*FM 3-60
Field Manual
No. 3-60
Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, D.C., 11 August 2023

Army Targeting

Field Manual (FM) 3-60, describes the tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with effectively applying a targeting methodology to integrate and synchronize capabilities to create desired effects on targets and enable positions of relative advantage during the conduct of operations. Targeting is critical to synchronize operations from competition to crisis and into armed conflict. During worldwide staffing of the FM 3-60, significant input was received with valuable recommendations from the force. The Army Multidomain Targeting Center (AMTC) in conjunction with the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), Intelligence Center of Excellence (ICOE), and the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) collectively revised the FM to ensure we captured all force requirements, concerns, and recommendations. Army targeting fed by focused intelligence support is critical to operational success. Some of the new doctrinal aspects of FM 3-0 drive the need for a sophisticated targeting effort. For example, Army forces must account for the three dimensions (physical, information, and human) of the operational environment and nested decisive points and effects to execute an effective targeting methodology across the strategic contexts. Detailed intelligence on the operational environment supports detailed targeting. Key elements of this revision are—  Emphasizes targeting as an operations integrating process.  Focuses on echelon specific requirements.  Introduces Operational Framework.  Introduces intelligence support to targeting appendix.  Re-introduces target types and a codified list of desired effects, which will enhance the ability to articulate intent.  Added information on the assessment working group within the targeting process as assessments are the foundation of effective targeting.  Aligns the Army’s targeting manual with FM 3-0, Operations and JP 3-60, Joint Targeting. FM 3-60 is designed to be applicable and useful to all members of the Army Profession. This includes commanders, staffs, leaders, and targeting team members of a Theater Army, Corps, Division, and Brigade. The publication also provides the foundation for Army training and education curricula on targeting. FM 3-60 describes how targeting is conducted at echelon, as part of a joint or multinational force. This publication addresses targeting requirements and processes in support of the Army targeting methodology of decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) and the integration of the joint targeting cycle, as needed, to support operations. Targeting is a command responsibility that requires participation of key members of both the coordinating and special staffs. The intent of this version is to provide targeting teams at echelon an easy to use and valuable resource that is relevant to individual needs. We are striving to ensure this release is applicable to the changing environment, useful at echelon, and most importantly provides the doctrinal foundation expected from a targeting FM. Although the Army faces a substantial amount of change through the transition from counterinsurgency to large-scale combat and multidomain operations, it is imperative that we emphasize the effectiveness of the targeting process and the requirement to plan early. Using the targeting process effectively and efficiently will enable targeting teams to set conditions during planning and minimize unplanned or unanticipated targets from derailing friendly schemes of maneuver or impacting the ability to achieve the Commanders intent. The commander establishes the environment that determines the quality of the targeting effort and targeting often determines the commander's success or failure. The focus of this publication is on the targeting process from brigade to theater level. The Targeting methodology is not new or revolutionary. It consists of time-tested techniques organized in a systematic framework. Emerging organizations, all domain concepts, and large-scale combat operational considerations are also presented. FM 3-60 has been updated to reflect current changes in terminology and techniques used for targeting. FM 3-60 contains five chapters and nine appendices. Chapter 1 discusses the targeting guidelines and philosophy associated with targeting techniques and general responsibilities of targeting personnel. Chapter 2 discusses the Army targeting process relating to lethal and nonlethal effects. It discusses the D3A methodology and the integration and synchronization with maneuver forces. Chapter 3 discusses targeting at the brigade level to include battlefield framework, functions, planning, and battle rhythm synchronization. Chapter 4 discusses targeting at the division and corps level to include battlefield framework, functions, planning, and battle rhythm synchronization. Chapter 5 discusses targeting at the theater level to include battlefield framework, functions, planning, and battle rhythm synchronization. Appendix A provides a comprehensive checklist for decide, detect, deliver, and assess. Appendix B provides an overview of intelligence support to targeting. Appendix C provides a table of desired effects and the desired outcomes, and target categories. Appendix D provides an example of targeting tools and formats. Appendix E provides targeting working group and targeting coordination board individual responsibilities and examples of battle rhythm products. Appendix F provides examples of a target information folder. Appendix G provides example of a CARVER target value analysis tool. Appendix H describes target-numbering procedures. Appendix I describes alternate targeting methodologies. NEW, RESCINDED, AND MODIFIED TERMS FM 3-60 becomes the proponent of the following Army terms. See Introductory table 1.

Targeting is a complex and multi-disciplined effort that requires coordinated interaction among many groups. Army forces meet a diverse array of challenges and contribute to national objectives across a wide range of operational categories, including large-scale combat operations, limited contingency operations, crisis response, and support to security cooperation. While the overwhelming majority of operations conducted by Army forces occur either below the threshold of armed conflict or during limited contingencies, the focus of Army readiness is on large-scale combat operations. Army forces conduct operations in support of joint campaigns which for the most part occur as part of a larger coalition operation. Leaders must understand the interdependencies between their own assigned forces and the forces or capabilities provided by others to generate the complementary and reinforcing effects of combined arms approaches. Army forces employ joint and other unified action partner capabilities to the degree they are available. However, because peer threats can contest the force in all domains, Army forces must be prepared to conduct operations when some or all joint capabilities are unavailable to support mission accomplishment. Army forces employ organic capabilities in multiple domains, and they continuously benefit from air and maritime strategic transportation and space and cyberspace capabilities that they do not control, including global positioning, satellite communications, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Lower echelons may not always notice the opportunities created by higher echelons or other forces that operate primarily in other domains; however, leaders must understand how the absence of those opportunities affects their concepts of operations, decision making, and risk assessment. The Army’s multidomain operations concept accounts for the constant nature of war and the changing character of warfare. Its balanced approach guides how Army forces operate across the competition continuum given the prevailing characteristics of anticipated operational environments (OEs) now and in the near future. For more information on war, warfare, and multidomain operations see FM 3-0. In order to be successful throughout the range of military operations, across the competition continuum, and overcome the challenges presented by a very diverse OE, Army Commanders and staff use several integrating processes to synchronize forces and the warfighting functions within the military decision-making process (MDMP). An integrating process consists of a series of steps that incorporate multiple disciplines to achieve a specific end. Key integrating processes that occur within the MDMP include:  Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.  Information collection.  Targeting.  Risk management.  Knowledge management. This manual will highlight the key integrating process of Targeting and discuss its use in support of Army operations. The targeting methodology is an iterative, and logical means necessary for the development, planning, execution, and assessment of target engagements. Commanders establish a targeting team to assist in planning. Key staff components working together are referred to as the targeting team and include, but are not limited to, enablers such as fire support (FS), intelligence, operations, plans cells and information advantage assets. Representatives from these cells and elements are essential to a comprehensive targeting process. Other members of the staff may help them in the planning and execution phases of targeting. Close coordination among all cells and elements is crucial for a successful targeting effort. The commander establishes the environment that determines the quality of the targeting effort and targeting often determines the mission's success or failure. This success is dependent upon the shared understanding of the targeting team, and the use of a standard lexicon outlined in the following sections.

