*FM 3-81
Field Manual
No. 3-81
Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, D.C., 09 November 2021

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

FM 3-81 provides doctrine for the tactical employment of the MEB in support of Army operations. The manual provides the MEB with a unity of effort and a common philosophy, language, and purpose. As one of the multifunctional brigades of the Army, the MEB is designed to conduct support area operations in support of division and corps operations (also echelons above corps operations within Army, joint, and multinational structures). The MEB is a command and control headquarters with a robust multifunctional brigade staff that is optimized to conduct support area operations. FM 3-81 discusses how MEBs enable commanders to achieve their objectives in support of unified land operations. A MEB is a combined arms organization that is task-organized based on mission requirements. The MEB is not a maneuver brigade, although it can be assigned an area of operations (AO) (normally the support area) and control terrain. This revision is based on the successful training and employment of MEB units. This manual builds on the collective knowledge and wisdom that was gained through recent operations, lessons learned, doctrine revisions, and the analysis of the requirements for divisions and corps to control support areas. This doctrine has been adjusted to accommodate new technologies and organizational changes. There are changes to the force structure of the MEB that have affected the MEB. The MEBs brigade support battalion (BSB) is being replaced with a headquarters support company (HSC). These modifications have an impact on dependencies and require additional mission analysis for the MEB when determining an area support concept requirement by sustainment assets of the supporting sustainment command. FM 3-81 describes how MEB commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders plan, prepare, execute, and assess MEB operations in support of ARFOR that are conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations. It removes the maneuver support, stability, and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as the primary task for the MEB. The subordinate tasks that were aligned under maneuver support and stability are now aligned under tasks for the conduct of support area operations. FM 3-81 increases the emphasis on the MEB primary task of conducting support area operations while supporting the corps or division commander during decisive action—offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA tasks. FM 3-81 includes significant changes. It—  Establishes support area operations as the MEB primary mission and removes maneuver support stability and DSCA as primary MEB tasks.  Describes how the MEB is not a force provider for enduring periods of time and how this could cause the MEB to become ineffective in its ability to conduct support area operations.  Expounds the discussion on MEB support to Army operations.  Discusses how crime, disorder, and the fear of crime are persistent, debilitating factors that contribute to instability throughout the support area.  Adds organizational charts and a detailed discussion on MEB capabilities and the capabilities of units that may be task-organized to it.  Introduces rear command post support.  Designates the MEB role in synchronizing, integrating, and organizing protection capabilities and resources. The following is a brief introduction by chapter and appendix:  Chapter 1 provides an overview of the MEB and discusses the capabilities and primary and subordinate tasks of the MEB headquarters. It also discusses the employment of the MEB and the supported commands and their relationships.  Chapter 2 identifies and discusses the capabilities of MEB organic units and units that may be task-organized to the MEB based on mission requirements.  Chapter 3 discusses the operational necessity of a support area, the framework, and the fundamental principles that are common to all support areas at the corps and division echelon.  Chapter 4 highlights support area responsibilities that include terrain management, information collection, integration, synchronization, civil affairs (CA) operations, movement control, clearance of fires, security, personnel recovery, airspace management, minimum-essential stability operations, and mobility and countermobility.  Chapter 5 describes the integrated sustainment effort required to support MEB operations.  Appendix A describes how support area commanders synchronize, integrate, and organize protection capabilities and resources to protect the force, preserve combat power, reduce risk, and mitigate identified vulnerabilities throughout the support area.  Appendix B discusses MEB support to DSCA.  Appendix C describes how the forward movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel from the echelon (corps and division) support areas is vital to the support of decisive action and to the protection of ground supply routes, waterways, rail lines, and pipelines. It also describes how power generation and distribution capabilities are used to support operations across the range of military operations.  Appendix D provides an overview of support area tenant units and their capabilities.  however, units establish assembly areas (AAs), base camps, and base clusters throughout the support area to build on the concept of integrating mutual support into a viable defense. This appendix also provides a sample base camp defense plan. The MEB doctrine that is provided in this manual, together with related maneuver; fires; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear); engineer; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); military intelligence; CA; military police; and Army Health System (AHS) doctrine will support the actions and decisions of commanders at all levels. This manual is not meant to be a substitute for thought and initiative among MEB leaders and Soldiers. No matter how robust the doctrine or how advanced the MEB capabilities and systems, it is the MEB units and Soldiers who must understand the operational environment, recognize shortfalls, and use their professional judgment to adapt to the situation on the ground. Based on current doctrinal changes, certain terms for which FM 3-81 is the proponent have been modified for the purposes of this manual (see introductory table-1). The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms. Introductory table-1. Modified Army terms Term Remarks Maneuver support operations Rescinded Movement corridor Proponent changed from FM 3-81 to ADP 3-37

Understanding how ARFOR conduct operations as part of an interdependent joint force supports mission success and lays the framework for the roles and mission of the MEB. This chapter provides an overview of the MEB capabilities to provide command and control for units, key functions, and tasks required to conduct its primary task of support area operations. Support area capabilities focus on enabling close operations, supporting deep operations, and creating windows of opportunity that formations can exploit. MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE OVERVIEW 1-1. The MEB is a multifunctional brigade headquarters designed to command and control forces from multiple branches, but especially organizations that conduct tasks enabling support area operations. The MEB employs these organizations to support the conduct of decisive action in support of Army divisions; echelons above division; and joint, interagency, or multinational headquarters. Normally each division and/or corps headquarters receives and assigns a MEB to their support area. More than one MEB may be assigned to a division or corps based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). 1-2. Each MEB headquarters begins with the same basic organization structure, staffing, and capabilities. Task organization is based on mission requirements for the echelon being supported. The headquarters is staffed and optimized to conduct combined arms operations integrating a wide range of functional branches and combat forces. The staff is optimized to provide for the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of key tasks associated with protection (see ADP 3-37 and appendix A), security, support to mobility, and stability. It uses units that are attached or under operational control (OPCON) to conduct the MEB primary task throughout its AO and within the broader AO of the organization (division, corps) it supports. 1-3. The MEB has limited organic structure and depends on the task organization of units for capabilities to conduct support area operations. The MEB staff must conduct detailed mission analysis and running estimates to identify these requirements. This is mission-critical when submitting for MEB subordinate functional unit requirements. Examples of MEB dependencies include fire support (counterfire radar and target acquisition assets), engineers, military police, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, CA, EOD, air defense artillery (ADA), tactical combat force (TCF), sustainment, Role 2 medical support AHS (except role 1 treatment), medical evacuation (via air and ground), signal, and information collection capability (unmanned aircraft system and military intelligence units). The MEB also depends on the higher headquarters for legal, financial management, personnel, and administrative services. 1-4. The MEB may be placed in support of Army, joint, interagency, or multinational headquarters. The MEB may include a mix of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, CA, engineer, EOD, military police and, potentially, air missile defense (AMD) and a TCF (see figure 1-1, page 1-2). A tactical combat force is a rapidly deployable, air-ground mobile combat unit with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets assigned to, and capable of defeating Level III threats, including combined arms (JP 3-10). See table 1-1, page 1-2, for discussion on the levels of threats. Table 1-1 is a guide, not a definitive categorization, and attention must be given to enemy capabilities and activities. Size is not the sole determinant of a threat level. As required Legend: CA civil affairs EOD explosive ordnance disposal MI military intelligence MP military police MEB maneuver enhancement brigade NETNETNew equipment training network SPT support TCF tactical combat force 1-19. When designated as a joint force land component, the corps exercises command over Marine Corps forces as required by the joint force commander. The corps functions as an operational-level headquarters. If the joint force commander elects to establish a joint security area (JSA) within the joint operations area, the joint force commander normally determines its structure and controlling headquarters. The options for the JSA depend on the threat and mission variables, particularly forces available. If the threat to the JSA is low to moderate, the theater army commander may tailor ARFOR with a MEB specifically for controlling the JSA. The MEB may include additional military police and intelligence assets. If the threat to theater bases and lines of communications is significant, the theater army may tailor ARFOR with an additional BCTBCTBasic combat training to control that AO. A third option, in the case of very high threat levels, is to assign the mission to an Army division with BCTs. 1-20. When assigned the mission of supporting echelons above division, joint, or multinational forces, the MEB could be task-organized with other Service or national units and integrated staff augmentation to provide command and control for a variety of elements necessary to support those forces. The MEB may be assigned its own AO in such a role. When assigned to a joint command, the MEB may provide command and control of the JSA. In this case, the MEB commander may be designated as the joint security coordinator by a joint force commander. The MEB may be required to establish or support a theater level joint security coordination center. (See JP 3-10 for additional information on a MEB serving as a joint security coordination center for a JSA.) The MEB can also support functional component commands, a joint force, or another Service. Other Brigade Support 1-21. The MEB could be tasked to provide support to other divisional units, to include BCTs, functional brigades, or other support brigades. The division may task the MEB to conduct certain operations in general support to the division with selected tasks that require direct support to the main effort, such as protecting critical capabilities, assets, and activities. When providing general support, other brigades in the division coordinate their requirements with the division staff and the MEB. Based on the division commander’s intent, the MEB recommends priorities, provides task organization, and provides directed support, refining specific details through collaboration with BCTs and other support brigades to accomplish missions. 1-22. MEBs can support BCTBCTBasic combat training operations in a variety of ways. In general, the division may task-organize parts of the MEB to BCTs for a specific mission, or the MEB may complement or reinforce the BCTBCTBasic combat training with forces under MEB control that are performing selected missions or tasks within the BCTBCTBasic combat training AO. Examples include—  Assisting in BCTBCTBasic combat training initial detainee collection point construction.  Assisting in defensive-position construction.  Building a bridge over a gap.  Performing decontamination at a site within a BCTBCTBasic combat training AO.  Performing other tasks that are temporary and specific in nature. 1-23. Elements out of the MEB may also provide specific CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear or engineer reconnaissance capability to a BCTBCTBasic combat training. Military police may secure a sensitive site within a BCTBCTBasic combat training AO. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, engineer, EOD, and military police forces may provide a wide range of support to the BCTBCTBasic combat training or to other brigades within a division AO. However, specific missions does not imply long-term. If the MEB becomes a force provider for an enduring period of time, it could become ineffective in its ability to conduct support area operations. 1-24. The MEB may also support reorganization or reconstruction operations where a BCTBCTBasic combat training rests, reorganizes, and receives large quantities of supplies. This may occur when the MEB is assigned an AO within which the reorganization or reconstruction operations occur or when it is assigned an AO within which the MEB provides mobility support. E MPLOYMENT 1-25. Figure 1-3 is an example of a division task organization that contains a single MEB. This particular example does not provide the division with any functional brigades. Units that might be found in functional CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, engineer, military police, or other brigades would likely be task-organized to the MEB. Support that might be drawn from a functional brigade would likely come from the MEB if the necessary assets have been task-organized to the MEB. Legend: CA civil affairs SUST sustainment 1-26. The effectiveness and success of the MEB depend on the synergy that is leveraged from integrating and synchronizing subordinate and supporting units. Depending on the METT-TC factors, MEBs can task-organize assigned units into combined arms task forces and company teams. These combined arms elements can then perform multifunctional tasks more effectively and efficiently. The military intelligence unit would be task-organized to the MEB when the METT-TC factors associated with a particular AO require this augmentation of the MEB, similar to the organic military intelligence companies that are found in all BCTs. The TCF shown in figure 1-1, page 1-2, could be made up of a variety of maneuver forces, and its actual size and composition would be based on the Level III threat that it would be focused against. 1-27. Functional brigades and the MEB provide different capabilities to the supported headquarters, and sometimes both units are required. A functional brigade is needed with large and complex functional tasks that require three or more functional battalions of the same type. Additional MEBs are required if span of control is exceeded. 1-28. The MEB bridges a capability gap between the limited functional units (CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, engineer, and military police) of the BCTs and the more capable functional brigades. This headquarters provides a more functional staff capability than BCTs, but usually less than a functional brigade. The key difference between the MEB and the functional brigades is the breadth and depth of the MEB multifunctional staff. The MEB provides complementary and reinforcing capabilities. Based on its task organization and mission, the MEB can detach functional modular units or combined arms elements (task forces or company teams) to support the BCTs for specific tasks and, potentially, other multifunctional brigades, providing functional and combined arms support across the higher headquarters AO. 1-29. The MEB can provide command and control for units in transition as they arrive in the division AO or when they are in between task organizations and then detach those units to provide added support to BCTs or functional brigades when needed. The MEB capability to support onward movement and integration enables the modular Army to employ assets when and where they are required. 1-30. The MEB may control the terrain where other support or functional brigades are located. They synchronize their operations with other tenant support brigades. The MEB may require capabilities in a command or support relationship from the other support brigades. The MEB should have some command and control authority over the organizations positioned within the MEB AO to conduct security and defense; this may be TACON for security and defense. The MEB should also receive liaisons to coordinate and synchronize operations between specific command structures to foster positive relationships. 1-31. The MEB may support other functional brigades or BCTs. For example, the MEB can be expected to coordinate or provide protection of designated sustainment packages or convoys transiting through the MEB AO. The MEB is also dependent on the other support brigades to fill capability gaps that were identified during mission planning. OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK 1-32. The operational framework provides Army leaders with basic conceptual options for arraying forces and visualizing and describing operations. An operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). The operational framework provides an organizing construct for visualizing and describing operations by echelon in time and space within the context of an AO, area of influence, and area of interest. It provides a logical architecture for determining the responsibilities, permissions, and restrictions for subordinate echelons, and by doing so enables freedom of action and unity of effort. When used in conjunction with effective operational graphics, it provides commanders the ability to provide intent, develop shared visualization, and ultimately create the shared understanding necessary for the exercise of initiative at every echelon. 1-33. The operational framework has four components. First, commanders are assigned an AO for the conduct of operations, from which, in turn, they assign AOs to subordinate units based on their visualization of the operation. Units should be assigned AOs commensurate with their ability to influence what happens within them. Second, within their assigned AO, commanders designate deep, close, support, and rear areas to describe the physical arrangement of forces in time, space, and purpose. Third, commanders establish decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to further articulate an operation in terms of purpose. Finally, commanders designate the main and supporting efforts to designate the shifting and prioritization of resources. See ADP 3-0, FM 3-0, and FM 3-94 for additional information on the operational framework. 1-34. Commanders designate close, support, deep, and rear areas as required. They designate a deep area and rear area as required. The MEB primarily conducts operations in support of decisive action in the commander’s designated support area. Figure 1-4 depicts MEB support to a corps AO (organized into deep, close, support, and rear areas) within a theater of operations.  The close area is the portion of a commander’s area of operations where the majority of subordinate maneuver forces conduct close combat (ADP 3-0).  The support area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations (ADP 3-0).  A deep area is where the commander sets conditions for future success in close combat (ADP 3-0).  The rear area is that area within a unit AO that extends forward from its rear boundary to the rear boundary of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. It is an area of operations in which most forces and assets are located that supports and sustains forces in the close area. Legend: CA civil affairs EOD explosive ordnance disposal ESC expeditionary sustainment command MP military police MI military intelligence SUST sustainment 1-35. There are fundamental principles that are common to all support areas. Support areas may be designated by any Army echelon or by operational necessity, but they are usually associated with organizations that are capable of synchronizing and integrating continuing activities necessary to control terrain. A joint force would designate a JSA. Support area operations are conducted by the assigned area owner and tenants to prevent or minimize interference with command and control and SPO and to provide unimpeded movement of friendly forces; protection; operations to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces or defeat threats; and area damage control. Corps and divisions may have one or multiple support areas, located as required to best support the force. These areas may be noncontiguous. 1-36. When a corps or division support area is designated, the MEB, in most cases, is given responsibility for it. The MEB is normally task-organized units that support movement, protection, area security, and defense tasks throughout the support area. These organizations also provide area security (base/base camp defense, critical asset security, response force, area damage control, lines of communication, supply routes, and convoy security) as the predominant method of protecting support areas and areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. If conditions in the support area degrade, it is detrimental to the success of operations. A degraded support area inhibits the ability to shape the deep area for the BCTs involved in close operations. Therefore, the protection of support areas requires planning considerations equal to those in the close areas. 1-37. Corps and division commanders may establish a rear area, particularly in the offense as the friendly force gains territory, to exploit tactical success while enabling freedom of action for forces operating in other areas. A rear area has all the characteristics of a close area, with the purpose to consolidate gains through decisive action once large-scale combat has largely ended in that particular AO. 1-38. The division rear area grows as BCTs in close operations advance. When division boundaries shift, as is likely during the offense, the corps rear area grows and the balance of security and stability tasks may shift toward a stability focus, as conditions allow. The unit responsible for the corps rear area conducts consolidation of gains activities designed to set conditions for the handover of terrain to host-nation forces or legitimate civilian authorities. SUPPORT TO DECISIVE ACTION 1-39. Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or DSCA tasks. ARFOR conduct decisive action. Commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine three elements of decisive action—offense, defense, and stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines elements of DSCA and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland defense. 1-40. Decisive action begins with the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Decisive action provides direction for an entire operation. Commanders and staffs refine the concept of operations during planning and determine the proper allocation of resources and tasks. Throughout the operation, they may adjust the allocation of resources and tasks as conditions change. 1-41. The simultaneity of decisive action varies by echelon and span of control. Higher echelons generally have a broader focus than lower echelons when assigning responsibilities to subordinates. The higher the echelon, the greater the possibility that all elements of decisive action occur simultaneously within its AO. At lower echelons, an assigned task may require all the echelons’ combat power to execute a specific task. For example, in some form a higher echelon, such as a corps, always performs offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA operations simultaneously. Subordinate brigades perform some combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, but they generally are more focused by their immediate priorities on a specific element, particularly during large-scale combat operations. 1-42. Unified land operations addresses combat with armed opponents amid populations. This requires ARFOR to shape civil conditions. Winning battles and engagements is important, but it is not always the most significant task in a specific strategic context. Shaping civil conditions with unified action partners is generally important to the success of all campaigns, and thus it is a critical component of all operations. 1-43. Unified land operations encompass both competition and entirety of the conflict continuum. They are conducted in support of all four Army strategic roles. The relative emphasis on the various elements of decisive action varies with the purpose and context of the operations being conducted. See figure 1-5, page 1-10. O FFENSE 1-44. An offensive operation is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers (ADP 3-0). Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain physical advantages and achieve definitive results is the essence of the offense. Offensive operations seek to throw enemy forces off balance, overwhelm their capabilities, disrupt their defenses, and ensure their defeat or destruction by maneuver. An offense ends when the force achieves the purpose of the operation, reaches a limit of advancement, or approaches culmination. ARFOR conclude an offensive operation by consolidating gains through security and stability tasks, resuming the attack, shifting over to the defense, or preparing for future operations. ARFOR conduct four types of offensive operations—movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. See ADP 3-90 for additional information on the conduct of offensive tasks. 1-45. The MEB ability to conduct offensive operations is limited. During offensive operations, the focus of the MEB is typically on the protection and security of the support area, to include actions required to secure and protect lines of communication (see appendix C). The MEB may also conduct or provide support to a movement corridor in support of troop movement and logistics preparations in support of offensive operations in the close area or rear area. The MEB is not structured to conduct offensive tasks as a brigade but it may plan, conduct, and provide command and control for offensive tasks performed by assigned maneuver units and a TCF as part of security for the support area. 1-46. The MEB can form task forces or company teams to support the offensive operations of its supported headquarters. These organizations may be attached or placed OPCON to BCTs or employed by the MEB to complement or reinforce maneuver forces across the AO of higher headquarters for a specific or select mission or tasks that support the main effort. However, specific or select missions does not imply long-term task organization. If the MEB becomes a force provider for an enduring period of time, it could become ineffective in its ability to conduct support area operations. D EFENSE 1-47. A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). The defense alone normally cannot achieve a decision. However, it can create conditions for a counteroffensive operation that allows ARFOR to regain the initiative. Defensive tasks can establish a shield behind which stability tasks can progress. Defensive tasks counter enemy offensive tasks. They defeat attacks, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They preserve control over land, resources, and populations. Defensive tasks retain terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks. They can be used to gain time and economize forces so that offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere. 1-48. Defending forces anticipate the enemy attacks and counter them. Waiting for attacks is not a passive activity. Commanders conduct aggressive surveillance, reconnaissance, and security operations to seek out enemy forces and deny them information. They engage them with Army and joint fires and maneuver to weaken them before close combat. Commanders use combined arms and joint capabilities to attack enemy vulnerabilities and seize the initiative. There are three types of tactical operations associated with defense: mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde defense. ADP 3-90 provides details on the conduct of defensive operations. 