*FM 3-94
Field Manual
No. 3-94
Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, D.C., 23 July 2021

ARMIES, CORPS, AND DIVISION OPERATIONS

The Army gives the combatant commander depth and versatility because landpower expands the friendly range of military options. The Army, uniquely, provides a combination of armored, medium, light, and airborne forces. Along with a full suite of enablers, this allows us to provide tailorable and scalable force packages for various contingencies. By multiplying the range of U.S. capabilities that the adversary must counter, the Army narrows options that might otherwise work against a lesser opponent or a coalition partner supported only by U.S. air and maritime power. ADP 1 The unique and crucial role of the Army is to provide landpower to the geographic combatant commanders. Landpower, as ADP 1 notes, “is the ubiquitous tool of the joint force—often decisive, sometimes indirect, but indispensable.” FM 3-94 examines the employment of Army forces within a geographic combatant command and describes how the Army supports the geographic combatant commander across the range of military operations in that area of responsibility. In addition to being the largest of the Armed Forces of the United States, the Army has a greater variety of units than the other Services, each with a different organization and purpose. Therefore, the Army provides the combatant commander with an interlocking array of higher headquarters and formations trained and equipped to apply landpower from the theater level, through the operational level, and down to the tactical employment of various brigades, groups, and battalions. Together the theater army, field army (when constituted), corps, and divisions give the combatant commander multiple scalable options necessary for the employment of landpower in an interdependent joint force. FM 3-94 describes how armies, corps, and divisions conduct operations as unified action partners in competition and conflict using the Army’s operational concept —a fundamental statement that frames how Army forces, operating as part of the joint force, conduct operations (ADP 1-01). The Army’s operational concept in support of unified action is unified land operations. FM 3-94 discusses the foundations, tenets, and doctrine of army, corps, and division operations. It serves as a common reference for commanders and staffs at these echelons. FM 3-94 lists key higher echelon principles and tenets as a means of organizing ways commanders and staffs consider military problem solving at army, corps, and division echelons. Narrative discussions and historical vignettes provide explanations and context about commanding and controlling forces at these echelons. The proper application of principles and tenets to a particular situation requires situational understanding informed by professional judgment. FM 3-94 has five chapters and four appendices. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the higher echelons of the Army. It begins by des cribing the strategic environment in which Army forces operate. It describes the roles of these echelons within the context of a larger joint force. This chapter also discusses operational and administrative chains of command and their differences. The chapter concludes with a brief review of operational areas. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the operational art and science that underpins operations at the operational level of war. It discusses operational art and the design of campaigns at this level. It then describes operational-level combat power considerations. Chapter 3 provides an overview of theater and field armies. The chapter summarizes the subordinate units typically found in the theater army echelon. The chapter then discusses the internal organization of the theater army and the various command posts available to the theater army commander. Chapter 4 explains the roles and functions of the corps. The chapter then discusses the internal organization of the corps headquarters and the various command posts available to the corps commander. The chapter summarizes the subordinate units normally under the operational or tactical control of the corps. Finally, it briefly discusses corps-level operations across the competition continuum. Chapter 5 explains the roles and functions of the division. The chapter discusses the internal organization of the division headquarters and the various command posts available to the division commander. The chapter then summarizes the subordinate units normally under the operational or tactical control of the division. Finally, it briefly discusses division-level operations across the continuum. Appendix A describes command and support relationships. It begins with a discussion of joint and Army command and support relationships and other authorities. This appendix concludes with a discussion of command and control for multinational operations. Appendix B provides an expanded discussion on the role of the ARFOR. It focuses on the ARFOR’s administrative and support responsibilities to subordinate Army forces and to other Services within a joint force. Appendix C provides an expanded discussion of the multi-domain expanded battlefield framework and the operational framework. The appendix begins with a description of the multi-domain extended battlefield followed by a detailed description of the physical components of the operational framework. This appendix concludes with a friendly force doctrinal template of echelon above brigade frontages and depths. Appendix D describes some critical considerations for how armies, corps, and divisions transition to a joint headquarters. More details on each echelon will be published in three supporting Army techniques publications (ATPs). One will cover the theater army in detail. Another will provide details and vignettes on the corps and corps operations. It will also describe how the corps headquarters transforms into a joint task force (JTF) for contingencies. A third will address the division, with an extensive discussion on decis ive action at the tactical level. This manual is the proponent for a single term, ARFOR, which is not modified from the previous edition. FM 3-94 is not the proponent for any new Army terms. It does not rescind any defined terms.