In large-scale combat operations, targets in all domains are arrayed across the depth and breadth of the OE. These targets far exceed the number of resources available to acquire and create desired effects. It is paramount that higher HQ provide adequate guidance and must anticipate requirements subordinates may have. Targeting is a top-down driven process with a substantial need for bottom-up refinement. This will be applicable in any circumstance requiring lead time or insertion into supporting planning or execution cycles. The importance of what targets to attack and with what available capabilities must be planned and prioritized. This chapter explains how the Army conducts targeting using the D3A methodology. GENERAL TARGETING METHODOLOGY 2-1. The targeting process provides an effective method for matching friendly force capabilities against enemy targets in order to achieve the commander’s desired effects to achieve the commander’s objectives. There are two general ways to frame the D3A methodology. During planning and the MDMP, the staff uses the methodology as a process to assist in product development and visualization. The methodology is applied to analyze commanders’ guidance in order to determine the right targets, at the right place, at the right time. It is used through MDMP to make these decisions and apply the required assets to create desired effects. Further, the methodology is discussed through developing courses of action and wargaming them. It is also applied to assessment requirements and the analysis needed to facilitate future decisions. As an integrating process during execution, the second application enables the staff to apply the targeting products (HPTL, TSS, AGM, intelligence collection synchronization matrix (ICSM), and TSM) to facilitate operations. The staff is continuously making decisions, adjusting detection methods or location, and revising delivery options based on changes to threat courses of action. D3A is a flexible, simple, repeatable four-function process and is not designed to be time constrained or rigidly sequential. Figure 2-1 is a visual depiction of the D3A methodology. 2-2. The delineation of targeting duties and responsibilities are necessary to prevent the duplication of effort and misuse of resources. Targeting team members at echelon must understand the ground scheme of maneuver to ensure synchronized coordination measures to facilitate attack of targets. 2-3. Targeting is cyclic and must keep up with the constantly changing OE. The tools and products explained later in this chapter, must be updated based on combat assessment. Decisions are rarely made without information from previous targeting cycle. DECIDE, DETECT, DELIVER, ASSESS 2-4. D3A consists of four functions:  Deciding what, when, where, and how to employ capabilities against targets.  Detecting targets.  Delivering appropriate capabilities to create desired effects (conducting the operation).  Assessing the effects of engagement(s). D ECIDE 2-5. The decide function begins the targeting cycle and is applied throughout the Operations Process (Plan, Prepare, Execute, Assess). Decisions made during planning will be evaluated and revisited during preparation and execution, ultimately leading to effective assessments. The targeting team must be conscious of the decisions made and adjust them during rehearsals, individual, and collective training. The endstate is to ensure the proper capabilities are integrated and synchronized in the proper geographic locations, at the right time to create desired effects. Following engagement, how and what assessment must be decided upon. The application of commander’s guidance is implemented throughout the steps of MDMP and refined until mission completion. 2-6. The outcome of success results in efficient employment of capabilities, favorable force ratios, and the accomplishment of all assigned tasks and objectives. The following are the consequences of failure:  Enemy prevents friendly forces from achieving tasks and objectives potentially leading to mission failure.  The commander is presented with unachievable solutions (capabilities are out of range).  Resources are misused (inaccurate weaponeering or firing solution, mismanagement of ammunition, employment of wrong capability).  Force ratios are unfavorable (Failure to see the enemy, lack of anticipation to support subordinates).  Subordinate echelons improperly resourced (Task organization, information collection, delivery capabilities). 2-7. With this information, the targeting team and appropriate staff officers can prepare their respective running estimates. From the standpoint of targeting: the FS, intelligence, information capabilities, influence capabilities, and operations estimates are interrelated and closely coordinated among each cell. 2-8. This function provides the overall focus and sets priorities and criteria for information collection and engagement planning. The decide function draws heavily on the staff's knowledge of the enemy (to include their tactics, culture, and ideology), a detailed IPB, and continuous assessment of the situation. Targeting priorities must be addressed for each phase or critical event of an operation. The targeting team works in concert to draft targeting guidance and priorities for the commander. Once approved, the decisions made are reflected in the following foundational products:  HPTL.  TSS.  AGM.  ICSM.  TSM. Note. For further information on these products see Appendix D. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 2-9. IPB helps the commander to selectively apply and maximize combat power at critical points in time and space. IPB helps the commander and staff visualize the operating environment, how the natural environment affects friendly units and likely enemy COAs. 2-10. IPB is a continuous staff planning activity undertaken by the entire staff. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations (ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01.3). Although the G-2/S-2 leads the IPB, various staff sections contribute to it. IPB, sets the context for operational planning and targeting. The process is flexible and well suited to account for lethal and nonlethal considerations (across the physical, information, and human dimensions) during operations. IPB:  Describes the totality of the OE that may impact friendly, threat, and neutral forces at that echelon.  Accounts for all relevant domains and dimensions of the OE that may impact friendly and threat operations.  Identifies possible defeat mechanisms and relative advantages that friendly forces might be able to create and exploit. 2-11. Initial IPB, which occurs during mission analysis, is important as a means to focus the staff on various aspects of the OE specific to that unit, mission, time, and place, as well as a means to create products that are important to subsequent planning and targeting. As planning progresses, beyond mission analysis, IPB products are refined to support planning and targeting. Some of the more important products include the modified combined obstacles overlay, threat models (with generic HVTs), situation templates, event template, event matrix, and draft HVT list. See Appendix B and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01.3 for more information. High-Payoff Target List 2-12. The high-payoff target list i s a prioritized list of high-payoff targets by phase of the operation. The HPTL is a key element commander’s guidance and communicates priority to the staff. Other considerations include the following:  The sequence or order of appearance of the system, function, or capability being targeted.  The ability to detect, identify, classify, and track the target. (This decision must include sensor availability and processing timeline considerations).  The degree of accuracy available from the acquisition system(s).  The ability to engage the target.  The ability to create the desired effects based on attack guidance. 2-13. Targets are prioritized according to the considerations above within specific time windows. The targeting working group recommends priorities for the targets according to its judgment and the advice of the targeting officer and the FAIO. Target list worksheets give a recommended priority and engagement sequence. If the target list worksheet or war gaming departs from the commander's guidance, it is noted on the proposed HPTL to inform the commander of the conflict. The target category of the HPT is shown, either by name or by number, on the list. The category name and number are shown on the target list worksheet. The number of target priorities should not be excessive. Too many priorities will dilute the intelligence collection acquisition and engagement efforts. The approved list is shared with the targeting team and staff. It is used as a planning tool to determine attack guidance and to refine the collection plan. This list may also indicate the commander's operational need for BDA of a specific target and the time window for collecting and reporting it. Note. Any format for prioritizing HPTs serves the purpose of a HPTL for linking targets with phases of battle. 2-14. One way to organize the HPTL is to group all HPTs into target sets that reflect the capabilities and functions the commander has decided to engage. Target sets are identified and prioritized for each phase of the operation. Within the sets, individual targets are ordered by target value, sequence of appearance, importance, or other criteria that satisfy the commander's desired effects. Additionally, the HPTL may be broken down based on individual targets within a system. Rather than listing integrated fires commands or integrated air defense systems, a systems approach to analysis may highlight key components of those systems. Staffs must understand the criticality of the system or system components when constructing their HPTLs. In this way, the targeting working group reduces, modifies, and reprioritizes HVTs while ensuring that HPTs support the concept of operations. 2-15. The commander's guidance may require changes, which should be annotated on the HPTL. The target name or number and description are placed on the list for specific HPTs in each category. Once the commander approves or amends the HPTL, it goes back to the targeting working group to help them develop the AGM and collection plan. See appendix D for a sample HPTL. Target Selection Standards 2-16. TSS are criteria applied to enemy activity (acquisitions and battlefield information) and used in deciding whether the activity is a target. TSS put nominations into two categories: targets and suspected targets. Targets meet accuracy and timeliness requirements for engagement. Suspected targets must be confirmed before any engagement. See Appendix D for a sample TSS worksheet. Units may develop their own worksheet format. 2-17. TSS are based on the enemy activity under consideration and available weapon systems by using the following:  Weapon system target location accuracy requirements such as target location error (TLE).  Size of the enemy activity (point or area).  Status of the activity (moving or stationary).  Timeliness of the information. 2-18. Different TSS may exist for a given enemy activity based on different weapons system. For example, an enemy artillery battery may have a 150-meter TLE requirement for attack by cannon artillery and a 1-kilometer requirement for attack aircraft. TSS are developed by the FSE in conjunction with the intelligence section. Intelligence analysis use TSS to quickly determine targets from battlefield information and pass the targets to the FSE. Weapon system managers such as FSEs, fire control elements, or fire direction centers use the TSS to identify targets for expeditious attack. Commands can develop standard TSS based on threat characteristics and doctrine matched with the standard available weapon systems. 2-19. TSS worksheets are given to the intelligence officer by the FSE. The FAIO uses TSS to confirm or verify targets that are forwarded to an FSE. Intelligence analysts evaluate the source of the information as to its reliability and accuracy, confirm that the size and status of the activity meet the TSS, and then compare the time of acquisition with the dwell time. Accurate information from a reliable source must be verified before declaring it a target if the elapsed time exceeds dwell time. Note. Dwell time is the length of time a target is doctrinally expected to remain in one location. 2-20. Some situations require intelligence assets to confirm positive identification before approval to engage is given. HPT that meets all the criteria should be tracked until they are attacked in accordance with the AGM. Location of targets that do not meet TSS should be confirmed before they are attacked. See appendix D for a sample TSM. Attack Guidance 2-21. Knowing target vulnerabilities and analyzing the probable effect an engagement will have on enemy operations allows a staff to propose the most efficient available engagement option. Emphasis is placed on the desired effect and commander’s guidance. During war gaming, decision points linked to events, areas of interest, or points on the battlefield are developed. 2-22. The attack guidance matrix is a targeting product approved by the commander, which addresses the how and when targets are engaged and the desired effects (FM 3-09). The AGM is a compilation of engagement criteria in a format that can be easily understood. Attack guidance applies to both deliberate and dynamic targets and incorporates lethal and nonlethal engagement against both target types. One AGM may be produced for execution at any point in the operation, per targeting cycle, or by phase. 2-23. Based on commander's guidance, the targeting working group recommends how each target should be engaged in terms of the desired effects and engagement options. Desired effects are translated into automation system default values to engage targets more effectively. 2-24. The decision of what engagement means or system to use is made at the same time as the decision on when to acquire and engage the target. Coordination is required when deciding to engage with two or more means such as electromagnetic attack, information capabilities, or attack aviation. Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual Weaponeering Software (referred to as JWS) is the digital weaponeering tool used to assist in attack guidance decisions. 2-25. The commander, with recommendations from the targeting working group, must approve the attack guidance. Attack guidance may address specific or general target descriptions and is provided to weapons systems managers via the AGM. This guidance should detail the following:  A prioritized HPTL.  When, how, and desired effects of engagement.  Any special instructions.  BDA requirements. Attack Guidance Matrix 2-26. The AGM is a tool usually disseminated as a matrix. The AGM includes as a minimum:  Phase or time period covered by the AGM.  Specific HPT.  Timing of engagement.  How targets are engaged.  Desired Effects.  Remarks to include restrictions. Note. A sample AGM is shown in appendix D. Information Collection Synchronization Matrix 2-27. The information collection plan focuses the collection effort to answering PIRs and identifying HPTs. To support the detection of HPTs on the battlefield, the targeting cell provides indicators and specific information requirements (SIRs) to the collection management team for each HPT. The information collection matrix accounts for PIRs and other intelligence requirements. The collection management team accounts for targeting intelligence requirements, if developed, in a targeting addendum to the information collection matrix. If the collection management team does not develop a targeting addendum, the team must graphically account for TAIs and HPTs through other means. For example, the team could add both TAIs and HPTs as columns to the information collection matrix or develop a supporting crosswalk of HPTs with supporting SIRs, NAIs, TAIs, an NAI, and collection assets. Targeting Synchronization Matrix 2-28. The TSM visually illustrates the HPTs and is designed to list specific targets with locations, in each category. The matrix has entries to identify if a target is covered by a NAI; the specific detect, deliver, and assess assets for each target; and engagement guidance. Once completed, the TSM serves as a basis for updating the information collection plan and issuing a fragmentary order once the targeting working group and targeting board concludes their sessions. In addition, the TSM facilitates the distribution of results produced by the targeting working group and targeting board. The TSM ensures planned activities are coordinated and execution is feasible in time and space. D ETECT 2-29. Operations officers, at all levels, are responsible for directing the effort to detect HPTs identified in the decide function. To identify the specific who, what, when, and how for target acquisition, operations officers must work closely with the targeting team. The collection manager is a critical piece of this effort. The detect function is planned during the decide function and conducted during the execution of the OPORD. 2-30. The outcome of success achieves relative advantage in all dimensions, (human, information, and physical). It provides for positional, information, capability, and decision advantage. Successful detection enables timely and accurate employment of capabilities. The following are outcomes and consequences of failure to detect:  Enemy prevents friendly forces from achieving tasks and objectives potentially leading to mission failure.  PIR/information requirements remain unanswered and decision points are affected.  The enemy retains critical capabilities to achieve mission success.  HPTs are not affected, and friendly objectives remain unaccomplished.  May require rapid decision making and synchronization process (RDSP).  Increased risk to mission and risk to force. 