiliar and potentially unsustainable USG model. 2-64. SFA forces train partner FSF on the knowledge, skills, and attributes appropriate to their level of function, organization, and equipment. SFA forces should develop tailored programs of instruction that are appropriate for the partner FSF. They should include a comprehensive assessment of the partner FSF being trained. 2-65. As the capacity and capability of the partner FSF increases, SFA forces conduct combined training to develop the capacity for foreign force and U.S. force interoperability. The goal of combined training is to develop partners with the capacity to function as part of a combined multidomain force with multinational objectives. Combined training exercises familiarize both forces with the capabilities and shortfalls of the other force and develop procedures to leverage capabilities and mitigate shortfalls. E QUIP 2-66. Equip refers to all activities to create, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle management. 2-67. While SA is the primary means to enable the equip activity, 10 USCUSCUnited States Code security force assistance and 22 USCUSCUnited States Code security assistance training activities support this by focusing on the development of partner FSF processes for new equipment fielding, employment, operational readiness, maintenance and repair, and recapitalization. B UILD AND R EBUILD 2-68. Build and rebuild refers to all activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities. This may include SFA activities to develop partner FSF capability and capacity to construct or repair physical infrastructures such as bases and stations, lines of communications, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures. 2-69. Specific build and rebuild activities will vary according to the mission’s goals, objectives, and desired end state. The host nation’s priorities and ability to sustain what is constructed must be carefully assessed and included in the plan. Since the build/rebuild activity often involves physical construction and protection of facilities, effectiveness will also depend on the allocation of adequate resources by the host nation. A DVISE 2-70. Advise refers to all SFA activities that provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to a partner FSF while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit or organization. Advising may occur across the executive, generating, and operating functional structure, under combat or administrative conditions, and in support of individuals or groups. SFA advisors provide executive, generating, and operating functional expertise to the partner FSF in the development, sustainment, and employment of their security enterprise to meet their national security needs, in support of U.S. interests. Advising establishes a personal and a professional relationship where trust and confidence define how well the advisor will be able to influence the partner FSF. Note. In the context of advising the governance function, the DOD provides experts to advise processes such as the national security and foreign policy core process described earlier. Other core processes, like authorizations, routinely involve other USG entities (JP 3-20). SFA CONFLICT INTEGRATION ACTIVITIES 2-71. Commanders must provide clear intent to their advisors to allow them flexibility to execute their mission with the foreign security force. The proximity of the advisors, intensity of the conflict, frequency of contact, and various legal considerations provide the broad context for SFA operations (ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-96.1). Advisor teams will adjust their level of integration into the foreign security force’s formations and the level of support and liaison provided based on mission requirements. A DVISE 2-72. Advising is the bridging activity that connects OTEBA developmental activities in competition to support and liaison integration activities with a partner force in armed conflict. Advisors shape an OE by strengthening allies and building lasting partnerships. Advisors increase host-nation capability through joint exercises, and they remain ready to support the partnered force’s operations and modernization in conjunction with other instruments of national power. When directed, SFA advisors conduct support and liaison activities to enable multinational operations during armed conflict (FM 3-0). S UPPORT 2-73. Support is defined as the action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains other forces in accordance with a directive requiring such action (JP 1, Volume 2). SFA advisor teams support the partner FSF with capabilities and capacity to enable mission success. In the transition to armed conflict, embedded SFA advisors, with their unique knowledge of the region and partner FSF capabilities, support and enable an agile response by the joint force in the rapid transition to combat operations (JP 3-0). 2-74. SFA forces co-located or embedded with the partner FSF support and enable synchronization of activities, fill key capability gaps, and help to ensure unity of purpose and mutual support in offensive operations. L IAISE 2-75. Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (FM 6-0). SFA liaison teams work to increase understanding of mission and tactics with other forces, convey information, enhance mutual trust, and improve teamwork (JP 3-08). 2-76. The ability to monitor and coordinate are the two most essential liaison functions. SFA advisors must be able to monitor the partner FSF unit to which they are assigned, as well as their own parent organization to focus combat power, enable situational understanding, and synchronize lethal and nonlethal effects. As a representative of the commander, SFA advisors must understand their own commander’s intent, guidance, mission, and concept of operations. They must also be technically and tactically competent to coordinate on behalf of their own commander, and with the partner FSF for tactical matters to achieve and maintain unity of effort. SFA PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 2-77. U.S. national, defense, and military security strategy provide the basis for the global, regional, and functional strategic end states specified in the JSCP. For each strategic end state, combatant commands must establish intermediate military objectives and goals the commands expect to achieve through their campaigns, as milestones to measure progress toward achieving directed end states. Combatant commands develop CCPs and contingency plans to achieve those end states. 2-78. Theater armies play a critical role in the theater campaign planning process for SFA. Theater army staff organizations should be included in joint operational planning teams and planning conferences and tasked through a planning order or tasking order to develop supporting plans and participate in the combatant command development and implementation of those documents. This includes conveying Service and DOD functional equities to the combatant command and conveying combatant command equities to their Service, assisting with concept design (especially SFA developmental activities supporting theater-level intermediate military objectives), determining the resources required to execute identified steady-state activities, and developing a synchronization plan for these activities. T HEATER C AMPAIGN S UPPORT P LANNING 2-79. The JSCP provides measurable intermediate objectives and guidance for combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies focused on planning and employing the joint force at current resource levels. The combatant commands develop their CCPs and each Service develops campaign support plans that describe how they will support the combatant command campaigns and articulate institutional or component-specific guidance. Theater armies develop a theater campaign support plan, an annex to the CCP. The theater campaign support plan serves as the mechanism between Army planning, programming, budgeting, and execution by, with, or through the theater army and supported by Headquarters, Department of the Army, ASCCASCCArmy service component commander, Army commands, direct reporting units, and National Guard Bureau plans. The purpose is to resource SFA activities that shape an OE and achieve CCP objectives and JSCP end states. 2-80. For every operation, commanders gain a detailed situational understanding of an OE, including a thorough understanding of the partner FSF capacity and capability. Commanders then visualize a desired end state and construct a broad concept for shaping the current conditions toward that end state. Thorough conceptual design coupled with mission analysis provides the “big picture” and focuses the planning efforts thereafter. Successful mission analysis is crucial to developing well-formed objectives and establishing their causal relationship to particular theater strategic end states. Thorough, well-conducted mission analysis provides the SC and SFA planners answers to the following questions:  What has the theater army been tasked to accomplish, and how does the theater army support and resource those requirements?  What specific results are desired, and what is the desired strategic effect?  Where and when must the theater army achieve these results?  Why was the theater army given this task?  What limitations (for example, authorities) have been placed on the theater army, and for what purpose? O PERATIONAL E NVIRONMENTS 2-81. SFA and associated SC programs, activities, and missions play a key role in understanding and shaping an OE. Effective SFA planning and assessments allow commanders to gain situational understanding of their operational environment, including the region and specific countries. These include existing defense relationships, partner military capacity and capabilities for internal and external self-defense, and peacetime and contingency access, all of which are critical to planning multidomain operations and achieving combatant command objectives and JSCP end states. Commanders strive for a clear understanding of the conditions that make up the current situation, including the relevant population, FSF, and other factors. From this understanding, commanders visualize desired conditions that represent a desired end state. The host nation or regional security organization helps to determine desired conditions associated with the partner FSF. After envisioning a desired end state, commanders then design and conceptualize how to influence the current situation to achieve that end state. 2-82. The changing nature of each OE affects the execution of SFA activities and missions. When considering an OE, a key planning factor for SFA is the foreign defense establishment’s capabilities and capacity to support and participate in multinational operations where interoperability is essential to success. This includes a thorough understanding of the regional security organizations; the region’s history, culture, and languages; the host-nation leaders; and political, economic, and social dynamics. The conditions of an OE can rapidly change, and those planning and those executing SFA activities must assess these changes continuously. They must measure and evaluate the effectiveness of programs that prevent and deter and determine whether further means should be applied towards meeting the combatant command objectives. Two types of environments underpin an OE: permissive and uncertain. 2-83. A permissive environment is an OE in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist SFA activities that a unit intends to conduct. Under this condition, maximum support of the host country to SFA activities is expected, and thus they would require little or no assembly of combat forces in country. In such an environment, a theater army can expect hosting nation concurrence and possible support. The theater army’s primary concerns may be sustainment functions involving logistics support, emergency medical treatment, transportation, administrative processing, and coordination with DOS and other agencies. While a minimum number of security forces may be used, prudent preparations should be in place to enable the force conducting SFA activities to respond to threats as required. SFA personnel should plan for the potential of isolation and ensure they have issued isolated soldier guidance to all personnel even when operating under the most permissive of environments. Theater armies should anticipate resource scarcity, language barriers, and a reluctance to adopt more disciplined, professional practices as the major barriers to continued progress. 2-84. An uncertain environment is an OE in which the hosting government security forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area. An uncertain environment is most likely to be found in less developed countries that have lost government control of an area following a disaster, or in areas that traditionally harbor insurgents or terrorist elements that may oppose U.S. presence regardless of the humanitarian mission. Because of the uncertainty, the theater army may elect to reinforce the host nation with additional security units or a reaction force. Approved rules of engagement (ROE) are disseminated early to ensure that the force conducting SFA activities has knowledge of and is sufficiently trained and proficient in application of the ROE. Planning for SFA activities in an uncertain environment should take into consideration the possibility for escalation to a hostile environment. In an uncertain environment SFA forces may anticipate opposition from insurgents, warlords, criminal gangs, outside forces, or others desiring instability. Usually, a military show of force is sufficient to maintain control of the situation, however planning should include refined personnel recovery plans that ensure all Soldiers are issued isolated Soldier guidance in the event they become isolated. Prudent employment of military information support operations can prevent the degeneration of a permissive or uncertain environment into a hostile environment. O PERATIONAL V ARIABLES 2-85. Army planners analyze an OE in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. Operational variables are those broad aspects of an OE, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect campaigns and major operations. Depending on the relationship with a given country, situations may exist where a country may be a good partner and share similar interests with the United States, but access is not granted for the purpose of training and equipping the partner FSF. 2-86. Commanders must be aware of the specific constraints, such as authorities, and capabilities of the forces of participating nations, and consider these differences when assigning SFA missions and activities. Political Considerations 2-87. Because of the complexity of relationships between formal and informal political actors, SFA forces may lack sufficient knowledge to understand the political dynamics within partner nation institutions affecting a given operation. Generating force organizations provide analyses of political institutions, actors, issues, and dynamics at the local, regional, and national level in the operational area. The range of such analyses can run from the entire operational area to a single urban area or region within it. These analyses address not only formal and tangible factors but also the underlying social and cultural attitudes that confer or deny legitimacy to systems for the exercise of political authority. 2-88. Important political considerations include—  What are recent changes in the nature of U.S. bilateral and multilateral security relations with nations and international organizations in the region?  What international and acquisition agreements exist?  Do acquisition agreements support access, sustainment, and freedom of movement?  