1-49. During defensive operations, the initial focus of the MEB is typically on security and protection of the support area. The MEB may conduct reconnaissance operations to support the defense. The MEB prepares to execute area damage control. Depending on the situation, the MEB continually improves defensive positions within its AO or relocates some or all of its activities if required by the higher headquarters defensive plans. The MEB continually assesses its effort to support the defensive efforts of its supported division or corps, including—  The commitment of the MEB assigned TCF.  The balance of effort between support to mobility, protection, and sustainment.  The balance of effort between self-defense and mission support. 1-50. If the MEB is supporting a division level defense, MEB focus is on defensive operations within its AO. It is also prepared to provide task-organized assets to support BCTs for specific missions in their defensive tasks. These organizations may be attached or placed OPCON to BCTs or employed by the MEB to complement or reinforce maneuver forces across the AO of higher headquarters for a specific or select mission or tasks that support the main effort. However, specific or select missions does not imply long-term task organization. If the MEB becomes a force provider for an enduring period of time, it could become ineffective in its ability to conduct support area operations. S TABILITY 1-51. A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0). These operations support governance by a host nation, an interim government, or a military government. Stability involves coercive and constructive action. Stability assists in building relationships among unified action partners and promoting U.S. security interests. It can help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions in an area while supporting the transition of responsibility to a legitimate authority. Commanders are legally required to conduct minimum-essential stability tasks when controlling populated areas of operations. These include security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. See ADP 3-07 for a detailed discussion of stability. 1-52. Stability tasks are tasks that are conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. When properly task-organized, the MEB can conduct or support stability operations. D EFENSE S UPPORT OF C IVIL A UTHORITIES 1-53. Defense support of civil authorities is support provided by United States Federal military forces, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events (DODDDODDDepartment of Defense directive 3025.18). DSCA is a task executed in the homeland and U.S. territories. It is conducted in support of another primary agency, lead federal agency, or local authority. National Guard forces—Title 32 or state active forces under the command and control of the governor and the adjutant general—are usually the first forces to respond on behalf of state authorities. When federal military forces are employed for DSCA activities, they remain under federal military command and control at all times. (See ADP 3-28, DODDDODDDepartment of Defense directive 3025.18, and JP 3-28 for a detailed discussion of DSCA.). When properly task-organized, the MEB can conduct or support DSCA. See chapter 2 for additional discussion on MEB support to stability operations. See appendix B for additional information on MEB support to DSCA tasks. OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES 1-54. Operational and mission variables complement each other and support the common purpose of describing the operational environment. The operational variables include political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure that collectively create the joint memory aid of PMESII (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [operational variables]. The Army adds two more operational variables physical environment and time [PT]) to this joint construct to create the memory aid of PMESII-PT with a total of eight operational variables. 1-55. The six mission variables are grouped into the time-tested memory aid of METT-TC, which captures the six variables of METT-TC. Each variable affects how ARFOR combine, sequence, and conduct military operations. Commanders tailor and task-organize forces, employ diverse capabilities, and support different missions to accomplish military objectives. O PERATIONAL V ARIABLES 1-56. Army planners describe conditions of an operational environment in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational environment, but also the population’s influence on it. Using Army design methodology, planners analyze an operational environment in terms of the eight interrelated operational variables PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time). As soon as a commander and staff have an indication of where their unit will conduct operations, they begin analyzing the operational variables associated with that location. They continue to refine and update that analysis throughout the course of operations. 1-57. The variables provide a broad view of the operational environment that emphasizes its human aspects. Because land forces always operate among populations, understanding the human variables is crucial. They describe each operation’s context for commanders and other leaders. Understanding them helps commanders appreciate how the military instrument complements other instruments of national power. Comprehensive analysis of the variables occurs at the joint level; Army commanders use the comprehensive joint analysis of the variables to shape their understanding of the situation. 1-58. The eight Army operational variables discussed below highlight potential implications for the support area. The examples are not meant to be all-inclusive concerns. For more information on the variables, see FM 6-0.  Political. The political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance—the formally constituted authorities, as well as informal political powers. The political variable includes influential political groups and the collective attitude of the population toward the United States. The support area operations may have challenges associated with political circumstances permitting or denying access to key ports of entry or critical sustainment facilities. Opportunities in the form of alternative access routes might be added. The political variable (which is always important) takes on a more prominent role during stability and civil SPO.  Military. The military variable explores the military and/or paramilitary capabilities of all relevant actors (enemy, friendly, and neutral) in a given operational environment. This includes nonmilitary armed and unarmed combatants, as well as insurgent forces, guerrilla forces, and criminal organizations.  Economic. The economic variable encompasses individual behaviors and aggregate phenomena related to the production, distribution, and consumption of resources. The support area may include challenges associated with the production or availability of key materials and resources.  Social. The social variable describes the cultural, religious, and ethnic makeup within an operational environment and the beliefs, values, customs, and behaviors of society members. Societies are comprised of structured and overlapping groups and institutions, each with relative statuses and roles that support, enable, and provide opportunity to achieve personal or community expectations. Important characteristics of a social system include population demographics, migration trends, and diversity of religious and ethnic groups. Understanding these complex interrelationships in a society is vitally important for successful military missions.  Information. The information variable describes the nature, scope, characteristics, and effects of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. Information involves the access, use, manipulation, distribution, and reliance on information technology systems, both civilian and military, by an entity (state or nonstate). Understanding existing communication infrastructure in an operational environment ultimately controls the flow of information to the population and military and/or paramilitary forces and influences local and international audiences. Communication availability can act as a leveling function with regard to mitigating military technical advantages to a surprising extent. Military units must understand and engage in the information environment to achieve their objectives.  Infrastructure. Infrastructure comprises the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society. The support area may have challenges associated with specific deficiencies in the basic infrastructure. Opportunities in the form of improvements to existing infrastructure and specific new projects might be added. Units in the support area provide a detailed understanding of infrastructure by subcategories in the context of combat operations and stability. The degradation or destruction of infrastructure impacts the entire operational environment. This variable also reflects the infrastructure sophistication of an operational environment.  Physical environment. The defining factors are complex terrain and urban settings (super-surface, surface, and subsurface features), weather, topography, hydrology, and environmental conditions. Operations in the support area may have challenges due to natural and man-made obstacles. Insights into environmental considerations are also a concern (see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-34.5). Opportunities in the form of existing routes, installations, and resources might be added. A broad understanding of the physical environment can be accomplished through geospatial engineering, which is discussed in detail in ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-34.80 and JP 2-03.  Time. The variable of time influences military operations within an operational environment in terms of the decision—cycles, operating tempo, and planning horizons. Support area operations might have challenges associated with completing required CA-related plan missions in the time allotted because of the impact on perceptions of civilians during stability tasks. Opportunities in the form of potential to accelerate priority projects might be added for the positive effect it would have on civil considerations and the perception of mission success. M ISSION V ARIABLES 1-59. Analysis of the operational environment in terms of the operational variables provides the relevant information that commanders can use to frame operational problems. While such analysis improves situational understanding at all levels, land operations require more specific information. When commanders receive a mission, they require a more detailed mission analysis focused on their specific situation. 1-60. Similar to the analysis of the operational environment using the operational variables, commanders at the tactical level use the mission variables to seek shared common understanding. Additionally, commanders use these variables to assist in hazard identification during deliberate planning and real-time application. The identified hazards are then mitigated. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 5-19.) The support area commander is expected to exercise prudence and ensure that residual risk is accepted at the appropriate level. The following are examples for each mission variable:  Mission. The support area commander analyzes the mission in terms of specified tasks, implied tasks, and the commander’s intent (two echelons up) to determine the essential tasks. Early identification of the essential tasks for support area operations enables the commander to ensure that they have the required capabilities for mission success (or, in selected cases, to designate other assets to perform those roles) early in the planning process.  Enemy. The support area commander’s view of the enemy concentrates on enemy tactics, equipment, and capabilities that could threaten friendly operations in the support area and along the ground line of communications (LOC). This may include an analysis of other factors within the AO or the area of interest that could have an impact on mission success.  Terrain and weather. The support area commander and staff analyze terrain (man-made and natural) to determine the effects on friendly and enemy operations. The staff uses the five military aspects of terrain (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment). The support area commander and staff also use geospatial products to help determine how certain aspects of the terrain aids the enemy, promotes crime and criminality, and impacts traffic and dislocated civilians on main supply routes (MSRs) or alternate supply routes (ASRs).  Troops and support available. The support area commander considers the number, type, and capabilities required (joint, multinational, and interagency forces) for mission success. The number and type of organizations placed in the support area depend on the mission, threat, and number and type of units to conduct support area operations.  Time available. The support area commander must understand the time needed for planning support area operations and the importance of collaborative and parallel planning. The commander must also realize the time needed for positioning critical assets and the time associated with setting conditions for performing support area tasks or projects.  Civil considerations. Civil considerations are the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations (ADP 6-0). Civil considerations comprise six characteristics, expressed in the memory aid ASCOPE—areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. THREAT 1-61. The term threat includes any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm U.S. forces, U.S. national interests, or the homeland. Threats include nation-states, organizations, people, groups, or conditions that can damage or destroy life, vital resources, or institutions. The various actors in an AO can qualify as a threat, an enemy, an adversary, or a neutral or friendly. A peer threat is an adversary or enemy with the capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple domains worldwide or in a specific region where it enjoys a position of relative advantage. Peer threats possess roughly equal combat power to U.S. forces in geographical proximity to a conflict area. Enemy and friendly unexploded ordnance pose a significant threat during large-scale combat operations. See FM 3-0 for additional information on peer threats. 1-62. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (TC 7-100). Hybrid threats combine traditional forces governed by law, military tradition, and custom with unregulated forces that act without constraints on the use of violence. These may involve nation-states using proxy forces or nonstate actors, such as criminal and terrorist organizations, that employ sophisticated capabilities traditionally associated with states. Hybrid threats are most effective when they exploit friendly constraints, capability gaps, and a lack of situational awareness (see ADP 3-0). Land operations often prove complex because actors intermix, often with no easy means to distinguish one from another. Civilians could interfere with military operations. Civilians are considered noncombatants or combatants under the Law of Land Warfare. Civilians are afforded noncombatant status unless they engage in a hostile act. They may be the most difficult to counter because they are not normally part of an established enemy agent network and their actions may be less predictable. 1-63. Many urban environments include vast, densely packed areas with populations that exceed a million people. In urban environments, threats can be difficult to identify due to the often complex nature of the forces and environment. These threats may operate independently or together. Individuals may be active members of one or more groups. Potential urban adversaries share many characteristics. In urban terrain, friendly forces may encounter a variety of potential threats, such as conventional military forces, paramilitary forces, insurgents or guerilla forces, terrorists, criminals and organized crime, drug traffickers, warlords, or street gangs. Individual criminals or small gangs do not normally have the capability to adversely affect legitimate political, military, and judicial organizations. However, large-scale criminal organizations can challenge governmental authority with capabilities and characteristics similar to a paramilitary force. 1-64. Threats in a support area are categorized by the three levels of defense required to counter them. Any or all threat levels may exist simultaneously in the support area. Emphasis on base defense and security measures may depend on the anticipated threat level. A Level I threat is a small enemy force that can be defeated by those units normally operating in the echelon support area. A Level I threat generally consists of a squad size unit or smaller groups of enemy soldiers, agents, criminals, or terrorists. Typical objectives for a Level I threat include supplying themselves from friendly supply stocks, disrupting friendly missions command nodes and logistics facilities, and interdicting friendly LOC. 1-65. A Level II threat is an enemy force or activities beyond the defense capability of both the base camps and base clusters and any local reserve or response force. Level II threats consist of enemy special operations teams, long-range reconnaissance, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and attrited small combat units. Typical objectives for Level II threats include the interdiction of friendly LOC, as well as the disruption or destruction of friendly command and control nodes and logistics and commercial facilities, the collection of information on friendly forces, and the interdiction of friendly LOC. Typically, MEB military police assets can neutralize Level II threats. 1-66. A Level III threat is an enemy force or activities beyond the defense capability of both the base camps and base clusters and any local reserve or response force. It consists of mobile enemy combat forces. Possible objectives for a Level III threat include seizing key terrain, interfering with the movement and commitment of reserves and artillery, and destroying friendly combat forces. Its objectives could also include destroying friendly sustainment facilities, supply points, command post facilities, airfields, aviation AAs, and arming and refueling points; gathering information on friendly forces; and interdicting LOC and major supply routes. The most appropriate response to a Level III threat in the support area is a TCF. 1-67. The nexus between criminal and irregular threats has grown closer and stronger. Most criminal activities in the operational environment occur in densely populated urban areas where disorder, crime, and the fear of crime harm civilian populations, weaken developing security forces, destabilize governments, and threaten military operations. Irregular and criminal threats continue to attack, manipulate, exploit, and intimidate vulnerable and frustrated populations as ways to discredit governments, gain power and influence, drive disorder and instability, and generate illicit profits. Crime, disorder, and the fear of crime continue to be persistent, debilitating factors that contribute to instability across the operational environment, especially in densely populated urban areas and in weak, failing, and failed states. Despite the potential threat, the support area will likely include urban areas, and MEBs will often establish base camps or base clusters in them to take advantage of existing facilities (airports, warehouses, ports). SUPPORT TO ARMY OPERATIONS 1-68. The Army defeats enemies by using a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations and supports civil authorities through DSCA. The effort accorded to each task is proportional to the mission and varies with the situation. The MEB supports Army operations through the integration of MEB capabilities to synchronize, integrate, and organize all organic and task-organized capabilities and resources throughout operations to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale combat, and consolidate gains. The MEB primary task of support area operations in support of operations enables the unrestricted movement of resources to allow greater freedom of action of forces in the close area and units shaping the deep area. A RMY O PERATIONS 1-69. The United States Army exists to provide dominant landpower for the joint force and the nation. Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people (see ADP 3-0). To maintain dominant landpower for the joint force, ARFOR conduct multidomain operations. During multidomain operations, ARFOR (as part of a joint and multinational team) employ multidomain capabilities throughout the extended battlefield to enable joint freedom of action, create and exploit the positions of relative advantage necessary for defeating enemy forces, and consolidate gains to enable enduring strategic outcomes. 1-70. Successful operations require ARFOR to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative by forcing an enemy to respond to friendly action. By presenting multiple dilemmas to an enemy, commanders force the enemy to react continuously until the enemy is finally driven into untenable positions. Seizing the initiative pressures enemy commanders into abandoning their preferred options and making mistakes. Enemy mistakes allow friendly forces to seize opportunities and create new avenues for exploitation. Throughout operations, commanders focus combat power to defeat enemy forces, protect populations and infrastructure, and consolidate gains to retain the initiative within the overall purpose of an operation. 1-71. Operations to shape consist of various long-term military engagements; security cooperation; and deterrence missions, tasks, and actions intended to assure friends, build partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. Operations to shape typically occur in support of the geographic combatant commander’s theater campaign plan or the theater security cooperation plan. These operations help counter actions by adversaries that challenge the stability of a nation or region contrary to U.S. interests. Shaping activities are continuous within an area of responsibility. MEB commanders and staffs must perform detailed mission analysis to identify the mission requirements and specific capabilities needed to accomplish MEB missions. The MEB must synchronize, integrate, and organize all organic and task-organized capabilities and resources throughout operations to shape and protect U.S. interests and to build partner capacity and partnerships. 1-72. Operations to shape include unit home station activities, including maintaining operational readiness, training, and contingency planning. Combined exercises and training, military exchange programs, and foreign military member attendance at Army schools are examples of home-station shaping activities. At home stations, the MEB participates in mission readiness exercises that enable commanders to generate, project, and preserve combat power during training and deployment tasks that are associated with readiness requirements. 1-73. The purpose of operations is to prevent and deter adversary actions contrary to U.S. interests. They are typically conducted in response to activities that threaten partners and allies and require the deployment or repositioning of credible forces in a theater to demonstrate the willingness to fight if deterrence fails. These operations are characterized by actions to protect friendly forces, critical capabilities, assets, and activities and indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation. 1-74. Army operations in large-scale combat converge capabilities from all domains to generate effects on land. These operations include airborne and air assault operations, AMD, fires, aviation, cyberspace electromagnetic activities, information operations, space operations, military deception, and information collection. Large-scale combat operations such as these entail significant operational risk, synchronization, capabilities convergence, and high operating tempo. 1-75. During large-scale combat operations, ARFOR focus on the defeat and destruction of enemy ground forces as part of the joint team. ARFOR close with and destroy enemy forces in any terrain, exploit success, and break their opponent’s will to resist. ARFOR attack, defend, conduct stability tasks, and consolidate gains to attain national objectives. Divisions and corps are the formations central to the conduct of large-scale combat operations and are organized, trained, and equipped to enable subordinate organizations. 1-76. In large-scale combat operations against regional peer enemies, commanders conduct decisive action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. This involves the orchestration of many simultaneous unit actions in the most demanding of operational environments. Large-scale combat operations introduce levels of complexity, lethality, ambiguity, and speed to military activities not common in other operations. Large-scale combat operations require the execution of multiple tasks synchronized and converged across multiple domains to create opportunities to destroy, dislocate, and disintegrate enemy forces and isolate enemy forces from positions of relative advantage. During large-scale combat, the MEB controls terrain and provides security, movement control, mobility support, and clearance of fires in the echelon (corps or division) support area to facilitate operations, freedom of action, and sustainment. See FM 3-0 for additional information on multidomain operations and large-scale combat operations. 1-77. Consolidate gains are the activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Consolidation of gains is not separate nor isolated from large-scale combat operations; consolidation of gains activities are a form of exploitation inherent to large-scale combat operations. ARFOR conduct consolidation of gains throughout the range of military operations. The MEB, when properly task-organized, supports the consolidation of gains and focuses their priorities toward the performance of the initial response tasks of the six primary stability tasks as the security situation stabilizes. See FM 3-0 for additional information on the consolidation of gains. This page intentionally left blank.

The MEB is a multifunctional command and control headquarters that is organized to perform support area operations for Army divisions and corps. The MEB may include a mix of maneuver, engineer, military police, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, CA, EOD, and other capabilities. The number and type of organizations that are task-organized to a MEB are driven by mission requirements. Peacetime task organization may vary due to stationing and the types of units that are collocated under the MEB for command and control. This chapter discusses the capabilities of units that are organic to the MEB and the capabilities of organizations that are task-organized based on mission requirements.

