*FM 3-50
Field Manual
No. 3-50
Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 2 September 2014

Army Personnel Recovery

This publication is organized into six chapters: Chapter 1 describes personnel recovery. It defines Army personnel recovery and discusses the foundations of personnel recovery. It explains Army personnel recovery components and concludes with the Army personnel recovery proficiencies. Chapter 2 addresses the personnel recovery responsibilities and supporting tools of commanders at all echelons and staffs at battalion level and above. The discussion applies to headquarters from battalion and brigade to theater army. Chapter 3 discusses the planning for personnel recovery. It discusses how the staff uses the military decisionmaking process, the personnel recovery appendix format, isolated Soldier guidance, and the evasion plan of action. Chapter 4 discusses personnel recovery considerations for major combat operations. It emphasizes personnel recovery in the context of offensive and defensive tasks. It discusses the characteristics of major combat operations, the cause of isolation incidents, and conducting the operations process. Chapter 5 discusses the personnel recovery considerations for stability. It discusses the characteristics of stability as they apply to personnel recovery. It then explains the isolation risk in stability as well as isolation risk reduction strategies. It elaborated on Department of Sate and Department of Defense interactions. Lastly, the chapter discusses interactions with other partners. Chapter 6 discusses the personnel recovery considerations for defense support of civil authorities operations. It discusses characteristics of defense support of civil authorities tasks. It explains the personnel recovery capability phases. It concludes with the commander and staff’s focus during defense support of civil authorities. This publication makes several major changes from FM 3-50.1 (now obsolete), which it supersedes. This publication articulates the importance of the commander in successful personnel recovery operations. It enlarges the scope of Army personnel recovery doctrine for stability and defense support of civil authorities tasks. This publication incorporates the doctrinal concepts in ADP 1, ADRP 3-0, ADP 3-07 ADRP 3-07, ADP 3-28, ADRP 3-28, ADP 3-90, and ADRP 3-90. Other changes from FM 3-50.1 include: • The Army term and definition for personnel recovery are modified; the term is changed to Army personnel recovery (see introductory table 1). The definition is limited to military efforts. • Chapters 4 and 5 are combined to include personnel recovery operations during offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in large-scale combat, and in defense support of civil authorities. • Former appendixes are integrated into applicable chapters. • Chapters are arranged to align appropriately with current joint personnel recovery doctrine. • The publication is designed in accordance with Doctrine 2015 guidance.

This chapter describes personnel recovery. It defines Army personnel recovery and discusses the foundations of personnel recovery. It explains Army personnel recovery components and concludes with the Army personnel recovery proficiencies. FOUNDATIONS 1-1. Army personnel recovery is the military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Army forces work together with Department of Defense (DOD) and other unified action partners to recover individuals and groups who become isolated. Isolation refers to persons being separated from their unit or in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape. In addition, Army forces support the recovery of other persons designated by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Preserving the life and well-being of persons working for the Army, or any DOD organization, is one of the highest priorities of the United States Government. The personnel recovery mission includes preparing Soldiers, other Service members, Army civilians, and contractors in danger of isolation while participating in any activity or mission sponsored by the United States. 1-2. Army professionals have moral and legal responsibilities to train, educate, coordinate, and recover isolated members of the Army (and other persons as designated) who are operating in the area of operations (AO) or accompanying Army or unified forces. It is a principle embedded in the Army’s Warrior Ethos and the Soldier’s Creed (see ADP 1). 1-3. Unified land operations is the Army’s warfighting doctrine and the Army’s contribution to unified action. It describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage (see ADRP 3-0). Army forces execute unified land operations through the elements of decisive action: offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities’ (DSCA’s) tasks. Within all these elements, alone or in any combination, Army personnel recovery doctrine guides Army forces to adapt to conditions and successfully accomplish personnel recovery missions. ORGANIZATIONS 1-4. Army forces conduct operations as part of a joint force and together with other Service and government partners. The joint force cooperates and coordinates with unified action partners. Army forces use established organizational structures coordinated with joint, other Service, and United States Government (USG) entities. Each Service has its own personnel recovery policy, doctrine, equipment, education, and training. Paragraphs 1-5 through 1-20 give an overview of organizational structures for personnel recovery. JP 3-50 contains a detailed discussion of personnel recovery organizational structures. J OINT P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY O RGANIZATIONAL S TRUCTURE 1-5. DODDDODDDepartment of Defense directive 3002.01 assigns DOD responsibilities for personnel recovery. It identifies the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as responsible for development of national personnel recovery policy, strategy, and operational oversight, through the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Integration and Chief of Staff and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Affairs. The United States (U.S.) Air Force is the DOD executive agent for personnel recovery (other than policy). The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) is the office of primary responsibility. The JPRA is a chairman controlled activity, aligned under the Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development. The JPRA provides joint guidance, develops and conducts joint training, provides support to deployed forces, collects joint lessons learned, and supports joint policy and doctrine development. The JPRA supports operational implementation of joint personnel recovery policy. 1-6. Combatant commanders are responsible for planning and executing personnel recovery in their area of responsibility. Figure 1-1 depicts the personnel recovery architecture in a combatant command organized by function. J OINT P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY C ENTER 1-7. Each combatant commander establishes a joint personnel recovery center (JPRC). The JPRC plans, monitors, and coordinates personnel recovery for the command. It coordinates with joint and Service component staffs, DOD agencies, and other USG agencies and unified action partners to accomplish its mission. The center’s composition varies. A JPRC is typically composed of senior leadership (director and deputy), shift duty officers, noncommissioned officers, and subject matter experts in related disciplines. These individuals act as liaisons to and from external organizations. The JPRC serves as the joint force commander’s primary coordination center for assisting other nations or appropriate civilian entities. JP 3-50 details the responsibilities of the JPRC. P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY C OORDINATION S ECTIONS 1-8. At the Army Service component level, personnel recovery coordination sections (PRCSs) implement guidance from higher headquarters. Army doctrine identifies the Army Service component personnel recovery organization as a section; joint doctrine identifies the organization as a personnel recovery coordination cell. A RMY O RGANIZATIONAL S TRUCTURE 1-9. Army headquarters above brigade are scalable, stand-alone entities. The Army’s division, corps, and theater army commanders exercise mission command for any combination of modular brigades and smaller forces. The Army organizes its headquarters at echelons above brigade as functional cells; integrating cells; coordinating, special, and personal staff sections; and boards, working groups, and meetings. Figure 1-2 graphically portrays the layout and the interaction of the functional and integrating cells. The PRCS is a staff section at echelons above brigade. The personnel recovery section is part of the protection functional cell. A personnel recovery officer overseeing the PRCS may be designated a personal staff officer if the threat of isolation is such that a personal relationship is required. There are staff personnel recovery responsibilities associated with each of the Army warfighting functions. (Chapter 2 describes the responsibilities of the PRCS.) O THER S ERVICE O RGANIZATIONAL S TRUCTURES 1-10. DOD policy directs the Services to develop a personnel recovery capability. The Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard have long familiarity with personnel recovery because the nature of their operations often requires them to recover the crews of ships and aircraft. Service doctrine and practice are applicable for permissive environments, resulting from accidents or disaster, and nonpermissive environments in combat or unfriendly situations. The joint force commander can task subordinates with personnel recovery missions. All Service components staff, equip, and train personnel recovery sections for 24-hour operations. Marine Corps 1-11. Marine Corps personnel recovery operations follow a tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (known as TRAP) concept. The Marine Corps does not dedicate personnel recovery assets but trains and exercises all appropriate units for these missions. Marine Corps personnel recovery operations range from single aircraft missions to a task force with fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft, security elements, ground search capability, and medical support. The Marine air-ground task force operates much like Army tactical-level units for personnel isolated in ground operations. A Marine expeditionary unit is the standard forward-deployed Marine Corps expeditionary organization. Marine expeditionary units have special operations capabilities. Appendix D of JP 3-50 discusses Marine Corps personnel recovery. Navy 1-12. The Navy conducts personnel recovery operations to support its surface, subsurface, and air assets. Navy search and rescue doctrine discusses permissive and nonpermissive actions. The Navy deploys dedicated search and rescue units to respond to accidental and combat situations. Specialized vessels, aircraft, equipment, and personnel provide round-the-clock personnel recovery capacity to the fleet. Aviation safety, maritime safety, and medical activities support these specialized personnel recovery activities. See NTTP 3-50.1 and Appendix E of JP 3-50 for details on Navy personnel recovery. Air Force 1-13. The Air Force considers combat search and rescue a primary task. The Air Force equips and trains dedicated forces for personnel recovery, organized under the numbered air forces. Combat search and rescue personnel train and exercise for personnel recovery in permissive and nonpermissive environments. Combat search and rescue units assist local, state, and other governmental bodies in civil search and rescue. All components of the Air Force—Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard—have rescue squadrons. Configured for global response, they are generally self-deployable or capable of movement in tactical and strategic airlift assets with necessary communications and life support. Primarily focused on the recovery of downed aircrews, Air Force personnel recovery assets also have the capability to recover partners. Air Force Annex 3-50 and Appendix F of JP 3-50 details Air Force personnel recovery operations. Coast Guard 1-14. The Coast Guard conducts personnel recovery operations to support its surface and air assets. Coast Guard search and rescue doctrine discusses permissive actions in maritime rescue. The Coast Guard deploys dedicated search and rescue units to respond to accidental situations. Specialized vessels, aircraft, equipment, and personnel provide round-the-clock personnel recovery capacity to maritime vessels. Aviation safety, maritime safety, and medical activities support these specialized personnel recovery activities. See Appendix G of JP 3-50 for detailed information on Coast Guard personnel recovery. S PECIAL O PERATIONS F ORCES 1-15. Special operations forces sometimes conduct tactical missions with the potential for strategic impact. Special operations forces extend the capabilities of conventional forces to recover isolated persons located at extended ranges, to recover isolated persons located in environments difficult for conventional forces to reach, or to capitalize on contacts with indigenous groups. Special operations forces in a combatant command typically include forces forward deployed and trained to conduct urgent hostage rescue missions. Special operations forces operate under their own chains of command but interface with conventional forces when required, including operating under operational control or tactical control of conventional force commanders for missions related to personnel recovery. Special operations forces conduct unconventional assisted personnel recovery operations in cooperation with conventional forces or with indigenous or surrogate forces. 1-16. An unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell is an entity of the special operations component of the joint force. Typically located within the joint special operations task force or the joint force special operations command, the unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell is responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring personnel recovery activities of unconventional forces, including unified action partners. This cell coordinates with the JPRC, the Service component PRCSs, and lower echelon command and staff entities as needed. See Appendix G of JP 3-50 for more information. M ULTINATIONAL P ARTNERS 1-17. When cooperating with multinational partners, the level of preparedness and the formal personnel recovery structure vary depending on the nature of the relationships. Whether in a permanent formal alliance such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or an ad hoc multinational coalition such as during Operation Iraqi Freedom, each situation’s requirements for personnel recovery planning, preparation, execution, and assessment differ. 