2-31. The effective and efficient delivery of capabilities is achieved through a comprehensive collection plan. Detect and track targets by the maximum use of all available capabilities to create an effective layered collection plan. A collection plan is a systematic scheme to optimize the employment of all available collection capabilities and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination resources to satisfy specific information requirements (JP 2-0). The collection manager must focus the collection efforts on approved PIRs, targeting intelligence requirements and other information requirements. The collection manager considers the availability and capability of all collection assets. The collection manager translates PIR and targeting intelligence requirements into indicators and specific information requirements. Dissemination of targeting information from collection will be through pre-determined channels and in accordance with unit SOPs. Information Collection 2-32. The accurate and timely detection of targets is dependent upon a comprehensive collection plan and facilitates effective and efficient employment of capabilities. The collection manager must focus the collection efforts on approved PIRs, targeting intelligence requirements and other information requirements. The collection manager considers the availability and capability of all collection assets. The collection manager translates PIR and targeting intelligence requirements into indicators and specific information requirements. Dissemination of targeting information from collection will be through pre-determined channels and in accordance with unit SOPs. 2-33. HPTs must be detected in a timely and accurate manner, and reported in sufficient detail to enable the commander, through various lethal and nonlethal capabilities, the ability to produce the desired effects. Clear and concise tasks must be given to the reconnaissance units, information collection elements, weapons locating radars or any asset that can detect a given target within the information collection plan (Annex L). Information collection assets collect information and report back within operations and intelligence or targeting channels. Some collection assets provide actual targets, while other assets must have their information processed to produce valid targets. Processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capabilities play an important role within targeting. The target priorities developed in the decide function are used to expedite the processing of targets. As the situation changes during operations the current operations or staff, led by the collection management team, assesses collection, and updates the collection management plan as needed to meet new requirements. For more information see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01. 2-34. The information collection plan focuses the collection effort to answering PIRs and identifying HPTs. To support the detection of HPTs on the battlefield, the targeting cell provides indicators and SIRs to the collection management team for each HPT. The information collection matrix accounts for PIRs and other intelligence requirements. The collection management team accounts for targeting intelligence requirements, if developed, in a targeting addendum to the information collection matrix. If the collection management team does not develop a targeting addendum, the team must graphically account for TAIs and HPTs through other means. For example, the team could add both TAIs and HPTs as columns to the information collection matrix or develop a supporting crosswalk of HPTs with supporting SIRs, NAIs, TAIs, an active NAI, and collection assets. 2-35. The information collection matrix and information collection synchronization matrix are products used by the collection manager to ensure that collection tasks are tied to the scheme of maneuver in time and space, effectively linking reconnaissance and surveillance to maneuver and effects. 2-36. The target priorities developed in the decide function are used to expedite the processing of targets. As a part of information collection, successfully acquiring and identifying HPTs, tracking HPTs, and conducting BDA are often critical to the success of the mission. This effort is collection asset-, intelligence analysis-, and support-intensive. Depending on circumstances, this effort is often controlled out of the current operations cell in conjunction with the targeting team and intelligence section. In some situations, a unit may choose not to conduct BDA on an HPT, but then the unit assumes an operational risk because it will not know the effects of fire on and the status of the HPT. Actions Within Detect 2-37. The first portion of the detect function is positive identification. This is confirming the threat entity acquired in collection is in fact an HPT. Depending on the collection capability of this initial acquisition it may require the cueing of another asset to confirm identification of the HPT. 2-38. Mobile HPTs present an additional requirement within the detection function. Tracking is often required to maintain a current target location. Tracking priorities are based on the commander's concept of the operation and targeting guidance. Target tracking requires a specific level of timeliness, accuracy, and detail necessary to support the execution of fires. The HPT is tracked as it either moves to the TAI as planned or as subsequent planning occurs to develop a new TAI to engage the target. In accordance with the TSS, the FSE tells the collection manager the degree of accuracy required and dwell time for a target to be eligible for engagement. The collection manager must match accuracy requirements to the TLE of the collection systems. If the target type and its associated signatures (for example, electronic, visual, and thermal) are known, the most capable collection asset can be directed against the target. The asset is positioned according to estimates of when and where the enemy target will be located. 2-39. When an HPT is detected, the information is quickly disseminated to the FAIO, or designated targeting officer, located in the intelligence cell for necessary action. These actions include validating if the target is an HPT, and determining the target’s priority, and if the target complies with TSS. In those cases where identification of the HPT is too uncertain, the collection manager and current operations integration cell must cue other information collection assets to conduct further collection and the FAIO, or designated targeting officer, must notify the intelligence cell and targeting team of the need for subsequent analysis. 2-40. As the assets collect information, it is forwarded to the intelligence analysts of the ACE. The ACE uses the information in developing situational awareness (SA) and situational understanding and target refinement. Continuous updates to the collection plan and ICSM are required as targets are detected. Once an HPT is identified, it is passed from G-2 to operations. Essential Target Information 2-41. Target recommendations are passed from the G-2 to the FSE by a number of means either digital or analog. It is important that the essential information be passed for proper analysis and engagement to take place. At a minimum, the target report (digital or analog) must include the following:  Reporting agency.  Sensor type.  Report Date Time Group.  Acquisition Date Time Group.  Target Description.  Posture.  Activity.  Size of the target.  Target location.  TLE.  Dwell time. 2-42. See appendix D for a sample target report. D ELIVER 2-43. Deliver is the third function in the Army targeting methodology and occurs during the execution portion of the operations process. This function executes the target attack guidance and supports the commanders battle plan once the HPTs have been located and positively identified. The main objective is to create effects as planned in the decide phase and in accordance with the commander's guidance. Additional activities include the prosecution of targets that were not selected for action in sufficient time to be included in deliberate targeting. The selection of a capability or a combination of capabilities to meet the desired effect requires a synchronized time of engagement dependent on the tactical situation and the technical solution for the selected capability. 2-44. The outcome of success allows friendly forces to achieve relative advantage in the human, physical and information dimensions. Consequences of failure are as follows:  Tasks, Objectives, and End-states not met resulting in mission failure.  Attrition of Friendly Forces and unfavorable force ratios.  Increase in human and material cost.  Loss of initiative, inability to shape/set conditions. 2-45. Targeting products developed during the decide phase of the targeting process simplify and expedite delivery decisions during execution. A dedicated effort by the targeting team during planning enables predictability and assists the staff in executing the commander's guidance in support of the decision support matrix (DSM). During the initial targeting product development, when more time is available, the staff may not have all necessary information. As operations progress, the staff will inherently gain additional information. This will force the transfer of considerations into execution under increased time constraints and potentially reduced asset availability. This ultimately causes the targeting team to react to operational changes. When deviating from planned guidance (AGM, TSS), the decision maker needs to weigh the operational risks of tactical patience balanced with the immediacy of directed action. 2-46. Unplanned or unanticipated targets always have the potential to be identified during operations. Unforeseen variables in the operation can cause a change in commander's or attack guidance. 2-47. Dynamic targets or targets of opportunity are processed the same as planned targets. Targets of opportunity are first evaluated to determine when, or if, they should be engaged. The decision to engage targets of opportunity follows the engagement guidance and is based on a number of factors such as the:  Criticality of target compared to other targets being processed for engagement.  Activity of the target (risk to friendly forces).  Dwell time. 2-48. If the decision is made to engage immediately, the target is processed further. The availability and capabilities of assets to engage the target are assessed. If the target exceeds the capabilities or availability of the unit delivery asset, the target should be sent to a higher HQ for immediate engagement. If the decision is to defer the engagement, then continue tracking, determine decision point(s) for engagement, and modify collection tasking as appropriate. Engagement Considerations 2-49. The engagement of targets must satisfy the targeting guidance developed in the decide phase and be integrated with the friendly scheme of maneuver. The plan for target engagement is typically developed via the targeting working group and presented for approval in the targeting board. Target engagement requires several decisions and actions. These considerations fall into two categories: tactical and technical. 2-50. Tactical considerations:  Time of the engagement.  Desired effect, degree of damage, or both.  Capability to use for engagement.  Potential for collateral damage. 2-51. Technical considerations:  Number, type, and duration of effect (munition/payload/action).  Unit/agency/organization to conduct the engagement. Tactical Considerations 2-52. Tactical considerations include the time of engagement, desired effects, capabilities, and collateral damage. These considerations are described in the following paragraphs. Time of Engagement 2-53. The time of engagement is determined according to the type of target: planned target or target of opportunity. Time of engagement is a critical consideration when synchronizing multiple capabilities to create desired effects on the target. The targeting team must be conscious of each decision and the second and third order of effects created. Desired Effects 2-54. The desired effects to be created from targeting efforts are critical elements of the commander targeting guidance. Desired effects should result in measurable and observable changes in the OE to enable assessment for follow on actions. A complete list can be found in appendix C. 2-55. A trained observer or analyst is required to properly assess effects. It is important that each target has a primary and alternate observer. Each observer must understand the desired effects to include when and for how long they are required. Capabilities 2-56. The next consideration is the selection of the appropriate delivery mechanism. For planned targets, this decision is made during the decide function of the targeting process. A check must be made to ensure that the selected target engagement capability is still available and can conduct the engagement. If not, the targeting working group must determine the best delivery mechanism available to engage the target. 2-57. Weaponeering is a key part of determining the appropriate method of engagement. Weaponeering is the process of determining the specific means required to create a desired effect on a given target (JP 3-60). Weaponeering also considers such things as enemy actions (the effects of actions and countermeasures), munition delivery errors and accuracy, damage mechanism and criteria, probability of kill, weapon reliability, and trajectory. The commander's intent and end state, desired effects, tasks, and guidance provide the basis for weaponeering assessment activities. Targeting personnel quantify the expected results of fires against prioritized targets to produce desired effects. Since time constraints may preclude calculations of potential effects against all targets, calculations should proceed in a prioritized fashion that mirrors the HPTL. 2-58. The weaponeering process, across all domains, is achieved through multiple approaches. The use of the Joint Munition Effectiveness Manual Weaponeering Software (referred to as JWS) is the automated system for employment of lethal munitions. Information capabilities such as Space, Cyber, special technical operations (referred to as STO), and CEMA have structured procedures (access, placement, resources, and planning horizons) to take into account during weaponeering analysis. Other information capabilities such as information, public affairs officer, civil affairs and psychological operations assess employment and effectiveness. Collateral Damage 2-59. Collateral damage estimation is a methodology that assists the commander in staying within the law of armed conflict and ROE. The law of armed conflict requires:  Reasonable precautions to ensure only legitimate military objects are targeted.  Combatants to refrain from intentionally targeting civilian or noncombatant populations or facilities through lethal means.  Anticipated civilian or noncombatant injury or loss of life and damage to civilian or noncombatant property incidental to engagements must not be excessive in relation to the expected military advantage to be gained. Note. See the current version of CJCSICJCSIChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3160.01D for more information on No-strike and collateral damage. 2-60. Failure to observe these obligations could result in disproportionate negative effects on civilians and noncombatants and be considered a law of war violation. Furthermore, United States leadership and the military could be subject to global criticism, which could adversely affect achievement of current and future military objectives and national goals. Finally, adversaries and enemies may call attention to any U.S. and ally missteps through propaganda to decrease legitimacy and undermine support for operations. 2-61. During targeting the staff has the responsibility to mitigate the unintended or incidental risk of damage or injury to the civilian populace and noncombatants, structures in the immediate area, targets that are on the NSL, RTL, livestock, the environment, civil air, and anything that could have a negative effect on military operations. This will assist the commander in weighing risk against military necessity and in assessing proportionality within the framework of the MDMP. 2-62. The targeting working group determines the delivery means subject to the maneuver commander's approval. All available engagement assets should be considered when delivering an information capability to create a nonlethal effect the targeting team must account for unintended collateral effects. This is SOPSOPStandard Operating Procedures dependent until a formal methodology is published. 2-63. The availability and capabilities of each resource is considered using the following:  Desired effects on the target.  Degree of risk in the use of the asset against the target.  Impact on friendly operations. Technical Considerations 2-64. Technical considerations include the number, type and duration of the effect, and the unit, agency, or organization to conduct the engagement. Technical considerations are discussed in the following paragraphs. Number, Type, Duration of Effect 2-65. At the recommendation of the FSCOORD and targeting team the G-3 directs the appropriate asset to engage the target once the tactical decisions have been made. This can be in an OPORD or as the tactical situation dictates. The targeting team evaluates all available capabilities against approved targets to determine appropriate options available for engagement and develops the best possible solution under given circumstances. A careful analysis is necessary to employ all capabilities efficiently and effectively with the appropriate number, type and required duration to create the desired effect. Unit/Agency/Organization to Conduct the Engagement 2-66. The systems or asset managers, tasked unit, or agency determine if their system or capability can create the desired effects. The targeting team is notified when a capability is unable to provide the desired effects. There are various reasons a capability may not be able to create the desired effects which may include the following:  System, asset, capability not available at the specified time.  Required munitions, asset, or authority not available.  Targets out of range. A SSESS 2-67. Assessment occurs at all levels and across the range of military operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and provide the commander timely information needed to make decisions. 2-68. During the planning and preparation for operations, the targeting team must take all aspects of assessment into consideration. Assessments are difficult and time consuming. They require dedicated personnel and resources and must be included in the collection plan and synchronized through the collection and targeting working group. The staff must prioritize the use of collection assets and consider the risk of tasking assets for assessment versus other requirements. For further information on assessment see FM 5-0. 2-69. The outcome of success is effective targeting, efficient use of resources, and lower risk to mission and force. The following are consequence of failure to assess:  Tasks, Objectives, and End-states not met resulting in mission failure.  PIR/information requirements remain unanswered and decision points are affected.  The enemy retains critical capabilities to achieve mission success.  Inaccurate understanding of the operational situation.  Inability to capture Munitions effectiveness or make reattack recommendations.  Inability to measure effectiveness of target engagement.