How important is national security to the state compared to economic and social issues?  What does the regional security architecture look like (regional security organizations and country relationships)?  What are the desired regional outcomes, what are the external drivers, and was there a change in the security environment?  What is the dominant political party in the area?  Is the government effective at influencing the people? Do the people support it? Is there a shadow government in place, and is it the source of power? Military Considerations 2-89. The military variable explores the military capabilities of all relevant actors in a given OE. Army SFA forces seek to thoroughly understand the evolving defense and security capabilities of the partner FSF and adversaries. The Army’s joint and multinational partners may accurately describe their capabilities without being fully aware of the implications for landpower. Additionally, partners continuously adapt their capabilities, so SFA planners must continuously analyze the resulting implications. 2-90. Important military considerations include—  What is the balance of military power in the region, and what are the security relationships between regional neighbors?  Are appropriate authorities in place to facilitate training and equipping the partner FSF?  What partner FSF operate in the area of operations?  What partner FSF capabilities exist and what are the requirements associated with internal and external defense?  What are the institutional capabilities with respect to DOTMLPF-P?  Do the partner FSF being advised have jurisdiction?  What is the division of labor between civil, police, and military units in the area of operations?  What threats exist, including “insider threats,” and how will they infiltrate and fight both the multinational and partner FSF?  What multinational units operate in the area of operations, what are their capabilities, and what can be expected from them? Social Considerations 2-91. The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an OE. Understanding the social factors of a society or a group can significantly improve the SFA force’s ability to accomplish the mission. Culture is the lens through which information is transmitted, processed, and understood. However, Army SFA force knowledge and understanding of cultures in their area of operations tend to be relatively limited due to the time needed to develop that knowledge and understanding. 2-92. The Army’s generating force can help the SFA enterprise develop their understanding of foreign cultures, based on its own expertise and access to significant analytical capability and capacity from the DOD and other sources outside the DOD. The uncertainty surrounding the outbreak of future conflicts and the long lead-time associated with developing a useful degree of cultural understanding cause the Army’s knowledge of foreign cultures to be relatively limited. 2-93. Understanding the sociocultural aspects of a particular society or group within a society can significantly improve the SFA force’s ability to accomplish the mission. Important social and cultural considerations include—  How popular is the military institution amongst the society?  What is the human context based on the country’s history, culture (shared beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors), and language(s)?  Does the presence of women and children in the streets indicate stability, or merely the perception of it?  Is there a dominant religious or ethnic group, and, if so, from where does it get support?  What is the ethnic composition of neighborhoods or villages?  Who are the powerful individuals and groups within the area of operations? Who are the civilian decision makers?  Are Soldiers restricted from interacting with any people in the area of operations without government approval? Economic Considerations 2-94. An economic system encompasses individual behaviors and aggregate phenomena related to the production, distribution, and consumption of resources. Successful conduct of SFA depends, in part, on understanding the economic aspects of an OE. 2-95. Important economic considerations for SFA include—  What does the economic architecture consist of, in terms of regional security organizations and regional economic organizations?  What are the relationships between the countries in the region?  Do international agreements exist that facilitate access and freedom of movement?  What is the extent of poverty in the area of operations?  What is the primary source of income for most civilians?  What criminal activities exploit the area of operations (such as corruption, prostitution, extortion, illegal fuel sales, or bomb making)?  What collective job opportunities exist to employ the young and disenfranchised?  What role does the partner FSF currently have regarding corruption within the economic arena in the area of operations?  What corruption is best left alone in the interest of SFA mission accomplishment? Information Considerations 2-96. This variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The information environment relevant to a specific campaign or major operation typically extends beyond the joint operations area. Adversaries and enemies establish their information operations capabilities in sanctuaries in neutral countries. They attempt to conduct information operations against the United States worldwide, making the defense of enterprise network capabilities relevant to the ongoing joint operations. 2-97. Important SFA information considerations include—  What regulations guide intelligence and information sharing with the partner FSF (foreign disclosure requirements by country, category of information, and classification level)?  What is the state of communications management and media relations? How does this relate to partner FSF intelligence and information sharing capabilities?  Are there any local news media in the area?  How do the people receive their news?  What is the state of social media used to turn communication into interactive dialogue?  How can Army SFA forces effectively use inform and influence activities?  What is the enemy using to influence information in the area of operations?  What is the partner FSF doing to promote a positive perception of security?  What is the partner FSF doing that detracts from promoting a positive perception of security? Infrastructure Considerations 2-98. The infrastructure system is composed of the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society. A stable, functioning civil society requires adequate infrastructure. It is likely that Army forces conducting SFA will be employed in areas where infrastructure is inadequate, damaged, or destroyed. Important considerations include—  What is the state of public transportation, utilities, sustainment, health care, and communications facilities?  What is the current assessment of sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other services in the area of operations?  What environmental considerations and environmental protection requirements apply to the partner FSF?  What projects must be supported by the partner FSF?  What projects require multinational support?  What are the road conditions?  Are there any political offices, sensitive sites, or otherwise restricted areas? Physical Environment Considerations 2-99. The physical environment consists of the physical circumstances and conditions that influence the conduct of operations throughout the domains of land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. Key factors of the land domain are complex terrain, including urban settings (supersurface, surface, and subsurface features), weather, topography, hydrology, and environmental conditions. 2-100. The structural complexity of the physical environment requires capabilities to assess, repair, maintain, and even develop infrastructures. Important considerations include—  How can Army SFA forces assist the partner FSF to mitigate environmental hazards, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) hazards?  How can Army SFA forces help the partner FSF provide or restore essential services?  How can Army SFA activities enhance the legitimacy of partner governments? Time Considerations 2-101. Time considerations influence military operations within an OE in terms of the decision cycles, operating tempo, and planning horizons. Time also influences endurance or protraction of operations since any actor in a conflict may exhaust its resources over time. 2-102. Important time considerations include—  Is there a sense of urgency from the people in the area of operations?  How does the host-nation culture or cultures view time?  What time constraints do multinational partners have?  What time constraints (if any) does the partner FSF have? SFA FORCES AND ADVISING CONSIDERATIONS 2-103. Conventional and SFO are the two main resources the Army utilizes to conduct SFA. Army regionally aligned forces, security force assistance brigades, the State Partnership Program, and digital liaison detachments represent the bulk of conventional forces that can execute SFA. ARSOF that execute SFA normally consist of special forces, military information support operations, and civil affairs. ARSOF coordination for the integration of SC capabilities is done by, with, and through the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the theater special operations command. 2-104. Regionally aligned forces provide the combatant command with tailored, responsive, and consistently available Army forces. They meet combatant command requirements for scalable, tailored capabilities to support operational missions, military exercises, and theater SC activities. They represent those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. Assigned units have a regional mission and training focus, including emerging operations, security cooperation activities, and exercises. They are the combatant commander’s primary sourcing solution if capabilities match. Theater army planners should consider the time and resources required to familiarize and train the regionally aligned force on—  Partner nation capabilities and desired capacity goals.  Advising, assessments, monitoring, and evaluation.  Partner nation culture and language training (especially if deploying without interpreter support).  Strategic objectives and end states for the United States and partner FSF. S ECURITY F ORCE A SSISTANCE B RIGADE 2-105. The security force assistance brigade (SFAB) is the Army’s dedicated conventional organization for conducting SFA, and its capabilities allow it to execute SFA developmental activities with the partner FSF in conjunction with unified action partners anywhere in the world. The SFAB complements the DOS, foreign area officers, ARSOF, regionally aligned forces, SA teams, State Partnership Program, digital liaison detachments, and other unified action partner activities to expand access and create options for senior military and civilian leaders. During competition and campaigning, each combatant command is allocated a persistent SFAB force package. Conducting security cooperation activities under the threshold of armed conflict, the SFAB often falls under operational and administrative control of the theater army. The combatant commander assigns tactical-or operational-level SFA developmental activities to the SFAB. Advisor teams can establish relationships among other conventional force partners to enable the rapid integration of other multinational forces that may be essential during future multidomain operations (ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-96.1). S TATE P ARTNERSHIP P ROGRAM 2-106. The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a joint DOD SC program authorized by 10 USCUSCUnited States Code, Section 341, and governed by DODIDODIDepartment of the Defense Instruction 5111.20. The SPP is managed by the National Guard Bureau, executed by the combatant commands, and sourced by the National Guard of the states and territories. The SPP links a State’s National Guard with a partner nation’s military, security forces, and disaster response organizations in a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship. SPP is one of the few SC programs authorized to engage across the spectrum of country governmental organizations and is a multi-categorization SC tool. D IGITAL L IAISON D ETACHMENT 2-107. Digital liaison detachments are assigned or attached to selected theater armies for employment at the theater army or in support at corps and division echelons. These teams provide SFA to the partner FSF through digital information management and communications interface capability for U.S. systems with a subordinate or parallel joint and multinational headquarters in an operational area. Digital liaison detachments are typically embedded in their counterpart staffs to facilitate mission command by clarifying orders, interpreting commander’s intent, and identifying and resolving issues (ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-94.1). A RMY S PECIAL O PERATIONS F ORCES 2-108. Army SFO are particularly well suited to conduct SFA due to their advanced skills, capabilities, and regional orientation. SFA and FID overlap without being subsets of each other (see figure 1-1 on page 1-3). At operational and strategic levels, both SFA and FID focus on developing partner FSF internal capacity and capability, however SFA also prepares the partner FSF to defend against external threats and to perform as part of an international coalition. FID and SFA are similar at the tactical level where advisory skills are applicable to both (FM 3-05). A DVISING C ONSIDERATIONS 2-109. The advisor mission is critical to achieving U.S. national security objectives and continues to be a primary tool for working with foreign partners to develop their capabilities and capacities to address shared security interests. 2-110. Advisors need to understand their efforts are part of a larger program of U.S. assistance to other nations. The assistance may be bilateral (between the United States and a host nation), multilateral, part of an internationally sponsored effort, or may employ a combination of methods to assist other nations in support of U.S. strategic objectives. The keys to success at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels require advisors to coordinate with related efforts in a particular operational area. 2-111. Because every mission is different, the combatant command and Service components determine the appropriate force mix to be tasked for the mission. Advising activities can be conducted with any combination of SFO, conventional forces, expeditionary civilian workforce, or contract personnel. Additionally, the joint staff will coordinate with other government agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, police, border patrol, and customs personnel to ensure the best suited capabilities are part of the effort when appropriate, authorized, and permitted. 2-112. Advisors coach, teach, and advise FSF by establishing mutual trust and respect. Advisors focus on personal (interpersonal and communication skills) and professional (technical and tactical knowledge) FSF development. Sometimes, advisors are expected to do more. 2-113. Advisors commonly serve multiple roles. The primary mission is to advise, but advisors must be prepared to conduct support and liaison roles. Assess is a required developmental activity for all roles. Each role could be a mission by itself with personnel employed to conduct that single purpose. Situation and lack of personnel may require advisors to do them all. Furthermore, the advisor’s overall impact must be evaluated through proper assessment (For more on advising see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-07.10/MCRP 3-03D.1 [MCRP 3-33.8A]/NTTP 3-07.5/AFTTP 3-2.76). This page intentionally left blank.