1-18. The armed forces of many nations have robust personnel recovery capabilities; Army forces coordinate with them to take advantage of partner capabilities. This provides the joint or Army commander more options to meet personnel recovery requirements. However, liaison with multinational partners adds complexity. Through planning and coordination, the PRCS strives to overcome differences in language, equipment, procedures, and rules of engagement while still maintaining security. Unit commanders and staffs must decide whether to maintain a robust team at the remote location or keep the expertise at the main command post. O THER U NITED S TATES G OVERNMENT P ARTNERS 1-19. The American Embassy or diplomatic mission serves as a base of operations for many governmental organizations not a part of the Department of State (DOS). Partners typically represented at an embassy include the Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Commerce, DOD, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treasury, and the Federal Aviation Administration. The list varies depending on the situation and the requirement to project USG interests. These representatives provide additional capabilities to address isolating events and more potential targets to protect. Diplomatic personnel and others encounter elevated risk if they work at remote locations. The embassy’s emergency action plan contains a personnel recovery annex. 1-20. During DSCA, other government agencies include state, county, and municipal agencies, including the governor’s office and state police, the county administrator and sheriff, and city mayors and police. DOD agencies and Services collaborate with these types of agencies during DSCA. ARMY PERSONNEL RECOVERY COMPONENTS 1-21. Army forces conduct personnel recovery using the integrated Army personnel recovery components. Figure 1-3 on page 1-6 depicts four general components for personnel recovery: focal groups, options, tasks, and military methods of recovery. P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY F OCAL G ROUPS 1-22. The three entities most concerned with applying personnel recovery doctrinal principles are the commander and staff, unit or recovery force, and isolated persons. These personnel recovery focal groups apply the principles at the operational level and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) at the tactical level. Together, these three groups integrate activities using the personnel recovery components to accomplish missions. Commander and Staff 1-23. Leadership and accountability are essential for effective personnel recovery. Leaders at every echelon, from company and below, through battalion and brigade, to echelons above brigade are responsible for the conduct of operations, including personnel recovery. At every echelon, the commander and staff personnel recovery focal group integrates and coordinates several functions that affect all the personnel recovery components. Develop and Disseminate the General Personnel Recovery Guidance 1-24. Commanders develop and disseminate general personnel recovery guidance. They periodically revise it as conditions change. Subordinate leaders build and develop their personnel recovery guidance based on that of the higher headquarters. Produce Isolated Soldier Guidance Based on the Personnel Recovery Guidance 1-25. The commander and staff personnel recovery focal group produce isolated Soldier guidance (ISG) based on the personnel recovery guidance. ISG is more developed and refined than the commander’s personnel recovery guidance. It may exist for an AO, but leaders at all echelons force tailor the ISG for each specific mission within the AO. Maintain Personnel Accountability at All Times 1-26. The commander and staff personnel recovery focal group maintain personnel accountability at all times. Accurate accountability and reporting narrow the focus of search operations and save time and resources. Success of personnel recovery operations generally depends on how rapidly a recovery force can respond. Constant and redundant communications are important in maintaining accountability. Identify and Provide Guidance and Tasks to the Recovery Force 1-27. The commander and staff personnel recovery focal group identifies and provides guidance and tasks to the recovery force. The recovery force may be designated in the execution document and given a personnel recovery mission (the force will execute at a set time) or an on-order mission (the force will execute at a time to be determined). Commanders sometimes give a be-prepared mission to a designated recovery force. A unit with a be-prepared mission trains, obtains resources, and remains ready to execute the mission. All three instances require guidance and preparation. Exercise Mission Command of Personnel Recovery Tasks 1-28. Commanders—supported by their staffs—exercise mission command of personnel recovery tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. This means that commanders are familiar with the tasks and have adequately resourced the staff to conduct operations. Unit or Recovery Force 1-29. The second personnel recovery focal group is the unit or recovery force. The immediate or deliberate recovery of isolated Soldiers or others normally falls to the responsibility of the person’s unit of assignment as designated in the operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD). Units generally execute an immediate recovery of any isolated unit member when practical. This is especially important for isolation caused by enemy action where the friendly force can conduct the recovery before the enemy knows of the isolation. If an immediate recovery is not possible, that unit or another designated recovery force may conduct a directed recovery mission. The unit or other designated recovery force, as a personnel recovery focal group, integrates several responsibilities within the personnel recovery components. Receive the Mission and Conduct the Operations Process 1-30. The unit or recovery force receives the mission and conducts the operations process. As time is critical in personnel recovery, this may be an abbreviated process based on guidance from higher headquarters where mission analysis leads to a rapid (or directed) course of action (COA) development, COA analysis and approval, and production of the order. Execute the Order 1-31. The unit or recovery force executes the order. Execution includes an update on the friendly and enemy situation or environmental hazard, marshalling the required unit resources and maneuvering to the location of the isolated person. The recovery force may have to fight for the recovery and must come prepared for combat. In the case of isolation by an environmental hazard, such as a chemical spill or biological contamination, the force must prepare for contingencies, including the need for decontamination or lifesaving medical treatment. Deliver the Isolated Person or Group to Postisolation Reintegration 1-32. The unit or recovery force delivers the isolated person or group to reintegration. Postisolation reintegration activities follow successful recovery of the isolated person or group. Depending on the circumstances of and the length of time a recovered person was isolated or in the control of the enemy, reintegration may be a short local activity requiring little planning or a long and involved process. If possible, commanders ensure reintegration activities are planned in detail to avoid undue stress to the isolated person or group. Isolated Persons 1-33. The primary task of an isolated person is to try to regain contact with friendly forces as soon as possible. When all three personnel recovery focal groups base their actions on the ISG, they facilitate the coordination and synchronization of recovery efforts. Adherence to the ISG provides some predictability to the isolated person or group that their actions will be more easily monitored, thus making recovery more certain. P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY O PTIONS 1-34. Joint personnel recovery doctrine describes three personnel recovery options: military, diplomatic, and civil. The only option commanders can select is the military option; the other two are at the USG or citizen level. Military Option 1-35. In most cases, a unit conducts a recovery making full use of the in-place personnel recovery capabilities and the designated recovery forces. Army commanders consider four general approaches (sometimes referred to as methods) to conduct personnel recovery: unassisted, immediate, deliberate, or external supported. Unassisted Recovery 1-36. Successful units train and equip all individuals to self-recover in the event recovery forces cannot execute other recovery methods due to weather, threat, or operational necessity. Isolated personnel may have the most complete knowledge of their situation and use individual Soldier skills to evade enemy forces, awaiting the right time to return to friendly control. An unassisted recovery depends on the condition of the Soldiers and the situation at the location where they are isolated. A wounded, injured, exhausted, or disoriented Soldier, one endangered by enemy forces, or one without the proper equipment, may be unable to self-recover. If possible, isolated individuals communicate if they cannot conduct unassisted recovery to alert the responsible command to begin planning for an immediate, deliberate, or external supported recovery. Immediate Recovery 1-37. An isolated person’s unit is often in the best position to receive the report, locate the person, and execute recovery. Unit leadership—knowing the mission and Soldier’s tasks—has the best idea of the Soldier’s whereabouts. Immediate recovery aims to locate isolated persons, keep them under direct observation, and recover them before the enemy understands the situation. Immediate recovery assumes that the tactical situation permits a recovery with the forces at hand, and those forces have a clear enough understanding of the situation to accomplish the mission. It also assumes that successful recovery occurs without excessive casualties to the recovery force, without unduly imperiling the isolated person, and without endangering the unit’s overall mission. Deliberate Recovery 1-38. Deliberate personnel recovery is appropriate when an immediate recovery was unsuccessful or not attempted due to the threat, asset availability, current operations, or isolated personnel situation. Such a situation can arise when the enemy has a preponderance of combat power or when environmental conditions such as weather, contamination, or flooding prevent immediate recovery operations. Commanders conduct deliberate personnel recovery like any other deliberate operation, using the military decisionmaking process and appropriate preparation. The operation can be a mission specifically to recover an isolated person or a specified or implied task in another mission. External Supported Recovery 1-39. When a recovery mission exceeds the capabilities of Army forces, they may request external support from Service, joint, or multinational forces. When Army forces assist outside entities in personnel recovery, it is external support. In addition to direct military support, host-nation (HN) security forces (military, paramilitary, and national police) and multinational forces often support recovery operations. This external support can include direct participation or indirect support in the recovery mission. Examples of indirect support are intelligence; air, ground, and water transport; reconnaissance and surveillance; medical evacuation and medical treatment facilities; fires; protection; and communications. At echelons above brigade, the command’s PRCS coordinates external support with its appropriate counterparts. To facilitate the external support entity’s activities, Army headquarters and forces provide necessary information, which may include information entered on DD FormDD FormDepartment of Defense form 1833 (Isolated Personnel Report [ISOPREP]) and ISG. (See chapter 5 of JP 3-50 for more information about ISOPREP data for authentication.) The command and support relationships for external support are normally coordinated and agreed upon during mission planning. Some external support capabilities may be under the operational control of senior echelon Army headquarters. The command relationship may also be tactical control in which the recovery force gets the benefit of the support, but the unit remains under the command of its organization. Diplomatic Option 1-40. The DOS has the lead for personnel recovery for military forces not directly under the command of a geographic combatant commander. Following the DOS lead, U.S. forces provide support. The DOS and other USG agencies associated with the mission often have the resources and HN contacts to support recovery operations. This is especially true when diplomatic options require knowledge of HN laws and agreements or internationally recognized territorial sovereignty. Modes of cooperation can be formal or informal. 1-41. Units most often use direct government-to-government cooperation when formal diplomatic relations exist between the United States and the host nation. Whether the isolation results from hostile action, an accident, or environmental conditions, the HN government willingly assists in the recovery activities. At a minimum, this assistance permits U.S. recovery forces access to ground and water or overflight rights to the sovereign territory. Direct government-to-government support involving several governments complicates a recovery effort. 1-42. Certain situations require an indirect approach. Coordination sometimes occurs through clandestine contacts by American Embassy personnel in the host country or by meetings between envoys of affected countries in other locations. The result of such contacts may be full and open support to recovery efforts or permission to conduct the operations—including negotiations for release—without attracting public notice. 1-43. In situations when the USG has no direct diplomatic relations with a nation-state, or it appears more advantageous for both parties to have no direct contact, third parties may act as surrogates. These individuals act as diplomatic go-betweens for the United States and the nations involved. Civil Option 1-44. Civilians or civilian organizations sometimes facilitate the recovery of isolated persons. Occasionally, the USG requests the assistance of partners such as the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the Organization of American States. In many locations, organizations such as these have built trust with national, regional, and local governments. Occasionally, members of partner organizations assume the responsibility to secure the release of an isolated person or group without the request or sanction of the U.S. or HN governments. Influential private citizens—such as distinguished individuals from the host nation or region—sometimes are asked or volunteer to facilitate personnel recovery. Distinguished members of the international community, such as Nobel Prize laureates, revered religious figures, or well-known retired politicians or military members sometimes become involved. The decision to accept support from such partners usually lies beyond the authority of the geographic combatant commander. Commanders do not use a civil option; they only use the military option. The military can employ local forces or civilians to influence a recovery for an external supported recovery; however, the military is still in the lead. P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY T ASKS 1-45. The PRCS and other elements of echelon above brigade Army headquarters respond according to the unit’s SOPSOPStandard Operating Procedures, the current OPLAN, and the latest changes to the order issued in the fragmentary order (FRAGORD). The guide to execution in figure 1-4 on pages 1-10 and 1-11 uses the personnel recovery tasks discussed in paragraphs 1-48 through 1-74.