Targeting at the tactical level is largely defined by the capability and capacity of personnel and equipment. The sheer numbers of personnel at the brigade are far less than that of a corps or Theater Army. The staff and targeting team must assess capability and requirements to determine the feasibility and level of detail when applying the D3A methodology. The brigade is realistically the first echelon where a formal process will be conducted. The application of the methodology will be very similar at echelon; however, processes and procedures may be abbreviated. Targeting decisions at a higher HQ affect targeting decisions at subordinate HQ. The brigade staff may use the targeting products of the division or produce their own, depending on time and personnel available, to coordinate and integrate targeting actions. The brigade will focus on synchronizing assets to meet the commander's objectives within their assigned AO and submit requests for support or target nominations to division for effects they are unable to create with task organized capability or organic assets and enablers. Targeting at these echelons is typically more focused on specific threat systems, equipment, or individuals than on larger threat capabilities or functions such as integrated air defense systems, integrated fires commands, or logistics.

The key to successful targeting at the corps and division is three-fold. First is understanding the support needed by the subordinate echelons and shaping efforts required to enable their operational success. Second is understanding division and corps schemes of maneuver, time, and assets available and third is understanding the planning horizons associated with requests for support and target nominations for external capabilities. Corps and divisions must operate in all domains. Targeting at these levels require the integration and synchronization of many more organizations, elements, and capabilities to create the desired effects within a joint environment. Organizations and elements such as the joint air-ground integration center (JAGIC), FAB, and E-MIBs are key components at these echelons. Organically, corps and divisions have separate, subordinate elements to provide unique capabilities to support the achievement of the commander’s objectives but must establish relationships with necessary external joint interagency multinational (referred to as JIM) partners to be truly effective and successful. Targeting at this echelon is complicated by expanding roles and a greater operational reach. This is also the first echelon where delineation of the D3A methodology and the Joint Targeting Cycle must occur. It is critical for division and corps targeting teams to definitively understand their task organization and the capabilities organic to their respective formations.

Targeting in support of a theater is primarily conducted at the operational to strategic level of war. It involves commanders and staffs using the Joint Targeting Cycle in support of operations. A corps and division commander might also command a JFLCC or a JTF, requiring them to perform Joint tasks and integrate targeting efforts at a theater level.

Targeting is a very complex and challenging process. There are many considerations and variables that impact the ability of the targeting team to plan and execute with efficiency. The below checklist, like many of the appendices, is intended to be printable and used throughout planning and execution to minimize mistakes and missed opportunities.