The support area represents a key AO in support of Army operations. Operations are not successful solely based on support area operations, but Army operations could be lost in the support area. If conditions in the support area degrade, it is detrimental to the success of operations. Therefore, the protection of support areas requires planning considerations equal to those of the close areas. SUPPORT AREA OVERVIEW 3-1. There are fundamental principles that are common to all support areas, whether they are established in a contiguous AO or a noncontiguous AO during large-scale combat operations or contingency operations. Support areas may be designated by any Army echelon or by operational necessity, but they are usually associated with and assigned to units that are capable of controlling an AO and executing the AO responsibilities as described in ADP 3-0. 3-2. Commanders assign a support area as a subordinate AO to protect the force, preserve combat power, reduce risk, and mitigate vulnerabilities throughout corps and division support areas. The support area may provide critical infrastructure and secondary command and control nodes. This is where most of the echelon sustaining operations occur. Support area operations as discussed in this manual do not include the mission SPO conducted by tenants within the support area. Considerations for establishing a support area include—  The location (size required and proximity to LOC).  Command and support relationships between units in the support area.  Transportation networks (including road, rail, inland waterways, and air) into and out of the area.  Survivability of critical assets and personnel.  Terrain management.  Security responsibilities.  The dispersion of units to increase survivability against indirect-fire and air attacks.  Displacement considerations to sustain tempo and shorten LOC.  Movement control into, through, and out of the support area by units enabling combat operations.  Security and defense capabilities.  The congestion of organic, supporting, and unassigned airspace users over the AO.  A plan for transitions (boundary shifts, commander’s priorities, mission). 3-3. The higher headquarters assesses and assumes risk in the support area to maximize combat power in other AOs. During planning, the higher headquarters and assigned support area commander conduct their initial assessments and adjust resources as the situation changes. Based on METT-TC, any unit assigned the support area will normally require augmentation to successfully complete the mission. Within a division support area, a designated unit such as a BCTBCTBasic combat training or MEB is identified as the support area land owner and conducts support area operations. Within a corps support area, the corps designates a division, BCTBCTBasic combat training, or MEB as the designated land owner. The MEB is the primary Army unit for conducting division and corps support area operations (see FM 3-0). Key functions performed by the support area commander include terrain management, movement control, protection, security, and defense. Note. Assigning the support area to functional or multifunctional brigades without the capability to conduct AO responsibilities will increase operational risk. C ONTIGUOUS A REA OF O PERATIONS 3-4. In most operations, corps and divisions employ contiguous areas of operations. Contiguous area of operations is where all of a commander’s subordinate forces’ areas of operations share one or more common boundaries (FM 3-90.1). This allows the command and control for the majority of the AO by using subordinate organizations while avoiding gaps and seams in responsibility. Contiguous areas of operations may provide additional security for maneuver units, headquarters, and support areas by limiting the gaps between units. Figure 3-1 provides an example of a contiguous corps AO with established support areas that include ground LOC. Legend: CSACSACommunications service authorization corps support area DSA division support area SUST sustainment FSCL fire support coordination line N ONCONTIGUOUS A REA OF O PERATIONS 3-5. A noncontiguous area of operations is where one or more of the commander’s subordinate force’s areas of operation do not share a common boundary (FM 3-90.1). The reasons for using a noncontiguous area vary but begin with geographical separation of important terrain from the remainder of the areas of operations. The commander’s decision deploys the force into a noncontiguous AO, regardless of command echelon, derived from the mission variables of METT-TC analysis. In particular, the commander evaluates the threat and ability of the enemy to mass combat power sufficient to threaten friendly forces in noncontiguous AOs. Second, the commander evaluates the enemy’s ability to sever ground LOCs between noncontiguous AOs. 3-6. When conducting operations in a noncontiguous AO, commanders should take a holistic approach to countering threats. Commanders and staffs must expect the enemy to operate between the noncontiguous AOs using sophisticated surveillance devices, improvised explosive devices, mortars, rockets, missiles, unmanned aircraft systems, space and cyberspace operations, and information warfare, making support areas increasingly vulnerable. Area security may be the predominant method of protecting support areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. Area security operations are often emphasized in noncontiguous AOs to compensate for the lack of protection integrity that large or distant, unoccupied areas often create. Forces conducting area security operations can saturate an area or position on key terrain to provide protection through early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance and guard against unexpected enemy attack with an active response. Ground LOC located in noncontiguous areas present unique challenges based on the location, distance between supporting base camps and base clusters, and the security environment. Figure 3-2 provides an example of a noncontiguous corps AO with established support areas. Legend: DSA division support area SUPPORT AREA OPERATIONS 3-7. Support area operations are conducted by the MEB and tenants to prevent or minimize interference with command and control and SPO and to provide unimpeded movement of friendly forces; protection; operations to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces or defeat threats; and area damage control. The support area may provide secondary command and control nodes. Support area operations, as discussed in this chapter, do not include the mission SPO conducted by tenants within the support area. See appendix D for additional information on support area tenant units and their capabilities. 3-8. Support area operations are often conducted as economy-of-force operations. Within a division or corps support area, the MEB conducts support area operations (area security, terrain management, movement control, mobility support, clearance of fires, airspace management, TCFs for security, mobility and countermobility support, rear command post support). Note. A theater sustainment command, expeditionary sustainment command, or sustainment brigade headquarters should not be assigned support area responsibility because these headquarters lack the capability to execute the AO responsibilities and would require significant augmentation of personnel and mission command systems. 3-9. The MEB also has the capabilities to provide command and control for units, key functions, and tasks required to conduct support area operations. Support areas achieve the economy-of-force by having properly staffed headquarters control terrain so that combat forces can conduct combat operations. The MEB conducts engagements to defeat threats throughout the support area. Due to the MEB having limited organic capabilities, the higher headquarters provides resources for the MEB or assists them in defeating threats that are expected in the support area. This is most appropriately done by task-organizing the MEB with military police and a TCF if Level III threats are present and no other TCF has been task-designated by the division or corps. Table 3-1 identifies MEB support area responsibilities and supporting tasks. 3-13. The corps and division operational areas are normally subdivided and assigned as subordinate unit AOs, corps AOs to divisions and brigades, and division AOs to brigades (see FM 3-0). At corps and division levels, METT-TC analysis may not support an option to assign the echelon support area to a single unit. The area retained by the echelon may be easy to secure and control so that it can all be assigned as the echelon support area to a MEB with minor augmentation. As the operation progresses and the situation changes, the size of the echelon support area may change. 3-14. The MEB commander plans for support area operations within an assigned support area. The AO responsibilities require the MEB to plan decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations within the AO. Securing host-nation populations and critical infrastructure must also be planned for during support area operations. The MEB commander and staff must synchronize and integrate numerous units and headquarters’ elements to conduct support area operations. 3-15. When the operational environment or particular missions in the support area require a high degree of certainty and order, compliance, or centralization, the MEB commander may adjust the degree of control. Examples are in terrain management with the positioning and design of base camps. This is often needed for base-inherent defensibility, clustering of base camps for mutual support, the employment of base camps and base cluster response forces, and the TCF assigned to the support area. Some units that are tenants within the support area will not have the staff to conduct detailed IPB and defense planning and preparation needed to execute a decentralized command and control operation. This requires the MEB commander to conduct operations in a level of detail not normally done by other brigades. 3-16. The MEB higher headquarters order should establish command and support relationships within the support area and give the MEB commander clear authority to request or negotiate with units for their compliance or support for security and defense. The MEB commander must integrate the actions of tenant units, to include base camps and base cluster commanders. Responsibilities may include protection, information collection, security, defense, movement control, fires, air support, AMD, incident response, and area damage control. The MEB commander coordinates decentralized execution by assigned units, base camps, and base cluster commanders. The MEB commander’s staff may also need to coordinate area damage control support to functional brigades, the sustainment brigade, or the sustainment command throughout the support area. The staff reviews and coordinates the supporting base camp and base cluster defense plans; develops plans to employ the TCF and fires; and coordinates for host-nation, joint, interagency, and multinational assets. See appendix D for additional information on base camps and base clusters. 3-17. The MEB staff coordinates with the higher headquarters to establish priorities, develop plans, and decide when and where to accept risk in the support area. The MEB staff can use several levels of vulnerability, threat, and criticality assessments and the risk management process discussed in ADP 3-37 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 5-19. 3-18. Based on vulnerability and risk assessment, the higher headquarters may provide the MEB commander with additional capabilities, to include information collection support, additional security forces, or additional fires and other forces. The increased span of control might be excessive for the MEB commander and require the higher headquarters to manage areas not assigned to subordinates within its larger AO, commit another unit (MEB or BCTBCTBasic combat training) that is capable of providing command and control for another portion of those unassigned areas if that is feasible, or accept risk. 3-19. The MEB will command one of the base camps within the support area and may designate an assigned battalion size unit as the base camp defense commander. The MEB commander may assign subordinate unit boundaries within the AO. 3-20. The MEB may use several boards or working groups during support area planning and execution. For example, multifunctional members of the protection working group may be used to ensure that all aspects of protection are considered, assessed, and incorporated. 3-21. While CA activities are a significant part of support area operations, the division and corps information operations also integrates and synchronizes information-related capabilities actions to support protection and other warfighting functions. These information-related capabilities actions include tactical deception and support to joint military deception; support to mobility and countermobility, protection, intel, and fires; crowd sourcing; and coordination for multispectral decoy emplacements. Other staff elements at division and corps, including cyberspace electromagnetic activities, provide secondary jamming against enemy bypassed regular forces, irregular forces, and hybrid threats. In addition, signal procedures should include electromagnetic spectrum terrain masking and directional antenna use. 3-22. The MEB is also responsible for stability operations within the support area. Commanders use civil-military operations to enable these stability operations. The planning and coordination of these operations, from corps to brigade, are the responsibility of the assistant chief of staff, CA operations (G-9)/S-9. See FM 3-57 for more information on G-9/S-9 responsibilities. 3-23. The MEB designated with AO responsibilities may not be designed as a maneuver headquarters, but some of its subunits must be capable of maneuver and enabled with capabilities to enhance freedom of movement when required. The MEB should be assigned a maneuver unit as a TCF (designed to combat Level III threats, ideally at least a battalion headquarters to provide effective command and control) or may potentially form a response force short of a TCF from other attached or OPCON units such as military police. The MEB would control the maneuver of the TCF or response force as they employ maneuver and fires to defeat threats throughout the support area. The MEB will initially fight any size threat operating in the support area and must plan to employ all fire support assets, to include indirect fires, Army aviation, and close air support. The MEB commander is responsible for and plans where to locate and use attached, OPCON, or TACON radars to actively acquire enemy indirect-fire and engage with the best available fire support asset. 3-24. The MEB headquarters must tailor their operations process to the mission and operational environment. Staff planning requires details that are unique to the support area mission and size of the operational area, to include terrain management and airspace considerations. P REPARE 3-25. During initial entry, the MEB commander directs designated base camp commanders to prepare their individual base camps according to standards directed by its higher headquarters. If the support area is established in an initially secure area, contractors alone or assisted by military units may construct the base camps. A technique may be to have the designated support area land owner or functional units construct base camps within their AO that are readily available for use. These camps would be planned, designed, sited, constructed, and able to secure against Level II or III threats as required. There may be situations in which the MEB commander takes control of support area base camps and facilities that are not constructed to acceptable standards and must be upgraded. 3-26. The MEB can conduct tasks to support the support area defensive plan and prepare for area damage control. This includes mobility, countermobility, and survivability; obstacles; structures; and AT. The MEB commander will direct reconnaissance and surveillance assets to conduct initial reconnaissance of their AO throughout the support area to verify and refine IPB. The proper location selection, design, establishment, construction, and manning of base camps and base clusters can help to reduce the need for a TCF. 3-27. The MEB commander will establish standing operating procedures throughout the support area to ensure protection, security, defense, and the ability to perform area damage control. The MEB commander will ensure that base camp security and defense forces are trained, rehearsed, and ready. Important rehearsals include commitment of base camp response forces, commitment of cluster response forces, commitment of the support area TCF, battle handover, and fire plan rehearsals. E XECUTE 3-28. The MEB commander conducts support area operations within the assigned support AO. The MEB staff will ensure close, continuous coordination with higher headquarters staff, AO tenants, and transient units to ensure security, protection, movement, continuous support, and defense. The MEB will execute detection, early warning, and rapid response to threats and coordinate responsive area damage control to minimize effects. 3-29. The MEB staff will synchronize security operations, conduct information collection, and develop the threat and common operational picture and share it with all units in the support area. The staff will coordinate the collective defense within the AO. The MEB commander may direct and employ transiting combat forces with the approval of higher headquarters. The support area TCF will defeat Level III threats or conduct battle handover to other combat forces. 3-30. The MEB must integrate airspace user requirements with the theater airspace control system. A division may execute the joint air ground integration tactics techniques and procedures and request a volume of airspace to control all airspace users entering, exiting, and operating in their operational area. The MEB air defense airspace management cell coordinates with the airspace control element responsible for airspace control over their assigned AO. A SSESS 3-31. The MEB staff must fuse the assessments from the commander, staff, subordinates, supporting units, and tenant units to monitor and evaluate the current situation and progress. The staff conducts base camp threat and vulnerability assessments. Key areas the staff assesses include security, base camp defense preparations, and area damage control preparations. The MEB commander and staff share their assessment with their higher headquarters commander and staff. Based on the assessments, they share responsibility to adjust tasks, resources, or risks. This is a dynamic process that will need to be redone as the conditions and risk change. The staff can use measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) to help it develop security measures for the assigned support area and required detailed tasks. SUPPORT AREAS BY ECHELON 3-32. Corps and division commanders establish a support area to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and support tactical operations. The echelon commander assigns the support area as an AO to a subordinate unit. The location and size of the support area varies according to METT-TC. The echelon support area commander establishes the support area into one or more base camps, and assigns security responsibilities to units located within the base camps. Possible tenants of the support area include (but are not limited to)—  Sustainment (see FM 4-0 for additional information on sustainment operations in a support area).  Field artillery operations (see FM 3-09 for additional information on field artillery operations).  Military police (see FM 3-39 for additional information on military police operations in a support area).  Engineers (see FM 3-34 for additional information on engineer operations in a support area).  CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear assets (see FM 3-11 for additional information on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations in a support area).  Aviation (see FM 3-04 for additional information on aviation operations in a support area).  CA (see FM 3-57 for additional information on CA operations in a support area).  Nongovernmental organizations.  Host-nation entities.  Medical treatment facilities (see FM 4-02 for additional information on medical support to a support area).  Signal support to operations (see FM 6-02). C ORPS 3-33. The corps establishes a support area to concentrate sustainment, protection, available aviation, and support capabilities required to sustain, enable, and control tactical operations. The corps support area is based on geographical advantages for sustaining the force and protecting these assets. When the corps establishes a support area, it assigns it as an AO with responsibility to a subordinate unit such as a division, BCTBCTBasic combat training, or MEB. However, in a corps contingency force operation, ill-defined or nonexistent boundaries and areas of operations can occur. 3-34. The corps commander can direct maneuver forces to reinforce the support area security mission as a TCF. If there is a Level III threat in the corps support area that needs more than a single battalion size TCF to mitigate the risk to an acceptable level, then the corps commander should allocate a BCTBCTBasic combat training to this mission. The United States Air Force tactical airspace control personnel joint terminal attack controllers are essential to the ground commander’s ability to employ close air support mission aircraft in the support area. D IVISION 3-35. The division support area is the area in which the majority of the division’s sustainment functions occur. The division support area also facilitates the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and support divisional forces. 3-36. The division OPORD establishes area security responsibilities for the division support area. The support area commander will have TACON of all ground forces within or transiting that area for security and defense. The order specifies the commander’s broader TACON authority for the protection, security, defense, movement control, and terrain management. 3-37. When assigned to the MEB, the division support area becomes the MEB AO. To accomplish all of the doctrinal responsibilities associated with controlling an AO, the MEB requires augmentation consisting of Army and Air Force airspace control personnel. Units located within or transiting the division support area are responsible for self-protection against Level I threats. They must coordinate with the MEB for maneuver, troop movements, and indirect fires outside of the established perimeter of any base camp to which they are assigned. 3-38. In the absence of a MEB, the division commander assigns the mission to a BCTBCTBasic combat training commander. If the division commander assigns the support area to a functional brigade, significant augmentation is required for the functional brigade to accomplish all of the doctrinal responsibilities associated with controlling an AO, such as augmenting personnel and key systems to control fires and airspace. The division commander remains responsible for all unassigned areas within their AO that are not assigned to a subordinate unit, such as BCTs or the MEB. This page intentionally left blank.

Command and control is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. No single specialized military function, either by itself or combined with others, has a purpose without it. Through command and control, commanders provide purpose and direction to integrate all military activities toward a common goal—mission accomplishment. Commanders assign support areas to subordinate commanders to conduct support area responsibilities. This chapter describes the MEB role in conducting terrain management, controlling movement, protection, security, and defense functions. TERRAIN MANAGEMENT 4-1. Terrain management is the process of allocating terrain by establishing areas of operations, designating AAs, and specifying locations for units and activities to deconflict activities that might interfere with each other (ADP 3-90). Throughout the operations process, commanders assigned an AO manage terrain within their boundaries. Through terrain management, commanders identify and locate units in the area. The operations officer, with support from others in the staff, can then deconflict operations, control movements, and deter fratricide as units get in position to execute planned missions. Commanders also consider unified action and host-nation partners located in their AO and coordinate with them for use of the terrain. 4-2. The higher headquarters may position a number of other support brigades; functional brigades; smaller units; various higher headquarters; contractors; and joint, interagency, and multinational organizations within the support area. Regardless of the size of units, the MEB commander has some command and control responsibilities over those in their AO. Units assigned to operate within the support area are typically TACON to the MEB commander for defense and force protection. The MEB commander has approval authority for the exact placement of units and facilities within the support area, unless placement is directed by the MEB commander’s higher headquarters. In instances where there is disagreement, the higher headquarters retains final authority. The commander must deconflict operations, control movement, and prevent fratricide. 4-3. Terrain management involves allocating terrain by establishing AOs and other control measures, by specifying unit locations, and by deconflicting activities that may interfere with operations. Indirect fires and air corridors must be planned congruently to ensure deconfliction in time and space. Control trigger, elevation, and azimuths should be considered when planning airspace deconfliction and should be synchronized with division or corps and adjacent unit plans. During large-scale combat operations, the MEB commander may designate AAs where the tenants of the support area occupy an area and provide temporary functional support until support area base camps and base clusters can be established or until a relocation of the support area is required due to transitions. Occupy is a tactical mission task that involves moving a friendly force into an area so that it can control that area. Both the force’s movement to and occupation of the area occur without enemy opposition (FM 3-90-1). While in the AA, each unit is responsible for its own protection activities, such as local ground security. An assembly area is an area a unit occupies to prepare for an operation (FM 3-90-1). Ideally, an AA provides—  Concealment from air and ground observation.  Adequate entrances, exits, and internal routes.  Space for dispersion; each AA is separated by enough distance from other AAs to preclude mutual interference.  Cover from direct fire.  Good drainage and soil conditions that can sustain unit vehicles and individual Soldier movements.  Terrain masking of electromagnetic signatures.  Terrain allowing observation of ground and air avenues into the AA.  Sanctuary from enemy medium-range artillery fires. 4-4. Establishing a support area includes grouping units into base camps and designating base clusters as necessary for common defense. Terrain management should facilitate current and future operations. Poor terrain management can result in congestion, interruption of tactical traffic patterns, and degradation of SPO. The failure to follow basic rules of coordination can cause disruption and create combat identification hazards. Good terrain management enhances operations. Figure 4-1 provides an example of an established support area with multiple base camps. Legend: ACP air control point ASR alternate supply route CCP communications control point DC dislocated civilian DHA detainee holding area MP military police MSR main supply route NAI named area of interest SUST sustainment TCF tactical combat force 4-5. Having an assigned AO assigned and facilitates the movement of units and the use of fires. It restricts units that are not assigned responsibility for the AO from moving through the AO without coordination. It also restricts outside units from firing into or allowing the effects of its fires to affect the AO. Both of these restrictions can be relaxed through coordination with the owning unit. It facilitates the movement and fires of the unit assigned responsibility for, or owning, the AO. In selected situations, subordinate AOs may be created to facilitate the movement of sustainment convoys or maneuver forces through the support AO. 4-6. Within the support area, the MEB commander conducts the tactical coordination and integration of land and air units while employing firepower and maneuvering forces for positional advantage in relation to the enemy. Beyond the inherent responsibilities for adjacent unit coordination, the MEB commander deconflicts terrain coordination issues by collaborating with adjacent, passing, and supported units to reduce the likelihood of combat identification errors and trafficability problems and to enhance situational understanding, security, and defense. The MEB plans, coordinates, and monitors airspace throughout the support area. Fires integration and coordination is conducted by the designated land owner (support area) fire support element through the targeting process. The MEB also coordinates AMD for critical assets and activities through protection prioritization. Effects are assessed against the supporting mission requirements. 4-7. The S-3 functions as the overall terrain manager and assigns and reassigns AOs based on mission requirements to subordinate units throughout the support area. The MEB is responsible for any terrain in the support area not assigned to a subordinate unit. The S-3 is responsible for overall support area surveillance and reconnaissance plans and integrates subordinate unit and base camp plans. The S-3 will engage the entire staff, particularly the S-2, the engineer, military police, brigade surgeon, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations, fires, and AMD staff, when analyzing factors essential to assigning territory and locating base camps and facilities within the support area. These factors include—  Coordinating with the supporting medical treatment facility and other medical assets to ensure proper site selection and accessibility for evacuation of patients.  Locating base camps on the best defensible terrain. The S-2, S-3, terrain analysis team, engineer, and maneuver commander (if a TCF is assigned) collaborate on this effort. This will significantly reduce the resources needed to effectively defend them.  Locating the sustainment brigade (if in the AO) with access to transportation infrastructure.  Constructing a base camp defense, which can be viewed as constructing a strong point (360-degree defense). 4-8. These factors also include an assessment of—  Drop zones or landing zone availability that is protected from the observation and fire of the enemy, which is a main consideration in selecting and organizing the location.  Geographical boundaries.  A concept of the operation.  Theater basing plan.  Mission requirements.  The mission priority.  Tactical maneuver plans.  Likely enemy avenues of approach.  Direct-and indirect-fire weapons capabilities.  Deconfliction of fires (via scheme of fires and fire support coordination measures) and integration of airspace users (via the unit airspace plan and airspace coordinating measures).  Airspace above the AO.  Equipment density.  Incident response.  Accessibility for sustainment.  Storage space for supply units.  Indigenous civil considerations.  Trafficability (ideally level, well-drained, firm ground).  Access to the MSR, roads, and transportation infrastructure.  Available facilities.  Environmental threat and endemic disease considerations.  Room for dispersion.  Natural obstacles and canalized areas.  Cover, concealment, and camouflage (natural or man-made structures).  Security and mutual support.  Ease of evacuation.  Key facilities.  Weapons of mass destruction research, production, and storage sites.  Toxic industrial material hazard sites and areas.  Decontamination sites. 4-9. The MEB S-2 performs a detailed IPB for the support area and shares it with all tenants. A detailed IPB is critical for identification of threats present within the operational environment, to include health threats prevalent in the area to prevent or reduce individual and collective exposure. The detailed terrain analysis is key to terrain management. The designated unit must consider the defensibility of the terrain and primary unit missions when constructing new base camps and assigning units to existing base camps. INFORMATION COLLECTION 4-10. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). This activity implies a function, mission, or action and identifies the organization that performs it. Information collection activities are a synergistic whole analysis effort focused with emphasis on synchronizing and integrating all components and systems. Information collection integrates the intelligence and operations staff functions focused on answering commander’s critical information requirements. Joint doctrine refers to information collection combined with the operations process and the intelligence process as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. See FM 3-55 for additional information on information collection. 4-11. Information collection is the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements. This includes the following:  Plan requirements and assess collection.  Task and direct collection.  Execute collection. 4-12. Commanders integrate information collection to form an information collection plan that capitalizes on different capabilities. Information collection assets provide data and information. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity that results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity. See JP 2-0. 4-13. Intelligence staff inform commanders and staffs where and when to look. Reconnaissance, security, intelligence operations, and surveillance are the ways—with the means ranging from national and joint collection capabilities to individual Soldier observations and reports. The end is intelligence that supports the commander’s decision making. The result is successful execution and assessment of operations. This result depends on effective synchronization and integration of the information collection effort. 4-14. The intelligence and operations staffs work together to collect, process, and analyze information about the enemy, other adversaries, climate, weather, terrain, population, and other civil considerations that affect operations throughout the support area. Intelligence relies on reconnaissance, security, intelligence operations, and surveillance for its data and information. Conversely, without intelligence, commanders and staffs do not know where or when to conduct reconnaissance, security, intelligence operations, or surveillance. The usefulness of the data collected depends on the processing and exploitation common to these activities. 4-15. The MEB commander supports information collection requirements during the conduct of support area operations that may contribute to the commander’s critical information requirements; inform intelligence-led, time-sensitive operations; or shape support area operations. The conduct of information collection activities supports the commander’s understanding and visualization of the operations by identifying gaps in information, aligning assets and resources against them, and assessing the collected information and intelligence to inform the commander’s decisions. They also support the staff’s integrating processes during planning and execution. The direct result of the information collection effort is a coordinated plan that supports the operation. 4-16. The MEB commander tasks units (engineer, military police, CA, intelligence, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, military intelligence, and TCF) that it has a command or support relationship with within the support area to conduct reconnaissance, security, intelligence operations, and surveillance. (See table 4-1 for unit capabilities.) If the support area designated land owner is not task-organized with adequate information collection assets, it requests information collection support from the higher headquarters. This support could be provided through counterintelligence, human intelligence, signals intelligence, unmanned aircraft systems, or ground surveillance systems.