This chapter discusses the responsibilities of commanders, staffs, and organizations conducting personnel recovery operations. It also outlines supporting tools to help fulfill these responsibilities. RESPONSIBILITIES 2-1. Commanders, leaders, and Soldiers understand and carry out their personnel recovery roles and responsibilities so they can accomplish the mission. Army professionals are accountable to fulfill responsibilities, whether defined or implied. Usually, a duty description specifies responsibilities; sometimes the situation implies them. Each duty position has core responsibilities and associated supporting responsibilities. However, responsibilities for a given duty position vary, depending on the situation. For example, a personnel recovery officer provides doctrinally correct input to an Army unit OPLAN or OPORD but also may serve as the officer in charge of a recovery operation. This field manual is intended to provide flexible guidance that Army organizations can adapt to their specific situation. 2-2. In any Army unit or organization, the commander combines the art of command and the science of control to integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission. Staff members support the commander and subordinate commanders in understanding situations, making decisions, and implementing decisions. Paragraphs 2-3 through 2-35 detail personnel recovery responsibilities of commanders, staffs, and organizations. C OMMON C OMMANDER AND S TAFF R ESPONSIBILITIES 2-3. All echelons of command, from the company to above brigade, regardless of the makeup of the personnel recovery staff section, share core responsibilities. In every action, the commander and staff exemplify the tenets of the Army profession and winning spirit espoused by the Soldier’s Creed: never accept defeat, never quit, and never leave a fallen comrade behind. The commander and staff sections consider their responsibilities concerning the operations process, training, guidance, coordination, and equipment. The discussions are not all inclusive. 2-4. By integrating personnel recovery into all aspects of the Army operations process, the commander and staff—  Conduct personnel recovery operations to report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate isolated personnel anywhere within the command’s AO.  Use the tactical-level mission variables—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations (known as METT-TC)—to refine their understanding of a situation.  Embed personnel recovery concepts and tasks in all plans and orders.  Implement a communication plan for personnel recovery.  Plan and prepare a designated area for recovery to serve as a focal point for short-term personnel recovery operations or specific missions.  Ensure all intelligence and reports on an isolating event are collected, preserved, analyzed, and reported to proper authorities, including the lessons learned and assessments at the headquarters. 2-5. When training for personnel recovery, the commander and staff have the following responsibilities:  Conduct predeployment, premission, annual Code of Conduct, and annual SERE training.  Monitor, exercise, and rehearse all personnel recovery missions.  Implement, train, and apply personnel recovery doctrine.  Facilitate training for commanders, staffs, and forces commensurate with their assigned roles.  Emphasize unassisted recovery in all personnel recovery training.  Develop and maintain a unit personnel recovery system, including SOPs, TTP, and training.  Fully staff designated personnel recovery positions where they exist and train multifunctional staff officers and noncommissioned officers in personnel recovery matters. 2-6. The commander and staff have the following responsibilities that apply to guidance and assessment:  Develop and disseminate personnel recovery guidance to facilitate personnel recovery activities based on guidance from higher headquarters.  Know the higher headquarters personnel recovery guidance.  Develop and disseminate ISG for each operation.  Assess unit readiness to conduct personnel recovery activities, including equipment and recovery aid status.  Assess intelligence, information collection, and operations for their effectiveness after personnel recovery missions.  Assess civilian and diplomatic capabilities to support personnel recovery activities in the AO.  Assess how HN security forces, intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations, and local civilians can support or disrupt personnel recovery activities. 2-7. The commander and staff have the following responsibilities that apply to coordination:  Coordinate personnel recovery issues vertically and horizontally, particularly with subordinate personnel recovery staffs.  Communicate necessary information that contribute to situational awareness of those associated with a recovery operation.  Coordinate with the appropriate staff for necessary support to personnel recovery missions. 2-8. The commander and staff maintain accountability for Soldiers and specialized personnel recovery equipment. They maintain access to authentication information (entered on DD FormDD FormDepartment of Defense form 1833 through the Army’s PRO-File data entry system or on Personnel Recovery Mission Software Web site [only if SECRET Internet Protocol Router is available]) on all Soldiers in the unit. C OMMANDER R ESPONSIBILITIES 2-9. Commanders provide leadership and demand accountability. Personnel recovery missions require a combination of approaches. Successful personnel recovery operations often depend on timely decisions and rapid execution. The time available to conduct a recovery may be short, and the tactical situation may change rapidly. Therefore, commanders exercise mission command and delegate personnel recovery decision-making authority to subordinate commanders. This facilitates decentralized execution and maximizes use of available time. Subordinate commanders often have the best situational understanding of their AO and can respond quickly to an isolating event. Higher echelon commanders decentralize personnel recovery decision making and allocate appropriate resources to subordinate commanders to accomplish the mission. Commanders identify personnel recovery information requirements and focus the staff on answering those requirements. Commanders provide direction and emphasis on personnel recovery education and training. 2-10. While decentralized execution applies to many personnel recovery missions, situations occur in which a centralized command approach may be appropriate. To illustrate, persons are isolated in a country in which the host nation or the DOS has the lead in recovery and small joint or Army units provide support. When facing these conditions, subordinate commanders may lack sufficient information to evaluate the impact of conducting a recovery on the operation at large. 2-11. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess throughout personnel recovery operations. They continuously develop, test, and update their understanding throughout the conduct of operations. They actively collaborate with other commanders, the staff, and unified action partners to create a shared understanding. As commanders begin to develop an understanding of an operational environment, they start visualizing the operation’s end state and potential solutions to solve problems. After commanders visualize an operation, they describe it to their staffs and subordinates. This description facilitates a shared understanding of the situation, mission, and commander’s intent. AR 525-28 directs that all commanders—  Develop policies and procedures for their command to report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate Soldiers and Army civilians in the event they become isolated.  Ensure deployable Soldiers and Army civilians plan with their families the actions families should take if Soldiers or civilians become isolated.  Develop policies and procedures to support the families of Soldiers and Army civilians in the event they become isolated.  Provide requirements to the contracting officer concerning personnel recovery for incorporation into contracts. At a minimum, commanders identify any training (such as theater entry requirements) and equipment needed by a CAAF for personnel recovery efforts.  Establish a functioning PRCS for major exercises and operations at the division and corps levels. Additionally, AR 525-28 directs that commanders at the brigade level identify a personnel recovery officer or noncommissioned officer. 2-12. The primary responsibility of the commander—at the appropriate level—is to issue personnel recovery guidance and ISG. The primary method for exercising this responsibility is face-to-face contact with subordinate commanders and interaction with the staff. When required, this coordination extends beyond the chain of command to host nations, multinational partners, and international or nongovernmental organizations. S TAFF R ESPONSIBILITIES 2-13. A staff integrates information to support the commander’s situational understanding. Personnel recovery staff members have similar responsibilities whether they are trained personnel recovery officers in echelons above brigade headquarters, personnel recovery staff officers or noncommissioned officers at brigade level, or multifunctional staff officers or noncommissioned officers at battalion level. A staff analyzes the impact of an operational environment on personnel recovery operations in terms of the operational variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (known as PMESII-PT)—when serving at the appropriate command echelon. Paragraphs 2-15 through 2-19 focus on personnel recovery operations at echelons above brigade headquarters, but the discussion also applies to responsibilities at lower staff echelons. Each staff section in the scalable headquarters has some personnel recovery responsibilities. Functional Cells 2-14. Functional cells group personnel and equipment by warfighting function. Movement and Maneuver Cell 2-15. The movement and maneuver functional cell, and especially its current operations integration cell, helps the commander anticipate the possibility of an isolating event. This functional cell develops and rehearses staff actions to react effectively to execute the schemes of maneuver to recover the isolated person or group. This cell supports all personnel recovery tasks but is especially responsible for the reporting necessary to establish that an isolating event has taken place. The cell also supports the commander’s decisions by communicating direction to the force. Depending on the decisions of the commander and the recommendation of the chief of staff, the personnel recovery officer may be located in the current operations integration cell. Intelligence Cell 2-16. The intelligence functional cell plays a critical role in the timely recovery of isolated personnel. It coordinates before, during, and after an isolating event with higher, lower, and adjacent units and staffs. It contributes to mission planning, provides real-time information and intelligence concerning the mission, and participates in reintegration. Its analysis helps the command avoid isolating events, describe the hybrid threat or environmental concerns to the isolated person and the recovery force, and evaluate likely areas for recovery and evasion. The intelligence staff integrates closely with the movement and maneuver functional cell during operations. Fires Cell 2-17. The fires functional cell and its elements (fire support element, electronic warfare, field artillery intelligence officer, and the Air Force tactical air control party) provide staff support to joint and Army fires. The fires functional cell coordinates missions to enable personnel recovery tasks. Fires can prevent the enemy from observing or capturing the isolated person or group and protect the recovery force as it accomplishes its missions. The fires functional cell coordinates the capability to destroy, neutralize, or suppress enemy targets near isolated personnel. The cell also has the ability to clear fires to support recovery operations. The fires cell integrates its efforts with higher, lower, and adjacent fires elements and with all elements within the staff. Through its representatives in the current operations integration cell, the fires cell is responsible for the input of fires information into the common operational picture so the commander and staff can develop situational awareness. Protection Cell 2-18. The protection functional cell is responsible for integrating or coordinating tasks and systems that fall under the protection warfighting function. The protection cell advises commanders on the priorities for protection and coordinates the implementation and sustainment of protective measures to protect assets according to the commander’s priorities. One of the protection cell’s primary tasks and responsibilities is to integrate personnel recovery into the operations process with the personnel recovery coordination center. Personnel recovery officers are a part of the protection functional cell at echelons above brigade. When directed, its responsibility extends beyond the headquarters and the chain of command to include noncombatants, physical assets, and information. During an isolating event, the protection cell and its personnel recovery staff have the primary responsibility to integrate or coordinate personnel recovery activities into planning and execution. The protection cell becomes one of two focal points (the movement and maneuver cell is the other) for completing the personnel recovery tasks: report, locate, support, recovery, and reintegrate discussed in paragraphs 1-45 through 1-74. (See ADRP 3-37 for more information on the protection cell and tasks.) Sustainment Cell 2-19. The sustainment functional cell supports the commander, the unit, the recovery force, and isolated persons. The sustainment cell is responsible for integrating sustainment and related activities into all phases of personnel recovery operations. Related activities include supply, maintenance, transportation, personnel, finance, and operational contract support. The cell coordinates its capabilities to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance of the force. It provides information and updates on the state of its components and their impact on planned or current personnel recovery activities, the most important of which is unit accountability. The sustainment cell is responsible for coordinating the logistic, personnel services, resourcing, and health service support for the recovery forces. Finally, it provides the support through units to the recovery forces to facilitate rescue and return of isolated personnel to friendly control. Its responsibilities extend to reintegration when the sustainment functional cell supports all efforts to return the formerly isolated person or group to duty or reassignment. Integrating Cells 2-20. By definition, the three integrating cells—plans, future operations, and current operations integration—are responsible for collecting the information to support the tasks and purposes of the command (see figure 1-2, page 1-3). Based on three planning horizons—short, mid, and long—these integrating cells coordinate daily with the commander, functional staff sections, personnel and special staff, and the other integrating staff sections (including the meetings that serve as ad hoc integrating elements). These coordination responsibilities occur in general operations and specific missions, including personnel recovery. The integrating cells responsibilities are both horizontal (within the headquarters) and vertical (up and down the chain of command). Personal and Special Staff Elements 2-21. Personal and special staff elements facilitate personnel recovery activities for the commander. The personal staff normally includes the senior enlisted advisor, the inspector general, the staff judge advocate, the public affairs officer, the chaplain, a political advisor, a cultural advisor, and a surgeon. This group expands and contracts based on the needs and desires of the commander. The responsibility of this group is to advise the commander and serve as a conduit of information to and from other staff elements. Other important informal members of this group are interpreters (those who transfer the spoken word of one language into another) and translators (those who render the written words of one language into another) who accompany the commander and staff members overseas. Interpreters and translators can be key members of the recovery force in a rescue operation. 2-22. The special staff elements provide guidance to the entire staff. They are special in that they are important enough not to be subsumed into the activities of the functional or integrating staff cells. The special staff elements at division headquarters and above—the provost marshal; knowledge management officer; operational researcher; red team officer; staff weather officer; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (known as CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) officer; engineer; and personnel recovery officer—interface with the rest of the staff in all operations. This grouping also includes the command and functional liaison teams providing a window on other commands. Command liaison represents the interests of the chain of command and associated organizations (such as multinational, HN, DOS, and civilian organization partners). Functional liaison teams support the virtual and physical systems on which the command depends, such as intelligence, infrastructure, and life support. The Personnel Recovery Officer’s Responsibilities 2-23. All echelons of command above battalion level have trained personnel recovery officers. At company level and below, the commander or leader may not recognize a specific personnel recovery role; however, leaders exercise this role as a part of their larger leadership role. At battalion level, a member of the training and operations staff section typically serves as the point of contact (POCPOCPoint of contact) for personnel recovery. The brigade level is the lowest command echelon in which a staff officer serves in a recognized personnel recovery role. While there is no fixed number of these staff officers, most battalion and brigade-sized units—especially those in areas with an increased risk of isolation—identify an officer, warrant officer, or noncommissioned officer as a personnel recovery officer. At echelons above brigade headquarters, the personnel recovery officer coordinates the personnel recovery efforts and staffs the PRCS. The staffing, grade requirement, and number of these officers constantly changes; however, commanders often augment PRCSs based on the situation. These elements serve as POCs and fusion points for personnel recovery matters at their respective commands. Responsibilities for personnel recovery officers fall into the following four broad categories:  Advisor to the commander.  