Intelligence support to targeting is a specialized and synchronized effort as it overlaps with operations functions and all components of the intelligence warfighting function. Specifically, intelligence support to targeting touches several all-source intelligence analysis tasks, all aspects of collection management, and every intelligence discipline and complementary intelligence capability. This support occurs across the echelons as an intelligence push from the theater army, which has regional expertise and extensive capabilities, down to each successive echelon. Therefore, understanding intelligence support to targeting must begin with understanding intelligence. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGETING OVERVIEW B-1. Commanders and staffs need timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to support the targeting effort, which includes the selection, prioritization, execution, and assessment of targets. Therefore, the intelligence support to targeting effort must be resourced, carefully planned, and supported by a large portion of the intelligence architecture. The intelligence architecture is the compilation and interrelationship of all relevant intelligence and communications capabilities, data centers, organizations, supporting capabilities, concepts of operations, and personnel necessary to ensure the successful execution of the intelligence process. (See ADP 2-0.) B-2. Intelligence support to targeting is specialized as it occurs across a significant portion of the intelligence warfighting function. While all intelligence disciplines and complementary intelligence capabilities support targeting, the effort is ultimately focused by the close collaboration between the all-source intelligence analysis element (whether dedicated to targeting or ad hoc), the collection management element, and various targeting and fires elements, including the target development working group if applicable. B-3. Intelligence support to targeting is one of the four primary intelligence tasks and provides the commander information and intelligence support needed to both lethal and nonlethal targeting. It includes support to the planning (target development), identification (target detection), and assessing the effect of those operations (combat assessment). The intelligence warfighting function provides support during all functions of D3A. D ECIDE B-4. During MDMP, targeting becomes more focused based on the commander's guidance and intent. Once objectives are determined by the commander, the intelligence staff must continuously review them with respect to the threat and the changing situation to ensure they remain relevant to the commander's intent. Intelligence provides the commander with an understanding of the threat in terms of probable intent, objectives, strengths, weaknesses, probable COA, most dangerous COA, values, and critical vulnerabilities. Additionally, intelligence analysts recommend objectives based on enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and likely COAs. The decide function of the targeting methodology provides the overall focus and sets priorities for information collection and attack planning. It is the most important targeting function and requires close interaction between the intelligence, plans, operations, and FSE/fires cells, and the servicing judge advocate. This step draws heavily on the staff's knowledge of the threat, a detailed IPB (which occurs simultaneously), and a continuous assessment of the situation. Targeting priorities are addressed for each phase or critical event of an operation. B-5. During the targeting meeting, the collection management team advises the targeting working group on the ability of available collection systems to acquire and identify HPTs, track HPTs, and support BDA on HPTs. The team assists the group, as needed, in developing an architecture that disseminates target-related intelligence to attack systems in near-real-time. The targeting working group further refines event templates and associated event matrices, developed during IPB, into targeting matrices, which provide the level of detail the collection management team requires to focus information collection to support targeting. The team uses targeting matrices, IPB products, and the TSS to break down HPTs into collection functions, SIRs, NAIs and TAIs, and specific collection tasks. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01, ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01.3, and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-33.4 for detailed information) D ETECT B-6. The current operations integration cell is the primary cell responsible for directing the execution of the information collection effort to detect HPTs identified in the decide function. The intelligence cell (with the current operations integration cell) must focus their intelligence analysis efforts to support both situation development and the targeting effort. Therefore, close coordination between the intelligence cell and the FSE is critical. Key staff members in this effort include the G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2, information operations officer, FAIO (when staffed), targeting officer, and FSCOORD/FSO. B-7. The collection manager directs the information collection synchronization effort with focus on PIRs and target intelligence requirements. The collection manager ensures the information collection plan supports the finalized targeting plan. The collection management team, in coordination with the targeting team (or intelligence targeting officer), develops collection strategies to satisfy PIRs and targeting intelligence requirements. The collection management team may have to differentiate collection tasks to support the acquire and identify collection function or the track collection function when a collection asset cannot perform both collection functions. This is a major challenge during large-scale ground combat operations at which time the concept of persistent surveillance is often not possible. National technical means may have to serve as an intermittent form of surveillance in conjunction with Army collection assets to acquire, identify, and track HPTs. Some collection assets provide actual targetable information while information from other collection assets requires PED to produce valid targets. The target priorities developed in the decide function are used to expedite the processing of targets. The collection management team:  Plans for synchronized collection, focusing on the proper HPT at each phase in the COA.  Plans collection to satisfy that set of SIRs if BDA is required to support the COA.  Plans and arranges, when possible, direct dissemination of targeting intelligence from the collector to the targeting cell or the appropriate fires element. B-8. During operations, the collection management team monitors the execution of the collection management plan; uses the information collection matrix to ensure collection assets are focused on the proper HPTs (and their associated NAIs and TAIs); tips off the appropriate fires element as targets of opportunity present themselves, and cross-cues collection assets to support the targeting effort. When detecting a planned HPT, the information is quickly disseminated to the FAIO to determine if the target is an HPT, the target's priority, and if the target complies with TSS. To ensure the target-related intelligence is disseminated quickly, the FAIO should be co-located in the intelligence cell with communications to the FSE/fires cell. If the target is an HPT, the FAIO coordinates with the intelligence cell and disseminates the target-related intelligence directly to the FSE/fires cell. If the commander approves actioning the target, it is transferred to a firing unit. In those cases where the situation dictates the development of a new HPT or when the staff assesses a significant change to an existing HPT, subsequent target development must occur. When subsequent target development is necessary, the targeting information is forwarded for intelligence analysis and the target development process must occur quickly. Upon identifying a target specified for attack, analysts pass the target to the FSE/fires cell. The FSE/fires cell executes the attack against the target. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01, ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01.3, and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-33.4 for detailed information) D ELIVER B-9. During the deliver function, the intelligence staff examines potential target systems and their components to make a recommendation for generating the commander's intended effect on the target, though the final decision is made by the FSO in collaboration with the operations officer. The intelligence input is based primarily on the AGM - determining the most effective friendly means available to produce the commander's desired effect on the target. During the deliver function, the collection management team cues collectors to continue tracking targets during their engagement. Preplanned or cued BDA collection and reporting assists in determining if the engagement produced the desired effects; if not, continued tracking supports immediate reengagement. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01, ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01.3, and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-33.4 for detailed information) A SSESS B-10. Intelligence supports the assessment function by determining if targeting actions have met the desired effects and if reattack is necessary to perform essential fires tasks and achieve the commander's intent for fires. Intelligence support to combat assessment relates to specific targets by completing physical damage assessments and functional damage assessments. During the assess function, the collection management team continuously assesses the information collection effort and compares ongoing actions to the collection management plan and the original intent. As operations progress and the situation deviates from the plan, it is important to ensure information collection is supporting all requirements. If the staff's assessment reveals that some requirements are not answered, the collection management team must reevaluate the collection management plan. Then the team and staff must provide input on adjustments to the collection effort, retaskings, or the development of new tasks. The collection management team and current operations track the situation relative to those requirements to determine the completion of collection tasks; the effectiveness of targeting and resulting effects on the target; continued synchronization with other operations or emerging collection opportunities; and most critically, the requirements for target reengagement, if required. B-11. The assess function of the targeting methodology is nested in the overall continuous assessment of operations within the operations and intelligence processes. Assessments are directly tied to the commander's decisions throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Planning for assessment identifies key aspects of the operation that the commander directs be closely monitored, and where the commander wants to make the decisions. Intelligence plays a major role in assessments as a part of the targeting methodology. The assess function of the targeting methodology is performed through combat assessment. Combat assessment is the determination of the effectiveness of force employment during military operations (JP 3-60). Combat assessment comprises three elements:  BDA.  Munitions effectiveness assessment.  Reengagement recommendation. B-12. BDA is the estimate of damage composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force (JP 3-0). The staff determines how combat assessment relates to specific targets by completing BDA. Producing BDA is primarily an intelligence cell responsibility but requires coordination across the staff, similarly to IPB and most steps of intelligence support to targeting. BDA requirements should be captured as PIRs or as similar high-priority information collection requirements. Together, BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment provide the commander and staff with an assessment of the effects achieved against targets and whether the targeting guidance was met. Based on this information, the staff can recommend reengagement when necessary. B-13. Characteristics that best describe the intelligence support to targeting effort include deliberate planning, collaboration across national to tactical intelligence echelons, and precise intelligence to target threat capabilities at the right time and place and to open windows of opportunity to achieve positions of relative advantage. This effort is challenging because the threat, especially peer threats, makes precisely analyzing threat target systems, predicting threat COAs, accounting for terrain and weather effects, providing intelligence specific to a location and time, and accurately assessing the employment of capabilities extremely difficult. Intelligence support to targeting includes tracking highly mobile targets and simultaneously engaging targets, including targets in complex terrain (such as subterranean and urban areas, and jungle and mountainous terrain) across multiple domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment. Intelligence support to targeting primarily consists of:  IPB.  Collection management.  Intelligence support to target development.  Intelligence support to target detection.  Intelligence support to combat assessment. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD B-14. Conducting IPB allows commanders and staffs to take a holistic approach to analyzing the OE. The IPB process comprises four steps: define the OE, describe environmental effects on operations, evaluate the threat, and determine threat COAs. It is a collaborative staff effort led by the G-2/S-2 and the intelligence staff. IPB products developed during MDMP, specifically during mission analysis, and continuously updated facilitate situational understanding and assist commanders and staffs in identifying relevant aspects within the AO that can affect mission accomplishment. B-15. IPB is critical to targeting threat capabilities at the right time and place to open windows of opportunity across domains. Close interaction between the commander, G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and the rest of the staff is essential, as the entire staff supports unit planning and preparation through the integrating processes. During step 2 of MDMP (Mission analysis), the intelligence staff when conducting IPB, works closely with targeting team members to provide and integrate a holistic IPB. This integration enables the planning process to reduce uncertainty in the conduct of IPB across the physical, virtual, cognitive and temporal framework of the OE. The holistic approach:  Describes the totality of relevant aspects of the OE that may impact friendly, threat, and neutral forces.  Accounts for all relevant domains that may impact friendly and enable threat operations.  Allows commanders to leverage positions of relative advantage at a time and place most advantageous for mission success with the most accurate information available. B-16. IPB results in intelligence products that are used during MDMP in developing friendly COA and decision points (referred to as DPs) for the commander. Targeting personnel contribute to and leverage IPB to understand the effects of the operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (referred to as PMESII-PT) and civil considerations, the AO, mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available, civil considerations, and information considerations (referred to as (METT-TC[I]), on friendly and enemy operations, and to identify and develop high-value targets (HVTs), assist with developing HPTs, as well as provide nominations and recommendations to the NSL, RTL, and TST nominations. Figure B-1 on page B-5 contains a list of outputs (intelligence products) used during MDMP. Several of these products are crucial to planning information collection and targeting. They include:  Threat situation templates with associated COA statements and high-value target list.  Event templates and associated event matrices.  Modified combined obstacle overlay (referred to as the MCOO), terrain effects matrices, and terrain assessments.  Weather effects, light and illumination tables, and weather assessments.  Civil considerations overlays and assessments.  Initial collection plan with all available assets.  Initial PIR recommendations. making process B-17. During step one of IPB the targeting team leverage the limits of the AO to identify significant characteristics that could affect operations. These characteristics may include-  Critical structures or facilities that support transportation, communications, and information systems that can be sensitive or need to have restricted actions placed on them.  Cultural or social factors that are sensitive.  Facilities, structures, or industries that can be considered sensitive, or if affected can produce an occupational and environmental health threats.  Foreign embassies, international government organizations, and non-government organizations. B-18. During step two of IPB, the targeting team seeks to understand the impact of the environmental effects on operations and the operational and mission variables. These might include, but not limited to the following:  The impact and continuing assessment of the modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO).  The effects of weather and terrain.  Civil capabilities and vulnerabilities that can be leveraged to affect operations. B-19. During steps three and four of IPB, the intelligence staff uses all relevant intelligence products, threat templates, models, characteristics, and matrices to evaluate the threat. This is done to understand how they can affect friendly operations and to determine possible courses of actions that can enable friendly forces' mission accomplishment. Each warfighting function and staff section contribution to steps three and four of IPB is crucial in understanding the various functions and the critical capabilities the enemy requires and depends on to accomplish missions. B-20. During the IPB process, the targeting team should have a clear understanding of civil capabilities that can affect friendly and enemy operations. The team identifies threat forces critical capabilities, requirements, dependencies, and vulnerabilities. This will lead to the identification of HVTs and potential HPTs for COA development and war gaming. COLLECTION MANAGEMENT B-21. Successfully collecting timely, relevant, and useful information requires the staff to plan for and use well-developed procedures and flexible planning to facilitate situational understanding, track emerging targets, adapt to changing operational requirements, and meet the requirement for combat assessment. The collection management team participates in various meetings, such as intelligence synchronization meetings, operational update briefs, and targeting working groups. Routine exposure to these meetings assists collection management teams in understanding important aspects of and considerations for operations and fires. B-22. Both collection management and intelligence analysis are driven by PIRs, targeting intelligence requirements, and other intelligence requirements to develop information collection recommendations. These recommendations assist in the tasking or requesting of collection assets to collect information, which results in timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence that answers the commander's requirements. B-23. The collection management team, commander, requesters, and the rest of the staff collaborate to define what requirements to collect against and when to collect. The collection management team must:  Be heavily involved in all aspects of the targeting process.  Rely on the knowledge generated from mission analysis and the IPB process to ensure the collection management plan is structured to meet target intelligence requirements.  Use knowledgebase about the enemy and other relevant aspects of the OE to develop requirements that are strongly connected to decision points and targeting intelligence requirements that will affect operations. B-24. The collection management team, operations staff, and collection assets (or assets' C2 element) collaborate to specify what assets should collect against target intelligence requirements and define when, where, and how to employ those assets and PED capabilities. B-25. The collection management plan is an output of the completion of MDMP. This plan guides the information collection efforts and drives analysis in support of targeting and providing combat assessments. The collection management plan includes the following:  Evaluating collection assets, including their availability, capability, sustainability, and vulnerability.  Collection Strategy.  Collection management tools (information collection matrix, information collection synchronization matrix, information collection overlay).  Annex L (Information Collection). INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGET DEVELOPMENT B-26. Intelligence support to target development involves a flexible but detailed process, displayed in figure B-2. The tasks of the intelligence support to target development process are:  Analyze target systems.  Conduct TVA.  Develop initial and continually update target intelligence folders.  Identify specific HVTs.  Refine/adjust HVTs, when necessary.  Support the selection of HPTs and other products.  Support subsequent target development. A NALYZE T ARGET S YSTEMS B-27. Friendly forces cannot target threat forces and capabilities without understanding threat target systems, from the most general level to very detailed target elements (a macro to micro approach). This effort results in intelligence that is pushed from the joint force and theater army down to the BN level. Analyzing target systems overlaps with developing threat models during generate intelligence knowledge and should be conducted as early as possible before actual operations-preferably well before MDMP. Analyzing target systems is a priority primarily for theater organizations during the shape and prevent Army strategic roles. However, the task may be conducted at any time if the staff does not have general HVTs, or if it lacks an understanding of the components of a threat function and how that threat performs that function. Often, there are major differences in how and when this task will be conducted to support stability operations versus offensive and defensive operations. It is more likely analysis of target systems will be conducted at the lower tactical levels, as well as during MDMP, when necessary, to support stability operations. B-28. When possible, the targeting working group participates in the Army analysis of threat systems effort led by the intelligence targeting element. Analysis of target systems focuses on breaking down target systems into successive elements at a greater level of detail to eventually identify HVTs and HVT elements. The resulting products and the development of threat models support subsequent and more detailed target development. The first step is evaluating which target systems are relevant to future or current operations. Typically, a target system comprises a broad set of interrelated and functionally associated components that generally produce a common output or have a shared mission (such as the air defense structure within a specific threat unit). From the target system, analysts carefully determine all associated target system components, general HVTs, and HVT elements. With each level, there is a growing number of entities. B-29. Analysis of threat systems is related to/supported by functional analysis using critical factors analysis (CFA), an advanced structured analytic technique detailed in ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-33.4. CFA is an overarching analytic framework that assists analysts in identifying threat critical capabilities, threat critical requirements, and threat critical vulnerabilities, which they may integrate into other structured analytical techniques. Functional analysis supports analysis of threat systems in effectively identifying windows of opportunity and threat vulnerabilities. At EAC, the CFA assists in identifying threat centers of gravity. B-30. As the number of entities grows with each level, all relationships of those entities are mapped. These relationships can occur from a physical, logical, or complex social system or from another perspective. While a target system component or HVT may be significant because of its characteristics, the component's or target's real importance is in its relationship to other components or targets within a target system. Components and HVTs are both intra-dependent to perform specific functions and interdependent to support threat capabilities (for example, the capabilities of a certain theater army-level integrated air defense target system may depend on logistics, C2, radar coverage, automation, and many other components). Analysts must link all the components down to HVTs and HVT elements, when necessary, to properly template all elements of the target system. B-31. Considerations for conducting analysis of target systems include but are not limited to:  Open-source research.  