Sustainment is the provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion. (ADP 4-0). Sustainment provides freedom of action, extends operational reach, and prolongs endurance to unified land operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Sustainment provides the support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment. MEB commanders use their assets to maintain the momentum of operations and enhance the capabilities of their forces. This chapter discusses sustainment of the MEB. PLANNING 5-1. The sustainment warfighting function is defined as the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (see ADP 3-0). Sustainment encompasses the elements of logistics, personnel services, financial management, and HSS required for mission accomplishment. Logistics is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. The elements of logistics include maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, operational contract support, and general engineering. The Army HSS is support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army Medicine to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the behavioral and physical well-being of personnel by providing direct patient care that includes medical treatment (organic and area support) and hospitalization, medical evacuation (to include medical regulating), and medical logistics (to include blood management). Personnel services include human resources (HR) support, legal support, religious support, and band support. Financial management encompasses finance operations and resource management. 5-2. This chapter discusses how the MEB sustains itself. The MEB is a unique organization that can expand to employ a wide range of capabilities, each with their own sustainment needs. Operational planners must ensure that MEB sustainment planning is conducted as early as possible and continue to monitor as the mission changes to effectively sustain the MEB throughout the operation. Because the MEB no longer has a BSB, the MEB S-4 must work with the higher echelon headquarters and the sustainment command headquarters to conduct METT-TC analysis to ensure that the MEB has the required sustainment support to ensure mission success. 5-3. The MEB staff synchronizes operations across all six warfighting functions to generate and maintain combat power. It plans tactical logistics. The MEB S-4, S-1, brigade surgeon, and chaplain are the principal sustainment planners for the MEB. The S-4 is the principal sustainment executer. Logistics synchronization for the brigade is done between the primary staff sections and S-4. The MEB commander designates who will oversee logistics synchronization for the brigade. The MEB commander may elect to use the deputy commanding officers, the XO, or the brigade S-4 to oversee logistics synchronization for the brigade. The MEB obtains the logistics preparation of the theater information and products from the supporting sustainment brigade and the higher echelon headquarters concept of operations and integrates this with their IPB. The S-4 and S-1 maintain a continuous sustainment estimate during all operations. They use the logistics estimate to determine sustainment capabilities, anticipate support requirements, identify and resolve shortfalls, and develop support plans. They integrate into all planning what is needed to develop and synchronize sustainment with maneuver and fire plans. Sustainment commanders and planners must thoroughly understand the mission, tactical plans, and the MEB commander’s intent. 5-4. The MEB must know the—  Mission, task organization, and concept of operations for all subordinate battalions and attachments under MEB control.  Higher headquarters sustainment plans.  Known and anticipated branch plans and sequels.  Density of personnel and equipment of each subordinate unit.  Known and anticipated enemy situation and capabilities.  Capabilities and limitations of subordinate units.  Host-nation support and contract capabilities.  Size and capabilities of local population civil infrastructure.  Capacity and capability of local government and nongovernmental agencies.  Cultural considerations in the MEB AO. 5-5. The MEB does not necessarily need to establish a brigade support area. Given the MEB mission, it will typically be collocated with a support battalion providing general support to the MEB and other units in the support area. MEB operations may require split-based sustainment operations. The S-4 may conduct replenishment operations within the MEB support AO or within the AO of a unit that the MEB is supporting. 5-6. Logistics planners must understand the MEB current and projected sustainment capabilities. They use information collected from personnel and logistics reports and operational reports to determine the personnel, equipment, and supply status of each unit within the MEB. They consider the disposition and condition of all supporting sustainment units and individual unit-level capabilities. They analyze this data and the current situation to determine the MEB logistical capabilities and limitations. 5-7. Sustainment planners must anticipate and understand support requirements of a tactical plan or COA. Running estimates are a critical tool for achieving shared understanding. The S-1, surgeon, and S-4 analyze all COAs and modifications to current plans. They assess their sustainment feasibility, identify support requirements, and determine requirements for synchronization. The S-1 and S-4, like the commander, must visualize how the operation will unfold to determine critical requirements for each sustainment element. They consider the requirements for each sustainment element during all phases of an operation. They analyze each COA and consider the—  Type and duration of the operation.  Task organization, tasks, and sustainment requirements of subordinate forces.  Medical and maintenance profile of units to be assigned or attached.  Ramifications of tactical operations such as gap (river) crossings, tactical pauses, long movements, preparatory fires, or defenses.  Need for special equipment, supplies, or service.  Requirements to separate, disassemble, configure, uncrate, or trans-load supplies above normal requirements.  Requirements for reconstitution.  Required varieties and quantities of all classes of supplies (especially Class III, V, VIII, and IX).  Requirements for support of reconnaissance forces, security operations, or deception efforts.  Need for Class IV/V obstacle material.  Positioning of combat trains and other supporting logistics elements.  Casualty numbers and likely locations.  Large-scale decontamination operations in support of BCTs or consequence management decontamination operations.  Area damage control preparations and response.  Minimal essential stability tasks to support the operation. 5-8. The S-4’s analysis also includes estimated attrition based on likely outcomes of subordinate missions. Analysis of estimated attrition primarily focuses on critical systems. The S-1, in coordination with the surgeon, assists by projecting potential personnel losses (through development of the casualty estimate). To perform this analysis, current unit personnel and equipment densities, standard planning factors, operations logistics software, and historical data are used in conjunction with the operations logistics plan. When analyzing COAs, this projection helps the commander understand the potential losses and associated risks of each COA. 5-9. To understand the MEB capabilities and determine support requirements, logistics planners apply a METT-TC analysis to the operation. Table 5-1 gives an example of general sustainment considerations for tactical operations.

The support area commander synchronizes, integrates, and organizes protection capabilities and resources to protect the force, preserve combat power, reduce risk, and mitigate identified vulnerabilities throughout the support area. Criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in determining protection priorities. Although all military assets are important and all resources have value, the capabilities they represent are not equal in their contribution to overall mission accomplishment. Determining and directing protection priorities may involve the most important decisions the support area commander makes and their staffs support. PROTECTION A-1. Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). Protection serves as a warfighting function and as a continuous and enduring activity. It integrates all protection capabilities to secure routes, prevent casualties, and protect forces. A-2. Protection is not linear–planning, preparing, executing, and assessing protection is continuous and enduring. Protection preserves capability, momentum, and tempo. Protection is an important contributor to operational reach and closely relates to endurance and momentum. It also contributes to the commander’s ability to extend operations in time and space. Commanders and staffs synchronize, integrate, and organize capabilities and resources throughout the operations process to preserve combat power, enable freedom of action, and prevent or mitigate the effects of threats and hazards. A-3. The principles of protection provide Army leaders and staffs with a context for implementing protection efforts, developing schemes of protection, and allocating resources (see ADP 3-37 for additional information on the protection principles):  Comprehensive.  Integrated.  Layered.  Redundant.  Enduring. P ROTECTION W ARFIGHTING F UNCTION A-4. The protection warfighting function refers to the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 3-0). Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, and physical assets of the United States and unified action partners. The protection warfighting function enables commanders to preserve force integrity and combat power by integrating protection capabilities to safeguard friendly forces, civilians, and infrastructure. Commanders incorporate protection when they understand and visualize capabilities available for protection. Some of these actions or effects may be generated through the combined integration of the eight elements of combat power, resulting in an increasingly effective and efficient scheme of protection. A-5. Military operations are inherently complex. Commanders must deliberately plan and integrate the ethical application of military force against an enemy while protecting the force and preserving combat power. Commanders develop protection strategies for each phase or transition of an operation. They integrate and synchronize protection tasks and systems to reduce risk, mitigate identified vulnerabilities, and act on opportunity. P ROTECTION T ASKS A-6. Army operations and missions are executed through tactical tasks. The support area commander and staff incorporate protection tasks when they understand and visualize available protection capabilities. Protection tasks enable the designated support area land owner to preserve the force, safeguard bases/base camps, and secure routes throughout the support area. When properly integrated and synchronized, the tasks and systems that comprise the protection warfighting function increase the probability of mission success. A-7. The support area commander and their staff must consider all protection tasks and systems and apply them as appropriate. Each task and its associated system are typically associated with a staff or staff proponent that performs specific duties. The protection warfighting function tasks—  Conduct survivability operations. Survivability is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.34). Survivability operations enhance the ability to avoid or withstand hostile actions by altering the physical environment (see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.34 for additional information on survivability). They accomplish this by providing or improving camouflage, cover, and concealment via the following four tasks:  Constructing fighting positions.  Constructing protective positions.  Hardening facilities.  Employing camouflage, cover, concealment, and movement.  Provide FHP. The Army FHP consists of measures that promote, improve, or conserve the behavioral and physical well-being of Soldiers comprised of preventive and treatment aspects of medical functions that include: combat and operational stress control, dental services, veterinary services, operational public health, and laboratory services. This enables a healthy and fit force, prevents injury and illness, and protects the force from health hazards. Its mission is under the protection warfighting function. Successful FHP measures require deliberate and consistent analysis and communication of health threats to inform commanders and individuals; they also require the implementation and enforcement of unit and individual countermeasures (to include exposure controls, chemoprophylaxis, and immunizations against diseases both endemic and those used as warfare agents) needed to reduce associated health risks. Commanders and unit leaders must remain informed and proactively engaged to ensure the health of the force; reduce health threats, stressors, and risks; and promote all available countermeasures. See FM 4-02 for additional information on FHP.  Conduct CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations include the employment of tactical capabilities that anticipate and counter the entire range of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards (see FM 3-11 for additional information). The activities to implement protection include the following:  Understand the environment.  Conduct CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear information collection through reconnaissance and surveillance.  Conduct CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense.  Cooperate with and support partners.  Establish CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response efforts to minimize the effects of a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident.  Provide EOD and force protection support. EOD is a key asset in the protection of military and civilian personnel, critical assets, infrastructure, and public safety. EOD units provide support through the supporting EOD headquarters across the range of military operations by detecting, locating, identifying, diagnosing, rendering safe, exploiting, and disposing of all explosive ordnance, improvised explosive devices, and weapons of mass destruction. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 4-32.1 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 4-32.3 for additional information on EOD.  Coordinate AMD. AMD protects the force from manned and unmanned aerial attacks and enemy aerial surveillance. Coordinating AMD support protects friendly forces from the effects of threatening ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and unmanned aircraft systems. It enables the freedom of action commanders to require synchronized maneuver and protects critical capabilities from interdiction. See FM 3-01 for additional information on AMD.  Conduct personnel recovery. Army personnel recovery refers to the military efforts taken to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel (FM 3-50). Personnel recovery is the overarching term for operations that focus on recovering isolated personnel before captivity. See FM 3-50 for additional information on personnel recovery.  Conduct detention operations. Detention involves the detainment of a population or group that poses some level of threat to military operations. Detention operations are conducted by military police to shelter, sustain, guard, protect, and account for populations (detainees or U.S. military prisoners [U.S. military personnel ordered to confinement]) as a result of military or civil conflict or to facilitate criminal prosecution. Detention operations are essential to setting the conditions for consolidation of gains during large-scale combat. They lessen enemy capability to prolong a conflict through protracted resistance by irregular forces. See FM 3-63 for additional information detention operations.  Conduct risk management. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). The Army uses risk management to help maintain combat power while ensuring mission accomplishment during current and future operations. It is the Army process for helping organizations and individuals make informed decisions to reduce or offset risk. Risk management applies to operations and to nonoperational activities. Using this process increases operational effectiveness and the probability of mission accomplishment. It is a systematic way of identifying hazards, assessing them, and managing the associated risks. Commanders, staffs, Army leaders, Soldiers, and DA Civilians integrate risk management into planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 5-19 for additional information on risk management.  Implement physical security procedures. Physical security consists of physical measures that are designed to safeguard personnel and to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents and safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, theft, and terrorism. The Army employs physical security measures in depth to protect personnel, information, and critical resources in all locations and situations against various threats through effective security policies and procedures. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-39.32 for additional information on physical security.  Apply AT measures. AT consists of proactive defensive measures used to deter, detect, delay, deny, and defend individuals and property against terrorist acts. These measures include limited response and containment by security forces. AT measures are required to be incorporated into all military operations. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.2 for additional information on AT.  Conduct police operations. Police operations encompass policing and the associated law enforcement activities to control and protect populations and resources and to facilitate the existence of a lawful and orderly environment. Police operations and the associated skills and capabilities inherent in that function provide the fundamental basis on which all other military police disciplines are framed and conducted. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-39.10 for additional information on police operations.  Conduct populace and resources control. The function of populace and resources control is conducted in conjunction with, and as an integral part of, all military operations. Populace and resources control functions consist of two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. These controls are normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. Combatant commanders define and enforce these controls during large-scale combat, consolidation of gains, and times of civil or military emergency. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-39.30 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-57.10 for additional information on populace and resources control.  Area security. Area security is a type of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a specific area (ADP 3-90). Area security may be the predominant method of protecting the support areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. Area security often focuses on the following activities:  Tactical AA security.  Base/base camp defense.  Critical asset security.  Node protection.  High-risk personnel security.  Movement corridors.  Response force operations.  LOC security.  Checkpoints and combat outposts.  Convoy security.  Port area and pier security.  Area damage control.  Conduct cyberspace and security defense. The Army secures and defends the network through a defense-in-depth approach, incorporating layered security and defenses. The tasks to secure and defend cyberspace are perform cybersecurity activities and conduct defensive cyberspace operations–internal defensive measures. See FM 3-12 for more information for cyberspace planning considerations.  Conduct electromagnetic protection actions. Many Army capabilities, including communications, cyberspace operations, information collection, space capabilities, target detection, and precision guided munitions, depend on assured access to the electromagnetic spectrum. The tasks to protect Army access to the electromagnetic spectrum are conduct electronic protection actions, conduct defensive electronic attack, and conduct electromagnetic spectrum management.  Conduct OPSECOPSECOperational Security. Operations security is a capability that identifies and controls critical information, indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities (JP 3-13.3). Effective and disciplined OPSECOPSECOperational Security is employed during decisive action. Units routinely employ OPSECOPSECOperational Security measures to reduce, eliminate, and conceal essential elements of friendly information. Units use directional antennas and terrain masking to conceal tactical communication signatures and reduce detection by enemy direction-finding capabilities. This helps to prevent enemy or adversary reconnaissance and other information collection capabilities from gaining an advantage because the threat has knowledge of identifiable or observable unit-specific information. For additional information on OPSECOPSECOperational Security for division and below, see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-13.3. PROTECTION SUPPORT TO ARMY OPERATIONS A-8. Protection emphasizes the importance of planning and expanding protection priorities, to include protecting mission partners, civilian populations, equipment, resources, infrastructure, and cultural landmarks across the range of military operations. The synchronization, integration, and organization of protection capabilities and resources to preserve combat power from the effects of threats and hazards are essential. When properly integrated and synchronized, the tasks and systems that relate to protection effectively protect the force, preserve combat power, and increase the probability of mission success. A-9. Operations to shape include unit home station activities, including maintaining operational readiness, training, and contingency planning. Combined exercises and training, military exchange programs, and foreign military member attendance at Army schools are examples of home station shaping activities. At home stations, protection tasks maintain safe and secure environments that enable commanders to generate and preserve combat power during training and deployment tasks that are associated with Army sustainable readiness requirements that are in support of unified land operations. A-10. Army protection capabilities support operations to prevent or deter interference during mobilization and prevent or mitigate attacks during the transit of ARFOR and cargo, along movement routes, and at initial staging areas and subsequent AAs where uncertain threat conditions require a delicate balance between protection and building combat power. A-11. At the division level and higher, the integration of the protection warfighting function and tasks is conducted by a designated protection cell and the chief of protection. At brigade level and below, the integration occurs more informally with the designation of a protection coordinator from the brigade staff or as an integrating staff function assigned to a senior leader. The protection coordinators participate in various forums to facilitate the continuous integration of protection tasks into the operations process. This occurs through protection working groups, staff planning teams, and staffs conducting integrating processes. A-12. During large-scale combat, commanders and staffs deliberately plan and integrate protection capabilities to protect the force, preserve combat power, reduce risk, mitigate identified vulnerabilities, and act on opportunity. Figure A-1 shows the integration and synchronization of protection tasks in support of a gap crossing, movement corridor, and support area. Commanders also develop a scheme of protection for the transition of each phase of an operation or major activity. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting protection priorities between offensive, defensive, and stability tasks also involves a transition. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution so that a force can maintain the momentum and tempo of operations. A force is vulnerable during transitions. Commanders and staffs also identify potential threats and hazards during planning and identify protection priorities during the transition and follow-on operations. Legend: AMD air missle defense BSA brigade support area CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear chemical, biological, radilogical, and nuclear CIV civilian CSC convoy support center DET detention DSA division support area EOD explosive ordnance disposal EW electronic warfare FHP force health protection OPSECOPSECOperational Security operations security PL phase line PRC populace and resources control SUST sustainment TCP traffic control post A-13. As ARFOR transition from large-scale combat to the consolidation of gains, the focus transitions to area security and stability tasks. Army operations to consolidate gains correspond with stabilize and enable civil authority phases of a joint operation. Commanders continuously consider the synchronization, integration, and organization of protection capabilities necessary to consolidate gains and achieve the desired end state. Consolidate gains activities include the relocation of displaced civilians, detainee operations, the reestablishment of law and order, providing humanitarian assistance, and the restoration and protection of critical infrastructure ASSESSMENTS A-14. Initial protection planning requires various assessments to establish protection priorities. Assessments include threats, hazards, vulnerability, and criticality. These assessments are used to determine which assets can be protected given no constraints, and which assets can be protected with available resources. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide all assets the same level of protection. For this reason, the support area commander makes decisions on acceptable risks and provides guidance to the staff so that they can employ protection capabilities based on the protection priorities. A-15. Protection planning is a continuous process that must include an understanding of the threats and hazards that may impact operations from the deep area back to the strategic support area. Protection capabilities are aligned to protect critical assets and mitigate effects from threats and hazards. The protection cell and protection working group must prioritize the protection of critical assets during operations to shape, operations to prevent, large-scale combat, and during the consolidation of gains that best supports the commander’s end state. A-16. An important aspect of protection planning involves the support area. If conditions in the support area degrade, it is detrimental to the success of operations. A degraded support area also inhibits the ability to shape the deep area for the BCTs involved in close operations. Therefore, the protection of support areas requires planning considerations equal to those in the close areas. T HREAT AND H AZARD A SSESSMENT A-17. Personnel from all staff sections and warfighting functions help conduct threat and hazard analysis. This analysis comprises a thorough, in-depth compilation and examination of information and intelligence that address potential threats and hazards in the AO. The integrating processes (IPB, targeting, and risk management) provide an avenue to obtain the threats and hazards that are reviewed and refined. Threat and hazard assessments are continuously reviewed and updated as the operational environment changes. A-18. Considerations for the threat and hazard assessment include—  Enemy and adversary threats.  Operational capabilities.  Intentions.  Activities.  Foreign intelligence entities (see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-22.2-1 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-22.2-2).  Criminal activities.  Civil disturbances.  Health and safety hazards.  CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear toxic industrial materials.  Cyberspace threats.  Other relevant aspects of the operational environment.  Urban environments.  Incident reporting and feedback points of contact. A-19. The threat and hazard assessment results in a comprehensive list of threats and hazards and determines the likelihood or probability of occurrence of each threat and hazard. Table 1-1, page 1-2, shows examples of potential threats and hazards in an AO. In the context of assessing risk, the higher the probability or likelihood of a threat or hazard occurring, the higher the risk of asset loss. C RITICALITY A SSESSMENT A-20. A criticality assessment identifies key assets that are required to accomplish a mission. It addresses the impact of a temporary or permanent loss of key assets or the unit ability to conduct a mission. A criticality assessment should also include high-population facilities (recreational centers, theaters, sports venues) that may not be mission-essential. It examines the costs of recovery and reconstitution, including time, expense, capability, and infrastructure support. The staff gauges how quickly a lost capability can be replaced before providing an accurate status to the commander. The general sequence for a criticality assessment is—  Step 1. List the key assets and capabilities.  Step 2. Determine if critical functions or combat power can be substantially duplicated with other elements of the command or an external resource.  Step 3. Determine the time required to substantially duplicate key assets and capabilities in the event of temporary or permanent loss.  Step 4. Set priorities for the response to threats toward personnel, physical assets, and information. A-21. The protection cell staff and working group continuously update criticality assessments during the operations process. As the staff develops or modifies a friendly COA, information collection efforts confirm or deny information requirements. As the mission or threat changes, initial criticality assessments may also change, increasing or decreasing the subsequent force vulnerability. The protection cell members monitor and evaluate these changes and begin coordination among the staff to implement modifications to the protection concept or recommend new protection priorities. PIR, running estimates, MOEs, and MOPs are continually updated and adjusted to reflect the current and anticipated risks associated with the operational environment. V ULNERABILITY A SSESSMENT A-22. A vulnerability assessment is an evaluation (assessment) to determine the magnitude of a threat or hazards effect on an installation, personnel, a unit, an exercise, a port, a ship, a residence, a facility, or other site. It identifies the areas of improvement required to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or terrorism or attacks against threats. The staff addresses who or what is vulnerable and how it is vulnerable against threats. The vulnerability assessment identifies physical characteristics or procedures that render critical assets, areas, infrastructures, or special events vulnerable to known or potential threats and hazards. The general sequence of a vulnerability assessment is—  Step 1. List assets and capabilities and the threats against them.  Step 2. Determine the common criteria for assessing vulnerabilities.  Step 3. Evaluate the vulnerability of assets and capabilities. A-23. Vulnerability evaluation criteria may include the degree to which an asset may be disrupted, quantity of the asset available (if replacement is required due to loss), dispersion (geographic proximity), and key physical characteristics. A-24. DOD has created several decision support tools to perform criticality assessments in support of the vulnerability assessment process, including mission, symbolism, history, accessibility, recognizability, population, and proximity (MSHARPP) and criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER) (see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.2 for more information on MSHARPP and CARVER)—  MSHARPP. The purpose of the MSHARPP tool is to analyze likely terrorist targets and assess their vulnerabilities from the inside out, with focus on the U.S. military mission. Consideration is given to local threats, the probable means of attacks, and variables that affect dispositions of potential targets. After developing a list of potential targets, MSHARPP selection factors are used to assist in further refining the assessment by associating a weapon or tactic with a potential target to determine the efficiency, effectiveness, and plausibility of the attack method and to identify vulnerabilities related to the target. When the MSHARPP values for each target or component are assigned, the sum of the values indicates the highest-value target (for a particular mode of attack) within the limits of enemy known capabilities. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.2 for additional information on the MSHARPP tool.  CARVER. The CARVER matrix is a valuable tool in determining criticality and vulnerability. For criticality purposes, CARVER helps assessment teams and commanders (and the assets that they are responsible for) determine assets that are more critical to the success of the mission. This also helps determine which resources should be allocated to protect critical assets (personnel, infrastructure, and information). The CARVER matrix assesses a potential target from a terrorist perspective to identify what the enemy might perceive as a good (soft or valuable) target. ESTABLISH PROTECTION PRIORITIES A-25. Criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in determining protection priorities that become the subject of support area commanders’ guidance and the focus of area security operations. The scheme of protection is based on the mission variables and should include protection priorities by area, unit, activity, or resource. A-26. Although all military assets are important and all resources have value, the capabilities they represent are not equal in their contribution to decisive operations or overall mission accomplishment. Determining and directing protection priorities may involve the most important decisions that commanders make and their staffs support. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide the same level of protection to all assets. A-27. Most prioritization methodologies assist in differentiating what is important from what is urgent. In protection planning, the challenge is to differentiate between critical assets and important assets and to further determine what protection is possible with available protection capabilities. Event-driven operations may be short in duration, enabling a formidable protection posture for a short time; condition-driven operations may be open-ended and long-term, requiring an enduring and sustainable scheme of protection. In either situation, the support area commander provides guidance on prioritizing protection capabilities and categorizing important assets. PROTECTION PRIORITIZATION LIST A-28. Protection prioritization lists are organized through the proper alignment of critical assets. The commander’s priorities and intent and the impacts on mission planning determine critical assets. A critical asset is a specific entity that is of such extraordinary importance that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability of a nation to continue to function effectively (JP 3-26). Critical assets can be people, property, equipment, activities, operations, information, facilities, or materials. For example, important communications facilities and utilities, analyzed through criticality assessments, provide information to prioritize resources while reducing the potential application of resources on lower-priority assets. Stationary weapons systems might be identified as critical to the execution of military operations and, therefore, receive additional protection. The lack of a replacement may cause a critical asset to become a top priority for protection. A-29. The protection cell and working group use information derived from the support area commander’s guidance, the IPB, targeting, risk management, warning orders, the critical asset list and defended asset list, and the mission analysis to identify critical assets. Critical assets at each command echelon must be determined and prioritized. A-30. Protection cells and working groups can develop criticality, vulnerability, and threat probability values to help prioritize critical assets. Figure A-2 provides an example of how criticality, vulnerability, and threat probability values can help determine risk. Table A-1 provides an example of a protection risk analysis table.