This chapter describes SC in the competition continuum. First, it provides an overview of the competition continuum and SC in competition below armed conflict. Next, it discusses preparing FSF for combat across the range of military operations and SC’s role in setting the theater for multidomain and multinational operations in competition. Then it discusses the transition to crisis or armed conflict, provides an overview of SC in crisis and the activities at echelon during crisis. After that, the chapter discusses the transition to competition or armed conflict, an overview of SC in armed conflict, and the transition back to competition and post-conflict stabilization. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on SC support to post-conflict stabilization. THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM 3-1. SC occurs throughout the competition continuum but with different areas of emphasis, depending upon the level of cooperation and competition between the United States and other global powers; the unique position, geopolitical status, and military capabilities of a particular ally or partner; and the nature of that relationship with the United States. SC contributes to the ability of allies and partners to perform roles in support of U.S. campaign and contingency plans. SC activities and programs aim to ensure allies and partners can contribute to collective or common security effects (JP 3-20). The three security cooperation activities of SFA, SA, and military engagement must be fully integrated and synchronized to achieve optimal synergistic effects across the competition continuum. Effectively synchronizing the different programs is one of the critical tasks all SC practitioners must accomplish to achieve desired end states. 3-2. The strategies used in competition below the level of armed conflict will vary depending on the circumstances, but successful action should have distinct traits. First and foremost, the Army should have a thorough understanding of how relevant actors will view or respond to the action. Second, the Army and partner FSF should carry out a wide range of tasks, such as establishing access to critical areas, forward positioning of forces, establishing appropriate and timely presence, organizing exercises, sharing intelligence (in accordance with foreign disclosure policies and procedures), continuous OPE, and conducting information operations to counter and undermine the adversarial narrative. Third, the Army and the partner FSF should ensure that these tasks can be carried out in a creative and flexible manner and are adaptable to changes in the strategic environment. Finally, the Army should conduct continuous reassessment and reevaluation of adversarial capabilities and intent. 3-3. Strategic guidance calls for a renewal and strengthening of partner relationships to ensure national and global security. SC activities provide the “ways” to accomplish this end state by nurturing current alliances and building new partnerships designed to increase partner capability and capacity, and enable interoperability in joint, multidomain, and multinational operations. SC activities enable the Army to engage in strategic competition to protect and advance U.S. national interests, deter hostile aggression, counter adversarial competitive strategies, and set the conditions for engaging in armed conflict from a position of advantage if deterrence fails. 3-4. SC plays a critical role in current doctrine across all aspects of the competition continuum. During competition, SC shapes an OE by deterring adversaries and setting conditions for the joint force to maneuver from a position of advantage if required. During crisis, SC enables the joint force commander to deter adversaries by quickly building credible combat power with a small, rapidly deployable U.S. SFA element that can embed and provide support to foreign security forces. This provides immediate capabilities on the ground by enabling foreign security forces already in theater to rapidly integrate with U.S.-provided joint fires and multidomain enablers. Actions taken during conflict can have significant cascading effects across an OE. SFA forces, as a crucial force multiplier, enable allies and partners to fight effectively as part of a coalition through embedded support teams during multidomain operations. SFA and SA are both used to train and equip FSF during long-term conflicts; all critical to consolidating gains. Across the competition continuum, SC practitioners build partner FSF combat power; serve as force multipliers while conducting support, liaison, and information advantage operations; and shape the environment for post-conflict operations. SECURITY COOPERATION IN COMPETITION BELOW ARMED CONFLICT OVERVIEW 3-5. SC contributes to the ability of allies and partners to perform roles in support of U.S. campaign and contingency plans. SC activities and programs aim to ensure allies and partners can contribute to collective or common security effects. Collective security effects are those outcomes associated with achieving U.S. warfighting objectives in contested spaces; whereas common security effects are those outcomes associated with enabling regional resiliency of allies and partners and facilitating allies’ and partners’ support to interagency activities. SC activities and programs seeking to generate common security effects employ SC resources in a manner that will reduce risk to priority theaters; create opportunities for allies and partners to increase U.S. readiness within priority theaters; support allies’ and partners’ contributions to the maintenance of global indicators and warnings of potential threats; and ensure allies and partners in other theaters can maintain credible deterrence against threats (JP 3-20). 3-6. Military engagements, developmental activities, and SA programs are reinforcing and complementary. Military engagements facilitate the exchange of information between the United States and ally and partner security forces and institutions, which can inform combatant commanders and senior DOD leaders about whether and how developmental activities are most appropriate (JP 3-20). 22 USCUSCUnited States Code security assistance programs in competition focus on delivering defense articles, military education, and training to allies and partners to build partner capacity and develop relationships. The aim of theater-level planners is to integrate and synchronize SA, SFA, and military engagements into a coherent plan that achieves the commander’s intent. 3-7. In competition below armed conflict, SFA facilitates the setting of conditions for the theater army strategy and the execution of SC activities in support of the combatant command, by pursuing relative positional and capability advantages and ensuring a calibrated force posture. More simply—SFA enables the right capabilities, in the right place, at the right time, to support and shape joint and multinational security and diplomatic efforts. 3-8. SFA forces are designed to support a multinational force during large-scale combat operations. This design contributes to the potency and integration of the other instruments of national power, provides combatant commands tailorable capabilities for graduated responses, and enables the Army to help the joint and multinational force achieve strategic objectives through competition rather than armed conflict. 3-9. SC contributes to conventional deterrence during competition by preparing FSF for armed conflict across the range of military operations to include LSCO. SC is used to prepare allied and partner forces for LSCO by building capabilities needed to counter likely adversaries or capabilities needed as part of a multinational coalition, increasing capacity for both operational units and the capacity of the generating function to sustain long-term combat operations, and enabling their interoperability with U.S. and other multinational forces. This contributes to the potency and integration of the other instruments of national power, provides combatant commands tailorable capabilities for graduated responses, and enables the Army to help the joint and multinational force achieve strategic objectives through competition rather than through armed conflict. 3-10. The carefully orchestrated deployment of key multidomain capabilities in theater, enabled in large part by SC, can help shape the security environment in competition, deter escalation in crisis, and set conditions for the joint force to win in conflict. The Army can use forces that operate inside the adversary’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zones to impede denial schemes. In competition, these inside forces can significantly increase the adversary’s cost and risk threshold while increasing allied and partner capability and capacity and enabling interoperability in both direct and indirect competition. 3-11. During competition, SFA activities establish a need for access agreements across all domains. These standing access agreements, negotiated and approved by the DOS, set conditions for employment of joint capabilities across all domains in times of crisis or conflict. 3-12. During competition below armed conflict, the presence of SC forces enables relationships that support the continuous OPE. The access and influence gained by the presence of SFA forces—  Supports the partner FSF in setting the theater for multidomain and multinational operations.  Provides and develops added partner FSF layers of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability to the network.  Enables the partner FSF to gain and provide improved situational awareness and understanding of the OE.  Enables the partner FSF to share that information with the combatant command and regionally aligned units.  Supports and enables the partner FSF to preserve the consolidation and protection of critical capabilities, assets, and activities in theater. P REPARING F OREIGN S ECURITY F ORCES FOR C OMBAT ACROSS THE R ANGE OF M ILITARY O PERATIONS 3-13. Preparation for combat operations and demonstrating the interoperability of the U.S. joint force with allies and partners presents the strongest deterrence to adversaries (FM 3-0). Combined and deliberate messaging from the joint and multinational force that communicates the will and capability to conduct combat operations can amplify the deterrent effect of physical actions on the ground. Demonstrated capability, capacity, and interoperability of the joint and multinational force solidifies a unified approach to defending mutual interests. 3-14. As described in Chapter 2, the most effective way to build effective capabilities in a partner FSF is to simultaneously conduct SC across the executive, generating, and operating force levels. Executive-level advising is generally executed by the combatant command through the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program. In many smaller and less developed countries, the executive force level may simply not exist, and the host-nation army acts as the de facto ministry of defense with other branches in support. In such cases, it is imperative for Army SFA practitioners to coordinate through the combatant command to ensure that MODA advisors are available to synchronize advisory efforts across the executive, generating, and operating force levels. The process to plan, develop, resource, and train resident advisors can be lengthy. Figure 3-1 depicts the resident advisor process in more detail. 3-15. During competition, 10 USCUSCUnited States Code SFA programs are used to build capabilities in both the operating and generating force in coordination with 22 USCUSCUnited States Code SA programs. It is critical for Army SFA planners and practitioners to synchronize their efforts with those 22 USCUSCUnited States Code SA programs such as foreign military sales and foreign military financing (FMSFMSFinancial management specialist/FMF), IMET, and infrastructure construction to build capabilities using the DOTMLPF-P framework. Within any given country, the SCO is charged with developing capabilities using the DOTMLPF-P framework and SFA planners and practitioners must fully understand and integrate these practices to ensure unity of effort. For example, advisory efforts in the operating force must match doctrinal development in the generating force. Operators and maintainers of equipment provided by 22 USCUSCUnited States Code SA programs should be trained (potentially by SFA forces) at the operating force level, and a training pipeline for users and maintainers of that equipment must be established in the generating force. Neglecting any one of the DOTMLPF-P areas will likely result in temporary capabilities that expire over time because the FSF does not have the institutional capacity to maintain the capability. SC R OLE IN S ETTING THE T HEATER FOR M ULTIDOMAIN AND M ULTINATIONAL O PERATIONS 3-16. Campaigns and operations are carried out by combatant commands to achieve U.S. national objectives and shape an OE. These campaigns and operations aim to prevent, prepare for, or lessen the impact of a crisis or contingency while pursuing national objectives, and the measures taken have the potential to strengthen bonds between multinational partners, raise understanding of the region, help assure access when needed, and strengthen the capabilities for future multinational operations, all of which contribute to deterrence. 3-17. Setting the theater for multidomain and multinational operations is not limited to combat operations. In fact, setting the stage is a constant process, where SC planners anticipate, understand, and shape an OE to not only address LSCO, but activities across the range of military operations to include humanitarian assistance and relief. 