POCPOCPoint of contact for personnel recovery efforts to the staff and others.  Staff coordinator of personnel recovery activities across the command.  Trainer. Advisor 2-24. The personnel recovery officer is proficient in joint and Army doctrine and an expert in personnel recovery. As such, commanders at every level seek counsel from this officer when confronted with an isolating event. The personnel recovery officer provides personnel recovery expertise to the commander in response to an isolating event. Point of Contact 2-25. A personnel recovery officer—as an additional duty for a multifunctional staff officer at battalion or brigade, or in a required and authorized position at large-unit headquarters—answers inquiries about the doctrine and TTP for personnel recovery efforts within the command. Questions and comments may come from within the headquarters, outside staff entities, or other commanders. Depending on the situation, this may include contacts where a commander or staff members from lower or higher in the chain of command bypass the next level—or levels—of command in a request for information and guidance. In such cases, the contact usually is an attempt to get information about a planned, ongoing, or accomplished personnel recovery mission. POCPOCPoint of contact responsibilities include obtaining the necessary training to be able to inform the command of its personnel recovery responsibilities. Staff Coordinator 2-26. Personnel recovery officers are responsible to establish staff relationships with coordinating, personal, or special staff officers. Establishing and maintaining the interpersonal links and exercising the communications systems enable the PRCS’s personnel recovery experts to be ready. The coordination responsibilities can be routine or exceptional, depending on the situation. Routine coordination includes being a part of the daily contingency planning cycle. The difference between the POCPOCPoint of contact and staff coordinator responsibility is the level of activity and personal involvement. Whether located within the staff of a battalion or brigade, or one of the cells at echelon above brigade headquarters, the personnel recovery officer is a member of the team that contributes to the successful accomplishment of the recovery mission. As a staff coordinator, a personnel recovery officer provides doctrinally correct input to an Army unit OPLAN or OPORD and may also serve as the officer in charge of a recovery operation. E CHELON R ESPONSIBILITIES 2-27. Personnel recovery is a priority at every echelon of the joint and Army commands. It is an essential part of unit operations and planning. In addition to the actions of commanders, staffs, and personnel recovery officers, each command echelon has personnel recovery responsibilities. Higher echelons are typically competent not only in their own tasks, but also in those of subordinates. The responsibilities discussed within each echelon are listed in no specific order. 2-28. Leaders at all levels fill a crucial role in the personnel recovery structure. Personnel recovery as a discipline is more visible at higher echelons, including joint levels of command. At the lowest level, personnel recovery is a part of the many tasks the individual Soldier must master. Commanders at this echelon have no dedicated protection functional cell but are still responsible for integrating personnel recovery into operations. The company-level Soldier may be familiar with the term personnel recovery but is more likely to identify with the component skills necessary to avoid isolating events such as land navigation, survival training, first aid, marksmanship, small-unit tactics, and physical fitness. At battalion or brigade level, personnel recovery is an additional duty. The staff member with personnel recovery responsibilities needs to be more knowledgeable in its doctrine and include personnel recovery information in training and OPLANs and OPORDs. Protection integration at these echelons may require commanders to designate a staff lead to assume the role of protection officer to carry out the responsibilities performed by dedicated personnel at higher levels of command. Trained officers and noncommissioned officers at the upper echelons of Army operational forces provide a greater capacity to manage personnel recovery events and give greater visibility to the discipline. These headquarters also have the obligation to coordinate with higher, lower, and adjacent echelons. Tasks by Division, Corps, and Theater Army Headquarters 2-29. Division, corps, and theater army headquarters have organic personnel recovery staff support. The personnel recovery officer of the PRCS requests augmentation if needed. Normally, the PRCS has the responsibilities and organization described in paragraphs 2-38 through 2-44. Additionally, JP 3-50 offers more detail on the specific responsibilities for Service component and joint commands. PRCSs at the division, corps, and theater levels establish, adequately staff, and fully train other PRCSs. PRCSs at the division, corps, and theater levels perform tasks associated with conducting Army operations, joint operations, coordination, training, and support. 2-30. PRCSs at the division, corps, and theater levels perform the following tasks associated with conducting operations:  Plan, prepare, and execute personnel recovery operations when supporting or conducting operations under DOS chief of mission authority.  Prepare to conduct interoperable and cooperative personnel recovery operations with partners, including leveraging HN capabilities to rescue personnel unilaterally whenever possible.  Assess policies, processes, and programs that influence commanders’ ability to conduct personnel recovery operations; recommend actions to enhance personnel recovery capabilities.  Ensure that subordinate commanders routinely address actions planned when personnel become isolated.  Support the personnel recovery executive agent and others in the collection, reporting, and dissemination of personnel recovery lessons learned.  Provide the results of inspections that include findings or observations that pertain to personnel recovery activities to the personnel recovery executive agent. 2-31. PRCSs at the division, corps, and theater levels coordinate with the JPRC and perform the following tasks associated with joint operations:  Advise, assist, facilitate, standardize, and coordinate personnel recovery matters with other departments and agencies of the USG in the joint operations area.  Contribute personnel recovery-related data and information to the central historical repository and archive and reference library, managed by the JPRA.  Prepare to establish a JPRC if directed or if designated as the joint force supported commander for personnel recovery. This will not negate the requirement to perform Army PRCS functions as well. This requires personnel recovery staffs maintain education, training, and staffing requirements.  Coordinate isolated personnel authentication procedures with the JPRC and disseminate them in ISG and subordinate personnel recovery contingency plans.  Provide the JPRC with augmentees trained in personnel recovery as directed. These personnel assist in coordinating and deconflicting the Army’s personnel recovery capabilities at the joint level.  Provide mutual support to the recovery operations of the other Services to the greatest extent possible. Normally the JPRC requests and coordinates such support.  Ensure unit PRCS SOPs align with JPRC and theater army personnel recovery contingency operations.  Gather and disseminate information concerning personnel recovery assets and capabilities to adjoining PRCSs and the JPRC. 2-32. PRCSs at the division, corps, and theater levels perform the following tasks associated with training:  Ensure that military, Army civilians, and CAAF receive personnel recovery training commensurate with their level of risk for becoming isolated or exploited.  Ensure personnel recovery education and training preparation efforts keep pace with changes in the operational area.  Clearly define the circumstances needed to initiate SERE activities.  Ensure subordinate units and key personnel—such as the PRCSs, personnel at risk of isolation, and recovery forces—are familiar with unit SOPs, personnel recovery TTP, and directives. 2-33. PRCSs at the division, corps, and theater levels perform the following tasks associated with coordination:  Coordinate for personnel recovery section support throughout the headquarters, including the main command post, the tactical command post (where established), and any ad hoc facility, such as a contingency or early entry command post.  Coordinate and support joint, multinational, HN, and interagency personnel recovery activities.  Coordinate for theater of operations and national intelligence support to personnel recovery activities.  Ensure that subordinate units are familiar with other PRCSs and immediately transmit information on isolated personnel to the PRCS that coordinates personnel recovery operations. 2-34. PRCSs at the division, corps, and theater levels perform the following tasks associated with support:  Assist personnel recovery staff officers and noncommissioned officers in subordinate command echelons in the development of personnel recovery programs.  Ensure that intelligence reports, running estimates, and products support personnel recovery planning, training, and execution are available in a timely manner to subordinate units.  Support higher headquarters and Service reintegration plans by writing plans and identifying reintegration team key personnel. 2-35. Situations often dictate the responsibilities at each echelon of command. Commanders at lower or higher echelons may need to undertake missions with responsibilities different from those they are normally assigned. While functional commands do not have dedicated PRCSs on their table of organization and equipment, they are expected to perform the personnel recovery duties listed paragraphs 2-36 and 2-37. Tasks by Battalion and Brigade 2-36. Commanders at battalion and brigade levels frequently exercise their protection authority by assigning personnel recovery responsibilities to a specific staff officer or noncommissioned officer, usually in the operations staff section. In the role of advisor to the commander—as the POCPOCPoint of contact for personnel recovery activities and staff coordinator—the personnel recovery officer is accountable for the following common personnel recovery responsibilities and tasks:  Include personnel recovery responsibilities in unit execution documents.  Establish personnel recovery staff capabilities and assign primary responsibilities in the command post as the focal point for the commander and staff.  Establish isolated person reporting requirements in the brigade and subordinate information management systems.  Recommend task organization and mission assignment to subordinate elements.  Advise the commander on steps to ready subordinate units for personnel recovery missions.  Synchronize and integrate all required assets for personnel recovery activities.  Assist subordinate staffs and commanders in the development of their specific echelon’s personnel recovery system.  Support joint personnel recovery operations, if directed. Tasks by Company and Below 2-37. Commanders and leaders of company, battery, or troop and below have personnel recovery responsibilities no less important than the leaders at higher echelons. Small tactical organizations (including ad hoc tactical units such as convoy march, serials, trailer transfer points, refuel and maintenance points, and reintegration locations) often precede operational formations, placing them at increased risk. Small-unit leaders should be keenly aware of the isolation risk associated with their specific mission or circumstance and engage in risk management to mitigate that risk accordingly. When an isolating event occurs, individuals and small units often have the best opportunity to make a quick assessment and react or recover from the isolating situation. Leaders at the company level and below complete the following tasks:  Develop ISG or evasion plans of action for every member of the unit.  Identify shortfalls in personnel recovery capabilities during troop leading procedures.  Identify information requirements for potential personnel recovery operations.  Evaluate each tactical situation and plan accordingly.  Assess the unit’s ability to complete the personnel recovery tasks.  Request the support required to address shortfalls in capability. R ESPONSIBILITIES OF P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY O RGANIZATIONS 2-38. At echelons above brigade, the personnel recovery officer serves in two separate but related staff elements. First, the officer serves in the joint force headquarters—either a combatant command or subordinate joint headquarters such as a joint task force—if it has a JPRC. Second, the officer serves in the subordinate Army headquarters in the joint force, the theater army, corps, and division to establish a PRCS. The joint and Army elements have complementary responsibilities. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center 2-39. The JPRC serves as the fusion point at the joint force level and maintains staff connectivity to the PRCS. Personnel recovery officers from each Service and functional component of the joint force staff the center. The JPRC responsibilities are similar to those in other combatant command staff elements:  Implement personnel recovery policies at the joint force level.  Develop personnel recovery SOPs for the joint force.  Support personnel recovery planning in the combatant command’s area of responsibility.  Exercise communication networks with higher, adjacent, and lower personnel recovery entities.  Coordinate external supported recoveries with appropriate organizations, agencies, militaries, and governments.  Coordinate with national and theater assets to support personnel recovery.  Participate in the decision-making processes for joint personnel recovery situations.  Assist Service component personnel recovery coordination cells with their responsibilities.  Establish which recovery coordinator has the authority should the JPRC go offline for any reason.  Provide information to the personnel recovery management system.  Serve as POCPOCPoint of contact with the unconventional assisted recovery coordination cell for unconventional assisted recovery and nonconventional assisted recovery. 2-40. The number of personnel assigned to the JPRC varies based on the size of the operation and the level of risk of isolation. See JP 3-50 for further information on staffing and training requirements for a JPRC. The Personnel Recovery Coordination Section 2-41. The PRCS is the staff section in division, corps, or theater army headquarters that serves as the focal point for all personnel recovery actions. It is responsible for synchronizing and integrating all personnel recovery actions horizontally within the headquarters and vertically within the chain of command. The commander must adequately staff and resource the PRCS. The PRCS requests augmentation if its responsibilities increase to exceed the ability of the section to handle them. Typical augmentation includes aviation, intelligence, ground operations, maritime operations, medical, behavioral health, human resources, or communications expertise. 2-42. The location of the PRCS is a command decision. It typically is a section of the protection cell at echelons above brigade headquarters. It maintains connectivity with the command post. Multiple PRCSs can exist in the same command at multiple locations. Whether they report to a senior PRCS or are independent organizations depends on the situation and the direction of the commander. During an isolating event, the PRCS may become the focus of planning, preparation, and execution. It has to contend with the time-sensitive actions taken by the command to respond to the isolation and recover the personnel. The PRCS’s responsibilities increase during an isolating event. Regardless of where the section is located, the commander and staff seek advice and task the section to provide expertise as the command performs the five personnel recovery tasks. The PRCS participates in planning and preparation, provides liaison, and accompanies the commander. 2-43. Specific PRCS responsibilities consist of the following:  Advise the commander on the available personnel recovery forces and their capabilities and limitations.  Assist subordinate units and personnel to develop and maintain digital ISOPREP and evasion plan of action data.  Conduct or support recovery operations or other recovery-related activities, as directed or requested.  Coordinate education and training of subordinate commanders, staffs, and individuals in their personnel recovery responsibilities.  Develop and maintain personnel recovery SOPs.  Develop and review the personnel recovery content in OPLANs, OPORDs, and FRAGORDs.  Establish the PRCS with multiple means of secure and nonsecure communications within the command and with higher, adjacent, and lower personnel recovery organizations.  Implement personnel recovery policies and programs.  Maintain access authentication information (entered on the DD FormDD FormDepartment of Defense form 1833 through the Personnel Recovery Mission Software Web site) and evasion plans of action for all assigned Soldiers.  Notify the JPRC director of PRCS activation, unit’s ability to provide support to recovery operations, and deactivation.  Participate in the decision-making processes for personnel recovery situations.  Provide staff supervision of personnel recovery officers at subordinate echelons.  Provide the command with the identity, status, probable location, and personal authentication and identity verification data of isolated personnel.  Serve as subject matter experts and POCs for personnel recovery operations and issues at the Service levels.  Track personnel recovery events within the command. 2-44. The coordination process shown in figure 2-1, pages 2-10 through 2-12, for the PRCSs at Army unit headquarters (theater army, corps, and division) and functional commands may also be used as a guide for the personnel recovery officer at brigade level and the staff officer at battalion.