ARFOR demonstrate the Army’s core competencies by combining offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks. The continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks is known as decisive action. In DSCA, decisive action refers to how ARFOR combine DSCA tasks to support homeland security and, if required, DSCA tasks with offensive and defensive tasks to support homeland defense. The MEB is well suited to provide support to civil authorities because it has the most complete multifunctional staff of any Army brigade. The MEB also has the skills needed to provide command and control for units that are frequently needed by civil authorities. This appendix discusses the MEB support to DSCA. DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES CORE TASK B-1. ARFOR conduct four core tasks (figure B-1 illustrates the DSCA core tasks with examples) in support of DSCA and the overall homeland security enterprise:  Provide support for domestic disasters.  Provide support for domestic CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents.  Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies.  Provide other designated domestic support plan. B-2. These DSCA tasks can overlap. For example, providing Army support of civil law enforcement agencies can occur during disaster response or its aftermath. In most cases, a MEB may provide support for the first three tasks. The MEB may provide assistance as a unit or as part of a joint task force in support of lead civil authorities for DSCA (see JP 3-28). The U.S. laws carefully limit the actions that military forces conduct within the United States, its territories, and its possessions (see ADP 3-28 for information on laws). The MEB complies with these laws while assisting affected citizens. B-3. Doctrine on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management is contained in JP 3-0 and JP 3-41. This chapter uses the task Respond to CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear Incident for DSCA and area damage control. Tactical-level doctrine on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management operations is contained in ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-11.41. B-4. The MEB is designed to integrate many of the types of units that have the greatest applicability in support to DSCA (CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, engineer, EOD, and military police). The MEB has the broadest multifunctional capability and training for DSCA tasks of any brigade. The MEB may be the ideal brigade to respond to certain incidents because of its capability to provide command and control, be assigned an AO, and perform other related requirements. The brigade is trained to manage airspace and conduct interface with others that control airspace. This is particularly important in large-scale disasters requiring DOD aviation support. The MEB can conduct or support most DSCA tasks depending on the nature of the incident and its task organization. The MEB may be called upon to function as the on-site DOD or Army headquarters or to complement or support another headquarters (such as a joint task force or the CBRNE operational headquarters to respond to specific missions). The MEB can provide area damage control as part of support area or in support of its higher headquarters and assigned units. B-5. The MEBs in the Army National Guard could be among the first military forces to respond on behalf of state authorities. Planning DSCA tasks is similar to planning stability tasks; they both interact with the populace and civil authorities to provide essential services. The MEB tasks are similar, but the environment is different (domestic versus foreign). The specialized capabilities of the MEB to conduct stability tasks apply to DSCA, primarily for Tasks 1 and 3. However, the MEB supports the lead civil authority for DSCA. A civil authority is in the lead for DSCA, while the task force or joint task force (hence MEB) supports the lead civil authority. See ADP 3-28 for additional information on DSCA. P ROVIDE S UPPORT F OR D OMESTIC D ISASTERS B-6. Natural and man-made disasters occur throughout the United States and its territories. Most domestic disasters require no federal military support. State and federal emergency management entities receive most military support from the National Guard in state active duty or Title 32, United States Code (USCUSCUnited States Code) status. In a catastrophic event, the demand for resources may exceed National Guard capacity, even with assistance from other states. In such situations, federal ARFOR provide requested support, through either United States Pacific Command or United States Northern Command. B-7. DOD defines a complex catastrophe as any natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace attack, power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple, interdependent, critical, life-sustaining infrastructure sectors and causes extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage or disruption severely affecting the population, environment, economy, public health, national morale, response efforts, and/or government functions (JP 3-28). B-8. There are two distinguishing characteristics of a complex catastrophe: 1) the extremely large scale of damage and casualties, and 2) the cascading effects of the failure of critical infrastructure. These cascading effects impact both the types and quantity of response required in support of the affected populace as well as the environmental conditions in which the response must occur. Some of the effects include widespread and long-term power grid failure, degraded or inoperable communications, and severe impacts to the transportation infrastructure. The cascading effects from these failures could cause numerous problems beyond the immediate affected area and increase the severity of the situation including, but not limited to, widespread scarcity of food and water, lack of medical services at fixed sites within the impacted area, and potentially the breakdown of governance and rule of law. B-9. DOD installations and activities may receive requests directly from local civil authorities and will respond, within their capability, under their own immediate response authority in accordance with DODDDODDDepartment of Defense directive 3025.18, and mutual aid agreements in accordance with DODIDODIDepartment of the Defense Instruction 6055.06. P ROVIDE S UPPORT FOR D OMESTIC C HEMICAL, B IOLOGICAL, R ADIOLOGICAL, OR N UCLEAR I NCIDENTS B-10. A chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident is any occurrence, resulting from the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and devices; the emergence of secondary hazards arising from friendly actions; or the release of toxic industrial materials or biological organisms and substances into the environment, involving the emergence of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards (JP 3-11). The National Response Force integrates governmental jurisdictions, incident management and emergency response disciplines, and private sector entities into a coordinated CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident response. B-11. Military forces conduct domestic CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident support under appropriate laws, regulations, and policies. These include the hazardous waste operations and emergency response standard (Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standard Number 1910.120) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (Sections 9601 to 9675 of Title 42 USCUSCUnited States Code). Responders at every level plan and operate in accordance with these laws. These and other laws define—  Response authorities for public and private agencies.  Hazardous substances, emergency planning, and community right to know.  Cleanup requirements.  Required protective measures and training for responders within the United States. B-12. Department of Homeland Security uses the National Fire Protection Association Standard 472, Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents, to establish the qualifications for personnel conducting domestic CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident response. (See National Fire Protection Standard 472). During domestic CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident response operations, national laws subordinate military doctrine and military authority outside DOD installations. Command structures are based on the National Response Framework and the National Incident Management System, with DOD as a supporting partner. DOD is not the lead unless an incident occurs on a DOD installation. P ROVIDE S UPPORT FOR D OMESTIC C IVILIAN L AW E NFORCEMENT B-13. Providing support for domestic civilian law enforcement applies to the restricted use of military assets to support civilian law enforcement personnel within the United States and its territories. These operations are significantly different from operations outside the United States. ARFOR support domestic civilian law enforcement agencies under constitutional and statutory restrictions, as prescribed by corresponding directives and regulations. For additional information, see DODIDODIDepartment of the Defense Instruction 3025.21. B-14. Except as expressly authorized by the Constitution of the United States or by another act of congress, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 USCUSCUnited States Code 1385) prohibits the use of active Army and Air Force as enforcement officials to execute state or federal law and perform direct law enforcement functions. Likewise, United States Navy regulations prohibit the use of the Marine Corps and Navy for performing direct state and federal law enforcement functions. However, the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to state National Guard forces in state active duty status and Title 32, USCUSCUnited States Code status. Nor does the Posse Comitatus Act restrict the Coast Guard, even when under the OPCON of the Navy, since the Coast Guard has inherent law enforcement powers under Title 14 USCUSCUnited States Code. B-15. Domestic law enforcement missions differ substantially from similar stability tasks associated with civil security and civil control. The rights of civilians take precedence during domestic law enforcement support except in extreme emergencies. B-16. Law enforcement support falls into two broad categories: direct and indirect. Direct support involves enforcing the law and engaging in physical contact with offenders. Indirect support consists of aid to civilian law enforcement agencies but does not include enforcement of the law or direct contact with offenders. Federal laws, presidential directives, and DOD policy prohibit federal military forces from enforcing laws and providing security except on military installations. These laws, policies, and directives specify limited exceptions to the restrictions. When authorized by the Secretary of Defense, federal military forces may provide indirect support to civilian law enforcement agencies, but support is limited to logistic, transportation, and training assistance except in life threatening emergencies. State and territorial governors can use state National Guard forces for direct support of civilian law enforcement as a temporary expedient in accordance with state laws. P ROVIDE O THER D ESIGNATED D OMESTIC S UPPORT B-17. Providing other designated domestic support encompasses preplanned, routine, and periodic support not related to disasters or emergencies. Often, this is support to major public events and consists of participatory support, special transportation, and additional security. Examples are national special security events such as Olympics, inaugurations, or state funerals. Some missions may involve designated support requested by a federal or state agency to augment its capabilities due to labor shortages or a sudden increase in demands. Such support may extend to augmentation of critical government services by Soldiers, as authorized by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense. For example, skilled Soldiers replaced striking air controllers in the Federal Aviation Administration until newly hired civilians completed training. Soldiers have moved coal during strikes or even operated key commercial enterprises when national security considerations justified such extreme action. DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES CONSIDERATIONS B-18. Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations. The activities of the operations process are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. Planning starts an iteration of the operations process. Upon completion of the initial order, planning continues as leaders revise the plan based on changing circumstances. Preparing begins during planning and continues through execution. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage. Assessing is continuous and influences the other three activities. This section uses the operations process activities (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) to discuss considerations that are important to the MEB in conducting DSCA. P LAN B-19. The MEB uses Army planning procedures for DSCA, but must be able to participate and integrate its planning with federal, state, tribal, or local levels as discussed in the following section. Soldiers receive their orders in an Army format, but these orders must be consistent with the overall shared objectives for the response. These orders are aligned with the specific guidance that other on-the-ground responders from other civilian and military organizations are receiving. Soldiers exercise individual initiative to establish and maintain communication at all levels. Based on the type of support provided, MEB leaders, staffs, and Soldiers need to be familiar (to varying degrees) with the terminology, doctrine, and procedures that are used by first responders to ensure the effective integration of Army personnel and equipment. This ensures that citizens who are affected by the disaster receive the best care and service possible. B-20. When the MEB conducts DSCA tasks, a lead federal or state government agency has the overall responsibility depending on the MEB status as a 10 USCUSCUnited States Code or 32 USCUSCUnited States Code Title 10 or Title 32 organizations. The MEB status as a state or federal asset will determine which documents it should use as legal authorities when conducting operations. If the MEB is a state asset, it reports to the state National Guard chain of command. If the MEB is a 10 USCUSCUnited States Code asset (Regular Army), it reports to its federal chain of command. Note. The military chain of command is not violated while the MEB supports the lead federal agency to assist citizens who are affected by a disaster. B-21. The MEB leaders and staff may help support the emergency preparedness planning that is conducted at the national, state, or local level. The MEB may conduct contingency, crisis response, or deliberate planning. The MEB leaders and staffs must understand the following documents from the Department of Homeland Security:  National-level civil disaster and emergency response doctrine contained within the National Incident Management System.  National Response Framework documents. Note. The MEB leaders must understand the doctrine in JP 3-28. B-22. The National Response Framework organizational structure includes emergency support function annexes. There are currently fifteen emergency support function annexes. The emergency support functions are used to help identify who has what type of resources to provide as part of a disaster response. Possible considerations for MEB support to DSCA planning include—  Assisting with interorganizational planning.  Assisting with initial needs assessments.  Providing logistics support for civil authorities.  Providing sustainment in a damaged austere environment.  Assisting the lead civil agency to define and share COAs.  Soliciting agency understanding of roles.  Developing measurable objectives.  Assisting in the coordination of actions with other agencies to avoid duplicating effort.  Planning to hand over to the operation civilian agencies as soon as feasible. The end state and transition are based on the—  Ability of civilian organizations to carry out their responsibilities without military assistance.  Need to commit ARFOR to other operations or the preparation for other operations.  Ability to provide essential support to the largest possible number of people.  Knowledge of the legal restrictions and rules for the use of force.  Establishment of funding and document expenditures (see National Incident Management System procedures).  Identifying and overcoming obstacles, including—  Planning media operations and coordinating with local officials.  Maintaining information assurance.  Establishing liaison with the lead federal agency. P REPARE B-23. Commanders should prepare for DSCA by understanding the appropriate laws, policies, and directives that govern the military during response and by planning and preparing with the agencies and organizations they will support before an incident. There may be little or no time to prepare for a specific DSCA mission. When possible, the commander helps develop contingency plans and standing operating procedures for potential natural and man-made disasters. The MEB may plan, receive units, and deploy within hours. It is possible that the MEB will link up with units on-site during execution as they arrive from across a state or region. B-24. Based on METT-TC factors, training before deployment for DSCA aids in preparing for and executing the necessary tasks. Many stability tasks correlate with DSCA tasks. When possible, the MEB leaders and staff train with civil authorities. B-25. The notification for DSCA employment usually requires rapid reaction to an emergency, but sometimes may allow for deliberate preparation. After notification, the MEB commander and staff leverage the command and control system to coordinate and synchronize their operations with civilian authorities. B-26. The deployment may be within a state or anywhere within the United States or its territories. The MEB should develop standing operating procedures for the various methods and locations of deployment. Based on METT-TC, the MEB task-organizes to conduct DSCA. The MEB may deploy an advanced party with additional staff augmentation as an early-entry command post to provide on-site assessment and an immediate command and control presence. Deployment is affected whether the DSCA mission warrants the entire MEB or one or more task forces from the MEB. The MEB task organization may change periodically as the need for particular services and support changes. A MEB involved in DSCA operations normally will be task-organized with CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, engineer, medical, military police, public affairs and, potentially, units from other Services. Throughout the coordination effort, it is important for the commander and staff to understand and inform interagency personnel of the MEB capabilities and limitations. B-27. Due to nonhabitual supporting relationships and dissimilar equipment, the MEB and the lead governmental organization must ensure that there is close coordination in all areas. The MEB may co-locate its headquarters with the lead agency to improve coordination. The MEB headquarters may be established in tactical equipment or fixed facilities. By using liaison teams, the commander and staff work closely with interagency and other military elements. B-28. A defense coordinating officer and assigned staff may not suffice for a complex disaster. When required, the MEB headquarters can control capabilities that the lead authority requires from the DOD. Depending on the complexity of the operation, some staff augmentation may be required. The previously existing task organization of the MEB may require reinforcement with additional functional units to accomplish assigned missions. The MEB commander task-organizes available assets for the mission and requests reinforcement as necessary. B-29. The MEB leaders must understand the complex environment in which the brigade conducts its mission. The MEB must integrate its activities into the planning effort of the supported civilian agency, understand support requirements, and be aware of the supported agency’s capabilities and limitations. This leader understanding creates an atmosphere that permits shared communications and forges a unified effort between elements. Integrating the MEB command and control system into the command and control systems of the lead governmental agency and local first responders may be a challenge. The extent to which the MEB command and control system is able to integrate into the supported agency command and control system depends on the communications/network compatibility/capability of the supported agency. B-30. Oftentimes, an agency possesses data that, in its original form, creates compatibility issues with the MEB format and the common operational picture. It is incumbent upon the MEB to facilitate the exchange of information with the lead agency. During planning and execution, the MEB can deploy liaison officers to the lead agency. The network-centric environment of the MEB serves as the conduit for rapidly communicating information, while stationary or while moving en route to the geographical site for support operations. B-31. When the MEB works closely with an agency, the problem sets can be complex and diverse. The MEB and the agency must leverage their skill sets and resources to better inform leaders and maximize their greatest potential when preparing to conduct a DSCA operation. By eliminating redundancies and identifying shortfalls in corresponding capabilities, the MEB creates the conditions for a unified effort. The MEB must always protect its information, leverage its information collection capabilities and the communications network to enhance situational awareness, and verify the lead governmental agencies capability to fuse data. E XECUTE B-32. The MEB will do what is required to accomplish its mission when conducting DSCA, even though task organizations may need to be changed. The MEB may not be assigned an AO. The MEB may conduct the below tasks for DSCA. Respond to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear Incidents B-33. Depending on the nature of the incident and initial assessment, the task organization of the MEB may need to be changed frequently. The controlling headquarters may also change the command or support relationship of the MEB as additional units or organizations respond to the incident. Key response tasks may include assessing a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard, conducting risk management, responding to a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard, planning and preparing for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management support, and providing mass casualty decontamination support. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response addresses the short-term, direct effects of a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident. Major functions performed are safeguarding lives, preserving health and safety, securing and eliminating the hazard, protecting property, preventing further damage to the environment, and maintaining the public’s confidence in the government’s ability to respond to a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident. Provide Support to Law Enforcement B-34. The MEB conducts this task in domestic and foreign locations and is governed by applicable laws and policies (see ADP 3-28). The efforts are similar to the stability tasks: establish civil security and establish civil control. Key law enforcement tasks may include conducting law and order operations, providing guidance on military police 0perations, planning police operations, and providing operational law support. Conduct Postincident Response B-35. The MEB organic staff has many of the skills required to conduct most postincident response tasks. MEB requirements could include many of the tasks from stability and DSCA, to include tasks from support area operations. Some DSCA would require the MEB to conduct airspace management, unmanned aircraft system employment, debris removal, medical care, and the employment of specialized search and rescue teams. The MEB can provide command and control for most search and rescue tasks on land but may require augmentation and task-organized capabilities depending on the mission. In a domestic incident, United States Northern Command and United States Pacific Command have a capability area of protection that includes search and rescue. The United States Army Corps of Engineers provides organic and contracted land-based search and rescue capabilities. B-36. Executing DSCA must occur within the guidelines laid out by the lead civil agency. When requested and within the legal limits of federal and state law, the MEB may leverage attached/OPCON information collection assets and networks by positioning sensors, robotics, or forces in a manner that provides rapid and accurate data flow to lead governmental agencies, which enables them to assess the situation and the status of objectives. The civil agency may require an adjustment to the plan, and the MEB must be ready to modify its ongoing operations. The information processes the MEB has in place, because of its communication network, will allow for rapid dissemination of potential issues to the lead agency for resolution. B-37. When executing DSCA, MEB leaders and staff must—  Be familiar with the incident command system and be able to follow unified command system procedures for the integration and implementation of each system.  Know how the systems integrate and support the incident.  Be familiar with the overall operation of the two command systems and be able to assist in implementing the unified command system if needed.  Know how to develop an Incident Action Plan and identify assets available for controlling weapons of mass destruction and hazardous material events.  Coordinate these activities with the on-scene incident commander.  Be familiar with steps to take to assist in planning operational goals and objectives that are to be followed on site in cooperation with the on-scene incident commander.  Know how to interface with and integrate requisite emergency support services and resources among the emergency operations center management and the incident or unified command on-scene incident management team.  Be familiar with the coordination functions and procedures that are to be conducted by and with the emergency operation center in support of on-scene emergency response activities. B-38. The tasks of Soldiers are similar to many of the tasks in stability tasks. In most cases, they do not need to have as much knowledge of the incident command system. B-39. While DSCA operations vary greatly in every mission, the MEB can expect events to follow a pattern of planning, preparation, response, and recovery. Military support for DSCA will be provided through Commander, United States Northern Command; Commander, United States Southern Command; or Commander, United States Pacific Command depending upon the location of the incident. B-40. The Joint Director of Military Support in the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) serves as the action agent for the Assistant Secretary of Defense–Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs who has the executive agent responsibility delegated by the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Director of Military Support plans for and coordinates the DOD civil support mission and is the primary DOD contact for all federal departments and agencies during DOD involvement in most domestic operations. B-41. If DSCA is provided concurrently with homeland defense, the MEB must be prepared to transition to support the offensive and defensive operations of other military forces. Preparation B-42. The MEB preparation for disaster response depends on the priority of other missions. If the MEB is a 10 USCUSCUnited States Code unit, mission priorities may dictate minimal planning and preparation for DSCA operations. On the other hand, a 22 USCUSCUnited States Code MEB may have enough time to plan and prepare for DSCA with other civil and military organizations. B-43. Preparation implements approved plans and relevant agreements to increase readiness through a variety of tasks. Such tasks may include, but are not limited to—  Developing standing operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures with expected supported and supporting elements.  Task-organizing to fill gaps in duties and responsibilities.  Training personnel and leaders on nonmilitary terminology and procedures used for DSCA (such as the incident command system).  Obtaining (through training) the proper credentials for key personnel.  Exercising and refining plans with military and civilian counterparts.  Obtaining the proper equipment to provide the required capability.  Developing, requesting, and maintaining logistics packages for follow-on resupply and maintenance of all classes of supplies in support of extended operations.  