3-18. Setting the theater ensures critical capabilities are pre-staged, maintained, and continuously available to effectively respond and win in crisis and conflict. Overcoming adversarial A2/AD capabilities to establish and maintain access to operational areas where U.S. forces are likely to operate is essential. SC can enable sustained operational access and extend operational reach through cooperative efforts, like acquisition and cross-servicing agreements with the host-nation security force to ensure a forward presence and access to airfields, seaports, and sustainment stocks in the rapid transition from competition to crisis or armed conflict. 3-19. In addition to sustained operational access, SC force presence and activities can help to set the theater by providing the joint force commander (JFC) with flexible deterrence and response options. These options should include strategies to build, integrate, and leverage FSF combat power; familiarize, train, and rehearse with the partner FSF on contingency plans; and maintain influence by being responsive to partner FSF security needs through continuous advisement, support, and liaison. Providing Added Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capability to the Network 3-20. In competition below armed conflict, regionally aligned and forward-stationed SFA forces can be instrumental in helping to shape an OE by developing partner FSF capability to add additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capacity to the network. SFA forces are uniquely positioned and adept at recognizing and countering adversary attempts to gain positions of relative advantage because of their relationships and routine interactions with the partner FSF, and through a more intimate knowledge of host-nation information systems and processes, geography, and technical infrastructure. 3-21. SFA forces can leverage the partner FSF to support the theater army intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts by—  Helping to gain and maintain situational awareness across the theater.  Providing support to warning, general, and target intelligence products.  Providing continual support to target development.  Providing updates to the information collection plan. Gaining and Providing Improved Situational Awareness and Understanding to the Combatant Command and Regionally Aligned Units 3-22. Below the threshold of armed conflict, SC teams and forward stationed and rotational forces provide agility to the combatant command because they are able to perform a wide variety of missions and create options for the combatant command. These forces expand situational awareness through their presence and access to key land areas and populations. Their influence assures allies and partners and improves interoperability and agility of the multinational force (FM 3-0). 3-23. Allies and partners can provide security capacity, situational awareness, and expertise in interacting with local populations, relieving Army forces of area security operations better suited to host-nation forces. Establishing effective liaison with multinational partners through embedded teams, collaborative systems, and leader contact is critical to establishing a common operational picture and maintaining situational understanding (FM 3-0). Supporting and Enabling the Partner FSF to Preserve the Consolidation and Protection of Critical Capabilities, Assets, and Activities in Theater 3-24. Critical capabilities, assets, and activities may include mission and objective-related readiness; force projection platforms and infrastructure; and access to decisive spaces and points, lines of communications, and information systems. Preserving critical capabilities, assets, and activities is integral for the Army in the OPE in competition, and critical to the sustainment and survivability of the multinational force in LSCO. 3-25. The Army can conduct SC activities to deny enemy freedom of action and to preserve critical capabilities, assets, and activities. The adversary will continuously attempt to destabilize the region and friendly forces can deter these actions through counter information warfare and counter irregular warfare. Army forces conduct SFA and other SC activities with the host nation and partners to preserve the consolidation of critical capabilities, assets, and activities in the return to competition and can build up partner capacity through these combined efforts. 3-26. The host nation access that SFA provides enables development of partner FSF protection processes that help to characterize adversarial threats and nominate protective denial or defensive countermeasures. These efforts can expand the preservation of critical capabilities, assets, and activities through all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment. R ELATIVE A DVANTAGES BELOW A RMED C ONFLICT 3-27. Positional advantage below armed conflict is gained primarily through an expanded global landpower network that is comprised of allies and partners. SC is key to gaining positional advantage because it directly builds allied and partner capabilities. Capability advantage is gained through the development of capabilities, force structure, doctrine, and training. 3-28. The combination of these advantages along with demonstrations of assured power projection, enhance the credibility of military deterrence and enable policy makers to employ diplomatic, economic, and information means to prevent a conflict before it starts. SC can be a useful tool to ensure host-nation infrastructure and FSF capabilities and capacity are adapted to local conditions so that partner nation security forces develop their own capacity to maintain stability. I NTERAGENCY C OORDINATION 3-29. SC requires varying levels of interagency coordination based on the type, level, and duration of activities involved. Even small tactical operations require interagency coordination, most often through the SCO with the country team as a part of the combatant command’s routine activities (as part of a campaign plan), and in initial phases of an operation (such as deploying flexible deterrent or flexible response options) or campaign. Interagency coordination may also be accomplished through a joint multinational force or Service component headquarters organization during combat operations and through the SCO as operations transition back to civilian control. 3-30. Interagency coordination for SFA and other SC activities is led by the COM and coordinated through the country team. In the rare instance where a COM is absent, such as a country experiencing an irregular change in government or the collapse of government, and where interagency has a presence, USAID will most likely take the lead for USG and coordinate with the JFC. The strategic and operational-level coordination results in planning and resources for effective tactical-level application. C ONSOLIDATION OF G AINS 3-31. SFA supports consolidation of gains most effectively by maintaining a persistent or permanent presence in a theater of operations when required. This presence enables the cultivation of host-nation, partner FSF, and interagency relationships on a predictable and reliable basis, and provides Army forces a high degree of regular access to allies and partners. The enduring results of these SFA activities help ambassadors, country teams, and JFCs gain a greater degree of influence with allies and partners as they pursue mutually beneficial objectives. In addition to this increased influence, SFA support to consolidating gains contributes to integrated deterrence. 3-32. SFA forces and SA activities must be prepared to adjust and expand SFA activities to consolidate gains made in competition. This may prove critical to maintaining regional stability and preventing crisis or conflict. In addition to reducing risks during crisis and conflict, consolidation of gains during competition serves to reduce costs by promoting investments during permissive conditions. 3-33. During the consolidation of gains, SC activities help to maintain an OE that is advantageous to U.S. strategic interests. Experience proves that actions taken by the partner FSF during competition help to ensure stability and reduce the potential for manmade crises or armed conflict throughout the region, even in locations where no previous conflict has occurred. Examples of FSF consolidation of gains during competition include—  Transportation system improvements (including port, airfield, and rail lines of communications).  Increasing theater supply stocks available to joint and multinational forces.  Intelligence sharing and cooperation (in accordance with foreign disclosure policies and procedures).  Providing specialized FSF capabilities to support foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster response.  Conducting global health engagement activities to build capacity of the partner nation government to maintain a level of health care conducive to healthy human and animal populations. SC in Competition Situation: The country of Banderia has been a regional partner of the United States for several years. Banderia is a rapidly developing country that participates in regional security organizations, frequently contributes forces to United Nations missions, and shares many interests with the United States. Banderia is greatly concerned that its rival, Hegemonia, is rapidly growing in military capability and frequently acts contrary to Banderian and U.S. interests. Concept Synopsis: Theater army planners and AOR security cooperation practitioners must develop a cohesive and comprehensive SC plan that improves Banderian capability and interoperability. Informed by the combatant command, the theater army security cooperation directorate working with the security cooperation organization, develop a theater SC plan for the AOR and each country. In country, the security cooperation organization hosts a weekly meeting with the SPP liaison officer, MODA advisor, security force advisor team leaders, Air Force advisors, and ARSOF operational detachment alpha leaders to ensure their activities are fully synchronized. Members of the DOS political-military section also attend this meeting. The results are shared with the theater army security cooperation division, the security force assistance brigade headquarters, the SPP National Guard headquarters, and the theater special operations command. All advisory elements in the country regularly update their assessments and record all significant activities. This enables incoming advisory elements from all organizations to easily read and fully understand what advisory activities have already occurred in Banderia and the current assessment of the Banderian military across the executive, generating, and operating forces. Theater army and combatant command security cooperation elements also have access to these assessments, which informs their own assessments of their respective SC plans. All SC efforts pass the Leahy vetting process and are reviewed to consider the Child Soldier Prevention Act and Women, Peace, and Security Act requirements. Among other things, this supports the security sector reform efforts led by the DOS political-military section. The Embassy: Nesting with the combatant command and higher level strategic documents, the country team and security cooperation organization have developed a SC plan as part of the ICS which nests with chief of mission (COM) guidance and higher level DOS strategies. The ICS and theater Army SFA plans generally agree, and the parties have effectively addressed any differences to achieve unity of effort. Security Assistance: The security cooperation organization’s security assistance plan involves using FMSFMSFinancial management specialist and FMF to purchase necessary equipment for the Banderian army. These cases include contracted trainers for basic operating skills and renewable maintenance and ammunition contracts. USASAC resources this equipment from Redstone Arsenal, and SATMO has planned to field a mixture of hybrid SA teams comprised of multicomponent military, civilian, and contractors. Key members of the Banderian military are being sent to U.S. schools via IMET on a recurring basis; training facilities for the equipment are being built, and necessary doctrinal manuals are being developed for the Banderian military. MODA: The combatant command and DSCA have established a long-term MODA program with Banderia, and senior MODA advisors rotate into Banderia for 1-year assignments. SPP: Banderia’s partner state has multiple SPP missions throughout the year, including both Army and Air National Guard. They are highly involved in Banderia’s noncommissioned officer academy, as well as the engineer, ordnance, and artillery schools. These relationships are leveraged in part to support security sector reform efforts under the purview of the DOS. The state also has a liaison officer assigned to the embassy. SFAB: The SFAB is regionally aligned to the Banderian AOR. It has a persistent presence in Banderia consisting of three SFA advisor teams that rotate every 6 months. One works with the generating force to help develop the training pipeline for multiple military occupational specialties, one is embedded with a Banderian army tank brigade, and one is helping to establish a Banderian combat training center. Request for Forces: Banderia has requested specific training on both counter-unmanned aerial vehicles and electromagnetic warfare. Since the SFAB does not have these capabilities, the theater army has filled these requirements through the request for forces process. Forces are identified and trained at the Combat Advisor Training Course prior to their advising mission in Banderia. The mission is coordinated through the security cooperation organization and regionally aligned SFAB, and the advisor forces are under operational control to the SFAB for the duration of the mission. Regionally aligned forces: Regionally aligned forces conduct a major training exercise with the Banderian military once every two years. This military engagement is an opportunity to showcase and test multinational interoperability in LSCO by maneuvering large elements across Banderia. To enable these exercises, multiple agreements have been made with the government of Banderia. ARSOF: ARSOF also has advisory elements in country working with the Banderian special forces. This advisory effort is fully synchronized with the SPP, SFA advisor teams, and Air Force advisory efforts, and the Banderian special forces participate in the bi-annual major exercise along with ARSOF. Steady State : The security cooperation organization working with the other SC practitioners in Banderia has developed and manages a SC common operational picture for the country. This common operational picture effectively displays capability, capacity, and interoperability across the executive, generating, and operating forces for the Banderian army and other branches, as well as access to key terrain across all domains. This common operational picture directly informs the theater army and combatant command regional SC common operational pictures. These regional SC common operational pictures allow senior leaders to effectively understand and visualize the interplay of regional military capabilities, capacity, interoperability, and access within the context of specific theater contingency plans. This also allows senior leaders to understand, visualize, decide, and direct further SC activities to create conditions enabling more effective execution of contingency plans, as well as create options for branches and sequels to contingency plans. TRANSITION TO CRISIS OR ARMED CONFLICT 3-34. SC practitioners must always be ready to immediately transition to conflict since the transition from competition to crisis may occur rapidly and with little to no warning. As the U.S. military footprint becomes more regionally aligned, it will be more important to build, maintain, leverage, and expand partner nation relationships and security capacity gained during competition to mitigate the lack of response time during crisis. Pre-positioned combat equipment to enable the rapid transition to crisis or armed conflict becomes a key consideration when deemed necessary. 