This chapter discusses how personnel recovery is integrated into Army planning. It first discusses the personnel recovery staff using the military decisionmaking process. Then the chapter discusses the Appendix 13 (Personnel Recovery) to Annex E (Protection) for an operation order. It then details isolated Soldier guidance. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the evasion plan of action. PERSONNEL RECOVERY AND THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS 3-1. Commanders and staffs use the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) for planning during at least three methods of personnel recovery—immediate, deliberate, and externally supported. The deliberate method is the obvious method for use of the MDMP. During the deliberate method of personnel recovery, the commander issues intent and guidance to the staff. They, in turn, use the MDMP to develop COAs for recovering isolated persons. 3-2. When the headquarters is notified of an isolating event in battalion headquarters and above, personnel recovery in the MDMP becomes a normal staffing action. An isolating event can include a surviving, evading, or delaying contact with detained or captured person or persons. Sample staff personnel recovery actions are organized into matrixes (tables 3-1 through 3-7 on pages 3-1through 3-17) based on the steps of the MDMP. All actions are listed by responsibility and chronologically, as they would likely occur during an isolating event. These matrixes enable the commander, staff, and PRCS to plan in a deliberate or time-constrained environment. R ECEIPT OF M ISSION 3-3. Table 3-1, pages 3-1 to 3-7, lists staff actions for step one, receipt of mission. Such staff actions include alert the staff, gather tools, update the running estimates, conduct initial assessment, issue commander’s initial guidance, and issue the initial warning order. [CLASSIFICATION]

This chapter discusses general characteristics of major combat operations that influence the conduct of personnel recovery. Then it describes typical causes of isolation incidents. Finally, it discusses conducting the operations process for personnel recovery. CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS 4-1. The characteristics of major combat operations increase the complexity and uncertainty of personnel recovery operations. Large-scale offensive and defensive tasks involve complex operations against the uniformed armed forces of nation-states. Operations against hybrid threats can evolve into major combat operations. In Vietnam, from 1954 to 1975, a nationalistic guerilla movement, with outside support, grew into an intense conflict involving major ground and air combat. Military operations in Vietnam illustrate the ongoing risk of isolation for air and land forces. During major combat, enemies may have large standing armies with modern weapons or a combination of conventional and irregular capabilities. Some possess nuclear weapons. U.S. forces continue to train for and remain committed to defeating conventional enemy forces and hybrid threats in major combat operations. The principles of personnel recovery operations guide adaptable Army forces to accomplish successful personnel recovery missions in major combat. T HE C OMPLEXITY OF P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY IN M AJOR C OMBAT O PERATIONS 4-2. The complexity of major combat operations strains military capabilities, including personnel recovery capabilities. Major combat operations may cover wide areas and involve large numbers of personnel and equipment. Thousands of people and vehicles deploy to hundreds—if not thousands—of locations. The enemy may field equal numbers. Battles and engagements may cause hundreds of potential isolation incidents. Friendly forces face the risk of isolation daily. 4-3. Personnel, contractors, and others supporting friendly forces may become isolated. The availability of diplomatic, civilian, and military personnel recovery options does not mitigate the risk. Commanders and staff understand that the more partners participating in operations, the more complex the situation. 4-4. Wounds, injuries, and illness complicate isolation incidents, especially in the numbers associated with major combat. The raid on the Pangatian prison camp near Cabanatuan, Luzon, in the Philippines during World War II illustrates the transportation and medical challenges of rescuing large numbers of prisoners held for long periods. On 30 January 1945, a mixed force of Filipino guerillas, Army Rangers, and Alamo Scouts rescued over 500 prisoners from the camp. Some had been held since the fall of Bataan and Corregidor almost three years earlier. All had been mistreated, most were malnourished, and many were sick, wounded, or injured—including those held in the zero ward of the prison hospital, where they were judged to have no chance of survival. After the successful fight, the rescue force had to carry the liberated prisoners to a location remote from the camp before giving them food and water. From there the recovery force put the weakest and sickest on carts. When they reached U.S. lines, Sixth Army trucks met them and transported the group to freedom. 4-5. Even for persons isolated for short periods, personnel recovery operations must include adequate transportation, prompt medical aid, food and water, physical security, and behavioral health remediation. Captors may hold isolated persons in small groups or large numbers and even in a medical treatment facility. Recovering isolated persons protected by the enemy requires adequate personnel, physical security, and transportation resources. The terrain and environmental conditions add to the difficulty of transporting the sick, wounded, and injured. 4-6. Some individuals may actually choose isolation. For example, Captain (Chaplain) Emil J. Kapaun made such a decision in November 1950. At the start of the Korean War in June 1950, he deployed to Korea as the chaplain of the 3rd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry Regiment. During fierce combat with Chinese forces in North Korea, his unit was under heavy pressure and preparing to withdraw toward friendly lines when he was told that wounded 3rd Battalion Soldiers were surrounded and could not withdraw. Accompanied by Captain (Doctor) Clarence L. Anderson, Father Kapaun left the secure perimeter and found the men. He ministered to the Soldiers until captured by the enemy. He was the only member of the group not wounded. He elected to remain with the Soldiers—to isolate himself—rather than evade and return to friendly lines. Father Kapaun died in captivity. 4-7. The mission is always paramount. The Soldier’s Creed and the Warrior Ethos (see ADP 1 and TC 3-21.75) make it clear that the Army values its members, but the mission is foremost. At the tactical level, this often creates tension between accomplishing the mission and protecting those endangering their lives for the mission. Major combat increases this tension for leaders and Soldiers because of an increased tempo. Whereas stability or DSCA missions include episodes of high tempo, major combat operations maintain a high tempo as the norm. The need to create and maintain combat power when and where it is needed contrast with the requirement to preserve life. Expectations of life-saving personnel recovery operations prove challenging to meet in the conditions of major combat. T HE U NCERTAINTY OF P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY IN M AJOR C OMBAT O PERATIONS 4-8. Civilians within an operational area increase the uncertainty of personnel recovery activities, particularly in densely populated areas. Complex or unfamiliar cultural factors make it difficult to predict civilian behavior for or against isolated Soldiers. A local population or group opposed to friendly operations make personnel recovery operations more challenging. Groups or individuals supportive of enemy forces enhance the intelligence gathering capabilities of the enemy and increase the threat to isolated persons. Conversely, friendly populations are a boon to allied intelligence and support networks. However, modern communications enable anyone to secretly report the sighting of U.S. forces to their enemies. 4-9. Army commanders at every level are committed to the safety and security of their organizations. They emphasize personnel recovery to prevent Army forces from becoming isolated, missing, or captured and lessen the tactical, operational, and strategic impact of isolation incidents. Commanders and staffs at all echelons must guard against treating personnel recovery as episodic. They must anticipate requirements. Commanders who adequately resource personnel recovery elements with a full-time staff minimize the adverse impact of personnel recovery operations on mission accomplishment. This is especially important in major combat operations, where a robust recovery capability raises troop morale. This is because Soldiers can execute their missions in extremely hazardous conditions with the confidence that they can successfully avoid or contend with isolation incidents. CAUSES OF ISOLATION INCIDENTS 4-10. Individuals or groups become isolated for various reasons, including their own behavior, enemy actions, and interaction with the physical environment. Personnel recovery efforts must be effective regardless of the reason or reasons for an isolation incident. Paragraphs 4-11 through 4-16 discuss common causes of isolation incidents. This discussion applies mainly to major combat (offensive and defensive) operations, but also to stability and DSCA operations. The categories are flexible and do not exclude other possible causes. I SOLATION BY F RIENDLY B EHAVIOR 4-11. The most frequent cause of isolation incidents is friendly force behavior, regardless of the situation. The actions prescribed by warning orders, OPORDs, or FRAGORDs occasionally expose the force or individuals to unknown, underestimated, or even unacceptable risk of isolation. The information available for supporting situational awareness and decisionmaking may be incomplete or flawed. A leader exercising individual initiative sometimes directs a COA that leads to isolation, such as deviating from a planned route to take advantage of a just-discovered shortcut. An on-the-spot decision based on available information seems appropriate for an urgent situation, such as autorotating a helicopter with an engine failure. However, it could cause an individual or an aircrew to become isolated from friendly forces and at risk of capture. Subsequent rapid decisions may compound the risk. Leaving the initial site of the isolation to affect self-recovery, avoid enemy contact, or seek medical attention may exacerbate the situation. Rapid decisions may cause forces to become lost. Once isolated, some forces do not receive orders to move, so they stay in a vulnerable location. In major combat operations, the number of these types of isolation incidents is proportional to the number of forces deployed. I SOLATION BY E NEMY A CTION 4-12. Units sometimes become isolated when an enemy force separates them from other friendly forces. Enemy forces observing the isolation incident race to the scene, seeking to kill or capture isolated Soldiers. Friendly forces race to recover them. If an unassisted evasion or an immediate recovery by friendly forces is not successful, commanders decide whether to mount a deliberate recovery operation. In major combat operations, recovery operations compete for resources with other missions. Commanders weigh the decision with other tactical decisions based on the current situation. They consider the prospects of success against acceptable risk and the possibility of casualties. This decision is among the most difficult a combat leader must make. Should isolated forces wait for the outcome of the current operation, or could a reserve element not yet committed execute the personnel recovery mission? The decision affects the ongoing mission as well as the morale of the organization. 4-13. In major combat, Army forces isolated by hostile action are frequently in the most dangerous personnel recovery situation because they are typically under enemy observation. They may have the means to resist, but if cut off from support for extended periods, they eventually may evade returning to friendly control or even be forced to surrender. The personnel recovery structure, especially one strictly based on search and rescue, can become overwhelmed. In these circumstances, extraction by aircraft is generally impractical because of the number of aircraft necessary to move large groups. Furthermore, the presence of enemy antiaircraft and other direct-fire weapons makes airborne recovery dangerous for aircrews. Aircraft shot down during recovery attempts simply add to the number of isolated persons and the complexity of the mission. Recovery of large numbers of Soldiers typically requires ground and air forces in a deliberate attack, counterattack, raid, breakout from encirclement, or other tactical operation supported by intelligence, fires, and sustainment. In effect, personnel recovery becomes the primary mission. 4-14. Enemy action threatens the isolation of more than just friendly armed forces. DOD regulations, instructions, and directives place DOD civilians, DOD contractors, and other designated persons under the protection of U.S. forces. Designated persons may include persons or members of organizations such as friendly militias, volunteers, and organized resistance movement members fighting along with U.S. forces, embedded journalists and other media representatives, civilian aircraft and seaborne vessel crews, and members of intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations. The recovery of these persons is complicated because the Geneva Conventions does not protect them. An enemy force may not give designated persons the opportunity to surrender if it regards them as outlaws. Such persons may spontaneously take up arms to resist the enemy. The enemy may not recognize designated persons as belligerents, but Army leadership may direct their recovery nonetheless. Working with designated persons may present significant challenges to the Army force. Their groups may be fragmented. They may not be able to make detailed information readily available for identifying or authenticating their members. 4-15. Prisoners of war are initially isolated persons. All actions taken immediately after capture, before movement to a prisoner of war camp, and after detention are personnel recovery activities. The Third 1949 Geneva Convention defines this status—while under the control of the detaining force but before entering an incarceration facility—as being a prisoner of war. Any activity, large or small, involved in the repatriation of prisoners of war is considered a personnel recovery operation. I SOLATION BY THE E NVIRONMENT 4-16. The physical environment, including climate and weather conditions, can cause groups or individuals to become isolated. Inclement weather, biological contamination, chemical pollution, and the damage to terrain from combat cause isolation and complicate personnel recovery operations. A fast-flowing or deep river, large lake, wide crevasse, sheer cliff, seemingly impenetrable swamp, or unrelenting mud caused by heavy rain can create or contribute to isolation. Contamination, whether natural (such as water infected with Vibrio cholera, the cholera bacterium) or man-made contamination (such as chlorine gas spilled from a ruptured storage tank) interferes with movement and contributes to isolation. When large or aggressive enemy formations are present, the situation is especially challenging. CONDUCTING THE OPERATIONS PROCESS 4-17. Army commanders and staffs conducting the operations process for personnel recovery missions use judgment in applying the principles discussed in chapter 1. Paragraphs 4-18 through 4-24 discuss in detail how they plan, prepare, execute, and assess personnel recovery operations. P LANNING FOR P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY O PERATIONS 4-18. Commanders and staffs analyze their operational environments using the operational variables— political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time. Commanders and staffs use the mission variables as a filter to extract from the operational variables the information staffs need to conduct an operation and commanders need to exercise mission command. Higher command echelons ensure their personnel recovery guidance is appropriate for an operational environment. Tactical-level commanders ensure the ISG is appropriate for the situation on the ground. Several enemy characteristics are important in determining the risk of isolation such as composition, disposition, capabilities, recruitment efforts, level of training, robustness of logistic support, and support among the population. 4-19. Army planners use an Army planning methodology to focus the personnel recovery planning effort. They define the problem, gather information, develop possible solutions, analyze and select the best solution, and implement it. Often these steps take the form of the Army design methodology, the seven-step military decisionmaking process, or troop leading procedures (see ADRP 5-0). P REPARING FOR P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY O PERATIONS 4-20. Well-trained and experienced units typically perform better in the chaos of combat. The desire by commanders and staffs at all levels to protect Soldiers and keep faith with the Soldier’s Creed is no substitute for preparation. Preparation for personnel recovery is an integral part of the individual training of each Soldier and the collective training of every Army unit. The foundation of readiness is training. Personnel recovery training for several generations—at least since the Korean War—focused on SERE training of aircrews and isolated Soldiers. Traditionally, training for the forces as a whole has focused on Code of Conduct instructions. Analysis of the strategic impact of isolation incidents during Operation Iraqi Freedom resulted in a broader approach to provide personnel recovery training to the entire force. (ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-50.3 discusses SERE in detail.) 4-21. Commanders ensure the recovery force is ready to execute the recovery mission. They supply the force with necessary equipment, up-to-date intelligence, and information on weather conditions, the status of the isolated persons, and other friendly forces providing support. If necessary, they augment the force with air, ground, or water assets. They staff the PRCS and augment the current operations integration cell at senior headquarters with personnel recovery specialists to assist in decisionmaking. Preparation for personnel recovery operations includes mastering the shared personnel recovery proficiencies (see the discussion beginning in paragraph 1-75). E XECUTING P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY O PERATIONS 4-22. The PRCS synchronizes and integrates all personnel recovery actions horizontally within the headquarters and vertically within the chain of command. This includes monitoring execution of all personnel recovery tasks: report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. Executing a personnel recovery mission centers on the recover task. However, personnel recovery operations are not complete before the execution of the reintegrate task. Paragraphs 1-62 through 1-74 discuss reintegration. 4-23. The story of the 507th Maintenance Company during the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrates Soldiers executing the Army personnel recovery approaches (sometimes called methods): unassisted, immediate, deliberate, and external supported (also discussed in paragraphs 1-35 through 1-39). In the morning hours of 23 March 2003, thirty-three Soldiers of the 507th Maintenance Company, including two from the 3d Forward Support Battalion, entered the city of An Nasiriyah with eighteen vehicles. Due to a navigation error, enemy forces surrounded the convoy. During a ninety-minute struggle to fight off the enemy and return to friendly lines, the convoy divided into three smaller groups. Each group had a different personnel recovery experience. The smallest group of six Soldiers in three vehicles evaded roadblocks under fire and returned unassisted to friendly control when it met elements of a Marine Corps tank battalion. The second group of ten Soldiers in five vehicles fought off attacking Iraqi Soldiers, established a defensive perimeter, and treated its wounded. Advancing Marines rescued it in an immediate recovery operation. The final group of seventeen Soldiers and ten vehicles was involved in a vehicle crash under heavy enemy fire and was unable to move to friendly lines. It became fragmented and several members were killed, wounded, and captured. On 1 April 2003, special operations forces supported by Marines rescued one Soldier from an Iraqi hospital in an external supported recovery operation. Later in April, the remaining captive members of the convoy, and two captured Apache pilots, were recovered when word of their presence enabled nearby Marines to execute a deliberate recovery operation. A SSESSING P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY O PERATIONS 4-24. Commanders drive the operations process. They understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. They assess during the plan, prepare, and execute phases of the operations process. Likewise, commanders assess throughout the conduct of personnel recovery operations to determine the progress of the operation and adapt as required. Assessment helps commanders supervise recovery operations to better understand current conditions and determine how the operation is progressing. The commander maintains overall perspective, comparing the current situation to the one originally envisioned. Commanders use information received from subordinates to develop indicators to determine progress toward a successful outcome. When assessment reveals a significant variance from the commander’s original visualization, commanders reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan as required. This page intentionally left blank.