Chapter 1 establishes the roles of theater armies, field armies, corps, and divisions within the context of a larger joint force. This chapter begins by describing the strategic environment, including threats, the Army’s strategic roles, and the competition continuum. Next, this chapter summarizes how Army forces contribute to joint and multinational operations through unified land operations. This is followed by a brief description of these formations, including the roles they perform in operations. Then this chapter describes operational and administrative chains of command. This chapter concludes with a description of operational areas. LANDPOWER FOR THE JOINT FORCE 1-1. The primary purpose of the Army is to provide sustained landpower to the joint force. Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people (ADP 3-0). While landpower can, and often is, tailored to any circumstance or operation, the Army exists to fight and win wars on terms favorable to the United States and its allies. Army forces are organized, manned, equipped, and trained for this purpose. While prevailing in large-scale ground combat is the primary mission of Army forces, Army forces are often called upon to support the joint force across three additional strategic roles: shaping operational environments, preventing conflict, and consolidating gains. They do this during competition, crisis, and conflict. The echelons above brigade remain indispensable to these operations. Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service’s capabilities to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both (JP 3-0). 1-2. Armies, corps, and divisions provide the joint force flexible, tailorable formations and headquarters capable of managing crises and conducting large-scale ground combat. These echelons provide combatant commanders with credible forces that possess the technical and tactical capabilities to conduct successful operations across the full range of military operations. They provide the ability to conduct prompt and sustained operations; sustain Army and joint forces; consolidate gains; and enable unified action partners to interact with, secure, or control populations. 1-3. Armies, corps, and divisions, acting separately or in concert with each other as part of a joint and multinational force, provide the capability to plan, prepare, execute, and assess joint and multinational operations. They combine all elements of national, multinational, and joint power in the conduct of operations. In addition to providing trained and credible Army forces, these echelons may perform one of six roles during the conduct of operations:  Army Service component command (ASCCASCCArmy service component commander).  Theater joint force land component command.  Joint task force (JTF).  Joint force land component command.  ARFOR.  Tactical command. 1-4. Armies, corps, and divisions provide headquarters with the required expertise and capabilities to conduct continuous multi-domain operational preparation of the environment, rapidly converge effects from across multiple domains against enemy forces, synchronize that convergence acros s the depth and breadth of the extended battlefield, and ensure that overwhelming combat power is generated at the decisive time and place against enemy forces. This expertise at multiple echelons provides options to compete below the threshold of armed conflict, transition to conflict when necessary, and exploit windows of opportunity to create and attack enemy vulnerabilities. The remainder of this chapter sets the context in which these echelons above brigade combined arms formations enable the joint force to achieve its assigned objectives. The remainder of this manual describes how these echelons enable the joint force and the Nation to achieve their objectives across the levels of warfare. THE LEVELS OF WARFARE 1-5. The echelons described in this manual conduct operations that span the levels of warfare. The three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. The levels of warfare are a framework for defining and clarifying the relationship among national objectives, the operational approach, and tactical tasks (ADP 1-01). The level of warfare correlates to the role and focus of a headquarters on one of three broad roles—creating and implementing strategy (strategic); planning and executing campaigns and major operations (operational); or planning and executing battles, engagements, and actions (tactical). The levels of warfare correspond to specific levels of responsibility and planning of a headquarters with decisions at one level affecting other levels. Echelons of command or geographic areas do not define the levels of warfare, although they are related. The specific role assigned to an echelon headquarters determines the level of war in which it operates. 1-6. Between the levels of warfare, the focus and horizons for planning, preparation, and execution differ greatly. Strategic-level leaders focus on the development and promulgation of national and theater strategies through the conduct of global, regional, and combatant command campaign plans. Operational-level commanders typically orchestrate the activities of military and other organizations across large areas to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Tactical commanders focus primarily on employing combined arms formations in an area of operations (AO) to accomplish assigned tasks. A string of tactical victories does not guarantee success at the operational and strategic levels. Tactical success, while required to set operational conditions, must be tied to attaining operational and strategic objectives. S TRATEGIC L EVEL The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive. Carl von Clausewitz 1-7. The strategic level of warfare is the level of warfare at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives (JP 3-0). The focus at this level is the development of strategy—a foundational idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve national and multinational objectives. The strategic level of warfare is primarily the province of national leadership in coordination with combatant commanders. It is expressed in the national security, defense, and military strategies and other strategic guidance, including—  Joint Strategic Campaign Plan.  Unified Command Plan.  Defense Planning Guidance.  Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. (See JP 5-0 for a detailed description of strategic direction and guidance.) 1-8. Based on strategic guidance, combatant commanders and staffs —with input from subordinate commands (including the theater army) and supporting commands and agencies —update their strategic estimates and develop plans and strategies. In a practical sense there is a theater strategic level of warfare that accounts for how a geographic combatant commander (GCC) approaches the implementation of strategic guidance. A theater strategy is therefore a broad statement of a GCC’s long-term vision that bridges national strategic guidance and the joint planning required to achieve national and theater objectives. The theater strategy prioritizes the ends, ways, and means within the limitations established by the budget, global force management processes, and strategic guidance. O PERATIONAL L EVEL 1-9. The operational level of warfare is the level of warfare at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas (JP 3-0). The operational level links employing tactical forces to achieving strategic objectives. A campaign is a series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). A major operation is 1. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. 2. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation (JP 3-0). 1-10. The operational level of warfare generally is the realm of combatant commands and their Service and functional components and subordinate JTF headquarters and their Service and functional components. This includes theater army headquarters as the Army Service component to a GCC and any other echelon operating as an ARFOR, JTF, or land component commander. The focus at this level is on operational art—the design of campaigns and operations by integrating ends, ways, and means, while accounting for risk. (See Chapter 2 for detailed information on operational art.) 1-11. Operational-level planning begins with the development of the combatant command campaign plan. The combatant command campaign plan operationalizes the GCC’s strategy by organizing and aligning operations and activities with resources to achieve strategic and operational objectives in an area of responsibility (AOR). The combatant command campaign plan provides a framework within which the GCC and component commands conduct military engagement and security cooperation activities with regional partners. The combatant command campaign plan contains contingency plans that are viewed as branches within the campaign. Contingency plans, in the form of operation plans, identify how the command might respond in the event of a crisis to include crises involving armed conflict. Contingency plans are often phased and have specified end states that seek to re-establish conditions favorable to the United States. 1-12. The theater army develops supporting plans to the combatant command campaign plan. These plans include methods to achieve security cooperation, training and exercise programs, and ongoing Army activities in the theater, including intelligence, air and missile defense, sustainment, and communications. The theater army also develops supporting plans for contingencies identified by the GCC to include plans for large-scale combat operations. Theater army planners routinely develop, assess, review, and update supporting plans to numbered operation plans to ensure they remain feasible and relevant to the changes in the area of operations and evolving friendly force capabilities. This includes a review of Army force structure as well as time phased force and deployment data for identified contingencies. (See Chapter 2 for detailed information on force tailoring.) 1-13. Actions at the operational level usually involve broader aspects of time and space than tactical actions. Operational-level commanders need to understand the complexities of the operational environment (OE) and look beyond the immediate situation. Operational-level commanders seek to create the most favorable conditions possible for subordinate commanders by shaping future events. Figure 1-1 on page 1-4 illustrates the links among the levels of warfare using military actions in the Gulf War of 1991. T ACTICAL L EVEL 1-14. The tactical level of warfare is the level of warfare at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on tactics —the employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to each other (ADP 3-90). Operational-level headquarters determine objectives and provide resources for tactical operations. The tactical-level commander uses combat power in battles, engagements, and small-unit actions. A battle is a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement (ADP 3-90). Battles can affect the course of a campaign or major operation, and they are typically conducted by corps and divisions. An engagement is a tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver forces (JP 3-0). Engagements are typically conducted at brigade level and below. They are usually short, executed in terms of minutes, hours, or days. 1-15. In large-scale combat operations, corps headquarters normally function as a tactical land headquarters under a joint or multi-national land component. The corps headquarters is organized, trained, and equipped to control the operation of two to five divisions, together with supporting organizations (see Chapter 4). Divisions are the tactical units of execution for a corps. The division headquarters ’ primary role is a tactical headquarters controlling two to five brigade combat teams (BCTs) and two to four functional and multifunctional brigades in decisive action. The distinguishing difference between corps and division tactical operations are their scope and scale. (See chapters 4 and 5 for more information on corps and division operations.) 1-16. It is important to understand tactics within the context of the levels of warfare. The strategic and operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are reduced to a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Strategic and operational success is a measure of how one or more battles contribute to winning a major operation or campaign. (See ADP 3-90 for more information on tactical doctrine.) GLOBAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 1-17. The United States faces a strategic environment characterized by the reemergence of long-term competition with peer and near-peer threats bent on challenging American leadership and remaking the global order in their favor. This increasingly complex global security environment is a result of increasing long-term competition between nations, the rapid diffusion of new technologies, and the increased movement of people across borders. Combined, these factors challenge the international order and provide opportunities for state and non-state actors to leverage them to their advantage. 