3-35. While transitioning to crisis or armed conflict, it is critical for SFA forces already in the crisis or conflict zone to understand their legal status. The decision to become a combatant is reserved for the highest levels of the USG therefore SFA forces must take deliberate efforts to ensure they fully understand and abide by their combatant status as determined by the National Command Authority. To provide options to senior leaders, deployed SFA forces should always be prepared to transition to a combatant status and work with their partner security forces. SFA forces should also be prepared to maintain a noncombatant status, which will likely involve withdrawing from the country during a transition to crisis or conflict. It is likely that SFA forces will continue to support their partner forces, but they will do so from an adjacent country. In this instance, SFA forces will still likely work through their partner FSF to achieve theater objectives in a noncombatant role. 3-36. Current host-nation and partner FSF capability, capacity, and interoperability assessment data is an integral component to the planning process, especially during the rapid transition to crisis or armed conflict. These assessments may include quantitative and qualitative performance measures and estimates based on assessment, monitoring, and evaluation best practices. Key partner FSF entity variables may include the force’s purpose, structure, their will to fight, and strengths and weaknesses by warfighting function and domain. SFA forces in the contact layer are instrumental in the generation and dissemination of relevant partner FSF assessment data during transition not only to the theater Army and combatant command, but also to the blunt and surge forces that will deploy and augment the joint force in crisis. 3-37. Transitions are inherently complex and unpredictable because operational environmental conditions can quickly change and alter the perception of strategic leaders who may not have all the information necessary for clear situational understanding. To compete effectively during the transition period, SFA forces adopt a long-term approach that is agile enough to react to rapid changes in the political, diplomatic, and strategic environment. SECURITY COOPERATION IN CRISIS OVERVIEW 3-38. A crisis is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives (JP 3-0). A crisis can be long in duration, but it can also reflect a near-simultaneous and rapid transition to armed conflict if deterrence fails. 3-39. The collective military capability and capacity generated during competition sets the conditions and provides the leverage to win in crisis or resolve the situation with conditions favorable to the United States and its allies and partners. In crisis, SC enables the joint and multinational force to present credible and integrated deterrent options that demonstrate the ability to impose costs on malign action. During crisis, SC personnel may provide unique capabilities to advance partnerships, influence adversarial behavior, and support partner FSF and defense ministry crisis response operations. 3-40. In crisis, SFA forces may also be used to extend the capabilities of the multidomain task force by using combinations of partner FSF-provided non-kinetic and kinetic maneuver to neutralize adversary A2/AD networks to enable joint freedom of action. 3-41. SA activities in crisis seek to provide allies and partners with the relevant defense articles they require to conduct successful operations. Special SA authorities and programs can sometimes be used during crisis to enable the rapid provisioning of defense articles to allies and partners under 22 USCUSCUnited States Code authority if certain conditions are met. These special program processes can be executed much faster than the normal FMSFMSFinancial management specialist case management process used to conduct SA. For example, under the Presidential Drawdown Authority, the President can authorize the immediate transfer of articles and services from U.S. stocks, up to a funding cap established in law, in response to an “unforeseen emergency” (22 USCUSCUnited States Code §2318(a)(1)). SFA forces may be used to provide training on this equipment under special SA authorities. Effective synchronization of these combined SA and SFA efforts during crisis is critical to achieving desired end states. 3-42. Expeditionary and surge forces may lack the ability to rapidly integrate allied and partner capabilities into crisis action planning without SFA shaping efforts in competition. A key SFA support activity in crisis is to enable an agile response by the joint force in the rapid transition to combat operations. SFA forces co-located or embedded with the partner FSF can—  Support and enable integration and synchronization of U.S. and partner activities.  Provide insight on key capability gaps within the partner FSF structure.  Provide “on-the-ground” situational awareness to theater planners.  Help to ensure unity of purpose and mutual support in offensive operations.  Enable the joint force to maintain freedom of action and positions of relative advantage. 3-43. SFA forces and SA activities may also be positioned or repositioned outside of the crisis area to build coalition combat power for future offensive operations in a joint operational area. R ELATIVE A DVANTAGES IN C RISIS 3-44. SC can enable positional advantage to ensure that the right forces are in the right place at the right time to meet the requirements of the joint force. Relative advantage in crisis hinges upon enduring presence through a combination of assigned forces, rotational forces, and access to key capabilities. 3-45. SC can enable the joint force to rapidly build relative advantage in crisis. Many partner forces have effective land components but lack sufficient air and cyber domain capabilities for multidomain operations. U.S. joint forces can rapidly self-deploy air domain capabilities to a crisis area or support through the air domain from basing in the continental United States. Cyber domain capabilities can also operate from the United States. SC elements can provide the means to integrate and converge these capabilities with partner force land domain capabilities by embedding and accompanying partner nation land forces. This can be done with SC forces already in theater when crisis or conflict occurs, or by rapidly deploying small SFA teams to execute the mission. This can build immediate and credible combat power for the joint force while large U.S. land formations are still enroute to the operational area. 3-46. These operations will be more cost effective by employing smaller SC teams to build partner capacity and capability and enable interoperability during competition, and then surge as embedded support teams during crisis. Surging SC support teams will provide the multinational force commander with positional advantage at echelon to ensure that integrated deterrence effects are maximized. S UPPORT TO THE J OINT F ORCE DURING C RISIS 3-47. SC can provide support to the joint force in crisis through—  Providing early warning and conflict type determination.  Maintaining persistent advisory presence.  Supporting the multidomain task force.  Holding adversary interests at risk.  Enabling partner FSF resiliency inside adversarial A2/AD networks. Providing Early Warning and Conflict Type Determination 3-48. SC activities provide a method to overcome the tyrannies of distance and time. They can provide early and sustained indicators to enable conflict type determination and situational understanding based on forward presence and standing relationships in an area of operations. Maintaining Persistent Advisory Presence 3-49. SC forces can anticipate possible crisis areas during competition and work to maintain a persistent advisory presence in that area. In situations where a crisis occurs without a persistent SC presence in place, SC forces should be prepared to rapidly reposition to surge to the crisis area either from within the theater or from the continental United States, to enable the rapid integration of forward-stationed forces. Supporting the Multidomain Task Force 3-50. SC can enable the partner FSF to maintain contact in all domains and provide additional capability and capacity to the multidomain task force during crisis. SC personnel already present in theater from the competition phase or those surged during crisis, can integrate, advise, support, conduct liaison, and assess with the partner FSF to conduct continuous surveillance and reconnaissance for joint and multinational targeting and provide enhanced situational awareness to the multinational headquarters. This capability can enable the joint and multinational commander to sense adversary actions—across all domains—first, and initiate movement to spoil or prevent adversary attacks before their objectives are realized. The Coalition Support Team Concept During OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, the 5th Special Forces Group assumed the mission to provide support, liaison, and training to the Pan-Arab contingent to the U.S.-led coalition. This force included Saudi, Syrian, Egyptian, and Kuwaiti forces. From this mission, 5th Special Forces Group fashioned the coalition support team concept. 5th Group eventually fielded 106 coalition support teams, some with only 3–4 personnel, from its organic 12-member operational detachment alphas. This coalition support team capability excelled in four areas: • Training partner Arab units. • Reporting ground truth to the JFC. • Delivering joint fires for Arab commanders. • Coordinating closely with adjacent units to prevent fratricide. The Arab forces, as part of the coalition with coalition support team enablers, delivered lethal and effective combat power to the multinational force that could be confidently committed to major operations with significant responsibilities. The Pan-Arab contingent served as the screening force during DESERT SHIELD and penetrated well-prepared Iraqi defenses, and liberated Kuwait City during the DESERT STORM ground assault. The same tenets and capabilities highlighted in this historic example remain central to Army doctrine in multinational and multidomain operations. Holding Adversary Interests at Risk 3-51. SC can enable the partner FSF to be postured correctly to hold adversary interests at risk during crisis. SC activities can develop local and regional situational awareness, build networks and relationships with partners, and shape an OE to advance U.S. influence. SC contributes to deterrence that may ultimately prevent adversary action through the presentation of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction, and a belief that the cost of the action outweighs the perceived benefits. 3-52. SC personnel integrated with partner FSF units during crisis can fundamentally change the risk calculus for adversaries who seek to achieve their objectives through force, thereby giving adversaries a reason to pause before they act. The training and readiness of a nation’s defense forces is continuously assessed by potential adversaries, and this contributes greatly to shaping an OE. Training creates combat credibility, which contributes to deterrence (ADP 3-0). The Military Advisor Group Concept In July of 1949, one year prior to the start of the Korean War, the Army initiated an SFA program by establishing the Korean Military Advisory Group. This effort provided accurate assessments of both the gaps in the South Korean military capabilities and the likelihood of a North Korea attack. Unfortunately, these assessments were not effectively used, and the U.S. Army was caught by surprise when the Korean War started, resulting in the Task Force Smith debacle. This is a good example of establishing a persistent advisory presence in an area of anticipated crisis; however, it also displays the problems that can occur when SFA assessments are not effectively used. Once the Korean War started, the Korean Military Advisor Group had marked success in building the Army of the Republic of Korea into a security establishment capable of enforcing the government’s control of its territory and population, while also deterring external threats. Enabling Partner FSF Resiliency Inside Adversarial A2/AD Networks 3-53. SC can enable the resiliency of the partner FSF to persist inside adversary A2/AD networks during crisis. A2/AD is a tactic intended to prevent the United States from deploying its forces into a theater of operations from the onset. This tactic fails to deliver when the partner nation’s force is already operating inside the A2/AD area and has developed localized tactics that use dispersion to evade enemy attacks, deceive the enemy, and achieve surprise. SC can support the resiliency of a partner FSF in crisis by developing or enhancing their mobility, cover, concealment, and deception capability and capacity. 