Existing intelligence, databases, and files from generating intelligence knowledge.  Existing threat center of gravity and other forms of functional analysis.  Conducting TVA (for example using the CARVER technique) iteratively as part of analysis of the target system.  Signatures emitted from HVTs and the ability to collect on those HVTs.  Understanding the five broad methods (systems warfare, isolation, preclusion, information warfare, and sanctuary) employed by peer threats. (See both ADP 3-0 and FM 3-0 for more information on peer threats.)  Theater army-level guidance on the conduct of analysis of target systems. C ONDUCT T ARGET V ALUE A NALYSIS B-32. The intelligence targeting element conducts TVA with the targeting working group, FSE/fires cell, (based on unit SOPs). From the coordination and work performed during the IPB effort, the targeting working group, especially the intelligence staff and targeting officer, perform TVA that yields HVT lists (which may include HVI lists) for a specific threat COA. TVA is a methodology which assists in prioritizing HVTs and identifies potential HVT sets with a given tactical situation. It is a process led by the FSE/fires cell as part of targeting that quantifies the relative value of HVTs with each other in relation to a threat operation. This analysis is based in part on the conclusions reached by the intelligence staff upon evaluating threat characteristics. TVA continues the detailed analysis of relevant threat factors, including doctrine, tactics, equipment, capabilities, and expected actions for a specific threat COA. However, TVA is a valuable tool that can be applied multiple times during intelligence support to target development, as well as:  During step 3 of IPB (evaluate the threat) to identify general HVTs.  During step 4 of IPB (determine threat COAs) to identify specific HVTs.  Following step 4 of IPB and step 3 of MDMP (COA development) to select HPTs.  At any point to support subsequent target development. Note. To be effective, this analysis depends on the most current intelligence related to the threat. Initially, based on the threat template, TVA should be refined based on the threat COAs, and refined continually based on changes to the threat overlay during operations. Whenever conducted, the intelligence staff supports TVA with the most up-to-date threat-related intelligence. See JP 3-60, ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01.3, and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-33.4 for more details on TVA. D EVELOP I NITIAL AND C ONTINUALLY U PDATE T ARGET I NTELLIGENCE FOLDERS B-33. EAC organizations are critical to building target folders (also referred to as joint target folders or electronic target folders) during the competition phase and then disseminating those target folders to land forces commanders. Target folders, hardcopy or electronic, contain target intelligence and related materials prepared for planning and executing action against a specific target (JP 3-60). Target folders are built during the competition phase and disseminated to land forces commanders to support MDMP in preparation for large-scale combat operations and targeting. Currently, MIB-Ts and aerial exploitation battalions hold/will hold the Army's organic deep collection assets that are essential to collecting information relevant to targeting. MIB-Ts have the data storage and data transport necessary to connect ground units at echelons corps and below to joint target folders and other theater-level targeting materials. As such, EAC intelligence organizations support targeting through competition to conflict. B-34. Like joint target folders, Army echelon corps and below intelligence targeting elements develop and refine target intelligence folder. Target intelligence packets support he target folder. Army intelligence targeting elements develop and refine targeting intelligence packets based on their requirements. When not covered by joint target folders, Theater Army G-2 requirements, standards, and unit SOPs drive Army target intelligence packets. As required, target development elements develop target intelligence folders using specific intelligence products and analysis from the corps or division ACE. Target intelligence folders are both offensive and defensive in nature and are subsequently updated throughout operations to further detail information and intelligence over time. Initially, a target intelligence folder includes the same level of detail as the associated threat model. The target intelligence folder contains two subfolders:  Target intelligence packages (also referred to as intelligence target packet/package). The folder contains individual intelligence target packages used by the targeting working group to plan targeting operations.  Work folders. The folders contain raw data, working aids, and analyst notes used by individual analysts to form conclusions that the target development element presents to the G-2 ACE chief, G-2, and commander. B-35. Following the D3A targeting methodology, the target development element develops HVTs, assists in developing HPTs for the AGM, conducts combat assessment, and creates target intelligence packages for target nominations. The target development element collaborates closely with the fusion element, the FAIO, and the information operations staff to ensure its analysis addresses the physical and functional aspects of each target. B-36. A target intelligence packet contains pertinent target system, complex, or component information collected during target development. Information in the target intelligence packet is used to build target studies once HPTs are approved or validated. Generally, target intelligence packets deal with fixed or semifixed targets. This information may be in the form of databases, selected imagery, or graphics. The FSE/fires cell and intelligence cell develop and maintain target intelligence packets. Once the commander has approved a target, intelligence cell analysts develop target and objective studies to support mission planning. Target intelligence packets are focused, detailed intelligence products that assist in applying fires against a specific target set or area. These studies are graphically oriented and may use many of the graphics derived during the IPB process. Target intelligence packets identify HVTs in relation to operations by providing detailed targeting information. Target intelligence packets are IPB and wargaming products as well as a compilation of products that support the targeting methodology for a specific target. The purpose is to have all necessary products (including relevant IPB, operations, and legal products and information) in a single product. B-37. These packets are developed and maintained at the Army HVT level (but referenced to the larger threat target system and component) and include a unique target intelligence number that is maintained throughout operations. B-38. After target intelligence packets are first developed, they are subsequently updated throughout operations to further detail information and intelligence over time. Initially, a target intelligence packet includes the same level of detail as the associated threat model, except for unit and geographic specificity. Over time, the target intelligence packet includes analysis and supporting intelligence and information down to a detailed assessment of target element vulnerabilities and a historical record of HVT collection and analysis. I DENTIFY S PECIFIC H IGH -V ALUE T ARGETS B-39. HVTs are developed during step 3 (Evaluate the threat) and initially refined during step 4 (Determine threat COA) of the IPB process, an integrated process of step 2 (Mission analysis) of MDMP. Outputs from step 3 include the threat template, HVT list, and threat capability statement. Step 4 requires an understanding of the threat characteristics, as well as the effects of terrain, weather, and civil considerations on operations. The most important element in determining threat COAs is understanding threat operational art and tactics. The process for determining the COAs these threat forces may employ consists of the following:  Identify likely objectives and the desired end state.  Determine threat battlefield functions.  Determine threat capabilities available to perform each battlefield function.  Identify the full set of COAs available to the threat.  Evaluate and prioritize each threat COA.  Develop each COA in the amount of detail time allows.  Identify HVTs for each COA.  Identify initial collection requirements for each COA. B-40. Below are several techniques used by the intelligence staff in identifying and evaluating HVTs:  Identify HVTs from threat models, situation templates with time phase lines, existing intelligence studies, database evaluations, patrol debriefs, and size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (also called SALUTE) reports.  A review of threat tactics, techniques, and procedures.  Previous threat operations.  Understanding the threat's objective, tasks, purpose, and intent.  Identify assets that are key to executing the primary operation, branches, or sequels of threat COAs.  Determine how the threat might react to the loss of each identified HVT. Consider the threat's ability to substitute other assets and adopt branches or sequels.  Consider AO and area of interest effects and potentially broader effects.  Consider how the threat may use multiple capabilities to create the effects of one or more HVTs.  Consider how the threat may use assets by phases of an operation, which may lead to classifying certain threat assets, functions, or systems as HVTs across all domains, the information environment, and the electromagnetic spectrum.  Consider the multidomain nature of complex OEs and how threat forces may use assets to disrupt friendly operations at multiple echelons and locations.  After identifying HVTs, place them in order of their relative worth to the threat's operation and record them as part of the threat model. The value of an HVT varies throughout an operation. Identify and annotate changes in value by phase of the operation. The following are additional considerations:  Use all available intelligence sources (for example, patrol debriefs, reporting) to update and refine the threat models.  Categorize the updates to reach a conclusion concerning the threat's operations, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. B-41. CFA is an overarching analytic framework that assists the intelligence staff in identifying threat critical capabilities, threat critical requirements, and threat critical vulnerabilities. This assists friendly forces in effectively identifying windows of opportunity and threat vulnerabilities. CFA is most effective when conducted by a team of experienced analysts. At EAC, the CFA assists in identifying threat centers of gravity that friendly forces can use for operational planning. Identified threat critical vulnerabilities are key when identifying and developing HVTs, which are later prioritized by the FSE/fires cells through TVA. Note. Potential pitfalls - units may not have enough experienced personnel to apply CFA effectively, as multiple analysts are optimal. Additionally, there may not be enough time to conduct a thorough functional analysis. B-42. HVTs drive target development. Identification of HVTs overlaps with IPB. Developed prior to IPB, TSA templates and matrices or predeveloped threat models assist IPB significantly, especially in time-constrained environments. During step 3 of IPB, analysts develop general HVTs not associated with specific threat COAs and the terrain and weather. Then, analysts consider specific threat COAs and the terrain and weather to develop HVTs for each threat COA. Analysts must be proficient with the IPB steps and cannot develop specific HVTs outside of the IPB process. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-01.3 for detailed information about the steps of the IPB process. R EFINE /A DJUST H IGH -V ALUE T ARGETS B-43. During step 3 of MDMP, the targeting working group, led by the intelligence targeting element, refines the high-value target list one last time based on the most current intelligence and analysis. The entire staff conducts further analysis, including another iteration of TVA. Conducting TVA assists the staff in prioritizing HVTs and identifies potential HVT sets for each threat COA. They are placed in order of their relative worth to the threat’s operation and recorded as part of the threat model. The value of HVTs varies over the course of an operation. The entire staff analyzes and identifies those HVTs that must be attacked to ensure friendly mission success. Additionally, the staff analyzes all implications of attacking those HVTs and possible threat counteractions. Results of this analysis is the refined high-value target list. Those critical HVTs that the staff confirms as acquired and attacked are nominated as potential HPTs for each COA. S UPPORT THE S ELECTION OF H IGH -P AYOFF T ARGETS AND O THER P RODUCTS B-44. HPTs are initially developed during step 3 (COA development) of MDMP. Each friendly COA requires engaging specific HPTs to reach a specific effect at a specific time and location to ensure COA success. HPTs are critical to both the adversary's needs and the friendly concept of operations. They support achieving the commander's intent and executing the concept of operations. They are determined based on the commander's targeting guidance. Upon receipt of the HPT nominations, the staff groups the HPTs into a prioritized HPTL, associating the HPTs to a specific point in the battle. HPTs are incorporated into the scheme of fires and used to develop TSS and AGMs for each friendly COA. The HPTL, TSS and AGM are later refined during step 4 (COA analysis) and finalized during step 6 (COA approval) of MDMP. B-45. The HVTs and HPTs are developed during steps 2 and 3 of MDMP, and further refined during the step 4, COA analysis. During COA analysis, the entire staff, led by the chief of fires/FSCOORD, refines or adjusts the key targeting products (HPTL, TSS, and AGM). The intelligence targeting element ensures the staff has the necessary intelligence products to validate or adjust the targeting products during COA analysis. Then, the chief of fires/FSCOORD presents the HPTL, TSS, and AGM for the recommended friendly COA to the commander for approval. B-46. Wargaming is conducted during step 4 (COA analysis) of MDMP. During wargaming, the staff compares each friendly COA with the enemy's most probable COA. The staff recommends which HVTs are to become HPTs for each friendly COA. When listed in priority, the HPTs for the approved COA compose the HPTL. Other related decisions include:  When to engage each HPT.  Which system to use against each HPT.  The best places to attack an HPT.  The desired effects of each attack, expressed in terms of the targeting objectives.  Which HPTs require BDA.  Which HPTs require special instructions or require coordination. B-47. Target selection depends on the ability to acquire the target. The collection manager must be closely involved in ensuring information collection on HPTs is carefully synchronized into the information collection plan. This task includes:  Breaking HPTs into subsets, when necessary.  Developing adequate collection tasks.  Considering the use of cueing, collection redundancy, and sensor mix during the development of the information collection synchronization matrix. B-48. Based on wargaming, the targeting team refines specified targeting products for each friendly COA. These products include:  HPTL.  TSS.  AGM. B-49. Wargaming also assists the intelligence staff in refining and updating intelligence products in support of targeting. These include:  Updated IPB products (threat model, threat COAs, event template, event matrix).  Updated collection management products (refined intelligence requirements, information collection plan, information collection matrix, information collection support matrix, information collection overlay). S UPPORT S UBSEQUENT T ARGET D EVELOPMENT B-50. After MDMP, more detailed target development occurs. Some aspects of subsequent target development-such as target validation and dynamic target development-overlap with intelligence support to target detection. The intelligence target element is not the lead element for developing most of the subsequent target development products. However, the intelligence target element produces supporting target intelligence, updates target intelligence folders, and supports the FSE in performing different tasks, including:  Conducting deconfliction.  Making aim point recommendations.  Producing targeting materials.  Linking targets back to targeting objectives and MOE.  Vetting targets, when necessary.  Validating targets.  Developing dynamic targets, when necessary.  Clearing fires. B-51. Target vetting, when necessary, is conducted to establish a reasonable level of confidence in a target's designated functional characterization. The intelligence targeting element accomplishes the initial portion of vetting by reviewing the target intelligence to determine the level of accuracy on that target. At a minimum, after the intelligence review, target vetting includes the following: it does not include an assessment of compliance with the laws of war or ROE:  An assessment of the target's identification and significance.  Collateral damage estimation.  Geospatial or location issues.  Threat or friendly impacts of servicing the target.  Impact of not servicing the target.  Environmental and other effects.  Intelligence gain or loss concerns. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO TARGET DETECTION B-52. The targeting working group establishes target detection and tracking priorities based on targeting priorities. Target tracking is inherent in target detection. The FSE/fires cell provides the intelligence cell with the degree of accuracy required and dwell time for a target to be eligible for engagement. Then the collection manager can match those requirements to the TLE of the information collection asset. Execution of the information collection plan begins as early as possible during planning and continues all the way through the assess function and even helps transition unit operations into the next mission. The execution of the information collection plan to answer the targeting information requirements is central to detection. Targets are detected by using the appropriate information collection assets. B-53. The current operations integration cell is the primary cell responsible for directing the execution of the information collection effort to detect HPTs. The unit intelligence cell (with the current operations integration cell) must focus their intelligence analysis efforts to support both situation development and the targeting effort. Therefore, close coordination between the unit intelligence cell and the FSE is critical. Key staff members in this effort include the G-2/S-2, information operations officer, FAIO, targeting officer, and FSO. B-54. The G-2/S-2 makes maximum use of all available information collection assets to detect targets and focus the intelligence acquisition efforts on designated HPTs and PIRs. Situation development information, through detection and tracking, accumulates as information collection assets satisfy PIRs and information requirements. The collection manager-  Considers information collection assets' capabilities and availability within the echelon, and those assets available to subordinate, higher, and adjacent units.  Considers joint or combined force assets.  Arranges direct dissemination of targeting information, from the information collection asset to the targeting cell or targeting intelligence, to the FSE/fires cell if possible. B-55. When detecting a planned HPT, the information is quickly disseminated to the FAIO to determine if the target is an HPT, the target's priority, and if the target complies with TSS. To ensure the target information is disseminated quickly, the FAIO should be located in the intelligence cell with communications to the FSE/fires cell. If the target is an HPT, the FAIO coordinates with the G-2/S-2 analytic element and disseminates the target directly to the FSE/fires. If the commander approves the target, it is transferred to a firing unit. B-56. In those cases, where the situation dictates the development of a new HPT or a significant change to an existing HPT, subsequent target development must occur. When subsequent target development is necessary, the targeting information is forwarded for intelligence analysis and the target development process must occur quickly. Upon identifying a target specified for attack, analysts pass the target to the FSE/fires cell. The FSE/fires cell tasks the appropriate capability to execute the attack against the target. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COMBAT ASSESSMENT B-57. Intelligence also plays a major role in assessment as a part of the targeting methodology. The assess function of the targeting methodology is performed through combat assessment. Combat assessment is the determination of the effectiveness of force employment during military operations (JP 3-60). Units conduct combat assessment by determining the effectiveness of force employment during military operations (BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment). Battle damage assessment is the estimate of damage composed of physical and functional damage assessment, as well as target system assessment, resulting from the application of fires. (JP 3-0). The staff determines how combat assessment relates to specific targets by completing BDA. Producing BDA is primarily an intelligence cell responsibility but requires coordination across the staff, similarly to IPB and most steps of intelligence support to targeting. BDA requirements should be captured as PIRs or as similar high-priority information collection requirements. From this determination, they make recommendations for maneuver operations (reengagement recommendation). Identifying, defining, and maintaining accurate threat characteristics are also essential in conducting combat assessment. For example, understanding a threat's composition assists the intelligence staff in determining the threat's combat effectiveness. The intelligence staff incorporates the entire staff's input into IPB products for staff planning, decision making, targeting, and combat assessment. B-58. BDA provides commanders with an assessment of the target's combat effectiveness, overall status, capabilities (whether full or partial), and likely reactions or any change to their intent. This assists the staff in determining if the engagement is meeting the targeting guidance and is critical to any recommendation to reengage the target. BDA also provides important analysis used to conduct quick target development and decide on the allocation or redirection of assets or weapon systems for any reengagement. B-59. Together, BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment inform the commander of effects against targets and target sets. The threat's ability to make and sustain war is estimated continually. During the munitions effectiveness assessment of the targets, restrike recommendations are proposed or executed. BDA pertains to the results of attacks on commander-designated targets. Although BDA is conducted primarily by the intelligence staff, it requires coordination with the entire staff. BDA requirements are translated into PIRs. BDA-  Is conducted at the tactical level by commanders to obtain a series of timely and accurate snapshots of how they are affecting the threat. BDA provides commanders an estimate of the threat's combat effectiveness, capabilities, and intentions (threat characteristics). From this information, commanders determine when or whether their targeting effort accomplishes their objectives.  Assists in determining if restrike is necessary. Commanders use BDA to allocate or redirect attack systems to make use of available combat power. B-60. The Army's integrated systems demonstrate the seamless availability of national, theater, and tactical access-protected information, allowing Department of Defense users and mission partners to confidently share the information as needed. Intelligence personnel use these integrated systems to receive and distribute intelligence and information to support decision making, situation development, target development, and information collection at every echelon.

