*FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5
Field Manual
No. 3-24
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
No. 3-33.5
Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC
Headquarters
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Department of the Navy
Headquarters
United States Marine Corps
Washington, DC
13 May 2014

Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies

The 2006 version of FM 3-24/ MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, filled an important doctrinal gap at a time when U.S. forces were engaged in counterinsurgency operations. This version of FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 builds on that important manual. This field manual provides doctrine that frames counterinsurgency within the context of the range of military operations and provides a framework for the different ways land forces could counter an insurgency. Understanding insurgencies and the operational environment in which they exist, the ways in which the U.S. will attempt to counter insurgencies, and how commanders synchronize their efforts to achieve end states is at the core of what this manual provides to both the Army and the Marine Corps. This version is organized differently than the 2006 version. The new title, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, provides insight into the thinking behind the organization. Overall, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is divided into three parts. Part one provides strategic and operational context, part two provides the doctrine for understanding insurgencies, and part three provides doctrine for defeating an insurgency. In short, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is organized to provide the context of a problem, the problem, and possible solutions. Part one, the “Strategic and Operational Context,” provides a framework for understanding the environment where a counterinsurgency exists. Part one consists of chapters one through three. Part two, “Insurgencies,” provides a doctrinal framework for understanding an insurgency. Part two consists of chapters four and five. Part three, “Counterinsurgencies,” describes how to plan and execute operations to enable a host nation to defeat an insurgency. Chapter 1, “Understanding the Strategic Context,” answers the questions of how and why U.S. forces might get involved in a counterinsurgency. Chapter 1 highlights that there are many different ways U.S. forces could counter an insurgency and that there are a range of various contexts in which an insurgency can occur. Commanders and staffs must understand the conditions in which an insurgency occurs and the overall strategy for countering that insurgency so they can effectively support it. Chapter 2, “Understanding an Operational Environment,” provides context for an operational environment where an insurgency might be occurring. Chapter 3, “Culture,” describes the role of culture in counterinsurgency operations. Understanding culture is essential in any effort to support a counterinsurgency effort. Culture is of unique importance in understanding an operational environment. Chapter 4, “Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals,” provides doctrine for understanding the prerequisites of an insurgency and the root causes that allow an insurgency to keep and gain legitimacy. It than provides a framework for understanding the strategic decisions an insurgency might make and eight dynamics for analyzing any particular insurgency. Chapter 5, “Insurgency Threat Characteristics,” provides doctrine for understanding the threat characteristics of an insurgency. Chapter 6, “Command and Control and Mission Command,” provides doctrine for executing command and control under the philosophy of mission command. In a counterinsurgency effort, many units may perform many different tasks in decentralized operations. Understanding decentralized operations and ensuring these units are meeting the overall commander’s intent is essential for successful counterinsurgency operations. Chapter 7, “Planning and Operational Considerations,” provides guidance on how commanders and staffs can work from conceptual planning to detailed planning in counterinsurgency operations. It also provides important operational considerations, such as attack the network, that are essential in counterinsurgency operations. Chapter 8, “Intelligence,” provides considerations for intelligence in counterinsurgency. Because understanding the environment is essential in counterinsurgency, intelligence facilities successful operations. Chapter 9, “Direct Approaches to Counter an Insurgency,” provides guidance on how the Army and the Marine Corps directly counter an insurgency at the operational and tactical level. The operational philosophy behind the direct approach is shape-clear-hold-build-transition. If tactical units are directly interfacing with a society, they will perform shape-clear-hold-build-transition. In addition to guiding U.S. forces’ actions, shape-clear-hold-build-transition also provides a framework for understanding host-nation actions. If U.S. forces have to be the primary counterinsurgency force until the host nation can deploy its forces, shape-clear-hold-build-transition provides an effective operational approach. Chapter 10, “Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies,” provides a framework for working with and through a host nation. While the U.S. may provide the primary counterinsurgent forces, it may also work indirectly through the host nation. There are also important indirect enablers. Chapter 11, “Working with Host-Nation Forces,” provides a foundation for understanding how security cooperation efforts are integrated into a counterinsurgency effort. Whether U.S. forces are, for a time, the primary counterinsurgent forces or they are working indirectly through a host nation, enabling the host nation through security cooperation activities is essential. Chapter 12, “Assessments,” provides doctrine for understanding how a counterinsurgency environment changes and determining if counterinsurgent actions are having an effect on achieving the desired end state. Continued assessments are fundamental to understanding how an environment is evolving and reframing the basic problems commanders and staffs are facing. Chapter 13, “Legal Considerations” provides some legal considerations that are important for commanders and staffs to consider in all counterinsurgency operations. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 provides doctrine on how to understand a counterinsurgency environment, determine the counterinsurgency problem, and plan and execute operations in that environment. It provides guidance to commanders and staffs facing the unique challenges of countering an insurgency. This field manual is one manual in a larger doctrinal library that commanders and staffs need to understand in order to be effective in countering an insurgency. Any effort to counter an insurgency must be built on broad professional competence. The Army uses the term intelligence preparation of the battlefield while the Marine Corps uses the term intelligence preparation of the battlespace. Both Services use the same definition for these terms. This manual uses the term intelligence preparation of the battlefield/ battlespace to align with FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A.

When the United States (U.S.) conducts or supports counterinsurgency operations, it does so in a unique strategic and operational environment. While this is true for all operations, this is of particular importance when the U.S. is countering an insurgency. Tactical actions often have strategic effects in a counterinsurgency. This makes it essential to understand both the strategic and operational context when countering an insurgency. In this manual, part one provides an overview for commanders and staff to understand the environment and context of an insurgency and the decision to counter that insurgency. Chapter 1 provides the strategic context of a counterinsurgency. When the U.S. becomes involved in a counterinsurgency, policy and strategic decisions affect operations. Chapter 2 provides an overview of an operational environment and operational variables. In a counterinsurgency, there are unique considerations that operators and planners consider. Of particular importance in a counterinsurgency is culture. Chapter 3 provides an in-depth overview of culture and its relationship to counterinsurgency.

Part two provides doctrine to help understand an insurgency. While the first part provides the context of an insurgency, the second part provides a discussion of an insurgency within that context. Chapter 4 provides information about insurgency prerequisites and fundamentals. It helps commanders and staffs understand why an insurgency may form and how and why it acts. Chapter 5 then provides a description of an insurgency’s threat characteristics.

Part three provides doctrine for how to counter an insurgency. How commanders and staffs counter an insurgency is dependent on the strategic and operational context (part one) and the type of insurgency (part two). Chapter 6 discusses command and control and mission command. Chapter 7 discusses planning and operational considerations. Planning is essential in framing the problem and the possible solutions. Chapter 8 covers intelligence. Intelligence is fundamental in gaining situational understanding. Chapter 9 discusses direct methods and chapter 10 discusses indirect methods to counter insurgency. These chapters provide a framework to help commanders and staffs develop an overall operational approach to counter an insurgency. Chapter 11 discusses working with host-nation forces. Chapter 12 discusses assessments, which provide information on effectively using measures of performance and measures of effectiveness in counterinsurgency. Finally, part three discusses legal considerations in chapter 13.

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army, multi-Service, or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent manual for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition. Terms for which the Army and Marine Corps have agreed on a common definition are followed by ( Army-Marine Corps ).

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