Preparing and maintaining Soldier readiness for all personnel to ensure that they are up to date.  Ensuring that communications equipment, communications security, and controlled cryptographic items are serviceable and ready to deploy. Response B-44. As part of a response, the MEB subordinate units and/or liaison teams enter the affected area and make contact with relief organizations. They relay pertinent information about the effort of these organizations up through their military chain of command. The military chain of command relays this information to the lead civil authority. Planning for the operation, staging command post into the area, establishing security, deploying MEB subordinate units, and initiating contact with supported activities and other parts of the relief force occur during this phase of operations. B-45. The commander considers leading with liaison teams and urgent relief assets, such as debris clearance, law enforcement, search and rescue, food, and water. The command and control system of the lead unit gives the MEB units robust early ability to communicate and coordinate with each other and that organization with which the command and control information systems are compatible. Further, the ability to reconnoiter and gather information makes MEB units useful in the initial efforts by civil and other authorities to establish situational awareness, control the area, and oversee critical actions. Recovery B-46. Once DSCA is underway, recovery begins. With initial working relationships between all organizations in place, the MEB maintains steady progress in relieving the situation throughout this phase of operations. The MEB work includes coordination with its higher headquarters, supported groups, and other relief forces and the daily allocation of its own assets to recovery tasks. B-47. The MEB task organization is likely to change periodically as the need for particular services and support changes. Security, maintenance, the effective employment of resources, and Soldier support all need continuing attention. The brigade surgeon advises and assists the MEB commander in counteracting the psychological effects of disaster relief work and exposure to human suffering on MEB Soldiers throughout the operation. Restoration B-48. Restoration is the return of normality to the area. In most cases, the MEB disengages before restoration begins. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is in charge of restoration operations for DSCA. B-49. The DSCA ends in different ways. Crises may be resolved or the MEB may hand off a continuing DSCA to a replacement unit, a relief agency, a police force, or other civil authority. Missions of short duration or narrow scope may end with completion of the assigned task. A SSESS B-50. The MEB command and control system is essential to support the interagency overall assessment. The MEB network-centric environment provides for a robust exchange of information. A common problem that the MEB or a nonmilitary agency may encounter is information overload or a different perception on how an operation is progressing. Commanders share the common operational picture (their interpretation of the situation) with their civil agency counterpart to ensure a unified effort. Liaison should occur to demonstrate this capability and to verify the method in which information sharing will occur. B-51. MEB commanders gauge unit readiness for DSCA missions by assessing proficiency in the tasks of command and control, sustainment, protection, support area operations, and emergency/incident response or the specified tasks assigned to an Army National Guard unit for planning. The requirement to deploy into a domestic operational environment—often with little warning—and to operate requires command and control that can adapt systems and procedures for a noncombat, civilian-led structure. B-52. The MEB leverages its command and control system capabilities and supports a degraded or destroyed civilian command and control/communications system. The MEB brings its mobile network and augments and/or replaces a devastated civil infrastructure. Most first responder communications are wireless, using tower-based repeating which is powered by the grid. The MEB augments local law enforcement (and emergency medical services, fire services, and other first responder communications) with the command and control network to restore vital services to the AO. EMPLOYMENT B-53. An example of a MEB conducting DSCA is a plane that has crashed into a major industrial site and resulted in mass casualties. A CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident has occurred, with downwind prediction that affects a built-up area and state Highway 5, and there is an environmental hazard of runoff into the river that provides water to a built-up area downstream. B-54. The local officials responded but were overwhelmed. The state governor declared a state of emergency; directed the state emergency management agency to take over incident command, management, and response; and requested support from a neighboring state. That state has an Army National Guard MEB ready to respond to the mission based on an existing support agreement. B-55. The Army National Guard MEB immediately deploys the deputy commanding officer with an early-entry command post to collocate with the state emergency management agency on-site command post, while the rest of the MEB mobilizes and moves to the incident site. The MEB is task-organized with one engineer battalion, two military police battalions, a CA battalion, two CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalions, and one mechanized infantry battalion. The state emergency management agency also put their state medical battalion, rotary-wing squadron, local and state search and rescue teams, and a volunteer local construction company OPCON to the MEB. The state emergency management agency assigned the MEB an area to control, in which they will conduct the operations. The key tasks include conducting risk management, responding to a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incident, providing support to law enforcement, conducting postincident response, improving movement, and supporting area security in and around the industrial site. Finally, they are to conduct sustainment support operations (general engineering to construct a berm to control surface runoff) and other critical requirements that may be identified. This page intentionally left blank.

The forward movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel from the echelon (corps and division) support areas is vital to the support of decisive action. The protection of ground supply routes, waterways, rail lines, pipelines, and power generation and distribution capabilities is used to support operations across the range of military operations. LOC security is especially challenging during large-scale combat operations and the consolidation of gains. One of the greatest risks to Army operations can be threats along MSRs. LINES OF COMMUNICATION OVERVIEW C-1. The security, maintenance, and movement control of LOCs is critical to military operations. Line of communications are a route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move (JP 2-01.3). During large-scale combat operations, the support area commander’s primary focus is the security and maintenance of LOC (rail, pipeline, highway, waterway[canal or river]) throughout the support area and provides forward movement of personnel and the distribution of equipment and materiel from the echelon (corps and division) support areas to units forward. C-2. LOC security is an operation, not a sustainment function, and Level II and Level III threat conditions require a dedicated security force. Most units conducting operations throughout the support area can defend against and defeat Level I threats; however, various types of security forces are normally required to patrol and respond to incidents on LOCs to defeat Level II and III threats. These security forces include a dedicated LOC response force and TCF. A response force (normally military police) is a highly mobile, dedicated security force with the capability to defeat Level I and II threats and delay Level III attacking support area LOCs. C-3. Although all LOCs throughout the support area are important, the capabilities they represent are not equal in their contributions to support area operations and overall mission accomplishment. Determining and directing protection and maintenance priorities for ground LOCs throughout the support area may involve the most important decisions that the commander will make. There are seldom sufficient resources to simultaneously provide the same level of protection to all ground LOCs. See ADP 3-37 for establishing protection priorities. C-4. General engineering assets possess the capabilities to develop infrastructure to support mobility, force protection, logistics, base camps, and force beddown facilities. Infrastructure support includes the construction, rehabilitation, repair, maintenance, and modifications of landing strips, airfields, check points, MSRs, LOCs, supply installations, building structures, and bridges. General engineering units (in support of infrastructure development) can also provide capabilities to repair (and limited reconstruction of) railroads or water and waste facilities. The basic capabilities of general engineer units can be expanded by augmenting them with additional personnel, equipment, and training from specialized engineer units. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-34.40 for additional information on general engineering support. C-5. Movement control is a significant component to the control of LOCs, routes, and area security, but it is focused on control rather than security of the movement. Movement control is the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications (JP 4-01.5). Movement control activities also interface with information operations, CA, psychological operations, public affairs, crowd sourcing, and tactical deception. Security considerations should always be a part of movement control. Mobility considerations are also critical to providing security. LINES OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY C-6. Security operations are those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their protected forces (ADP 3-90). Security operations encompass five primary tasks—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. While the first three tasks are linked to the movement and maneuver warfighting function, the last two are linked to the protection warfighting function. These last two security tasks are focused on providing protection, although they may also enhance the movement and maneuver of the force. The focus of security operations may be either on a force (such as convoy operations), facility (base camp, dislocated civilian camp, detention site), or LOC for which they are providing security. See ADP 3-37, ADP 3-90, and chapter 2 for additional information on area and local security. C-7. Security forces operating in the support area (normally military police [see FM 3-39] or a TCF) may also conduct counterreconnaissance in the performance of area and local security in support of LOC security. Counterreconnaissance is a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a commander to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct mission, but a component of all forms of security operations (FM 3-90-1). R OUTE S ECURITY C-8. Route security is a specialized area security task conducted to protect LOCs or MSRs and friendly forces moving along them. Enemy attempts to interdict LOCs may have little immediate impact on the corps or division ongoing decisive and shaping operations because of subordinate unit basic loads. However, the security of those routes over which the corps and division sustaining operations flow are critical to sustained land operations. C-9. The security of the support area LOCs and supply routes, whether rail, pipeline, highway, or waterway, presents one of the greatest security problems in the support area. Route security operations are defensive in nature and are terrain-oriented. A route security force prevents an enemy force from impeding, harassing, or destroying traffic along the route or portions of the route itself. The establishment of base camps and base clusters along that route permits the concentration of security resources. Route security requires dedicated resources at almost an infinite number of points or reaction forces to counter possible enemy action. Units performing missions that require the habitual use of LOCs and supply routes, such as military police, maintenance, transportation, supply, and field service units, can perform route security operations with their primary activities. The support area commander can employ the following techniques to provide route security:  Active and passive security.  Route reconnaissance.  Cordon security.  Movement corridor. C-10. While the scope of these operations depends on the mission variables of METT-TC, route security operations tend to require the commitment of significant resources. A combination of passive and route reconnaissance is the most common pattern used over secured routes, such as a division MSR. Active and Passive Security C-11. Active and passive security is a technique to provide route security without a significant expenditure of labor or resources. It includes—  Camouflage.  Convoy formation and march control to present the least lucrative target possible under prevailing conditions.  Proper selection of routes.  Capitalizing on security offered by related activities taking place without regard to route security requirements. These activities include aircraft traversing over all or portions of the route, maintenance activities taking place along the route, training exercise or troop movement adjacent to or along the route, military and host-nation police traffic control activities, and the activities of the civilian population. C-12. The support area commander employs passive security for all conditions or situations and as an adjunct to any other technique of route security employed. They are the products of a long-term and continually improved program for an integrated security system. Route Reconnaissance C-13. Route reconnaissance addresses not only the route itself, but also all terrain along the route from which the enemy could influence the movement of forces. Route reconnaissance takes place at irregular intervals to avoid developing a regular pattern that an enemy could exploit. See FM 3-90-1 for additional information on route reconnaissance. Cordon Security C-14. It is normally not feasible to secure all points along a route by physically allocating resources to all the points of the route. Cordon security is the security provided between two combat outposts positioned to provide mutual support. (ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-91) The support area commander can assign any available air assault, mechanized, Stryker, or military police unit to combat outposts established at critical locations along the route. The commander locates these combat outposts within supporting distance of each other when possible. Units assigned to these combat outposts provide response forces in the event of enemy activity along the route within their subordinate areas of operations. Forces based at these combat outposts conduct reconnaissance patrols and offensive actions between their base combat outpost and adjacent combat outposts designed to counter enemy activities between these two points on a frequent but irregular schedule. C-15. Normally, each combat outpost contains at least a platoon size element and is equipped with automatic weapons, communications, and sensors and is supported by those fire support assets available to the support area commander. The outpost commander rotates personnel between duty at the combat outpost and duty on patrol. The higher commander of each combat outpost makes frequent contact with each deployed combat outpost to check its status. C-16. The establishment of cordon security does little to eliminate those threat forces that require the adoption of this technique. A commander directing the establishment of cordon security should also direct a series of parallel corrective actions, including—  Searching for a new route to bypass an enemy attack/ambush locations.  Conducting vigorous search and attack operations to destroy the enemy within the support area.  Rigorously enforcing circulation control measures in coordination with the host nation over the civilian population.  Removing cover from areas offering concealment to an enemy.  Constructing new routes to bypass dangerous areas.  Mass-evacuating the civilian population from towns and villages along the route. (This is an extreme measure and requires consultation with host-nation authorities and adherence to the laws of land warfare.) Convoy Security C-17. Convoy security is a specialized area security task conducted to protect convoys. Units conduct convoy security when there are not enough friendly forces to continuously secure LOCs in an AO and there is a significant danger of enemy ground action directed against the convoy. The commander may also conduct them with route security operations. Convoy operations are generally conducted at the battalion level or below, with brigade oversight. The support area commander is responsible for convoy security in the support area (which is usually the MEB commander). Likewise, responsibility for the security of convoys transiting BCTBCTBasic combat training areas of operations is the responsibility of the appropriate BCTBCTBasic combat training commander. Security of convoys transiting previously unassigned areas within the division AO will typically be the responsibility of the commander assigned responsibility for the temporary movement corridor designated by the echelon headquarters to support that convoy. Planning considerations for the division include—  Ensuring proper allocation of combat power to the task.  Coordinating combat enablers (fires, attack aviation, electronic warfare assets) for supported units.  Allocating information collection assets. Movement Corridor C-18. A movement corridor may be established to facilitate the movement of a single element or be established for a longer period of time to facilitate the movement of a number of elements along a given route. The support area commander may establish a movement corridor within the support area along an established MSR or a route designated for unit movement. All airspace requirements above the movement corridor, such as airspace for aerial recon and fires, must be included in the unit airspace plan to allow the establishing unit to conduct effective operations. C-19. The unit commander or convoy commander is responsible for a base level of security during movement. Most support brigades and functional units have a need for more security that they can organically provide during their movement and receive little support from maneuver units to provide additional required security. Units owning an AO may provide additional security support to units moving through or that are present in their AOs, to include the ability to provide fires. Several tasks and tactics, techniques, and procedures can be integrated within an AO to set conditions to help secure individual unit movement, to include—  Supporting situational understanding.  Conducting tactical maneuver (performed by the AO owner or assigned maneuver unit).  Conducting route and convoy security operations.  Conducting mobility operations.  Conducting AT activities.  Conducting CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.  Conducting survivability operations.  Handing off security responsibility when crossing AO borders or at the nearest secure area/facility/base.  Integrating fires.  Coordinating logistics support.  Conducting tactical troop movement.  Employing combat patrols.  Conducting counterambush actions.  Employing obscurants.  Providing tactical overwatch. C-20. The support area commander task-organizes the enablers required to establish a movement corridor and has the staff necessary to establish integrated operations within it. Military police, engineer, logistics, EOD, aviation, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, and other forces may establish a combined arms approach to establish a movement corridor to provide secure movement of military traffic through vulnerable areas (see figure C-1). Based on published movement tables, the combined movement corridor forces will open and maintain a safe passage route through uncontrolled terrain. The opening of the route requires a synchronized effort, with each branch providing unique movement and mobility skills to the route. The sequence may include engineer route clearance and maintenance activities that are integrated with area security implementation along the corridor. Legend: ACP air control point CSC convoy support center EOD explosive ordnance disposal MP military police MSR main supply route NAI named area of interest SUST sustainment TCP traffic control post TRP target reference point C-21. Engineer and military police forces conduct route reconnaissance missions to determine problems along the route. Sustainment forces may then establish temporary holding, maintenance, or rest areas along the corridor as the tactical situation dictates. With the establishment of military police traffic control posts and convoy escorts of critical commodities of supplies and with aviation convoy security in place, the convoys move along the protected route to their final destination. The movement corridor opens and closes for specified periods of time to meet movement table requirements. C-22. This paragraph discusses support to movement beyond the support area commander’s assigned support area by using the technique of movement corridors. There are several techniques that the support area commander may use to support movement beyond its assigned support area. Where an MSR passes from the support area AO through a division-controlled area directly into a BCTBCTBasic combat training AO, the division could designate an AO around the MSR and assign it to the support area commander as part of the support area. The support area commander could create a movement corridor from the support area boundary to the BCTBCTBasic combat training AO. In this case, the support area commander would be responsible for all actions within the movement corridor. The division would provide the required information collection and fires support. The support area commander would coordinate with higher headquarters and the units conducting the movement to provide the required capabilities to support ongoing operations. The support area commander would transfer responsibility for units moving along the corridor to the BCTBCTBasic combat training at their boundary. The BCTBCTBasic combat training could extend the movement corridor within their AO to their brigade support area or to their other boundary if the MSR passes through the AO. The support area commander’s support to movement that does not move on an MSR could also be provided within a movement corridor. A movement corridor that does not use an established MSR may require additional information collection and other forces to set conditions. R AILWAY AND R AILHEAD S ECURITY C-23. Support area commanders support the security of railheads, terminals, and railways that run through the support area and are critical to the forward movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel from the echelon (corps and division) support areas. As with air and sea ports and terminals, railheads and terminals may be collocated with a base camp located in the support area. C-24. Security forces operating in the support area support Army rail operations through local and area security. As with planning to support other intermodal operations, the support area commander and security forces need to understand the basics of those operations. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 4-14 for more information on Army rail operations.) It is important to understand the critical assets associated with rail operations (tracks, locomotives and rolling stock, switching modes, tunnels and bridges, marshalling yards) and the items (materiel and personnel) that are being transported. The basics associated with route security apply to the tracks, while those associated with local security apply to the protection of sites and specific points within the rail system. Military police may also be involved in providing security as part of the security force on the rolling stock itself (to include armored trains and cars), and many of the basics associated with convoy security will apply. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-39.30 and FM 3-39 for additional information on military police support to the security of critical sites. C-25. Security forces support to rail security operations is to prevent the theft, damage, and interference of rail operations during the transport phase. Therefore, security forces support of rail security focuses on high-value or sensitive military equipment. The overall rail security is the responsibility of the train commander or shipper; however, security forces are integrated into rail security if a viable threat has been identified or the sensitivity of the cargo requires additional trained security personnel. C-26. When planning for security forces support in rail security operations, security forces need to consider host-nation security regulations and close coordination with host-nation law enforcement agencies or other regulatory agencies. Planning considerations for security forces rail security activities include—  Developing a security plan for rail transport, including establishing preventive security assumptions/measures to ensure that transport is undisturbed.  Establishing initial security rules before the rail operations begin; for example, military working dog teams or security forces conduct security checks of rail wagons and/or stocks and supplies.  Obtaining a detailed threat assessment of the route before movement to identify likely threats and, based on the threat assessment, applying the correct level of security measures for rail operations.  Conducting route/railway reconnaissance, if necessary.  Coordinating and liaising with host-nation law enforcement activities and host-nation security forces before movement to minimize vulnerable points. When feasible, a detailed movement plan should be given to allied forces.  Defining where security monitoring/patrolling are required.  Determining host-nation and other national border-crossing requirements to ensure undisturbed transport via crossing points. P IPELINE S ECURITY C-27. Pipelines assist in maintaining storage levels to meet daily demand and required stock objectives for the distribution of petroleum. Pipelines reduce the number of convoys and personnel required in distributing the product. The support area commander tasks security forces to provide pipeline security through local and area security tasks to protect pipelines. Security forces (normally military police) conduct mobile security patrols and employ sensors and unmanned aircraft systems to detect and defeat Level I and Level II enemy threats disrupting pipeline distribution. TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL C-28. Traffic management and control are conducted to enable the unencumbered movement of personnel and resources along road networks in the most efficient manner possible. Although focused on supporting movement, traffic management can also be selectively applied to enable maneuver. Traffic management and control also contributes to the commander’s protection efforts. Reconnaissance is an essential component of effective traffic management and control. C-29. Traffic management and control is the direction, control, supervision, and execution of the activities required to enable freedom of movement for persons, vehicles, and resources. Traffic management holistically involves transportation, military police, engineer, and other technical capabilities. The four primary components of traffic management and control are—  Movement control (a transportation task under sustainment).  Traffic management and enforcement (performed by military police as part of their military police disciplines).  MSR and ASR regulation and enforcement (performed by military police as part of security and mobility support discipline).  