3-54. For mobility, partner land forces should be light and agile enough to quickly conduct operations, then rapidly reposition along the established nodes of the landpower network within the adversary’s A2/AD zone. Cover capacity should include site hardening against adversary attack and be augmented with the ability of the unit to conceal itself from detection through physical, electronic, and cyber means. Deception capacity should focus on the ability of the partner FSF to present false targets to the adversary through a combination of electronic spoofing and physical decoys. 3-55. SC can build partner force capacity that is highly mobile, with alternate and supplemental positions to ensure survivability and unpredictability. SC can enable and support FSF formations to integrate CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-defense planning considerations across all warfighting functions. SC used to increase partner FSF readiness against current and emerging CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards, enables FSF tactical and operational formations to fight, survive, and win in future combat operations. S UPPORT TO F ORCE P ROJECTION 3-56. Force projection is particularly important during crisis, as Army forces have an unknown amount of time to shape a developing situation. Forces projected forward during competition to conduct exercises, bolster allies and partners, and conduct other activities are under constant observation. Adversaries assess the speed and efficiency of these routine deployments, which can have a deterrent effect. Given the fluid nature of a crisis, force projection may continue well after a crisis has transitioned to armed conflict. 3-57. SC activities to enable force projection may involve developing partner FSF capability and capacity to support, augment, resource, and protect the force as it arrives in theater. SC forces work with their counterparts in host-nation defense ministries and the FSF to support and augment the theater commander and JFC’s force projection activities by, with, and through—  Opening the theater.  Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI).  Initial employment of forces.  Sustainment.  Redeployment. 3-58. During a crisis, the rapid projection of SC forces provides the JFC with more enduring options than forces primarily concentrated in or transiting other domains. The potentially close physical proximity of partner ground forces to adversary forces provides the JFC with greater understanding and a greater capacity to dictate the tempo of operations. 3-59. Partner forces will likely already be executing operations directed in response to provocations, indications, or warnings that hostile activities may commence. At the direction of the combatant command, Army personnel execute SC tasks, activities, and operations with partner FSF designed to deter further malign activity and set conditions for success should deterrence fail. The forward presence or projection of SC teams in a coalition support role provides capabilities that create tactical and operational dilemmas for threat forces, enabling the joint force to seize and retain the initiative. 3-60. Prompt deployment of land forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later, while also providing reassurance to allies and partners. SC uses a smaller force and less resources to build partner FSF combat power and represents an economy of force capability from a U.S. perspective. This benefit accrues to the JFC in a potential LSCO theater as well as to global U.S. military considerations in other theaters. Based on conditions and accepted risk, the Army can lessen its force commitment in one or more areas by employing SC teams as the primary Army presence for the duration of the crisis. The theater army and joint force may consider deploying SC teams to sustain contact with key partners, demonstrate U.S. commitment, counter adversary machinations, and maintain access for future contingencies. 3-61. Effective early intervention by SC forces and activities can also deny adversaries the time necessary for them to set conditions in their favor. Deployment alone does not guarantee success, rather it involves convincing adversaries that the deployed force can markedly reduce the adversary force’s chance of success during armed conflict. Adversaries measure the ability of Army and partner forces to conduct operations during armed conflict through careful observation of how well those forces prepare for and respond to a crisis. ACTIVITIES AT ECHELON DURING CRISIS 3-62. During crisis, SFA teams embedded within the executive, generating, and operating functions of the host-nation defense forces may work closely to support RSOI operations for arriving forces. SFA and the partner may work together to support arriving forces as they complete collective training, theater orientation, and theater acclimation. 3-63. SFA teams embedded with the partner FSF in a coalition support role may be useful in coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing AOR-tailored capability to incoming forces during crisis. The partner FSF can support setting the theater, enabling expeditionary maneuver, and responding immediately to regional emergencies all while protecting bases, key nodes, and networks. 3-64. During crisis, the U.S. land component headquarters may deploy into an operational area as a tactical headquarters with subordinate divisions and brigades. Impending LSCO may require the corps headquarters to function under the command of a multinational force land component or become subordinate to a joint task force army equivalent established as part of a multinational coalition. SC liaisons, including SFA advisors in a coalition support role will be key to partner FSF unit emplacement under the command of U.S. forces. Whether the multinational force is U.S.-led or not, the deep understanding of embedded SFA teams in partner force defense ministries will facilitate interoperability and overall demonstration of combat power. 3-65. During consolidation of gains, SC teams perform multiple tasks and developmental activities. SC teams leverage the FSF to ensure retention and safeguarding of critical capabilities it may have lost during events leading up to the crisis, such as computer server farms, television, and radio broadcast stations. SC also supports the FSF in its coordination with the joint force to safeguard key storage areas containing weapons, munitions, and weapons of mass destruction or its components. SFA activities can also enable and support the partner FSF in the rapid and comprehensive use of information to shape public opinion, discredit enemy narratives, and promote friendly objectives. SFA activities at this time are intended to enable and support the partner FSF to reinforce stability and resume full competition activities. Security Cooperation in Crisis Situation: Banderia has experienced a natural disaster which has created a crisis in the country. Simultaneously, the primary U.S. adversary in the region, Hegemonia, is using this natural disaster as a pretext to threaten invasion of Banderia to assist ethnic Hegemonian people living in Banderia. Hegemonian elements have entered Banderia to set conditions for an invasion. This is greatly exacerbating the situation and creating a political-military crisis. Concept Synopsis : SFA forces (SFABs and other entities engaged in advise and assist missions) in theater provide immediate early warning and situational awareness to the theater army and combatant command. These forces also take on an immediate role as information collectors for the theater army to gain further situational awareness and answer requests for information. The state national guard in the continental United States also receives multiple reports via social media and email through the committed relationships they have cultivated over the years with the Banderian military. This information is relayed to the theater army and the state sets up a crisis center in the state headquarters to assist in responding and passing information. The Crisis Unfolds : The myriad SFA elements in theater advise, assist, support, and liaise Banderian forces to respond to the disaster. This involves receiving and coordinating international aid while simultaneously preparing for possible combat operations with Hegemonia. SFABs and ARSOF elements use pre-positioned equipment to immediately transition to embedded advisory teams capable of executing LSCO. Due to the scale of the crisis, on-call security force advisor teams are deployed from the continental United States to further embed with operational forces, and a high level strategic advising team is embedded with the ministry of defense to provide executive force level advising. These forces maintain awareness of their noncombat status but are prepared to transition to combat with their partner security force. They are also prepared to withdraw to another country and work through their partner security force if U.S. policymakers decide to execute that course of action. They establish immediate reach-back to U.S. enablers across all domains. Preparing for Conflict : U.S. conventional ground forces prepare to deploy from the continental United States if directed. Due to pre-existing access agreements established during competition, theater opening teams from the theater support command are able to rapidly establish nodes to receive both humanitarian assistance and deploying U.S. combat forces. Existing access, basing, and overflight agreements have facilitated the immediate use of Banderian airspace by U.S. forces to conduct reconnaissance of Hegemonian preparations for combat. Ultimately, the rapid build-up of joint combat power and demonstration of U.S. resolve raises the risk calculus for Hegemonia, convincing them not to invade Banderia and stand down their forces. TRANSITION TO COMPETITION OR ARMED CONFLICT 3-66. When integrated deterrence, de-escalation, and cost imposition fail in crisis, partner FSF formations can be supported by SFA forces in a coalition support or liaison role to facilitate a rapid transition to conflict by enabling multinational maneuver and setting the conditions to defeat the adversary. SFA teams can integrate with FSF to enable multinational maneuver through a tailorable mix of SFA support enablers for long-range fires, protection, cyber, electromagnetic warfare, and other capabilities. FSF land forces supported by SFA support teams can help the multinational force commander establish the required “footholds” for maritime, air, and ground forces to operate through and from. These FSF formations and capabilities will be an integral part of the joint and multinational targeting and fires integration process, providing additional combined strategic effects as required from competition through conflict. 3-67. To retain the nation’s position of advantage, the multinational force manages the transition between security and stability tasks as FSF security requirements lessen and FSF stability tasks increase ahead of the return to competition. In that transitional period, the roles of the supported and supporting multinational commands will change to reflect the shift to stability and back to a competition environment. As combat and combat support forces retrograde, SFA teams should coordinate closely with host-nation defense ministries as the emerging competition environment will require the FSF to achieve both stability and competition objectives. SECURITY COOPERATION IN ARMED CONFLICT OVERVIEW 3-68. During LSCO, security cooperation serves two principal functions. First, SFA forces can serve as embedded advisors who advise, support, liaise, and assess. This provides access to joint force enablers and facilitates synchronization of coalition activities. Equally, embedded SFA liaisons can also leverage partner FSF capability and capacity to support the joint force. This may be done with or without major U.S. ground formations operating in conjunction with the FSF. Second, SFA forces can train and equip FSF during LSCO. This may occur inside or outside of the operational area. This is particularly important during extended combat operations where advising may occur directly with the generating force of the host nation. 3-69. SFA forces and SA activities may be used to train and equip allies and partners during LSCO. This may occur within the host country, or alternatively outside of the supported country in a noncombat role as authorized by U.S. policy. These SC elements may train and equip the partner FSF with coalition-provided equipment which the partner could then employ against adversaries without any direct SFA support. E MBEDDED A DVISOR S UPPORT TO L ARGE -S CALE C OMBAT O PERATIONS 3-70. SFA forces can co-locate or embed with the partner FSF to support and enable synchronization of activities, fill key capability gaps, and help to ensure unity of purpose and mutual support in offensive operations. Expanding the Operational Area in Conflict 3-71. SFA provides commanders with more options to exploit both strategic and operational indirect approaches in a globally integrated operation against a peer adversary. SFA can leverage partner FSF capabilities and their inherently forward posture to expand the operational area by maneuvering in areas inside and outside the traditional theater geometry. Properly advised, equipped, and trained partner FSF can operate inside the adversary’s A2/AD zones to provide credible and survivable capabilities that undermine area denial stratagems. Likewise, properly advised, equipped, and trained partner outside forces may be surged to enable the Army and joint force to control terrain, consolidate gains, and secure strategic support areas. 