This chapter discusses general characteristics of stability that influence the conduct of personnel recovery. It explains isolation risk and risk reduction strategies. It discusses DOD and DOS interaction and coordination with other partners. CHARACTERISTICS OF STABILITY 5-1. Stability has distinct characteristics that influence personnel recovery operations. For example, command and support relationships frequently vary. Army forces operate under joint command and control, under the control of a multinational force, or under the operational control of a civilian entity, such as the DOS. They may also operate in conjunction with HN forces. Soldiers and other designated persons are among the population, they are vulnerable to hybrid threats, and they often operate under restrictive rules of engagement or rules on the use of force. 5-2. Army forces conduct offensive, defensive, and stability tasks simultaneously. One unit may find itself conducting offensive or defensive tasks, while another unit is establishing civil control, providing support to governance, or training HN military forces. Soldiers scattered in remote areas are at increased risk of isolation. Vulnerabilities increase when stability operations require the use of nonmilitary personnel with little or no training in preventing isolation events. Personnel recovery characteristics in stability include addressing the local national sovereignty, HN security forces, local populations, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. These factors interact to increase uncertainty and the chance of isolation. N ATIONAL S OVEREIGNTY 5-3. Supporting the national sovereignty of the host nation is an important consideration in any deployment overseas. Nation-states are sovereign within their own territory. Army forces conducting personnel recovery activities do not violate this right. When a functional, effective HN government exists, Army and joint forces work with local civil and military authorities. Personnel recovery activities have a greater chance of success when the host nation is permissive and encourages U.S. military operations or is, at least, amenable to the presence of those forces on or over its territory. The worst-case scenario occurs when the political and security environments are in chaos, the state is in crisis or has failed altogether, and the host nation exercises little or no sovereignty over its territory. Normally, the situation hovers between these two poles. 5-4. The host nation welcomes—or at least does not prevent—Army forces but imposes restrictions on their actions in an effort to exercise its sovereignty or to make U.S. operations more acceptable to its population. The restrictions for personnel recovery overseas fall into several categories:  Force size.  Force composition and capability employment.  Length of stay.  Scope of operations.  Government-to-government contact.  Mandatory use of local resources.  Operational actions and locations. Force Size 5-5. It is common for nations to desire a light footprint of U.S. forces in stability operations for internal or regional political reasons, especially during foreign humanitarian assistance. The leaders of nations want control of activities within their nation’s borders. Nations affected by natural disasters or emergencies prefer to control relief activities, especially those involving other nations. One way to do this is to limit the number of foreign troops on sovereign soil. However, from the Army perspective, a smaller force size may equate to fewer capabilities available for personnel recovery operations. Force Composition and Capability Employment 5-6. Force composition determines personnel recovery capabilities. Host nations do not view all types of forces the same. For many, lightly armed military police in wheeled vehicles are acceptable, while tracked vehicles mounting large-caliber direct-fire weapons are not. In terms of the warfighting functions, sustainment forces may be welcomed while movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, and some protection forces are not. Likewise, local authority may prohibit use of certain weapons systems. For example, the host nation may not permit use of helicopters or Army watercraft useful in personnel recovery, or limit the hours of use. Length of Stay 5-7. Host nations generally give U.S. forces a time limit to achieve their mission, granting an extension only after a decision made through the local political process. Conversely, the Army may set a time limit on its own activities in a nation, mindful of the negative consequences of overstaying its welcome. Commanders strive to keep personnel recovery assets as long as possible. Scope of Operations 5-8. Wary of the internal political consequences of giving carte blanch to foreign forces, a host nation may limit the scope of Army operations, including personnel recovery activities. For example, Army forces may be allowed to conduct operations against hostile irregular forces but prohibited from entering urban areas. Government-to-Government Contact 5-9. In nations with fragile relationships between the national government and subordinate governmental entities, the national government may prohibit or severely restrict Army contact with local or regional authorities. Motivations for this are as simple as a desire to control things from a central location, or involve the complex political relations and long-standing mistrust between potential rivals for national control. Army forces many need to coordinate through a convoluted chain of authority. Mandatory Use of Local Resources 5-10. The deployment of U.S. forces to a nation for stability, even for a short time, will affect that nation and region. The economic impact is substantial and creates opportunities for the HN government. Understanding this may cause the local authorities to mandate the use of indigenous people, local resources (such as coal, petroleum, water, and foodstuffs), or transportation assets. Operational Actions and Locations 5-11. The host nation can require the activities of U.S. forces conform to certain procedures, such as conducting operations only in conjunction with local police or military forces. The host nation may curtail or severely restrict common military actions, such as the right of hot pursuit into neighboring countries. The host nation may prohibit U.S. forces from entering certain areas, such as border areas or restricted military operational areas. H OST -N ATION S ECURITY F ORCES 5-12. HN security forces represent a significant potential for personnel recovery support in stability. The Army’s relationship with a host nation can be long or short term, depending on the situation. In long-term relationships, the United States has a long-standing bilateral diplomatic, economic, and military partnership with the host nation. In long-term relationships, the United States may have formed a more recent security cooperation pact with the goal of stabilizing the overseas nation while advancing the national security interests of the United States. In still other situations, an ad hoc relationship exists to address a temporary state of affairs. An example of an ad hoc relationship is one resulting from a response to a natural or man-made disaster. In each relationship, the Army as part of a joint force conducts synchronization and coordination, and establishes liaison with the armed forces, national police, and other internal security forces of the host nation as part of unified action. 5-13. A relationship with HN security forces is important for several reasons. They normally have several capabilities important to the location, support, and assistance with recovery of isolated persons. National security forces—police and armed forces—are the first responders. They have elements throughout most of the country, including remote locations where U.S. forces may perform stability tasks. HN security forces are generally politically well connected. They facilitate coordination in personnel recovery. Wide distribution and political connectivity are important in timely intelligence collection and analysis. The most important relationship is often the American Embassy’s relationship with the national police and intelligence services. Such HN security forces understand the level of risk of isolation to U.S. forces. HN security forces provide advice to mitigate that risk for Army forces working in remote areas, or in areas with a high chance of encountering those with hostile intent. L OCAL P OPULATIONS 5-14. There is no empty battlefield. Soldiers interact with the local population in an AO. The relationship between Army forces and the local population includes various intangible factors such as understanding the culture, perceptions, beliefs, and values of adversary, neutral, or friendly political and social systems. While the local population may have reasons to interact with Army forces, HN authorities may have reasons to discourage contact between Army forces and the local population. Reasons to limit association include culture, religion, and economy. Commanders determine if they should limit troop interaction with the HN population. For example, restrictions can allow business or operational contact only, with social interactions prohibited. I NTERACTION W ITH I NDEPENDENT A CTORS 5-15. A number of independent actors influence stability. Joint and Army forces in stability operations interface with entities that possess various experience, resources, mandates, and capabilities. Some global organizations have broad mandates, while local organizations have specific, limited missions. These organizations sometimes provide valuable assistance in personnel recovery. 5-16. Army forces at all levels aim to build strong relationships with independent actors through ongoing cooperation and coordination. Examples of potential partners include the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The United Nations operates in most joint and Army operational areas. The International Committee of the Red Cross serves as an impartial, neutral, and independent organization to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence. Such organizations develop experience in local environments and can share knowledge of the locale, its people and their customs, and the government organization. Additionally, independent actors have knowledge networks that can prove a valuable resource during isolation incidents. 5-17. Many organizations wish to maintain independent and separate from Army forces. However, objectives of stability frequently align with those objectives of the independent actors. At the least, reasonable deconfliction of purpose is possible. Frequently, the United Nations, DOS, or the United States Agency for International Development facilitates the interface between Army forces and other intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations. The interface includes Army efforts to recover or prevent isolation of civilian members of these organizations, when required. 5-18. Commanders do not delay initiating cooperation and coordination in advance of potential isolation incidents. This includes the potential isolation of Soldiers or civilians. They anticipate the need and do not allow inadequate coordination and training to limit effectiveness of recovery operations. They plan to compensate for differences in communications equipment, signals, training, and procedures. Commanders consider the makeup of the work force of potential partners. ISOLATION RISK IN STABILITY 5-19. Risks impact personnel recovery operations. The most common type is accidental risk. Since military operations are inherently dangerous, the chance of accidents increases. Accidents often cause or contribute to isolation. Other types of risk include the presence of a threat from enemy forces, criminal elements, or a hostile environment. 5-20. Stability tasks may not require the same level of protection as major combat operations. A commander and staff still conduct risk assessments to determine the probability of an isolation incident occurring and its potential impact on mission accomplishment. For instance, figure 5-1 demonstrates how the risk of a Soldier becoming isolated may be very low, but its impact on the mission may be high (condition A). Conversely, the probability of an isolation incident may be high but the immediate impact on an ongoing operation may be low (condition B). With respect to personnel recovery operations, Army commanders assess the risk, apply control measures, and supervise the operation. 5-21. Personnel recovery challenges commanders of stability operations to respond quickly to an isolation incident with sufficient forces. In most stability situations, the final assessment of risk is a judgment call by the commander. The commander considers not only the severity of the negative outcome but also its probability. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 5-19 for more detailed information on risk management.) Generally, the risk of isolation for the friendly force is proportional to the size of that force and the degree and distance of separation from other friendly forces, including recovery forces. See figure 5-2 for an illustration of the relationship between force size and isolation. ISOLATION RISK REDUCTION APPROACHES 5-22. Commanders consider stability characteristics when developing approaches to reduce the risk of isolation incidents. First, large numbers of Soldiers, Army civilians, contractors, and other designated individuals support stability operations. Usually, individual risk of isolation is low, but the net risk is considerable in context of the number of exposures on a daily basis overseas. Second, because the scope of stability operations is worldwide, the Army personnel recovery structure and training mission are worldwide. Personnel recovery operations with unified action partners are the norm. Third, although isolation risk is highly variable, personnel recovery planners can weight their effort in areas considered high risk. However, in areas of high risk, frequently fewer partners help mitigate the risk. Forces adapt the personnel recovery structure to an operational environment. In addition to providing personnel recovery education and training, commanders use a mix of approaches for risk reduction. These approaches include acceptance, protection, and deterrence. A CCEPTANCE 5-23. One approach to reducing the isolation risk from hybrid threats is to encourage acceptance of activities of the USG. Acceptance aims to build relationships with local leaders and other authority figures—clerics, elders, teachers, health care providers, and influential members of intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations. The Army has long understood that winning the “hearts and minds” of a local population goes a long way to establishing conditions for eventual success and reducing the threat of isolation. This approach takes time. 5-24. At the local level, commanders can prepare mutual agreements between Army forces and local leaders. Special operations forces often use the acceptance approach. Such an approach led to the Sons of Iraq awakening movement in Iraq’s Anbar Province in 2005. Sunni Muslim militias collaborated with friendly forces to increase the level of security and reduce the risk of isolation in the region. However, acceptance is conditional on formal agreements and does not lessen the need for protection and deterrent measures. P ROTECTION 5-25. Protection is the use of internal control measures to reduce the risk of isolation incidents by reducing vulnerability. It is primarily passive. This approach emphasizes protection TTP to preserve the force and maximize combat power. Such tasks as training and education in operations security, survivability, health maintenance, safety, and chemical, biological, and radiological defense reduce the vulnerability. One example of a protection control measure is the existence of a robust personnel recovery infrastructure, staffed by competent people and interconnected with HN and regional governmental authorities. A potential shortcoming of protection control measures is that they contribute to a bunker mentality. The force fixated on protection looks inward and expends its resources on protection instead of reaching out to accomplish the stability mission. D ETERRENCE 5-26. Deterrence is an external protection control measure using the counter-threat of force to discourage enemies and mitigate isolation risk. Deterrence encourages the perception that Army forces can and will reach out and retaliate against perpetrators. Deterrence at individual and small-unit levels takes the form of presenting a hard target to a potential enemy. Brigade and below forces seek to convince the enemy that the risk in attempting an attack is not worth the potential benefit. Soldiers and units that always appear vigilant, travel with adequate security, and use every technological advantage to identify and track potential enemies, contribute to deterrence for brigade and below units. At the operational level, a well-advertised, rapid, and aggressive response to a kidnapping may give an actor pause in allowing operations in its district or may convince it to assist in the locate and recover tasks. 