Engineering support focused on traffic engineering. M OVEMENT C ONTROL C-30. Regulating movements entails the additional actions to synchronize the flow of movement over LOCs which includes, but is not limited to, planning and executing route synchronization and distribution network designs, managing convoys at distribution hubs/convoy support centers/border crossings/entry control points, and diverting the movement of a convoy or single shipment when necessary. C-31. A key aspect of regulating movements is route synchronization. Route synchronization is the planning, routing, and scheduling of movement on ground supply routes and is a control measure that regulates the flow of movement supporting military operations. Route synchronization is executed by commanders with the responsibility to provide order, prevent congestion, and enforce movement priorities for the ground supply routes in their operational area. C-32. The support area commander regulates movement throughout the support area. If the movement is conducted on MSRs or ASRs designated by higher headquarters, the support area commander regulates movement in coordination with the division transportation office/movement control battalion/movement control teams. Units may not move through ground LOCs within the support area without clearance from the AO responsible unit. The support area commander designates, maintains, secures, and controls movement along the routes within the support area unless the higher headquarters directs otherwise. Most routine movement on MSRs/ASRs is handled by the unit conducting the movement or the supporting headquarters. The support area commander must assert control when security conditions require it and stop, reroute, or delay movement even if coordinated or approved by others. C-33. The higher headquarters must provide clear guidance on the roles and responsibilities for movement control, protection, and defense of forces moving through the support area or originating in the support area AO that move into other AOs. Active participation by the SA commander and tenant units with higher headquarters planners will help to ensure proper guidance. The support area commander has responsibility for movement control, protection, and defense within the support area. The higher headquarters, through its movement control battalion and movement control teams, has primary responsibility for movement control within the AO. The convoy commander has primary responsibility for convoy protection, security, and defense. The support area commander may be assigned TACON for force protection in certain circumstances. When a unit wants to move within the support area, it coordinates with the BDOC or BCOC. The BDOC or BCOC will coordinate with the support area commander to obtain movement support: intelligence updates, additional security, fires, and final approval. When the unit plans to leave the support area, the support area commander will coordinate with the supporting movement control team as required to obtain movement clearance for use of the MSRs and ASRs. The base camp or base cluster commander adjusts perimeter security after a unit loads out for movement or integrates a new unit into existing plans to ensure a comprehensive security posture. When a unit moves through the support area, it coordinates with the supporting movement control team. C-34. Sustainment headquarters pushing convoys into a support area and the sustainment headquarters receiving the convoy coordinate with the support area BCOC or BDOC to ensure that the convoys do not conflict with movement and maneuver, protection, or fires warfighting functions. This is especially important for major unit moves supported by transportation units. The support area owner S-3 is ultimately responsible for controlling all movement through the support area. If possible, the support area owner may place a liaison officer at the higher headquarters to assist in controlling sustainment movements. C-35. The support area commander’s staff plans and conducts the required operations to support movement. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear officer determines likely areas for enemy use of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, and designates decontamination sites for restoring contaminated units. The CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear officer also coordinates with task-organized CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear assets to position CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear detection sensors and to establish the corresponding process for receiving, validating, and disseminating CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear alerts, precautions, and downwind messages to subordinate, adjacent, and higher units. The engineer coordinates mobility support, monitoring route status and directing required route maintenance. The EOD staff, in coordination with the engineer and intelligence staff, monitors and conducts trend analysis within the support area. The military police coordinates traffic control and directs required military police security. The S-6 ensures that the required codes, loads, administrative data, and procedures for accessing dedicated communication nets or networked systems are current, available, operational, and packaged for dissemination by the operations section to organic, tenant, or passing units. They coordinate with subordinate electronic warfare officers to ensure that electronic countermeasure devices and equipment are properly installed, tested, and deconflicted with noncomplementary devices of similar purpose within the support area T RAFFIC M ANAGEMENT AND E NFORCEMENT C-36. Traffic management and enforcement and MSR and ASR regulation and enforcement collectively include active and passive measures used to control traffic circulation, enforce traffic regulations, investigate traffic collisions, and enable safe movement of vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Traffic management and enforcement focuses on mitigating traffic disruptions created by threats, dislocated civilians, and congestion due to breakdowns, weather, and degradation of road surfaces. Traffic control elements coordinate with movement control teams to update and share information on MSR interdiction, traffic congestion, or other situations influencing movement in the AO. Military police provide temporary traffic control through manned traffic control posts and emplace temporary traffic control devices (signs, roadblocks, traffic cones, warning devices, other traffic control measures). Traffic management and enforcement and MSR and ASR regulation and enforcement conducted by military police may include—  Supporting movement associated with tactical missions, such as traffic control in support of breaching and gap crossing (traffic control posts, defiles, temporary route signing).  Supporting movement control priorities through execution of published traffic control plans and enforcing highway regulations.  Supporting passage of lines (forward or rearward) mobility support through traffic control (to include management of dislocated civilians, stragglers, and detainees) for stationary and passing units.  Enforcing traffic laws and building host-nation police capacity to perform traffic control and enforcement tasks consistent with the rule of law. C-37. Military police trained as traffic management and collision investigators can conduct traffic surveys to assess traffic problems on specific existing road structures. Based on these assessments, they can provide recommendations for implementation of traffic control measures to mitigate acute traffic flow problems. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-39.10.) Traffic flow problems that require major construction or cover large road networks (such as those found within large cities) require comprehensive traffic studies and expertise from traffic engineers supported by transportation, military police, and other technical specialties. L INES OF C OMMUNICATION M AINTENANCE C-38. Engineering support to traffic management and control can include repairing and clearing roads, improving trafficability and facilitating movement to major construction projects, and designing and building highways. In support of traffic studies, engineers also provide technical expertise on the design and installation of permanent traffic control devices into the road network. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-34.40 for additional information on general engineering support. This page intentionally left blank.

Many of the units not staffed to control terrain become tenants within the support area. Support area operations are conducted by the assigned area owner. Support area operations do not include the mission support operations conducted by tenants within the support area. The support area commander will synchronize their operations with tenant units in the support area to prevent or minimize interference with command and control and support operations and to provide unimpeded movement of friendly forces; protection; operations to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces or defeat threats; and area damage control. The support area commander will have some command and control authority over the tenant and transient organizations within the support area for security and defense; this may be TACON for security and defense. This chapter provides an overview of support area tenant units and their capabilities. capabilities. ENGINEER D-1. Engineers not assigned to BCTs are organized in capability-based units of multidiscipline combat, general, and geospatial capabilities. Army engineer forces operate as integral members of the combined arms teams and echelons above the BCTBCTBasic combat training during peace and war to provide a full range of engineering capabilities. These capabilities are generally provided by three engineer disciplines—combat, general, and geospatial engineering. Table D-1 provides an overview of engineer capabilities at the brigade and battalion level that may be a tenant unit of the support area. For additional information on engineer operations, see FM 3-34.

Support areas are subject to both conventional and unconventional threats. These threats will attempt to disrupt support area operations by attacking sustainment operations and command and control nodes, disabling AMD systems, and seizing key terrain. Every unit in the support area is responsible for its own defense. The establishment of base camps and base clusters throughout the support area builds on the concept of integrating mutual support into a viable defense. BASE CAMP AND BASE CLUSTER OVERVIEW E-1. A base camp is an evolving military facility that supports the military operations of a deployed unit and provides the necessary support and services for sustained operations (ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.10). Establishing base camps is a complex task that balances mission, protection, sustainment, and construction requirements. This task is further complicated by changes in missions; fluctuating troop levels; threat factors; and the complexity, lethality, and speed of military operations. Added to this are time and resource constraints, theater entry conditions, mission duration, access to resources, competing requirements, and environmental considerations. E-2. The use of base camps for sustainment and related activities are unavoidable during the conduct of large-scale combat operations. Commanders must be able to establish base camps and enable access for onward movement and sustainment of forces. Base camps, due to their size and immobility, are difficult to conceal and are generally considered high-value targets for enemy attacks due to the concentration of friendly forces and materiel. Securing and protecting base camps and infrastructure is essential to the force ability to compete and win. Base camps are highly contested and difficult to sustain forward on the battlefield. All activities forward on the battlefield, including LOCs, critical infrastructure, and hasty base camps or AAs, must be resilient and mobile. E-3. The base camp is the focal point for base defense planning and is responsible for defending itself against Level I threats. The base camp engages Level II and Level III threats and delays them until reinforcing military police or a TCF arrives to assist in defeating the threat. Each base establishes a BDOC to plan, coordinate, and supervise base camp defense operations. E-4. Base camps are nonpermanent by design and are geographically small, defendable areas with defined perimeters and established access controls. Base camps should be situated and designed to take advantage of natural and man-made terrain features. The area may vary from high ground with good observation and fields of fire to highly congested areas, obscuring observation and limiting fields of fire. E-5. Lethality and the speed of operations may require the establishment of AAs, hasty base camps, and base clusters using physical terrain features and dispersion to support the protection of forces. The designated base camp commander assigns areas to tenant units and requires them to tie in fires and observation with adjacent units. The BDOC is normally located near the center of the base camp. Unit locations in the base camp are assigned areas based on their future mission, their combat power, and the presence of enemy avenues of approach within their AO. The base camp commander ensures that observation posts are established at key points around the entire perimeter along the most likely enemy avenues of approach. When possible, hasty base camps should provide—  Concealment from air and ground observation.  Adequate entrances, exits, and internal routes.  Space for dispersion.  Cover from direct fire.  Good drainage and soil conditions that can sustain unit vehicles and individual Soldier movements.  Terrain masking electromagnetic signatures.  Sanctuary from enemy artillery fires.  Sufficient space for basecamp specific purposes. E-6. Base camps may have a specific purpose, or they may be multifunctional. While base camps are not permanent bases or installations, the longer they exist, the more they exhibit many of the same characteristics in terms of the support and services that are provided and the types of facilities that are developed E-7. A base camp can contain one or more units from one or more Services and typically support U.S. and multinational forces and other unified action partners operating anywhere along the range of military operations. (See JP 3-10.) A base camp has a defined perimeter and established access controls. The perimeter encircles the base camp site and employs crew served-weapons, fighting positions, and observation posts. E-8. Base camps provide a protected location from which to project and sustain combat power. Commanders apply operational art to decide when, where, and for what purpose to operate from base camps. The arrangement and location of base camps (often in austere, rapidly-emplaced configurations) throughout the support area complement the ability of U.S. forces to conduct sustained, continuous operations, enabling commanders to apply combat power in support of large-scale combat operations. E-9. Base camps throughout the support area may be developed for specific purposes. A base camp can serve as an AA or a sustainment base; support onward movement, integration, or detention operations; or perform multiple functions. The designated purpose and operational requirements of tenant units serve as the primary guides for designing a base camp. E-10. The support area commander designates an area or facility as a base camp and designates the senior officer as the base camp commander responsible for protection, terrain management, and day-to-day operations of the base camp. This allows other units in the base camp to focus on their primary functions. Units located within the base camp are under the TACON of the base camp commander for security and defense. E-11. Construction standards for a base camp in support of large-scale combat operations normally fall within the initial construction standards. An initial construction standard is characterized by facilities with minimum capabilities, requiring minimal engineer effort and simplifying material transport and availability. Organic construction is a subset of the initial construction standard. It is intended for immediate use by units upon arrival in theater for up to 90 days; however, it may be used for up to 6 months. Units use their organic/table of organization and equipment capabilities to the fullest extent possible to construct base camps. Organic capabilities may vary based on the type of unit, training, experience, and equipment available. They typically provide for initial force presence and maneuver activities until force flow supports the arrival of engineer resources. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.10 for additional information on base camp construction standards. E-12. Base camps may be grouped together into a cluster. Within the support area, the support area commander may designate base clusters for the mutual protection and accomplishment of mission objectives. A base cluster has no defined perimeter. However, each base camp within the base cluster does. The senior commander within the base cluster is the base cluster commander. The base cluster commander operates the BCOC and is responsible for the base cluster defense plan. E-13. A number of base clusters may exist within the echelon support area, but there will only be limited assets to assist in their defense. The support area commander will determine which base camps or base clusters have protection priority and submit the unit protection prioritization list to the appropriate echelon for consideration of additional protection assets. See appendix A for additional information on developing a protection prioritization list. BASE CAMP PRINCIPLES E-14. The base camp commander and staff use the base camp principles as a guide for analytical thinking. These principles are not a set of rigid rules, nor do they apply in every situation (see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.10 for additional information on base camp master planning principles). They should be applied with creativity, insight, and boldness. These principles are—  Survivability. A primary purpose of base camps is providing a protected location from which to project and sustain combat power. Base camps depend on the application of effective protection strategies, generally achieved by developing a comprehensive protection plan consistent with the principles of protection discussed in ADP 3-37.  Scalability. Scalability is the ability to tolerate population fluctuations and incorporate changes in the base camp mission, level of services, or force protection level without the need for redesign.  Sustainability. Sustainability is the ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of sustainment/logistics support to achieve military objectives. This means that base camps must achieve and maintain effectiveness within the means of available resources (materials, labor, energy, and funds) without placing any unnecessary strain on existing sustainment systems.  Standardization. The standardization of base camp policies, Service standards, guidance, system solutions, standard designs, and construction provides consistent expectations for commanders and drives the repetitive use of proven best practices and tactics, techniques, and procedures. It helps achieve a higher degree of sustainability, reliability, and efficiency. BASE CAMP ACTIVITIES E-15. Base camp activities are interrelated and interdependent; each activity provides an action that mutually supports the others. The foundation of all activities is master planning. The base camp activities are—  Master planning. Master planning is an integrated strategy for the design, construction, and maintenance of required facilities and infrastructure that integrates base camp improvements for protection, quality of life for residents, and efficiencies and effectiveness.  Operations and maintenance. This activity includes all of the tasks needed for constructing, maintaining, operating, and repairing base camp facilities and infrastructure.  Protection. Base camp protection includes the consideration of all of the protection tasks within the protection warfighting function articulated in ADP 3-37 (see appendix A for more information on protection).  Sustainment. Sustainment activities provide support in two major areas: sustainment/logistics and field services. SITE SELECTION AND LAYOUT E-16. Numerous competing demands and considerations influence a base camp site selection and layout, such as tactical and operational objectives, mission concerns, military constraints, environmental factors, division or corps directives, and commander guidance. A site selection and layout assessment assists in identifying the potential benefits, vulnerabilities, and protection requirements associated with a base camp. E-17. In all situations, a site selection and layout assessment aids in estimating base camp characteristics and the suitability of the site to meet protection requirements. It is important to recognize that some problems are inherent, such as high ground and snipers overlooking the entire base camp interior, or a location where floods occur while other problems can be mitigated. Knowledge regarding base camp protection measures improves throughout the process, from initial selection and layout to design and establishment of the base camp. Protection considerations deliberately integrated from inception into the site selection, layout, design, and establishment process greatly reduces the resource requirements (materials, time, and labor) needed to protect personnel and assets. S ITE S ELECTION C ONSIDERATIONS E-18. Many factors influence site selection, including the tactical situation, access to transportation and infrastructure, proximity to the civilian population, terrain, weather, protection considerations, and effects of selecting an alternate location. Site selection can be crucial to effective operations. The primary concern during site selection is mission accomplishment. However, protection considerations cannot be ignored. A poorly located base camp may be difficult to secure and could hinder rather than enable the mission. Early identification of protection and security requirements reduces construction requirements and manpower demands and helps ensure adequate protection of personnel and assets commensurate with the threat. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.10 for additional information on site selection. D ESIGN AND L AYOUT C ONSIDERATIONS E-19. Planners responsible for the base camp layout and design should consider many variables, such as operational and functional issues, infrastructure requirements, protection and security measures, health and safety, and emergency response. Each base camp should be prepared to defend against the effects of hostile actions, nonhostile or unintended events (such as fire), and environmental conditions such as flooding or other man-made or natural disasters. Many of the base camp layout considerations are similar to site selection criteria. However, layout concerns and constraints are typically base camp-specific. Throughout the design process, planners should recognize conflicts, establish priorities, and focus on the most favorable solutions. The base camp layout should—  Facilitate current and future operations.  Maintain a layered, defense-in-depth security approach.  Include entry control points that maintain security and control vehicle and personnel access.  Protect critical assets and provide accessible protective shelters (bunkers) throughout the base camp.  Allow for the dispersion of units and structures and maintain interior LOCs to support rapid incident response.  Maximize protection of high-occupancy structures using measures such as overhead and sidewall protection designs.  Maximize utilization of existing buildings and other infrastructure. E-20. Protection measures that reduce vulnerability and diminish potential threats and hazards to personnel and critical assets should be addressed during base camp design. These measures include the establishment of standoff and facilities separation distances, perimeter security, vehicle barriers, entry control points, access control, intrusion detection, and mass warning. SECURITY AND DEFENSE E-21. All commanders are responsible for the protection of forces on base camps within their AOs. The base camp and base cluster commanders integrate the appropriate protection tasks as part of mission planning and throughout the operations process. The framework for base camp protection consists of three primary areas: an outer security area, a perimeter zone, and an inner security area. These are shown conceptually in figure E-1. The base camp commander implements protection measures for tenant units on the base camp, and the base cluster commander coordinates, synchronizes, and integrates protection capabilities to safeguard base camps, secure routes, and protect forces within the base cluster. Protection and defensive measures are applied within and beyond the confines of the base camp to safeguard personnel, physical assets, and information. Protecting and defending base camps include consideration of all of the protection principles within the protection warfighting function in ADP 3-37 and the associated defensive tasks detailed in FM 3-90-1, including—  Comprehensive. Base camp and base cluster protection is an all-inclusive utilization of complementary and reinforcing protection tasks and systems available to base camp commanders to preserve the force.  Integrated. Base camp and base cluster protection is integrated with other activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities associated with base camp missions to provide strength and structure to the overall effort. Integration must occur vertically and horizontally throughout the process.  Layered. Base camp and base cluster protection capabilities are arranged using a layered approach to provide strength and depth. Layering reduces the destructive effect of a threat or hazard.  Redundant. Base camp and base cluster protection efforts are often redundant anywhere that a vulnerability or point of failure is identified. Redundancy ensures that specific activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities that are critical for the success of overall base camp protection have a secondary or auxiliary effort of equal or greater quality.  Enduring. Ongoing base camp and base cluster protection activities maintain the objectives of preserving combat power, populations, partners, essential equipment, resources, and critical infrastructure throughout the base camp life cycle. E-22. Base camp and base cluster security and defense capabilities are employed using a layered approach to provide strength and depth. Layering reduces the destructive effect from any single attack or hazard through the dissipation of energy or the defeat of the attacking force. A layered defense slows threat attacks and provides time for friendly defensive forces to assess, decide, and respond. Obstacles, such as barbed wire fences, jersey barriers, T-walls, berms and ditches, bastion barriers, networked munitions, and direct-fire positions and elements are deployed in depth, in a concentric fashion, to provide maximum protection. E-23. These obstacles, direct-fire positions, and active deterrents can be in the form of—  Wire, concrete, or other barriers used to reinforce the perimeter.  Entry control points and associated obstacle/countermobility plans used to canalize and control incoming personnel or vehicles.  Barriers employed to block high-speed avenues of approach, externally on approaches to the perimeter and internally to protect high-risk targets.  Perimeter guard towers and observation posts.  Ditches, berms, or other earthen obstacles.  Mobile security patrols.  Communications signal/electromagnetic signature masking. B ASE C AMP AND B ASE CLUSTER S ECURITY E-24. Base camps provide a protected location to project and sustain combat power. While some base camps, especially smaller base camps built in high-threat areas, may be required to focus on defense rather than just security, the primary focus for most base camps is not on conducting defense, except in rare instances. In these cases, normal mission operations on the base camp cease and the focus of all available assets is shifted to defense until the threat is eliminated or repelled. Once the threat is defeated, the base camp and its tenant or transient units return their focus to their primary missions. E-25. Security operations are those operations performed by commanders to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the forces being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow commanders to effectively use their protected forces (ADP 3-90). The five fundamentals of security are—  Provide early and accurate warnings. Early and accurate warnings of an enemy approach are essential to successful base camp and base cluster protection/force protection. The base camp and base cluster commanders need information to shift and concentrate forces to meet and defeat the enemy. The use of OPs, patrols, security forces, and sensors provide long-range observation; observe enemy movement; and report the enemy’s size, location, and activity.  Provide reaction time and maneuver space. Base camp and base cluster security assets—forces, sensors, and patrols—should work at a sufficient distance to allow the base camp and base cluster commanders time to review rapidly reported information. This timely review gives the base camp and base cluster commanders the reaction time necessary to order indirect fire to slow the enemy’s rate of advance; maneuver direct-fire elements into place to engage, exploit, and defeat the enemy; and initiate coordination for a response force or TCF if required, based on the threat level.  