3-72. Advanced adversary capabilities and capacity will necessitate large amounts of low signature, distributed, lethal inside forces that maneuver rapidly, aggregating and dispersing as required. In LSCO, these low-signature forces will replace static, high-signature operational outposts while constant displacement will be the norm. Formation in the future LSCO battlefield will tend to have broad fronts, will rarely have secure flanks, will engage in compartmented battles, and will not have air and naval superiority. The future LSCO battlefield will be a noncontiguous operational area where commanders must be able to integrate long-range precision fires and create effects across multiple domains. 3-73. SFA forces embedded with foreign security forces must be capable of operating in an austere environment without immediate access to U.S. Army support. These forces must have robust communications capabilities to synchronize U.S. enablers with FSF maneuver. Tactical mobility may be necessary and a potential lack of access to U.S. support may necessitate the use of host-nation transportation assets. Embedded SFA advisors must also be trained and equipped to operate outside the range of immediate U.S. medical support. This may require advanced medical training and/or a reliance on FSF medical facilities. Leveraging Multinational Forces to Create Overmatch 3-74. Expanding the operational area and striking across domains in depth through speed, range, and the convergence of multidomain capabilities provides multinational commanders with the ability to gain and maintain decision dominance and the overmatch necessary to prevail in LSCO. 3-75. SFA teams embedded with the partner FSF can help set the conditions for overmatch by executing and enabling nonlinear operations. Given expansive geometry of globally contested operations and a numerically superior adversary, multinational forces create overmatch through their ability to attack throughout the depth of the operational area and to survive adversary counterstrikes. 3-76. The partner FSF, properly enabled by SFA, can be instrumental in turning complex terrain into an advantage, enabling the multinational forces to attack and defeat land, air, and maritime targets by integrating multinational sensors and platforms. TRAINING AND EQUIPPING DURING LSCO 3-77. SFA forces and SA activities may be used to train and equip FSF during LSCO. SFA forces may discover gaps in partner force capabilities during combat operations and then rapidly establish training programs or strategies to close those gaps. 3-78. SFA forces and SA activities may use a combination of 10 USCUSCUnited States Code and 22 USCUSCUnited States Code equipping programs to close identified gaps or to provide additional capabilities. SFA forces may also provide training on these new material capabilities. 3-79. SFA forces may work with the FSF generating force to build and expand capabilities to train new forces or mobilize reserves. This may be critical to sustaining combat power over time during extended LSCO. 3-80. The United States has a long history of serving as the “arsenal of democracy.” Frequently, the United States provides a variety of U.S. equipment to partners during conflict. SFA forces and SA activities must be prepared to train on employment and sustainment of equipment, as well as to integrate its use into existing FSF doctrine. SFA practitioners must also be attuned to establishing systems to train qualified maintainers and replacement personnel on these systems. 3-81. U.S. forces may provide support to a FSF engaged in conflict without directly engaging in that conflict themselves. In this case, SC becomes the main effort for defeating the adversary by training and equipping the FSF in a proximate location outside the conflict area and then continuing to advise remotely or virtually. 3-82. Training and equipping a FSF from a proximate location creates unique challenges to SC forces. Since SC forces in this situation will not accompany the FSF into the conflict area, the FSF may encounter tactical or technical equipment employment problems beyond their capability to solve. At the operational force level, SC planners and practitioners should consider utilizing virtual and remote advising technologies (for example, reachback kits) to enable and support FSF units requiring specialized tactical and technical assistance from both military subject matter experts and technical experts in the defense industry. 3-83. The virtual and remote advising capability not only enables the FSF in real-time combat operations but also improves and enhances future SC training and equipping programs. At the generating force level, SFA forces advise the FSF on integrating virtual and remote advising technologies into their DOTMLPF-P framework to increase capacity. SC in Conflict Situation : A year after the previous crisis ended, Hegemonia, sensing a distracted U.S. presence, chooses to strike and their forces invade Banderia. U.S. policymakers commit to U.S. combat forces in the defense of Banderia. SFAB : The SFAB immediately executes its contingency plan to embed large numbers of SFA teams across the Banderian military, pulling and consolidating available security force advisor teams from other SFABs. Rapidly deploying into Banderia and embedding with Banderian units, they begin conducting advise, support, and liaison missions. Banderian Forces : Banderian conventional and special operations forces with embedded U.S. advisors engage in delaying actions with Hegemonian forces supported by U.S. joint enablers, while U.S. ground forces conduct RSOI. U.S. senior advisors embedded at the ministry of defense level set conditions for combined command and control of a multinational coalition while the U.S. joint task force headquarters conducts RSOI. Command and Control : A combined command structure is established with a heavy reliance on SFA liaison teams. Two digital liaison detachments are activated and also fall in on the partner nation headquarters. SFAB elements establish a digital liaison detachment-like capability with other partner nation headquarters. Executive and Generating Force : As the conflict draws out, a need is identified for additional SFA forces, particularly at the executive and generating force levels. The existing SPP relationship is leveraged and multiple executive level advisors are activated from the partner state. Training : Facilities are established in both Banderia and an adjacent friendly country to train Banderian forces on additional U.S. provided equipment that is rushed to the country under a new congressional authorization. SFAB forces are part of this authorization, but the level of the SFA required exceeds their capacity, requiring additional conventional forces to execute SFA. Building Partner Capacity : The embedded advisory forces and the forces conducting training and equipping out of contact are able to create enough capability and capacity in the Banderian military that Hegemonian forces are defeated and forced to withdraw. Unfortunately, in the process there is significant damage to Banderian infrastructure with large numbers of internally displaced people and a general humanitarian crisis. Consolidating Gains : As U.S. forces withdraw at the end of the conflict, there is a clear need for significant continued SFA activities as part of post-conflict stabilization. Joint and Army planners at the theater level anticipated this need and projected adequate numbers of follow-on forces to conduct stability activities. As the environment returns to competition with Hegemonia short of armed conflict, U.S. forces are able to consolidate the gains they made through the defeat of Hegemonia. This consolidation of gains not only occurs in Banderia, but also with other partners and potential partners in the region who are now alerted to Hegemonian aggression and therefore eager to align themselves with the United States, creating additional SFA requirements and opportunities for the region. TRANSITION BACK TO COMPETITION AND POST-CONFLICT STABILIZATION 3-84. Multinational forces continuously consolidate gains across the competition continuum. Consolidating gains during the transition back to competition is particularly important. Multinational formations continuously consolidate gains to maintain tempo and enable the transition from armed conflict to resuming competition. SC activities to consolidate gains eliminate the enemy’s capability and will to resist and are essential to exploiting tactical success and maintaining the initiative. 3-85. Like shaping actions, consolidation of gains is a continuous activity with varying levels of intensity and a variety of tasks including stability, security, and offensive operations against bypassed enemy formations. If required, a multinational force can be trained to improve the way it conducts consolidation of gains to reset the conditions for long-term deterrence and as the prelude to creating a new and improved security environment. From the outset of a campaign, the multinational force plans, sets, and continually adjusts the conditions for a more favorable return to competition and a new normal. 3-86. During the transition back to competition, FSF can leverage SC efforts to the extent they can be made available, and return to shaping the environment and defeating adversary aggression below armed conflict by—  Conducting continuous multidomain OPE.  Countering destabilizing information warfare campaigns.  Deterring escalation through deployment and training as part of multinational force.  Setting the conditions for rapid transition to armed conflict should deterrence fail. SECURITY COOPERATION SUPPORT TO POST-CONFLICT STABILIZATION 3-87. A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0). These operations support governance by a host nation, an interim government, or a military government. Stability involves coercive and constructive action (See ADP 3-07 for more information on stability operations). 3-88. Following LSCO, it is likely that there will be widespread destruction of host-nation infrastructure. FSF may also be depleted or destroyed to include law enforcement elements. Depending on the nature of the campaign, it is possible that coalition forces may find themselves occupying adversary terrain. These areas are also likely to have experienced widespread destruction of infrastructure and security forces. Both situations create an immediate need for SC to rebuild security forces to enable stability. 3-89. Depending on the length of the conflict, it is likely that SC forces supporting LSCO may be depleted to the point that that are not fully mission capable. It is critical that security cooperation planners anticipate this requirement and plan for additional stabilization resources prior to the commencement of conflict. 3-90. The multinational force conducts limited stability tasks during armed conflict in accordance with the laws of land warfare. Stability tasks become more prevalent in consolidation areas and during consolidation of gains after bypassed enemy forces are defeated. Multinational operations including stability operations present many opportunities for SC. Having multinational forces as part of an operation provides international legitimacy that helps isolate adversary or enemy forces. They may provide cultural awareness, foreign language skills, and affinities with populations that help with understanding the environment, conducting stability tasks, and transitioning to legitimate authorities. Allies and partners often operate with different authorities to employ key capabilities in space, cyberspace, and the information dimension of an OE. Lastly, multinational allies and partners bring additional forces to an operation, and they often possess capabilities U.S. Army forces may lack (FM 3-0). Meanwhile, adversaries attempt to isolate the United States from allies and partners by fostering instability in critical areas and among relevant actors to increase U.S. operational requirements. 3-91. SC teams conducting OTEBA developmental activities can be formed and mission-tailored to build partner force capability and capacity and enable interoperability for the FSF to implement stability mechanisms. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADP 3-0). As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone. The four stability mechanisms which SFA units and teams can enable FSF to implement and to improve are—  Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority.  Control involves imposing civil order.  Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign, friendly, neutral, and threat audiences through messages, presence, and actions.  Support establishes, reinforces, or sets conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively. 3-92. Helping partner nations build, rebuild, or maintain their national security institutions is a critical step in maintaining regional stability, and it is ultimately less expensive than requiring U.S. forces to do so. SC efforts can make it possible for the FSF to accomplish or augment the joint force and the Army in the minimum-essential stability operations tasks which are—  Establish civil security.  Provide immediate needs (access to food, water, shelter, and medical treatment). This page intentionally left blank.