1-18. Broad trends like globalization, urbanization, technological advances, and failing states affect land operations. These trends create instability and contribute to an environment of persistent competition that encompasses competition below armed conflict, periodic crisis, and episodic armed conflict. Competition is a fundamental part of international relations, as state and non-state actors seek to protect and advance their own interests. These actors sometimes cooperate, but more often they compete for strategic advantages. Adversaries to U.S. interests employ capabilities that counter U.S. interests and impede friendly operations while advancing their own interests. 1-19. Adversaries often coordinate their actions across all four instruments of national power to create conditions that challenge U.S. interests. Peer threats, including China and Russia, along with the rogue states of North Korea and Iran, operate across the competition continuum to achieve their objectives. China and Russia seek regional dominance by creating conditions advantageous to their objectives, largely at the expense of neighboring countries. Chinese expansionist policies threaten U.S. partners, allies, and interests. Recent Russian efforts meld military action and information warfare with coordinated diplomatic and economic efforts to intimidate their neighbors and threaten the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization) and allied partners. North Korea and Iran actively seek to coerce their neighbors in order to advance their interests and stabilize their governments. 1-20. Rapid technological advances and the diffusion of technology present another threat. U.S. forces no longer enjoy uncontested access across all domains. Chinese and Russian forces are increasingly capable of challenging U.S. forces across all domains, while North Korean and Iranian forces are capable of creating periods of overmatch in critical domains during competition and large-scale ground combat. China and Russia already possess nuclear arsenals, while North Korea and Iran are actively seeking to develop their own in an effort to offset U.S. and allied advantages. The proliferation of information technology allows U.S. adversaries to exploit opportunities through robust information warfare campaigns designed to discredit friendly action and subvert popular support at home and abroad. ARMY STRATEGIC ROLES 1-21. Army forces are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. The Army accomplishes its mission by supporting the joint force and unified action partners in four strategic roles:  Shape operational environments.  Prevent conflict.  Prevail in large-scale ground combat.  Consolidate gains. The strategic roles are not tasks assigned to subordinate units; instead, they clarify the enduring reasons for which the Army is organized, trained, and equipped. 1-22. All operations conducted by Army forces require the use of capabilities from across multiple domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment. Combining capabilities across multiple domains during operations provides opportunities for exploitation, and Army forces routinely combine capabilities to effect or compel desired human behavior on land. The convergence of these capabilities is critical to operations regardless of strategic role. In competition and conflict against a peer threat, all domains will be contested, and Army forces must account for this during operations. S HAPE O PERATIONAL E NVIRONMENTS 1-23. Army operations to shape bring together all of the activities intended to promote regional stability and to establish security conditions for outcomes favorable to U.S. interests. Shaping activities include military engagement; security cooperation; and forward presence to promote U.S. interests, to develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and to provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. The Army garrisons forces and pre-positions equipment in areas to allow national leaders to respond quickly to contingencies. As part of operations to shape, Army forces provide trained and ready forces to GCCs in support of their campaign plans. Army operations to shape are continuous, occurring before, during, and after a joint operation in a specific operational area. P REVENT C ONFLICT 1-24. Army operations to prevent conflict or escalation of conflict include all activities to deter an adversary’s undesirable actions. These operations are an extension of operations to shape, and are designed to prevent adversary opportunities to further exploit positions of relative advantage. Operations to prevent conflict raise the potential costs to adversaries of continuing activities that threaten U.S. interests. They are generally weighted toward actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners, and to indicate U.S. intentions to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation. P REVAIL IN L ARGE -S CALE G ROUND C OMBAT 1-25. During large-scale ground combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat and destruction of enemy ground and other forces as part of the joint team. Large-scale ground combat operations are sustained combat operations involving multiple corps and divisions (ADP 3-0). Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces in any terrain, exploit success, and break the enemy’s will to resist. Army forces attack, defend, perform stability tasks, and consolidate gains to accomplish national objectives. Field armies are the key operational formation, while divisions and corps are the tactical formations central to the conduct of large-scale combat operations. The ability to prevail in ground combat is a decisive factor in breaking an enemy ’s capability and will to continue a conflict. Conflict resolution requires the Army to conduct sustained operations with unified action partners as long as necessary to accomplish national objectives while continuously consolidating gains. C ONSOLIDATE G AINS 1-26. Army operations to consolidate gains are activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities (ADP 3-0). Army forces conduct a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations to successfully consolidate gains. Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous part of armed conflict, and it is necessary for achieving success across the range of military operations. Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains during all phases of an operation, and they consolidate gains with unified action partners. While Army forces consolidate gains throughout an operation, consolidating gains becomes the primary focus of Army forces after large-scale combat operations have concluded. Armies, corps, and divisions are integral to these operations. 1-27. The four strategic roles are not tasks assigned to Army units or phases of an operation. While they provide the larger purpose behind operations, they are not the operations themselves. Army forces execute various operations as part of a joint force in support of these strategic roles. The Army strategic roles provide a way for commanders to visualize and execute their operations in a larger strategic framework. Those operations occur across the range of military operations in a variety of operational environments. They may be of a short duration or extend for a significant period. They also vary in their intensity. Armies, corps, and divisions are integral to this effort. 1-28. Generally, Army forces perform operations to fulfill the Army’s strategic roles during periods of competition, crisis, or conflict. COMPETITION CONTINUUM 1-29. The competition continuum frames the application of landpower and the Army’s strategic roles. It describes the environment from an Army perspective in which landpower is applied to achieve objectives. For strategic and operational commanders, it provides a common way to understand, visualize, and describe the complexity of strategic relationships and how they correlate with general levels of violence. For tactical commanders, overlaying the range of military operations on the competition continuum provides a common way of focusing units on a particular mission theme. This visualization serves as a starting point for commanders to describe their operations to subordinates by using a framed explanation of the complex and dangerous environment they will face. 1-30. The competition continuum describes an environment of enduring competition characterized by a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. The competition continuum creates a distinction between war and other forms of armed conflict because of the scope and scale of land forces involved. While the U.S. Army has not been in an officially declared war since World War II, Army forces fought in several conflicts that rose to the level of war because of the resources involved. In that same period, Army forces also fought in several armed conflicts below the threshold of war. 1-31. The competition continuum descriptors can be used in two ways: to refer to the relationship between the United States and another strategic actor, or to refer to U.S. interactions with multiple actors in a specific theater. When considering a strategic actor that has the capability to act globally, these descriptors refer to the relationship between the U.S. and another strategic actor in relation to a set of specific objectives allowing for simultaneous interactions with the same actor at different points along the continuum. When considering operations inside of an AOR or theater, U.S. interactions with multiple state and non-state actors will vary along the continuum. 1-32. The competition continuum also places the potential for violence and its corresponding intensity on an ascending scale. On the far left of the competition continuum is cooperation, where the likelihood of violence is low. While violence occurs during cooperation, it is limited in scope and duration. War is characterized by intense violence. In practice, competition does not proceed smoothly along this continuum and back again. The level of violence may jump from one point to another. For example, competition may erupt in general war without a gradual escalation, or a general war may end in cooperation over the long term. Armed conflicts often spark additional violence in a region, creating broad areas of instability that threaten U.S. interests. (See figure 1-2 on page 1-8.) 1-33. Commanders design operations to secure U.S. objectives and create conditions favorable to U.S. interests. These operations gain or maintain a position of advantage during competition. In conflict, commanders direct operations to defeat enemy forces. Military power cannot, by itself, guarantee success in all situations. It must, however, establish global, regional, and local conditions that allow for the other instruments of national power to exert their full influence. In practice, all instruments of national power should function together as an interrelated and integrated whole. C OOPERATION 1-34. Cooperation is a selective activity to support or advance U.S. interests and objectives. Depending on the circumstances, cooperation can take many forms. In some cases, U.S. forces establish open-ended relationships with allies or partners involving the commitment of military efforts or resources. Security force assistance activities to build partner military capacity over time are one example. In different circumstances, U.S. forces may cooperate in a limited fashion with a partner to achieve a specific objective. Often, this partner is a competitor elsewhere or in relation to other objectives. The combined efforts of the United States and Russia to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an example of this kind of cooperation. 