Throughout the manual, creating the desired effects has been highlighted as an essential part of meeting the commander’s intent. Commanders’ guidance should include the task that they want to conduct, and the outcome intended by the specific action. Weaponeering is the process of determining the specific means required to create a desired effect on a given target. The targeting team may develop these effects through planning or the use of the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual Weaponeering Software (referred to as JWS) for specific lethal engagements. Both lethal and nonlethal capabilities are considered.

The commander, the targeting team, supporting, and supported units should implement the targeting products developed during the targeting process to facilitate the planning and execution of operations. The products allow the team to control and synchronize targeting in an effective and efficient way. TARGETING TOOLS AND FORMATS D-1. There are no prescribed formats for the targeting tools. Each unit will develop tools that work best for them. Factors to consider in developing formats are as follows:  Type, level, or role of the command.  Operational environment.  Assets available.  Missions.  SOPs. D-2. Regardless of the formats used, the targeting methodology applicable for the unit’s role must be followed. Targeting products can be presented in many forms. It is important forms be sharable in oral presentations, hard copy publications, or electronic format. D-3. The purpose of this appendix is to provide a menu of formats and a focus on the targeting information and knowledge the commander and staff requires. The formats may be copied or modified by the targeting team to support the requirements of the command. These examples are intended to provide a baseline understanding of the required information in each product. In the example products a mix of acceptable forms of inputs are used to further demonstrate the flexibility a unit has when developing its own targeting product standards. H IGH -P AYOFF T ARGET L IST D-4. The HPTL identifies HPTs by phases in the battle and order of priority. Other considerations include the following:  The sequence or order of appearance.  The ability to detect, identify, classify, locate, and track the target. (This decision must include sensor availability and processing timeline considerations.)  The degree of accuracy available from the acquisition system(s).  The ability to engage the target.  The ability to create the desired effects based on attack guidance. D-5. Targets are prioritized according to the considerations above within specific time windows. The targeting working group recommends priorities for the targets according to its judgment and the advice of the FSE targeting officer and the FAIO. The target category of the HPT is shown, either by name or by number, on the list. The number of target priorities should not be excessive. Too many priorities will dilute the intelligence collection acquisition and engagement efforts. The approved list is given to the operations, intelligence, and FSE. It is used as a planning tool to determine attack guidance and to refine the collection plan. This list may also indicate the commander's operational need for BDA of the specific target and the time window for collecting and reporting it. Table D-1 shows an example of a HPTL.

There are two battle rhythm events that directly facilitate the deliberate targeting process at the brigade through theater level, a targeting working group and a targeting coordination board. The assessments working group is a third battle rhythm event at echelons above brigade that supports the deliberate targeting process. All events require participation from staff sections, warfighting functions, subordinate commands, and other agencies as required. Each unit must develop an SOPSOPStandard Operating Procedures that is based on the unique mission, organization, equipment, personnel, and philosophy of the commander. The responsibilities for the targeting working group and targeting coordination board are broken out by individual personnel and groups listed below. Example targeting working group, targeting coordination board, and assessments working group agendas follow below. TARGETING BATTLE RHYTHM INDIVIDUALS E-1. The following is a list of targeting individuals and their responsibilities. The list is an example but is by no means all-inclusive as commander’s guidance and mission may require additions or deletions. Targeting individuals include the: C OMMANDING G ENERAL /C OMMANDER  Provide guidance, objectives, priority of effort, and intent for targeting.  Provide guidance and approve joint force command TST nominations and engagement criteria.  Provide guidance and approve sensitive target for engagement and or removal (the STAR process). C HIEF OF STAFF /E XECUTIVE O FFICER  Chair the targeting coordination board (When delegated).  Promulgate the commander’s future targeting guidance. F IRES S UPPORT COORDINATOR  Supported by the FSO and targeting officer lead the targeting working group.  Facilitate the targeting coordination board.  Manage all aspects of the targeting process.  Present the commander’s targeting guidance and intent. G-2 I NTELLIGENCE  Manage all aspects of target development.  Assist in the development of TSTs, sensitive targets, restricted targets, and no-strike entities.  Identify targeting requirements in support of PIRs and decision points.  Ensure targeting requirements are fully integrated into the collection plan.  Develop the high-value target list for each phase of the operation and ATO cycle. G-3 O PERATIONS  Chair the targeting coordination board (When delegated).  Oversees the targeting effort for each targeting cycle is synchronized with the appropriate scheme of maneuver. F UTURE O PERATIONS  Provide the concept of operation and commander’s intent by phase.  Identify key tasks and objectives of subordinate commands by phase.  Provide focus area for future targeting. G-33 C URRENT O PERATIONS  Responsible for the execution of the dynamic targeting process.  Coordinate the execution of actions and activities in support of deliberate targeting. G-4 L OGISTICS  Identify logistic issues unique to fires (status of precision-guided munitions).  Ensure infrastructure needed for future logistical operations are nominated for protection. G-39 I NFORMATION  Integrate information (at echelon) into the targeting process.  Identify host nation information capabilities. C YBERSPACE E LECTROMAGNETIC A CTIVITIES  Participate in target development, validation, and vetting, of all EW attack and offensive cyber capabilities supporting target nominations.  In coordination with the targeting cell, prioritize all EW and offensive cyber capabilities supporting targets nominations (including subordinates’ nomination). C HEMICAL B IOLOGICAL R ADIOLOGICAL AND N UCLEAR O FFICER  Coordinate with the G2 and staff weather officer concerning CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear targets and forecasted weather.  Perform CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear modeling to estimate the effects to include collateral damage from striking CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear targets.  Assess the effects of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear targeting on the friendly and enemy schemes of maneuver.  Recommend CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear targets for the RTL, JTL or NSL as appropriate when CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear modeling effects exceed higher HQ or the commander’s targeting guidance. G-9 C IVIL A FFAIRS O PERATIONS  Identify civilian entities for inclusion into the NSL.  Nominate host nation/local civil networks, cultural sites, internally displaced person, or dislocated civilian camps for inclusion on the RTL.  Provide information on nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and or local humanitarian operations with the area of responsibility. S TAFF J UDGE A DVOCATE  Participate in target development, validation, and vetting to ensure compliance with ROE, Law of armed conflict, and other legal agreements.  Highlight any potential harmful environmental impacts or consequences that should be considered in the targeting process. TARGETING WORKING GROUP E-2. The targeting working group agenda is divided to account for multiple targeting cycles. The Commanders designated representative (G-3, Chief of Staff, FSCOORD, Targeting Officer) directs the process and keeps the members focused on the unit mission, commander's intent, targeting guidance, and targeting priorities. The intent is to develop options for the Commander. As indicated by the name, work is meant to be done during the working group. Contingency operations may be developed, lethal and nonlethal capabilities are discussed and solutions for the best means of creating the desired effects should be worked through. New information, changes to previous understanding, and updates to approved plans should be discussed. The targeting working group is not intended to be a rehearsal for the targeting coordination board. Meeting times should be established to allow timely coordination of the parallel targeting effort of senior and subordinate HQ. O RGANIZATION E-3. Figure E-1 provides recommendations, routine functions, and delineates responsibilities for operations in the BN/brigade targeting working group. T ARGETING WORKING GROUP EXECUTION E-4. The targeting working group is an action officer level venue, led by a delegated authority of the commander (typically the Director of the Fires function, FSCOORD that meets as required in accordance with the commander’s guidance and battle rhythm. Targeting working group responsibilities:  Disseminate the commander's targeting guidance and priorities.  Consolidate, deconflict, and prioritize target nominations from subordinate and supporting commands, warfighting functions, staff sections, and other agencies.  Synchronize the lethal and nonlethal capabilities and effects to ensure target engagement remains nested with higher HQ objectives and is supportive to subordinated commands.  Synchronize detection and collection requirements with the collection manager.  Identify delivery capabilities.  Maintaining and updating the HPTL, candidate target list (referred to as CTL), NSL, RTL/JTL, and other relevant target-related lists. E-5. Figure E-2 provides general information, participants, the overall agenda, and the inputs and outputs related to the division/corps targeting working group. TARGETING COORDINATION BOARD E-6. The targeting coordination board is a director or primary staff level venue chaired by the commander or delegated authority. The targeting coordination board is executed in accordance with the organizational battle rhythm. Targeting coordination board responsibilities:  Review operational-level targeting, assessment and progress towards the commander's objectives.  Approve targeting priorities, effects, and targets for inclusion on the NSL, RTL/JTL, and HPTL.  Review and ensure targeting efforts are synchronized with ground scheme of maneuver.  Approve allocation and priority of resources (collection and delivery) in support of targeting.  Provide the commander's targeting guidance, priority of effort, priorities for dynamic targeting. O RGANIZATION E-7. Figure E-3 provides recommendations, routine functions, and delineates responsibilities for operations in the BN/brigade targeting coordination board. E-8. Figure E-4 provides the general information, participants, the agenda, and the inputs and outputs necessary to conduct a division/corps targeting coordination board. O VERVIEW E-9. The targeting coordination board is a director level venue chaired by the commander or delegated authority and meets as required in accordance with the corps battle rhythm. Targeting coordination board responsibilities:  Review operational-level targeting, assessment, and progress towards the commander's objectives.  Approve targeting priorities, effects, and targets for inclusion on the NSL, RTL/JTL, and HPTL.  Review and ensure targeting efforts are synchronized with ground scheme of maneuver.  Approve allocation and priority of resources (collection and delivery) in support of targeting.  Provide the commander's targeting guidance, priority of effort, priorities for dynamic targeting. E-10. Figure E-5 through figure E-30 on pages E-11 through E-34 provide a visual example of a possible targeting coordination board. ASSESSMENT WORKING GROUP E-11. The assessment working group is the battle rhythm event that allows staffs to formally assess changes in the operational environment and determine if effects are achieving operational objectives. After operations and target execution have begun, it is imperative the assessment working group meets before the targeting working group for the upcoming targeting cycle. This ensures the targeting team is armed with the most up to date assessment of the operational environment and understands the progress toward operational objectives. Assessment is a key step in Army and Joint targeting methodologies and thus makes the assessment working group and targeting meetings inextricably linked in the battle rhythm. Targeting team members must participate in the assessment working group as subject matter experts in the application and assessment of their respective effects on the operational environment. Targeting specific related inputs to the assessment working group can include the following:  Current assessment of enemy composition and disposition.  Assessment of intelligence collection operations during the assessed targeting cycle.  All portions of the combat assessment from the assessed targeting cycle.  Relevant Intelligence Analysis of effects created during the assessed targeting cycle that may not have resulted in measurable BDA.  All Warfighting functions must provide an assessment of their planned and executed effects for the assessed targeting cycle. At a minimum if time is constrained the assessment should include:  Fires  Maneuver  Intelligence  Sustainment  Supporting organizations must provide an assessment of their planned and executed effects for the assessed targeting cycle. Table E-1. is an example assessment working group agenda as displayed in FM 6-0. The assessment working group is executed in accordance with the organizational battle rhythm. For more information of assessment working groups and their execution see FM 6-0 or ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 5-0.3.