This chapter discusses legal considerations for SC. First it describes the general legal foundation for military actions and the legal authority for SC. Next, it discusses key SC funding programs and authorities. Finally, it discusses special foreign assistance authorities. GENERAL LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR MILITARY ACTIONS 4-1. Law and policy govern the actions of U.S. forces in all military operations, including security cooperation. For U.S. forces to conduct operations, a legal basis must exist. This legal basis profoundly influences many aspects of an operation. It affects the ROE, how U.S. forces organize and train foreign forces, the authority to spend funds to benefit the host nation, and the authority of U.S. forces to detain and interrogate. Under the Constitution, the President is the Commander in Chief of U.S. forces. Therefore, orders issued by the President or the Secretary of Defense to a combatant commander provide the starting point in determining the legal basis. Laws are legislation passed by Congress and signed into law by the President and treaties to which the United States is party. Policies are executive orders, departmental directives and regulations, and other authoritative statements issued by government officials. Following is a summary of key laws and policies that bear upon U.S. military operations in support of security cooperation. This summary does not replace a consultation with the unit’s supporting staff judge advocate. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR SECURITY COOPERATION 4-2. U.S. forces participate in security cooperation according to a number of legal authorities, most of which are codified in 10 USCUSCUnited States Code, 22 USCUSCUnited States Code, and in provisions of the annual National Defense Authorization Act. All security cooperation activities must be conducted according to and comply with these authorities, and the chief of mission must approve all security cooperation activities conducted in a foreign country. 4-3. 10 USCUSCUnited States Code authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the U.S. ambassador to the host nation. In such situations, U.S. forces may be granted status as administrative and technical personnel based on a formal agreement or an exchange of diplomatic letters with the host nation. This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in operations. Assistance provided to police by U.S. forces is permitted but, generally, the DOD does not serve as the lead government department. Without receiving a deployment or execution order from the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. forces may be authorized to make only limited contributions during operations that involve security assistance. H OST -C OUNTRY L AW AND S TATUS - OF -F ORCES A GREEMENTS 4-4. After considering the type of baseline protections represented by fundamental human rights law, the military leader must be advised regarding the other bodies of law that leader should integrate into planning and execution. This includes consideration of host-nation law. Because of the nature of most international missions not involving armed conflict, commanders and staffs must understand the technical and pragmatic significance of host-nation law within the area of operations. 4-5. Status-of-forces agreements and other forms of agreements frequently exist. They are essentially contractual agreements or treaties between two or more nations that establish the legal status of military personnel in foreign countries. Topics usually covered in a status-of-forces agreement include criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for damages and injuries. In the absence of an agreement or some other arrangement with the host country, DOD personnel in foreign countries may be subject to the host country’s laws. Commanders ensure that all personnel understand the status of U.S. forces in the area of operations and are trained accordingly. L EGAL C ONSTRAINTS ON M ISSIONS 4-6. U.S. law and regulation play a key role in establishing the parameters by which military forces may conduct missions. These parameters tend to constitute constraints on the activities of military units. They range from the ROE in combat situations to the authority to spend government funds in furtherance of a training or support mission. Rules of Engagement 4-7. Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 3-84). Often these directives are specific to the operation. If there are no operation-specific ROE, U.S. forces apply standing ROE. When operating with a multinational force, commanders must coordinate the ROE thoroughly and consider the laws of the host country. 4-8. ROE are a critically important aspect of military operations overseas. ROE contribute directly to mission accomplishment, enhance protection, and help ensure compliance with law and policy. While ROE are ultimately commanders’ rules to regulate the use of force, judge advocate general personnel nonetheless remain involved in ROE drafting, dissemination, interpretation, and training. Authority for Security Cooperation and Security Assistance 4-9. The DOS has the primary responsibility, authority, and funding to conduct foreign assistance on behalf of the USG. Foreign assistance encompasses any and all assistance to a foreign nation, including security assistance (assistance to the internal police forces and military forces of the foreign nation), development assistance (assistance to the foreign government in projects that will assist the development of the foreign economy or their political institutions), and humanitarian assistance (direct assistance to the population of a foreign nation). The legal authority for DOS to conduct foreign assistance is found in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195, 22 USCUSCUnited States Code 2151, et. Seq.). 4-10. All training and equipping of FSF must be specifically authorized. Military and civilian personnel, operations, and maintenance appropriations should typically provide only an incidental benefit to those security forces. All other weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. Moreover, the President must give specific authority to the DOD for its role in training and equipping a partner FSF. Absent such a directive, the DOD lacks authority to take the lead in assisting a host nation to train and equip its security forces. 4-11. 10 USCUSCUnited States Code funds may be appropriated to the DOD by Congress and managed by combatant commands to conduct military-to-military exchanges and traditional commander’s activities. This does not provide the authorities for U.S. forces to train or equip partner nation militaries. These programs support cooperative military engagement, and fund material support for the following—  Humanitarian and civic assistance projects.  Participation in exercises.  Traditional commander activities, such as conferences, seminars, or military-to-military exchanges. 4-12. Operations and maintenance funds are provided by the combatant command for support of the DOD or combatant command security cooperation programs other than security assistance in the country. These are DOD funds traditionally provided for the purpose of operating and maintaining U.S. forces such as salaries, exercises, training, operations, and overhead costs. General Prohibition on Assistance to Police 4-13. Historically, the DOD is not the lead government department for assisting foreign governments. The DOS is the lead when U.S. forces provide security assistance—military training, equipment, and defense articles and services to host-nation governments. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 specifically prohibits assistance to foreign police, prison, or other law enforcement forces except within specific exceptions and under a Presidential directive. When providing assistance to training, the DOS provides the lead role in criminal justice, police, and corrections assistance through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The President, however, may delegate this role to other agencies as required. Authority for Training and Equipping Foreign Forces 4-14. 22 USCUSCUnited States Code authorizes the transfer of defense articles and services (including training) by the USG to friendly foreign countries in furtherance of the security objectives of the United States and in consonance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. All training and equipping of FSF is specifically authorized. U.S. laws require Congress to authorize expenditures for training and equipping foreign forces. The laws of the United States also require the DOS to verify that the host nation receiving the assistance is not in violation of human rights. Usually, DOD involvement is limited to a precise level of staffing and materiel requested from the DOS under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 4-15. Defense articles and services shall be furnished or sold solely for internal security, legitimate self-defense, preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering such weapons, permitting the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter, or supporting economic and social development activities by foreign military forces in less developed countries. As such, all training and equipping of FSF must be specifically authorized. The President may authorize deployed U.S. forces to train or advise host-nation security forces as part of the mission in accordance with the provisions of the War Powers Act and other U.S. law. Consultation with a staff judge advocate or legal advisor early in the mission planning process will help commanders ensure that any planned effort to train or equip foreign forces are funded and executed in a manner consistent with the law. Authority for Foreign Internal Defense 4-16. Without receiving a deployment or execution order from the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. forces may be authorized to make only limited contributions during operations that involve foreign internal defense. If the Secretary of State requests and the Secretary of Defense approves, U.S. forces can participate in foreign internal defense. The request and approval go through standing statutory authorities in 22 USCUSCUnited States Code. Title 22 contains the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and other laws. It authorizes security assistance, developmental assistance, and other forms of bilateral aid. The request and approval might also occur under various provisions in 10 USCUSCUnited States Code. 4-17. 10 USCUSCUnited States Code authorizes military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance are planned and executed in coordination with the U.S. ambassador to the host nation. In such situations, U.S. forces work as administrative and technical personnel as part of the U.S. diplomatic mission pursuant to a status of forces agreement or pursuant to an exchange of letters with the host nation. This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in operations. Assistance to foreign police forces by U.S. forces is permitted but not with the DOD as the lead government department. 4-18. Foreign internal defense is a legislatively directed operation and is defined as participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). Foreign internal defense is one of the listed special operations activities under the purview of the commander of the Special Operations Command per 10 USCUSCUnited States Code 167. Funding Considerations and Programs 4-19. Commanders and staffs planning any security cooperation mission must consult a staff judge advocate as early as possible in the planning process. Security cooperation programs are governed by U.S. statute and require knowledge of the USCUSCUnited States Code. With limited exceptions, the DOD may not train FSF under Title 10. All training and equipping of FSF must be specifically authorized. The DOD has limited ability to build the capacity of security forces not part of the ministry of defense. The primary laws of concern are the Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and various sections of Titles 10 and 22, USCUSCUnited States Code. 4-20. Many different funding sources may be required for small segments of any activity, such as transportation or lodging for participants. Determining which funding sources should be used for various activities is challenging. Army units can avoid funding problems through early identification of and application to funding sources for specific activities. This is essential for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution. 4-21. The Leahy Amendments prohibit the USG from providing funds to a unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the DOS has credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. The provisions restrict funding until the Secretary of State determines and reports that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice. In the event the security forces include members suspected of human rights violations, the law restricts funding until the Secretary of State determines and reports that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice. 4-22. The Child Soldier Prevention Act aims to combat the recruitment or use of children as soldiers by publicly identifying countries that recruit or use child soldiers and restricting certain types of U.S. security assistance to these countries. In particular, the law requires that the Secretary of State publish annually a list of countries within which “governmental armed forces, police, or other security forces,” or “government-supported armed groups, including paramilitaries, militias, or civil defense forces,” recruited or used child soldiers during the previous year. The following types of SA are prohibited for countries designated pursuant to the Child Soldier Prevention Act:  Licenses for direct commercial sales of military equipment.  FMF for the purchase of defense articles and services, as well as design and construction services.  IMET.  Excess defense articles.  Peacekeeping operations. 4-23. The Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 codified the USG’s longstanding, sustained commitment to the principles of the women, peace, and security agenda. The DOD Women, Peace, and Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan established three defense objectives to support the Women, Peace, and Security Strategy’s lines of effort: (1) modeling and employing women’s meaningful participation in the joint force; (2) promoting partner nation women’s participation in all occupations in the defense and security sectors; and (3) ensuring partner nations protect women and girls, especially during conflict and crisis. The Army and the other Services have all initiated women, peace, and security policies to establish key staff and to guide the integration of women, peace, and security into SC planning, programming, and execution. 4-24. Congress specifically appropriates funds for foreign assistance. U.S. funds used for weapons, training, equipment, logistic support, supplies, and services provided to foreign forces must be paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. USAID expends such funds under the legal authorities in Title

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent publication for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition. Terms for which FM 3-22 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*).

Entries are by paragraph number.