Orient on the force, area, or facility to be protected. Base camp and base cluster organic, security, and reinforcement forces must be aware of any enemy movement and must reposition their elements accordingly to maintain their position relative to any threats. The force must understand the base camp and base cluster commander’s scheme of protection, including where the security force is in relation to enemy movement.  Perform continuous area security operations. Base camp and base cluster personnel conduct continuous area security operations to gain as much information as possible about the AO and any threats. This can be accomplished through OPs, mounted and dismounted patrols, and remote sensors, such as unmanned aircraft systems deployed to observe dead space.  Maintain threat contact. Once enemy forces are detected, base camp forces must continuously collect information on the enemy’s activities and disposition to assist the base camp or base cluster commander in determining the potential and actual enemy COA and deny the enemy the element of surprise. This requires security forces to maintain continuous visual contact to be able to use direct and indirect fires to influence enemy actions and gain time for the base camp and base cluster commander. Once the base camp security forces make enemy contact, they do not break contact unless the base camp or base cluster commander or a designated security force commander specifically directs it. E-26. Although not a fundamental of security operations, the use of dispersion is an important technique that commanders should consider. Dispersing units, command posts, equipment, and personnel reduces vulnerability against enemy direct-and indirect-fire threats and CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. However, units should be close enough to provide mutual support against enemy ground attacks. Commanders must determine where risk is acceptable. E-27. Base camps and base clusters typically protect their personnel and assets through the application of security activities. Some essential security activities include communications security, cybersecurity, information security, OPSECOPSECOperational Security, personnel security, and physical security. Of the five security tasks listed in ADP 3-90—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security—only area security and local security typically apply to base camps and base clusters. Area security preserves the base camp and base cluster commander’s freedom to move reserves, position fire support means, provide for mission control, conduct sustaining activities, and coordinate for reinforcing forces (see chapter 2). Local security provides immediate protection to base camp forces and assets. See ADP 3-37 and ADP 3-90 for additional information on area and local security. B ASE C AMP D EFENSE E-28. Defensive operations are operations to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0). Base defense refers to the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to United States forces (JP 3-10). Successful base camp and base cluster defenses share the following characteristics: disruption; flexibility; maneuver; massing effects; and operations in depth, preparation, and security. The basic defensive tasks are applicable to the area and perimeter of the base camp. See ADP 3-90 for a discussion of these characteristics. Area Defense E-29. Conducting area defense is a defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to a base camp, base cluster, or surrounding terrain. The focus of the area defense is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting, prepared positions. Units maintain their positions and control the terrain between these positions. An area defense capitalizes on the strength inherent in a closely integrated base camp defense. The higher commander may assign subordinate units or tenant organizations the task of conducting an area defense as part of their mission. Subordinate echelons defend within their assigned AOs as part of the larger-echelon operation. See FM 3-90-1 for more information on area defense. Perimeter Defense E-30. The commander can employ perimeter defense as an option when conducting an area defense or in the conduct of base camp and base cluster defense in the echelon support. A perimeter defense is oriented in all directions. The prerequisites for a successful perimeter defense are aggressive patrolling and security operations outside the perimeter. The unit within the perimeter can perform these activities; or another force, such as the territorial defense forces of a host nation, can perform them. The unit can organize a perimeter defense to accomplish a specific mission, such as protecting a fire base. A unit may also form a perimeter when it is located in the friendly echelon support area within the confines of a base camp or base cluster. E-31. A major characteristic of a perimeter defense is a secure inner area, with most of the combat power located on the perimeter. Another characteristic is the ease of access for resupply operations. The commander coordinates direct-and indirect-fire plans to prevent accidentally engaging neighboring friendly units and noncombatants. Normally, the reserve centrally locates to react to a penetration of the perimeter at any point. See FM 3-90-1 for more information on perimeter defense. B ASE D EFENSE O PERATIONS C ENTER E-32. A base defense operations center is a command and control facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense (JP 3-10). Other contingency locations may also establish BDOCs as the situation requires. A base camp’s commander provides and exercises base camp defense through a BDOC. Through the BDOC, the base camp commander plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base camp defense efforts (see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-90.20). E-33. The BDOC resembles a typical command post. A command post is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities (FM 6-0). Personnel and equipment are arranged to facilitate coordination, the exchange of information, and timely decision making. Well-designed BDOCs integrate command and staff efforts by matching personnel, equipment, information systems, and procedures against their internal layout. (See ADP 6-0 or FM 6-0 for more information on command posts.) The protection functions of a BDOC include the following:  Plan and execute force protection, AT, and physical security operations according to published guidance.  Conduct a protection working group and threat working group.  Ensure that all units within the perimeter conduct active and passive security measures.  Monitor and direct security forces. E-34. The composition of the BDOC depends on the combination of forces involved and may include other Services and multinational, host-nation, and other U.S. agency personnel, depending on the combination of forces located at each base camp. Multi-Service, other agency, host-nation, and multinational representation should be part of the BDOC when elements of their armed forces, police, or paramilitary forces are directly involved in the overall base defense effort, or when they are a major tenant organization. The BDOC normally consists of three primary sections: command, intelligence, and operations. There may be additional sections designated as deemed necessary (see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-22.2-1). E-35. Similar to a BDOC, the BCOC is a command and control facility that serves as the base cluster commander’s focal point for defense and security of the base cluster (see JP 3-10). The BCOC is established to control several subordinate base camps that may be grouped together in a cluster for mutual support for protection. The base and base cluster commanders also coordinate and integrate security operations with the BCOC as appropriate. Other contingency locations may also need to coordinate with BCOCs as the situation requires. Such coordination normally involves TACON over forces assigned or attached to the base primarily for the purpose of base defense and security. The base commander may also exercise TACON over other forces (such as medical or emergency services) residing on the base for primary purposes other than base defense. For example, when these forces perform functions related to base defense or local security missions as part of the overall base defense plan, they typically fall under TACON of the base commander (see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-90.20). This TACON relationship may not exist at other contingency locations; the echelon (corps or division) commander should provide guidance in those situations. The BDOC typically conducts 24-hour operations. Basic BDOC functions include the following:  Provide organization for coordinated base camp security.  Prepare plans to implement the commander’s base camp defense guidance.  Monitor assigned, attached, and tenant-unit forces and resources and provide the commander information to aid, allocate, and move forces and materiel to meet base defense requirements.  Inform the base commander of security concerns.  Develop and execute a reconnaissance and surveillance plan to ensure proper security from standoff threats within base camp boundaries, and coordinate with the base camp and base cluster commanders for the area outside the base camp boundary.  Coordinate with the base camp commander or tenant commander to deconflict security activities from combat and stability operations.  Identify and share emergency response and area damage control capabilities, to include medical support, engineering, EOD, and firefighting, as required.  Evaluate actions to identify operational deficiencies, lessons learned, and best practices.  Develop methods to improve combined operational effectiveness, to include coordinating training and exercising security measures. Base Defense Planning E-36. Base camp defense planning is a methodical process that combines site selection considerations, mission objectives, mitigation strategies, identified security requirements, and protection operations. Early identification of protection requirements is essential to base camp defense planning. Requirements established before construction reduce construction and manpower costs. Security measures established in the planning process are more easily applied than after construction. E-37. The base camp defense plan is necessary for the development and implementation of a comprehensive protection program. The base camp defense plan should focus efforts and resources toward cohesive defense operations. A sample plan template is provided in appendix D. The base defense plan should—  Convey the base camp commander’s intent.  Provide a clear, concise mission statement.  Provide tasks and activities, constraints, and coordinating instructions.  Permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans.  Focus on subordinate activities.  Promote initiative.  Include annexes containing subordinate information not included in the main defense plan. E-38. Base camp defense planning should be conducted using a team approach. Essential members include the base commander, tenant-unit commanders, and the protection team. Base Camp Commander E-39. Base camp commanders are responsible for protection planning and operations and should use all available assets to establish required security levels. Base camp commanders normally exercise TACON for the purpose of base defense over forces assigned or attached to the base. The commander may also exercise TACON over other forces residing in the base for primary purposes other than local base defense when these forces are called on to perform functions related to base camp defense or local security missions as part of the overall base camp defense plan. E-40. Base camp commanders also have direct interest in the security of the area surrounding the base. As such, the commander coordinates base defense efforts with the TCF or host-nation forces providing exterior security, if available. Base camp commanders establish a BDOC to serve as the focal point for protection, security, and defense within the base camp boundary. Through the BDOC, the commander plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base camp defense efforts. E-41. Critical to the success of the protection mission is the need for coordination and cooperation among assigned or attached units. These units should build operational relationships based on mutual support. For example, tenant-unit communications equipment may not be compatible with host-unit equipment. In this case, tenant-unit commanders should coordinate with the base commander to ensure compatibility. Tenant-Unit Commanders E-42. Tenant-unit commanders actively participate in base camp defense planning. Tenant units normally provide for their own security and contribute personnel to the protection mission. These assigned or attached forces fall under the base camp commander’s TACON. This relationship may not necessarily exist at all contingency locations. Regardless, tenant-unit commanders should ensure that provided personnel are properly equipped and trained. Key tenant-unit concerns include training, rehearsals, coordination, and competing requirements between security and operational tasks. Tenant-unit commander responsibilities include—  Participating in the preparation and execution of base camp defense plans.  Providing for unit internal security.  Conducting individual and unit training to ensure readiness for assigned defense tasks.  Providing an appropriate share of facilities, equipment, and personnel for the BDOC.  Advising the base camp commander on operational concerns specific to their units.  Sustaining and administering unit forces.  Providing unit requirements for common-user communications systems to the base camp commander’s communications element. Protection Working Group E-43. A working group approach should be used to develop the base defense plan and protection measures and to manage protection operations. To interact efficiently, team members should understand the concepts, roles, and capabilities of other members. A working-group approach facilitates protection plan development, intelligence sharing, and coordination between tenant units. BASE CAMP THREATS E-44. In most cases, base camps are located where the risk of Level III threats have been eliminated or effectively mitigated by the designated AO commander. During large-scale combat operations, base camps often become focal points for bypassed or reconsolidated Level III threats. The support area commander must be prepared to conduct defensive and offensive tasks by deploying the TCF to repel a Level III attack when the threat assessment indicates the possibility of a Level III threat in the support area, regardless of whether the element of decisive action/simultaneous activities is currently dominant. Preparations may involve significant increases in area denial measures; offensive actions; hardening, dispersal, and other protection measures; and immediate reaction to hostile actions. E-45. On initial occupation of the base camp site, friendly forces take offensive actions to identify levels of enemy presence and eliminate enemy threats in the immediate area, if required. Once the area is cleared and the necessary elements of the base camp defense have been established, the base camp commander continues managing area security tasks to provide an early warning and to mitigate the risks of threat elements operating within the base camp AO. The base camp commander and staff identify gaps in security and requirements for additional support or assets. The base camp commander, supported by the staff, coordinates with the AO commander to fill identified capability gaps. E-46. Base camps are purposely designed and constructed to be resistant to enemy attack and to recover quickly so that they can continue to operate. The ability to quickly recover from an enemy attack is enhanced through detailed planning and rehearsals of procedures. Base camps must be prepared to defend in any direction through flexible base camp defense plans that include the use of dedicated initial-response forces positioned to respond to the widest possible range of contingencies. E-47. The two principal types of attacks that a base camp commander and their staff focus on are categorized as penetrating attacks or standoff attacks. Infiltrated attacks from inside the base camp are likely to occur as well. Screening and vetting local workers are paramount to disrupting the threat’s potential to gain access as a base camp worker or visitor. Hybrid threats will use the difficulties of positive identification of threat actors as threat actors to their advantage, and often these actors will provide signatures similar to friendly or neutral actors, gaining them access to the base camps. P ENETRATING A TTACKS E-48. Defending against penetrating attacks relies on a strong perimeter defense that incorporates obstacles and integrated fires from well-protected firing positions. When applying defensive elements to a base camp perimeter, the type and extent of barrier and fires integration may be restricted based on mission and operational variables. Base camps within complex terrain, especially in support of stability tasks, will likely be restricted in the amount and types of obstacles and corresponding fires allowed in the outer security area; this is especially true for indirect fires. E-49. Security forces must be capable of disrupting and delaying the penetration of the base camp perimeter until reinforced by a response force or TCF. Base camp defenders should have tactical mobility with as much personal protection as possible. Security forces must be equipped with reliable and multiple means of communication. They should also have the necessary sensors and devices to execute reconnaissance and surveillance to the limits of the security area. This helps provide adequate detection and early warnings during periods of limited visibility. E-50. Joint fires may be employed to augment the organic direct-and indirect-fire capabilities of the base camp or base cluster. Security force personnel (augmentation and selectively armed personnel) may be directed to secure key facilities within the base camp, such as command posts, ammunition storage areas, and aircraft revetments. They may also support finding, fixing, containing, and defeating any attacks that may penetrate the perimeter. Adequate fire-control measures must be employed to prevent fratricide. S TANDOFF A TTACKS E-51. Standoff attackers are typically elusive targets. Level I and Level II threats may rely on blending in with the legitimate populace, only revealing themselves as combatants when they engage in a hostile act. Standoff attacks are mitigated by conducting area security tasks within and beyond the base camp AO to—  Deny hiding places to the enemy.  Disrupt enemy planning, reconnaissance, and organization.  Detect the enemy as it moves into position and posture forces to quickly neutralize detected forces.  Deny enemy anonymity through identity activities. E-52. These preemptive actions rely on timely, accurate, relevant, and predictable intelligence, including human intelligence, within the base camp outer security area and beyond. For imminent threats that originate outside the base AO for which the AO commander is unable to assist, the base camp commander must use organic base camp combat power to counter the threat or, with the permission of the support area commander, assume the risk of enemy standoff attacks. BASE CAMP SECURITY FORCES E-53. Within a support area, various types of security forces are assigned to secure the security area and LOCs. These include dedicated base camp and base cluster security forces, LOC security forces, and TCFs. A response force (normally military police) is a highly mobile, dedicated security force with the capability to defeat Level I and II threats and delay Level III threats within a support area. All base camp and base cluster units and/or detachments must maintain a readiness posture. Important rehearsals include commitment of base camp response forces, commitment of cluster response forces, commitment of the support area TCF, battle handover, and fire plan rehearsals. E-54. A base camp may or may not have a force dedicated to its security and defense. Therefore, it is important for base camp commanders to be aware of the assets available for base camp security and defense. When there is not a dedicated security force, the base camp commander requires TACON of tenant-unit personnel to augment security and defense of the base camp. Base camp security and defense is an economy-of-force mission, so it is imperative that all organic, tenant, and transient forces residing on the base camp provide assistance to the base camp commander to fulfill these requirements as necessary. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.10 for additional information on security forces. BASE CAMP DEFENSE PLAN E-55. The base camp commander plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base camp defense efforts. The commander also coordinates and integrates security operations with the BCOC as appropriate. Such coordination normally involves TACON over forces assigned or attached to the base primarily for the purpose of local base camp defense. The base commander may also exercise TACON over other forces residing on the base for primary purposes other than local base camp defense (such as medical). For example, when these forces perform functions related to base defense or local security missions as part of the overall base camp defense plan, they fall under TACON of the base camp commander. TACON may be authorized at the first common higher headquarters. Figure E-2 provides a sample format for a base camp defense plan. [CLASSIFICATION] Place the classification at the top and bottom of every page of the OPLAN or OPORD. Place the classification marking Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential in parentheses at the front of each paragraph and subparagraph. Refer to AR 380-5 for classification and release marking instructions. Note. Omit areas that do not apply. Copy ## of ## copies Issuing headquarters Place of issue Date-time group of signature Message reference number The first line of the heading is the copy number that is assigned by the issuing headquarters. Maintain a log of specific copies issued to addressees. The second line is the official designation of the issuing headquarters (for example, 1st Infantry Division). The third line is the place of issue. It may be a code name, postal designation, or geographic location. The fourth line is the date or date-time group that the plan or order was signed or issued and becomes effective unless specified otherwise in the coordinating instructions. The fifth line is a headquarters internal control number assigned to all plans and orders according to unit SOPs. OPLAN/OPORD [number] [(code name)] [(classification of title)] Number plans and orders consecutively by calendar year. Include code name, if any. References: List documents (JP 3-10 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.10) that are essential to understanding the OPLAN or OPORD. List references concerning a specific function in the appropriate attachments. numbers, edition, and scale. Note. Doctrinal references for this attachment include JP 3-10, ADP 3-37, FM 3-81, FM 3-90-1, and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-90.20. Time Zone Used Throughout the OPLAN/OPORD: State the time zone used in the AOs during execution. When the OPLAN or OPORD applies to units in different time zones, use ZULU time. Task Organization: Describe the organization of forces available to the issuing headquarters and their command and support relationships. Refer to Annex A (Task Organization) if long or complicated. The organization for defense should clearly specify the base units providing the forces for each defense element. Attached or transient units and the names of commanders should be included. The defense requirements of U.S., HNs, TCNs, and other civilian organizations quartered on the base also should be identified. Their capabilities to assist in the defense are determined and integrated into the base defense plan.) operations in the following subparagraphs (Under the following headings, describe the environment in which defense of the base will be conducted, in sufficient detail for subordinate commanders to grasp the way in which their tasks support the larger mission): [page number] [CLASSIFICATION] [CLASSIFICATION] references; for example, “Map, reference (b).” Refer to appendix 2 (Operation Overlay) to Annex C (Operations) as required. required. as required. (Place the classification and title of the OPLAN or OPORD and the issuing headquarters at the top of the second and any subsequent pages of the base plan or order.) composition, disposition, location, movements, estimated strengths, including terrorist organizations and reconnaissance elements.) information on friendly forces not covered by this OPORD, to include the mission of the next higher headquarters and adjacent bases as well as units not under base command whose actions will affect or assist the defense of the base. These units may include security forces, fire support, special operations forces, cyberspace operations forces, engineers, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units, military police, EOD, HN military or police organizations, and government and nongovernmental organizations of both the U.S. and HN.) organizations in the AO that may impact physical security or the implementation of physical security procedures. to Annex K (Civil Affairs Operations) as required. View civil considerations through a base defense perspective by using operation and mission variables. detached from the issuing headquarters. State when each attachment or detachment is effective (for example, on order or on commitment of the reserve) if different from the effective time of the base order. Do not repeat information that is already listed in Annex A (Task Organization). development. and establishes overall command priorities. This subparagraph should provide subordinates sufficient guidance to act upon if contact is lost or disrupted.) progress. Define the areas, buildings, and other facilities considered critical, and establish priorities for their protection.) commander.) elements to counter standoff and penetrating attacks to include the base boundary patrol concept of operation and establishment of a defense with primary, alternate, and supplementary defensive positions, as well as reaction force responsibilities. Describe the purpose of counterattacks and set work priorities.) indirect-fire assets, smoke, and aviation support.) set forth the specific tasks for each subordinate defense element listed in the Task Organization.) reserve.) [CLASSIFICATION] applicable to two or more elements or to the command as a whole.) These restrictions can be categorized as personnel, materiel, and vehicles. Security measures also may be outlined here.) Include a description of plans to cope with enemy standoff attacks.) description to disseminate requirements for identification and control of personnel who conduct business on the base, if applicable.) vendors, contractor personnel, and maintenance and support personnel – if applicable.) [CLASSIFICATION] emergency lighting.) and mobile. Attach detailed instructions such as special orders and standing operating procedures as annexes. Ensure that procedures include randomness.) be a contracted civilian security force.) circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.) [page number] [CLASSIFICATION] [CLASSIFICATION] detailed plans, such as combating terrorism, responding to bomb threats, active shooter response, hostage situations, emergency destruction of classified information, natural disasters, and firefighting.) will become effective.) instructions as required. Refer to Annex F (Sustainment) as required. commanders within the AO. of each command post and its time of opening and closing. as required. required. ACKNOWLEDGE: Include only if the attachment is distributed separately from the base order. [Commander’s last name] [Commander’s rank] The commander or authorized representative signs the original copy of the attachment. If the representative signs the original, add the phrase “For the Commander.” The signed copy is the historical copy and remains in the headquarter files. DISTRIBUTION: Show only if distributed separately from the base order or higher-level attachments. [page number] [CLASSIFICATION] Legend: AMD air missile defense AO area of operations AR Army regulation ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications Army techniques publication CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear EOD explosive ordnance disposal FM field manual HN host nation JP joint publication MSF mobile security force OPLAN operation plan OPORD operation order SOPSOPStandard Operating Procedures standard operating procedure TCN third country nationals U.S. United States ZULU time zone indicator for Universal Time This page intentionally left blank.

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definitions.

Entries are by paragraph number.