5-27. A fine line exists between deterrence and the unnecessary use of force. Even for Soldiers serving at brigade and below, deterrence goes beyond just the use of force. The employment of civil affairs and military information support capabilities, frequent interaction with local tribal and political leaders, and a threat to withhold the benefits of economic cooperation with U.S. forces can discourage action against friendly troops and their mission. 5-28. Not all risk reduction approaches work in all situations, but a combination of control measures contributes to the reduction of vulnerability and risk associated with operations in uncertain environments. All isolation risk reduction approaches have a cost. The cost may be in money, in the loss of contact with the local population, or the esteem of the international community. The situation in the presence of a hybrid threat is more complex. Danger from disease, an incipient insurgency, an external military threat from a nearby sanctuary, and an uncooperative HN government all call for a combination of risk reduction measures. Regardless of the combination, efforts in risk reduction pay off in increased protection and an improved climate for personnel recovery. DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTERACTION 5-29. The DOS mission includes helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world. All U.S. forces in a host nation support the DOS mission. The geographic combatant commander coordinates with the chief of mission and the embassy staff. Normally, the DOS is the lead for personnel recovery activities overseas. In a few narrow instances, normally involving an active military joint operations area within a weak and beleaguered HN government, the DOD takes the lead. 5-30. The DOS is the lead for stability. The American Embassy establishes relationships with a wide range of unified action partners to support reconstruction and stabilization activities. Partners include HN government officials, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and other groups and individuals. Important actors include civilian, business, and religious leaders (even those in opposition to the government); academics; and the diplomatic corps. Some of these relationships are formal, such as diplomatic ties, while others are informal, such as those with certain nongovernmental organizations. Access to all these partners supports the effectiveness of the personnel recovery structure within the host nation. In addition, the embassy may maintain informal, indirect, or clandestine contacts with individuals hostile to the existing government. 5-31. The responsibility for recovering isolated persons within a host nation belongs with the government of that nation. Therefore, the goal of the USG is to handle all personnel recovery operations diplomatically. However, it uses a whole-government concept of personnel recovery operations. The concept recognizes that all entities of the government have some level of responsibility for the recovery and safe return of isolated and captured U.S. citizens. This includes DOD employees who are HN or third-country nationals. D EPARTMENT OF S TATE A UTHORITY 5-32. The authority of the DOS to command and control personnel recovery operations overseas is found in Sections 4801, 4802, and 4805, Title 22, United States Code (USCUSCUnited States Code) (22 USCUSCUnited States Code 4801, 4802, and 4805). Section 4801 sets forth the responsibility of the Secretary of State to secure diplomatic operations overseas, to include accountability of USG personnel. It directs the Secretary of State to evacuate U.S. citizens endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster. Section 4802 directs the Secretary of State to protect USG personnel on official duty overseas except those under the command of a U.S. military commander and some other exceptions. These responsibilities include security of U.S. missions abroad, development of emergency plans, liaison with overseas private sector security interests, and various training functions. Of special interest is a stipulation to evacuate endangered private citizens. This is the origin of the requirement to recover “designated individuals” whom the embassy chief of mission designates. Section 4805 directs federal agencies to cooperate with the Secretary of State. The secretary may delegate operational control of overseas security functions to other agencies—DOD, for example—but the authority remains with the Secretary of State. The language in this paragraph enables the DOD and its representatives with the American Embassies overseas—and geographic combatant commanders—to provide resources to personnel recovery operations in a host nation. 5-33. Other authorizations under 22 USCUSCUnited States Code include Sections 1732 and 4314. Section 1732 directs the President, through the DOS, to use all means short of war to obtain the release of captured U.S. citizens held by foreign governments. This language can include those held under the control of groups supported by governments who support their efforts. Section 4314 directs the Secretary of State to fund HN law enforcement agencies to protect diplomatic facilities. 5-34. Of the more than 250 U.S. diplomatic missions around the world, the overwhelming majority are in host nations requiring emergency action plans accountable for personnel recovery operations within the host nation. As directed in 22 USCUSCUnited States Code 3927, the chief of mission has authority over all USG elements and representatives in the host nation except military forces assigned to the appropriate combatant commander. The chief of mission is the representative of the President in a host nation and is responsible for personnel recovery activities in every case. The chief of mission is usually the ambassador. When no ambassador is appointed, or the ambassador is out of the host nation, the deputy chief of mission assumes responsibility as the chief of the mission. 5-35. The chief of mission establishes a country team composed of the various officers, directors, attachés, counselors, chiefs, and senior government representatives. For personnel recovery operations, the chief of mission and the country team executing responsibilities under 22 USCUSCUnited States Code coordinate with the geographic combatant commander executing responsibilities under 10 USCUSCUnited States Code. The objective is to ensure a coordinated response among the DOS, DOD, and host nation. Although the chief of mission is responsible for conducting U.S. personnel recovery operations within the host nation, many resources for an immediate or deliberate recovery reside with the geographic combatant commander. In stability, the chief of mission coordinates the resources of the diplomatic, military, and civil authorities to execute personnel recovery responsibilities. 5-36. The chief of mission and the embassy staff coordinate with resident defense attachés and the DOS regional security officer (RSO). Members of these organizations are normally a part of the country team coordinating recovery activities. The defense attaché is primarily responsible to foster good relations with the HN defense and security establishment. Attachés establish networks within the local military and paramilitary organizations to facilitate a rapid response to crises. The diplomatic security service special agents staff the embassy regional security office supervised by a RSO. The RSO is responsible for the physical, information, technical, and personnel security of the embassy. They assist the Marine security guard detachments, other U.S. forces assigned to the embassy, contract security guards, and HN security, intelligence, and law enforcement services. The team may include representatives of U.S. special operations forces and members of the U.S. Coast Guard, if they are operating in the host nation. The RSO is responsible for arranging training for local national police and security officials. The RSO serves as point of contact and advises U.S. citizens travelling in the host country on safety and security procedures and threats. The RSO’s everyday contacts with these groups are invaluable in the case of an isolation incident; the contacts are already established. 5-37. Many host nations require emergency action plans accountable for personnel recovery operations within that host nation. The embassy regional security office and its emergency action committee, with the help of the defense attachés, assist the chief of mission to develop the embassy emergency action plan. This tailored plan establishes procedures for contingencies including responding to natural disasters, evacuating embassy and local U.S. citizens, and recovering isolated persons. The typical emergency action plan requires the embassy to conduct periodic crisis management exercises and to maintain a list of the estimated number of U.S. citizens living, working, or travelling in the host nation. 5-38. The emergency action plan addresses concerns of personnel recovery. The RSO, the defense attachés, and other emergency action committee members develop protocols in the sections of the embassy and with local law enforcement and security services to expedite a rapid response to any isolation incident. The objective is to leverage the formal and informal connections the embassy has within the host nation. The emergency action plan provides information on contact with local governmental agencies and lists the permanent, semi-permanent, and temporary USG assets available within the host nation to respond to an isolation incident. 5-39. As is often the case, especially in small U.S. diplomatic outposts overseas, the embassy may lack adequate resources to exercise personnel recovery responsibilities. The DOS frequently relies on U.S. forces in those locations. Serving under the operational control of the chief of mission, the geographic combatant commander provides personnel recovery resources. D EPARTMENT OF S TATE P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY O PERATIONAL C ONCEPT 5-40. The DOS bases its personnel recovery operational concept on the ideas that prevention and preparation are the keys to mitigating the risk, and the type and degree of risk depend on the location. The DOS focuses on preventing isolation and captivity through education, training, and information sharing. Foreign service officers and other representatives of the USG receive extensive training at the Foreign Service Institute before deployment overseas. These courses include information on individual security, environmental threats, hostage awareness training, regional security office operations, and personnel recovery roles and responsibilities. Department-level instruction includes courses on security operations in nontraditional or high-risk environments designed to mitigate those threats. Department-wide education and training combines with specific instructions on contingency planning at the embassy level. The emergency action plan contains a personnel recovery annex. Its instruction includes local nationals and contractors who work at embassies around the world. The DOS plans leverage all USG assets, including those of the DOD. D EPARTMENT OF D EFENSE A UTHORITY 5-41. The authority for the DOD to conduct personnel recovery operations overseas is contained in 10 USCUSCUnited States Code 1501 and 1502. Section 1501 invests the DOD with the responsibility to investigate and recover missing persons, including actions related to search, rescue, escape, and evasion. This section directs the DOD to coordinate with other departments and agencies on all matters concerning missing persons. It defines a covered person as a member of the armed forces who becomes involuntarily absent because of hostile action or whose status is undetermined. Further, it identifies covered persons as members of the armed forces, DOD employees, and contractors. Section 1502 stipulates that its components inform DOD within ten days of all missing persons to establish accountability. 5-42. The DOD and its subordinates are responsible for establishing an effective personnel recovery system for military personnel. The DOD has authority to recover an isolated Soldier or other designated person within the context of daily military operations. The DOS has the lead in all other cases; the DOD does not have authority to conduct personnel recovery operations unilaterally. Joint and Army forces conduct stability under the authority of the President, in accordance with treaties, conventions, and executive and other agreements; statutory law; and federal and agency regulations. Often joint and Army headquarters can pre-negotiate some of the personnel recovery tasks with the host nation before a major exercise or operation. These may include authority to conduct medical evacuation, conduct immediate search and rescue, and use blue force tracking, personal locater beacons, or preventive and protective measures. 5-43. In stability, the DOD conducts many of the personnel recovery activities with the cooperation of nonmilitary entities. The DOD coordinates with the DOS and the host nation to ensure that necessary response capabilities are available. This underscores the need to establish a broad network of relationships in an AO with not only the host nation’s security forces, but also with the diplomatic, humanitarian, and political organizations. Establishing and nurturing these relationships are the responsibilities of the DOS and other representatives of the USG. The DOD supports unified action. 5-44. The largest U.S. military entity in a host nation is the Office of Defense Cooperation. All DOD personnel in a U.S. diplomatic mission fall under the leadership of the senior defense officer, including those in the military group and the defense attaché office. Present in embassies where the United States has an agreement to provide military assistance, the Office of Defense Cooperation is a DOD organization that provides security assistance and advice to the host nation, supervises programs that strengthen interoperability, serves as the primary point of contact for foreign military sales, and manages other defense-related issues. It is one of the contact points between the DOS and DOD. 5-45. In some personnel recovery operations overseas, a special representative of the President or special envoy of the United Nations Secretary General may be involved. Stability in the host nation remains the responsibility of the chief of mission, who works closely with the geographic combatant commander to plan, prepare, execute, and assess all efforts. Generally, the geographic combatant commander coordinates with HN forces to execute mutually beneficial operations, while USG representatives implement the nonmilitary aspects of the broader plan or directive. C OOPERATION A GREEMENTS 5-46. For the protection of U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad, 22 USCUSCUnited States Code 4865 directs the DOS and DOD to develop a memorandum of agreement on rapid response procedures. This agreement provides the framework for cooperation between the two departments. The geographic combatant commander performs assigned tasks, per the agreement between the DOS and DOD, and activities coordinated with the chief of mission in a host nation. Generally, the geographic combatant commander exercises command authority through subordinate joint task force commanders or Service and functional component commanders. The responsibilities of the DOS and DOD overlap. The DOD executes certain programs under the operational control of the DOS, such as security cooperation activities. Chiefs of mission and country teams look to the host nation and other partners, such as intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations, for personnel recovery activities. They also look to the geographic combatant command’s JPRC and its joint personnel recovery coordinating cells. The JPRC looks to the JPRA and other entities at the DOS and DOD for assistance. INTERACTION WITH OTHER PARTNERS 5-47. Effective interaction with partners for personnel recovery requires commanders to understand both the levels of responsibility and complex support relationships. Table 5-1 on page 5-10 outlines general entities with primary, secondary, and coordinating responsibilities and the typical support relationships among various partners (entities and individuals) conducting personnel recovery in stability operations. 5-48. In addition to coordination within the host nation, the embassy and its various representatives conduct reachback coordination with the departments and agencies of the USG. Organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Secret Service, and the Coast Guard can provide intelligence collection capabilities and contacts in the host nation. 5-49. Certain groups and individuals may be willing to assist on humanitarian grounds when persons become isolated, even if they normally avoid direct contact with the USG and U.S. military forces. For any number of reasons, independent actors in the host nation often accept some responsibility to assist. They may be in the host nation to provide humanitarian relief, economic assistance, or medical missions, for example. They may represent news media organizations. Often, their main contribution to personnel recovery is information. Their contacts sometimes include those responsible for the seizure of the isolated person or group.