The Army targeting methodology does not have a prescribed target packet format or requirements unlike the joint targeting standards. Nevertheless, in order to database, sort, and share the targets developed through D3A, a digital format must be established by SOPs and Commander’s guidance and built on specific information points. This appendix will display an example format and content to be completed. This example is meant to support all target types but does not represent any prescribed requirements. TARGET PACKETS F-1. Targeting often requires that targets be in a shareable format. Whether in a joint or Army role, targeting teams must maintain the ability to save progress, share, or database targets during the development process to satisfy validation requirements. In an Army role, the presentation of a target is entirely unit and SOPSOPStandard Operating Procedures based. The method, format, and content in which to build a target packet is typically driven by the commander's requirements, FSCOORD and targeting officer's guidance, and intelligence capabilities at echelon. F-2. In a joint role, CJCSICJCSIChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3370.01D establishes the target development standards that must be met to present an electronic target folder to a validation authority. EXAMPLE TARGET INFORMATION FOLDER F-3. Target information folders (TIF) have proven to be an efficient and effective way of tracking information related to targets that require more than a cursory recommendation. The TIF typically contains three primary sections of data, they are listed and described below. F-4. The first section is the administrative data located at the top of every page of the TIF. The administrative data contains the following data fields:  Target System or HPTL category-Depending typically on the guidance from the commander, FSCOORD, or unit SOPSOPStandard Operating Procedures, the targeting team will track targets by the systems, warfighting functions, or HPTL items they are attempting to affect.  Supported Operation-This will delineate which phase, critical event, or operation this target is supporting.  Date of Information (referred to as DOI) - This specifies the latest date of intelligence supporting this target.  Basic Encyclopedia (BE), Counter-Terror Identification (CTID), Unique Identification (UID), Target Number-Depending on the target type or how the target is defined will determine the BE/CTID/UID/ Target Number. Any target being nominated to the joint level must have a BE, CTID, or UID. Targets at the tactical army level should be assigned a target number. These target numbers are unit or SOPSOPStandard Operating Procedures based.  Location/ Military Grid Reference System (referred to as MGRS) - Typically in MGRS coordinate form that can provide a horizontal accuracy sufficient to make the target geospatially distinct from any other target in the surrounding area. In some cases, a common name is added to the location data field to further identify the target within an AO. For example, if a target is within a geographic area without civil identification such as city, village, or town name.  Targeting Tasks or Objectives-This data field provides the operational linkage to the target. Not to be confused with supported operation, this field identifies the specific operational effort that will be aided in creating the desired effects against this target. F-5. The second section of the TIF contains the essential target information. The essential target information includes how the target functions, supports the target system, and its description, among other relevant categories that aid a validation authority in determining the validity of a target. Essential target information typically includes:  Target Significance-A target significance statement should address target affiliation and importance to the threat's target system(s) or the capability it provides to the threat ("This target is important to the system because..." or "This target provides the threat with the capability to..."). It should neither state nor re-state the targets’ function, functional characterization, or expectation statement, nor should it be a continuation of the target. Rather, it should relay the target's value given its identified function(s) and relationship to the system and threat.  Target Description-Aids in identifying and characterizing the target and differentiating the target from similar or collocated potential targets. The distinguishing features used for the target do not necessarily support the target's function; rather, this remark uniquely characterizes the target from other potential targets. Target description statements vary by target type and consist of physical descriptions, unique aspects, and/or patterns of life sufficient to identify and distinguish the target from similar or collocated targets.  Functional Characterization-Functional characterization must define the specific actions or activities that the target accomplishes, or the capabilities it provides to the target system. Many targets have multiple functions (especially individuals), and there is utility in considering more than just its primary function. The functional characterization statement provides the space and flexibility to describe multiple secondary functions that fall under a single, primary function. The functional characterization should reflect when a facility type target is a dual-use facility. Clearly identify in the functional characterization statement the primary functions representing both the civilian and military functions of a dual-use facility.  Expectation Statement-The focus of the target expectation statement is not the target itself, but the affect(s) on the target system and threat capability with which it is associated. The target expectation statement should address the following questions:  (such as, minimal, moderate, or significant operational or psychological impact)?  long-term effect)?  neutralized?  force do we expect if the target's function is neutralized, delayed, disrupted, or degraded?   Intelligence Gain Loss Statement-Describes potential intelligence gains or losses resulting from affecting the target. Descriptions of the type of intelligence gained, the intelligence value, any known or potential mitigation techniques, the anticipated significance of the loss or preservation of the intelligence, and an engagement recommendation. F-6. This is by no means an all-inclusive list. Aspects such as commander's guidance, unit SOPs, or mission may affect the specific essential target information captured in a TIF. Concerns are one form of additional information that can be included in this section of a TIF. They can include collateral concerns derived from collateral damage estimation, law of armed conflict concerns derived from the assessment of a target potentially being used for military or civilian purposes, or political concerns derived from the potential ramifications of effecting a target tied to political individuals or organizations. F-7. The last section of the TIF is the supporting intelligence. Supporting intelligence is the intelligence supporting the statements made about the target in the essential target information section. In the example TIF, supporting intelligence is listed in two ways and two locations. The first is in the data block on the first page of the TIF. This is intended to list the total number of intelligence reports supporting this TIF, by intelligence discipline if capable. The second method and location for listing supporting intelligence is through subsequent pages of the TIF, and in as many additional pages as necessary. Preferably by intelligence discipline, intelligence reports are listed with report number, classification, and brief description of report. For human intelligence, a source validation statement is recommended for each report. The supporting intelligence section can also include information outside of typical intelligence disciplines such as weapons locating radar analysis, biometrics, or operational reporting. At the end of the supporting intelligence an assessment or summary can be used to describe the target to a validation authority in the event the target can’t be briefed either in-person or electronically. F-8. Figures F-1 and figure F-2 on page F-3 are graphic examples of the TIF. Figure F-1 is the first page and is often referred to as a baseball card. Figure F-2 is an example supporting intelligence page. Note. Target information folders (TIFs) become classified when actual data is filled in.

CARVER is a memory aid tool that stands for criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect and recognizability and is a tool used to identify and rank (prioritize) specific targets so that attack resources can be efficiently used. CARVER is a target selection and risk, or vulnerability assessment used by calculating the value of a given potential target and the ease with which such a target could be affected. CARVER helps to identify targets that are vulnerable to attack and for defensive purposes. CARVER TOOL G-1. The CARVER matrix tool can indicate high-risk targets that require additional security assets allotted to them to prevent the degradation of these assets via enemy assault or terrorist action. C RITICALITY G-2. Criticality means target value. This is the primary consideration in targeting. A target is critical when its destruction or damage has a significant impact on military, political, or economic operations. Targets within a system must be considered in relation to other elements of the target system. The value of a target will change as the situation develops, requiring the use of the time-sensitive methods which respond to changing situations. For example, when one has few locomotives, railroad bridges may be less critical as targets; however, safeguarding bridges may be critical to maneuvering conventional forces which require use of such bridges. A CCESSIBILITY G-3. A target is accessible when an operational element can reach the target with sufficient personnel and equipment to accomplish its mission. A target can be accessible even if it requires the assistance of knowledgeable insiders. This assessment entails identifying and studying critical paths that the operational element must take to achieve its objectives and measuring those things that aid or impede access. R ECUPERABILITY G-4. A target's recuperability is measured in time; that is, how long will it take to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction of or damage to the target? Recuperability varies with the sources and type of targeted components and the availability of spare parts availability. V ULNERABILITY G-5. A target is vulnerable if the operational element has the means and expertise to successfully attack the target. When determining the vulnerability of a target, the scale of the critical component needs to be compared with the capability of the attacking element to destroy or damage it. E FFECT G-6. The effect of a target attack is a measure of possible military, political, economic, psychological, and sociological impacts at the target and beyond. This is closely related to the measure of target criticality. The type and magnitude of given effects desired will help planners select targets and target components for attack. Effect in this context addresses all significant effects, whether desired or not, that may result once the selected target component is attacked. Traditionally, this element has addressed the effect on the local population, but now there are broader considerations. R ECOGNIZABILITY G-7. A target's recognizability is the degree to which it can be recognized by an operational element and intelligence collection and reconnaissance assets under varying conditions. Weather has an obvious and significant impact on visibility. Rain, snow, and ground fog may obscure observation. Road segments with sparse vegetation and adjacent high ground provide excellent conditions for good observation. Distance, light, and season must also be considered. Table G-1 is an example of a CARVER matrix tool.

Target numbering is a system for expressing lethal and nonlethal actions against an entity or object considered for possible engagement or other actions. This numbering system identifies a wide array of mobile and stationary forces, equipment, capabilities, and functions that an enemy commander can use to conduct operations. The Army identifies targets using alphanumeric characters when selecting and prioritizing targets. The Army assigns target numbers that adhere to the provisions of NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization standardized agreement 2934. H-1. The targeting alphanumeric system represents the following-  Organizations.  Elements.  Cell, sections, or teams within a brigade size element.  Cell, sections, or teams within a BN size element.  Block of numbers. H-2. The target number is comprised of six characters consisting of two letters and four numbers in the following positions, for example AB1234. The two letters indicate the originator of the target number and the echelon holding the target data. The senior HQ establishes and publishes the assigned first letter in the operations order. The letter "Z" is the only permanently assigned first letter. The target number prefix "Z" is reserved for technical use by automatic data processing systems among nations when transferring target information from one nation to another. The second letter "E" is allocated for Service components forces in automatic data processing systems in those instances where a "Z" prefix target is generated for example "ZE." Table H-1 is an example of the assignment of first letters for targeting in an OE.

Two alternative methods have been used and implemented for a varying degree of needs. The two most common methods are the multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures for dynamic targeting known as find, fix, track, target, engage and assess (referred to as F2T2EA) and a Special Operations Forces methodology used predominantly for Counterinsurgency/HVI targeting known as Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD).

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The glossary lists terms for which FM 3-60 is the proponent with an asterisk (*) before the term. For other terms, it lists the proponent publication in parentheses after the definition.

Entries are by paragraph numbers.