This chapter discusses general characteristics of DSCA that influence the conduct of personnel recovery. Considerations discussed also include personnel recovery capability phases as well as commander and staff focus. CHARACTERISTICS OF DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES 6-1. The Army provides DSCA when requested for domestic emergencies, support to law enforcement, and other domestic activities. DSCA includes support provided by the three components of the Army—the Regular Army, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. Additionally, in DSCA there may be civilians and Army contractors. The National Incident Management System (known as NIMS) and the National Response Framework (known as NRF) establish the national policy for incident management. This policy applies across federal, state, and local governments and the military Services. DODDDODDDepartment of Defense directive 3025.18 establishes policy for DSCA. Army personnel recovery operations conform to the provisions of these policies. See ADP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28 for thorough discussions of Army DSCA. C OORDINATION W ITH P ARTNERS FOR D EFENSE S UPPORT OF C IVIL A UTHORITIES 6-2. Army commanders and staffs establish ongoing coordination with the appropriate unified action partners, including other Services and civilian organizations. This coordination is critical to ensure proper integration of military capabilities and procedures with civilian capabilities and procedures, to positively affect interoperability between military and civilian organizations. The command and control structures and procedures of federal and state military joint task forces facilitate the successful execution of personnel recovery operations. However, commanders cannot assume a high degree of interoperability or the existence of standardized personnel recovery procedures simply because they work with other Army units and civilian emergency management agencies. Prior coordination, training, exercising, and habitual relationships offer the best probability for success. C HALLENGES AND T HREATS IN D EFENSE S UPPORT OF C IVIL A UTHORITIES 6-3. Forces conducting DSCA face many challenges. Federal and state laws and regulations constrain the use of military forces in domestic environments. Coordination with partners, if not established in advance, will be difficult to arrange during response. Frequently, planning guidance requires minimal time between notification and deployment, allowing minimal time for detailed planning. Additionally, Army units typically deploy only elements of units with limited equipment. Most situations are more volatile and uncertain early in the operation. Early responding Soldiers may begin operations immediately upon arrival. Those unfamiliar with an operational environment may not recognize isolation hazards and inadvertently place themselves at risk. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (known as CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) hazards could pose a potential threat. Moreover, criminals could pose a threat to a response force. Destroyed infrastructure and devastated terrain may also affect operations. 6-4. Because of the immature protection situation in the early phase of deployment, unassisted recovery is the norm. This has implications for equipment and training of initial Army responders. Soldiers often operate independently at a time when their commanders and staffs may not be able to influence task organization arrangements for optimal personnel recovery operations. The risks of Soldiers becoming isolated in a DSCA environment are not to be underestimated. A RMY D EFENSE S UPPORT OF C IVIL A UTHORITIES T ASKS 6-5. The four core tasks in support of DSCA are—  Provide support for domestic disasters.  Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement.  Provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (known as CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) incidents.  Provide other designated domestic support. 6-6. Within these primary tasks, Soldiers may perform various tasks such as firefighting, responding to civil disturbances, protecting critical infrastructure, or supporting federal and state counterdrug efforts. Each task may include personnel recovery as an implied risk. In the domestic environment, training and equipping only a few specialized personnel, such as aviators and special operations forces, does not significantly mitigate risk to the force. 6-7. The response to any emergency always begins at the local level and grows from the bottom up, based on the National Response Framework and the National Incident Management System (discussed in ADP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28). Local first responders initiate response activities. If first responders cannot manage the situation, they request support through their civil authorities at the state level. Normally, the first Soldiers to provide response assistance are state National Guard forces. If additional forces are required, civil authorities may request additional support from the joint force headquarters state. As the need grows, so does the response. Eventually, National Guard units from several states through the emergency management assistance compact (known as EMAC), federalized National Guard units, Regular Army, and Army Reserve units may become partners in a coordinated response with federal, state, and local civilian partners. Army leadership coordinates the command and support relationships among these military and local, state, and national authorities based on the doctrine principles in ADP 3-28, ADRP 3-28, and JP 3-28. A CCOUNTABILITY C HALLENGES IN D EFENSE S UPPORT OF C IVIL A UTHORITIES 6-8. Emergencies present significant personnel accountability challenges. Initially, Army leaders may lack critical details on the numbers, types, and precise locations of military responders in the AO. Soldiers potentially disperse across vast AOs in small teams. They may work in terrain encompassing multiple regional, state, and local jurisdictions. Wide dispersion, coupled with the effects of a disaster, increases the potential of isolation and complicates the personnel accountability challenge. This physical dispersion precludes immediate accessibility to mutual support and reduces the responsiveness of the forces if isolation incidents occur. 6-9. Accountability is one of the immediate challenges, as leaders coordinate the differing civilian and military personnel accountability systems. Accountability proves difficult because of the desire to respond to the incident and immediately begin operations. Individuals, units, and their associated headquarters deploy, establish a presence in the operational area, and establish a chain of command. During initial deployment, the risk of isolation is greatest since Army and civilian leadership may still be coordinating who is working in what locations. The initial need to establish a personnel recovery structure with a doctrinal foundation includes wide-ranging personnel recovery guidance. This critical time requires fully staffed PRCSs and comprehensive ISG be provided to both military and civilian responders. Leaders must remind Soldiers that the greatest danger of isolation is during the initial deployment in DSCA. R ESTRICTIONS ON T HE U SE OF F ORCE 6-10. Circumstances of DSCA may require the use of force. Commanders employ the minimum necessary force, in accordance with the rules for the use of force (known as RUF). These rules are similar to rules of engagement (known as ROE) used by forces in combat, but they are more limiting. The rules of engagement are permissive while the rules for the use of force are restrictive. Soldiers have the inherent right to self-defense. The rules for the use of force relate directly to individual Soldier skills. The command develops personnel recovery guidance and ISG concerning the use of force for each operation. The authorization to use lethal force remains with the President for federal military forces (operating under 10 USCUSCUnited States Code) and with the governor for National Guard forces not federalized (operating under 32 USCUSCUnited States Code or State Active Duty). The use of armed National Guard forces from one state to perform civil defense or other law enforcement operations in another state requires a memorandum of understanding on rules for the use of force between the governors of the two states. 6-11. Limitations on military forces carry over to intelligence collection. Military forces cannot collect information in the United States or its overseas possessions. However, military forces can collect and analyze information provided by Soldiers, law enforcement, and other agencies. This affects the personnel recovery locate task and the potential deployment of intelligence assets such as unmanned aircraft systems. For more information on the use of information, see FM 3-55 and TC 2-91.7. PERSONNEL RECOVERY CAPABILITY PHASES 6-12. A serious disaster often damages critical infrastructure severely enough to disrupt basic government functions and emergency services. In these instances, communications, transportation, and commerce are degraded, and local response capabilities may be overwhelmed. Local first responders sometimes become isolated. The existing civilian capability naturally focuses on the affected population. In these transitional circumstances, commanders may not be able to count on civil resources to augment military personnel recovery capabilities. This is especially significant in the earlier stages of deployment when units may not have their full complement of forces and structures in place. 6-13. In personnel recovery, capabilities change over time. Figure 6-1 shows the life cycle of Army forces supporting civil authorities. The ability of Army forces to report, locate, support, and recover varies widely over time. The cross-section of the response may not mimic the curve shown, but it generally proceeds through the following four phases:  Initial minimum personnel recovery capability phase.  Optimal personnel recovery capability phase.  Residual personnel recovery capability phase.  Final minimum personnel recovery capability phase. I NITIAL M INIMUM P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY C APABILITY P HASE 6-14. During this initial phase, response forces are least able to react to isolation incidents. Often response forces contend with the confusion of the initial entry when Army forces are establishing themselves in the AOs, understanding the magnitude of the disaster, and forming command and support relationships with civil authorities. If the cause of the emergency is still present, such as an ongoing chemical spill or a persistent outbreak of disease, this initial phase may extend well into the buildup of forces. During this phase, the readiness of forces to assume the tasks and the buildup of the capabilities of the civil authority tiered response depends on firm leadership. The commander establishes the personnel recovery structure and expands it. Commanders and staffs become familiar with the mission. This is often when the initial isolation incidents occur that force the personnel recovery system to operate. O PTIMAL P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY C APABILITY P HASE 6-15. The second phase is the longest phase during the deployment. Having experienced—and survived— the initial phase, the personnel recovery structure is mature, fully staffed, and has possibly addressed isolation incidents. A response to the report of an isolated Soldier or other designated person often assumes the characteristics of training. During this phase, the commander and staff write OPLANs and OPORDs, execute them as required, draft and refine SOPs, and train response forces in personnel recovery. R ESIDUAL P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY C APABILITY P HASE 6-16. During this phase, commanders draw down forces in tandem to successful emergency remediation. The systems and procedures refined and exercised during the optimal personnel recovery capability phase are still in place, but the attrition of the force by redeployment has removed some of the expertise that characterized the previous phase. The personnel recovery system is in place, but it lacks the full capabilities the forces once had. F INAL M INIMUM P ERSONNEL R ECOVERY C APABILITY P HASE 6-17. In this phase, the conditions are similar to those at the beginning of the response. The transition to state or local control—or another military force—may add a measure of confusion to personnel recovery activities. Transitions are always a time of both maximum attentiveness and the greatest confusion. The transition may be from civil authorities to a response force, from one response force to another or—most probably—a combination of the two. All three of these transitions call for increased awareness of the potential for an isolation incident. 6-18. The length of each phase depends on the nature of the emergency. Factors such as the magnitude of the disaster, the duration of the incident, the degree of perceived risk, the training and readiness of the response forces, and the level of cooperation between civil authorities and the Army force concerning personnel recovery determine its length. Regardless of the scope of a task and the discrete phases portrayed in figure 5-1, Army commanders and staffs consider the entire duration in terms of personnel recovery vulnerability and control measures to mitigate potential isolation events. COMMANDER AND STAFF FOCUS IN DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES 6-19. Military units supporting civil authorities follow military doctrine, including that for personnel recovery. However, they adapt their procedures and liaison arrangements to interface with their civilian counterparts. This is especially important in the case of an isolation incident. In DSCA, commanders and staffs coordinate the plans and orders of the joint task force with the federal, state, and local authorities before execution. When forces cannot attain unity of command, they strive for unity of effort. 6-20. DSCA typically requires small-unit operations that call for immediate decisions by junior leaders who often lack the time or capability to confer with senior leaders. Leaders strive to make ISG clear, concise, and current. Tactical leaders may have the clearest picture of an operational environment, but they may not always have the capability to communicate with higher headquarters due to physical or procedural impediments. Regardless of the scope or size of the operation, coordination and role delineation are a critical factor in successful personnel recovery operations. With smaller units operating in a decentralized and dispersed deployment, this coordination becomes critical. The response to the isolation incident and the recovery of the isolated person may occur solely based on the organic assets of the local responder. In effect, the civilian leadership, their staff, and their operational entities at that level become the personnel recovery focal groups and become a part of the personnel recovery structure for any recovery effort. Both civil authorities and Army leaders prepare their organizations to respond to an isolation incident by fully assessing isolation risk for each mission. They reduce that risk through task organization, equipment, education, and training. 6-21. In DSCA, commanders coordinate personnel recovery activities with the supported civilian agency and joint and Army headquarters. Commanders address critical issues, such as communications and procedural interoperability, mission priorities, recovery assets, roles and responsibilities, and information flow. Army commanders provide focused personnel recovery guidance and ISG to mitigate the expected complexity from the beginning to the end of an incident response. Especially in the early phases of operations, commanders and staffs help civil authority by stressing personnel accountability and integrating status reporting of Army personnel with civilian incident management systems. Regardless of any other personnel recovery support or interagency coordination, deploying units plan for personnel recovery operations that maximize self-sufficiency and self-reliance. Leaders maintain situational awareness in the AO, and prepare to execute immediate and deliberate recovery operations as necessary. Frequently, ISG in a DSCA situation will read more like lost hiker guidance than combat ISG. 6-22. Commanders incorporate personnel recovery into planning, especially if they are supporting a local responder and higher military headquarters have not yet deployed. Because of the physical separation between headquarters, it is difficult to nest commander’s intent and communicate guidance at all levels to ensure actions are consistent throughout the chain of command. In these instances, subordinate commanders develop and disseminate ISG as well as identify recovery assets, whether they are under military or civil authority. Interoperability with civil and military organizations facilitates coordination, including the integrating of information management and airspace control. 6-23. Time constraints of early response by military forces initially influence the composition of a DSCA force. Some unit combat capabilities may not deploy as part of a response force and, therefore, will not be available for personnel recovery operations. Incomplete staff reduces the ability of a commander to visualize an AO through running estimates. This is particularly important as it relates to the application of information and intelligence. Information obtained from civil authorities supports planning for the personnel recovery missions by defining the threats potential isolated persons may face, as well as the threats a recovery force may encounter. 6-24. Early in a deployment, civilian and military organizations will have limited capabilities for to maintain situational awareness and facilitate requisite reporting and accountability. Initial military deployments often consist of medical, logistic, search and rescue, and infrastructure repair assets. This early emphasis on rescue and relief capabilities limits a commander’s options for identifying and tasking a recovery force. The infrastructure degradation also reduces the staff’s communication and coordination effectiveness and limits the recovery force’s maneuver options. 6-25. Commanders adjust and disseminate updated guidance as the situation develops and ensure that civilian leaders, military leaders, and their staffs receive modifications to the ISG. Tactical commanders require adequate time to refine guidance from higher echelons as it pertains to their missions and their specific AOs. The result is increased situational awareness and understanding of isolated personnel incident response. This page intentionally left blank.

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Terms for which FM 3-50 is the proponent (authority) manual are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

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