1-35. There are few circumstances in which a major military action does not have some ramification for at least one of the United States’ global or regional allies. In most campaigns and major operations, success, as characterized by a return to a lower level of competition below armed conflict, depends on unified action involving efforts by multinational military and civilian partners. C OMPETITION B ELOW A RMED C ONFLICT 1-36. U.S. forces compete at levels below armed conflict to achieve U.S. objectives while preventing adversaries from achieving objectives detrimental to U.S. objectives. Competition below armed conflict seeks to improve relative strategic or military advantage without causing an escalation to armed conflict. U.S. forces achieve the best possible strategic objective within resource or policy constraints. They seek to improve U.S. advantages without jeopardizing other U.S. interests. A RMED C ONFLICT 1-37. When directed, U.S. forces engage in armed conflict either unilaterally or as part of a multinational force. Operations conducted during armed conflict involve the destruction of enemy forces in the pursuit of assigned objectives. Armed conflict may occur during limited contingency and even crisis response operations, but in this case, the duration is limited and the use of force is focused on protecting designated parties and deterring further aggression by belligerents. For these reasons, the scope and scale of armed conflict short of war can vary widely depending upon the objectives. For example, foreign internal defense and counterinsurgency operations may only involve a handful of Army personnel at one end of the continuum or involve multiple echelons of command and tens of thousands of Soldiers at the other end. 1-38. When conducting operations during armed conflict, U.S. forces must consider what the transition period will look like afterwards. Armed conflicts do not end with a stable post-conflict environment. Without a plan to consolidate gains after conflict, the disruption and destruction resulting from armed conflict create conditions for widespread stability challenges and further violence. 1-39. General war is armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy. General war usually involves nation-states and coalitions; however, civil wars may reach this level of violence. The competition continuum creates a distinction between war and other forms of armed conflict because of the scope and scale of the land forces involved. In general war, large and heavily armed conventional forces compete for military supremacy by conducting multi-domain large-scale combat operations. 1-40. Large-scale combat operations are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives (ADP 3-0). These operations aim to defeat the enemy’s armed forces and eliminate the enemy’s military capability. Wars are dominated by large-scale combat operations, but they almost always include irregular and unconventional warfare. For example, Soviet partisans waged unconventional warfare against German lines of communications during World War II. Similarly, the Vietcong conducted guerrilla warfare throughout the Vietnam War, even as the North Vietnamese Army fought conventional battles against U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. 1-41. The most extreme form of conflict is total war. Total war is characterized by mass mobilization of the citizenry of at least one belligerent, conventional warfare, the possible use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) weapons, and potentially large-scale conflicts in multiple theaters. U.S. forces campaign during total war with a long-term view to the future transition period at the end of the main period of hostilities. Wars disrupt political, social, and economic structures in conflict areas. They often create the conditions that result in large-scale humanitarian crises that require significant resources and additional commitment of joint and multinational forces to address. ARMY FORCES ALONG THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM 1-42. Although Army forces are optimized for large-scale combat operations, they must be able to operate anywhere along the competition continuum. In reality, Army forces often operate on several levels along the continuum simultaneously. In every case, achieving the end state requires creating conditions that advance U.S. national strategic interests. Some situations require applying massive force in major combat operations to eliminate a threat; others involve applying military power more selectively to achieve limited objectives. The goal at any point is to move conditions to a lower level of violence and competition, returning U.S. forces to a level of favorable competition below armed conflict. RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 1-43. The range of military operations is a conceptual model that helps relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose to each other. During competition, Army forces conduct operations to shape the security environment and prevent adversaries from achieving their objectives without using armed force. In armed conflict and war, Army forces conduct operations to defeat enemy forces. In all cases, Army forces conduct operations to establish the conditions necessary to achieve their objectives. Grouping military operations with common characteristics in the four categories of the range of military operations helps to describe a major operation’s general characteristics, not the details of its execution. Characterizing the employment of military capabilities as one or another type of military operation has several benefits. For example, publications can be developed that describe the nature, tasks, and tactics associated with specific types of diverse operations, such as noncombatant evacuation operations and counterinsurgencies. The four categories in the range of military operations are—  Military engagement and security cooperation.  Crisis response operations.  Limited contingency operations.  Large-scale combat operations. Each category corresponds broadly to a range along the competition continuum and to the Army strategic roles. (See figure 1-3 on page 1-10.) 1-44. The range of military operations categories should not be confused with tactical tasks or activities. Rather, they describe general characteristics of military operations and activities, not the details of their execution. Some operations listed under one category are routinely conducted within major operations characterized by another. For example, noncombatant evacuation operations may be conducted during peacekeeping operations, or security force assistance activities may be performed during large-scale combat operations. Regardless of the operations, Army forces conduct offensive, defensive, stability, and defense support of civil authorities operations simultaneously. The preponderance of which type of operation is being performed depends on the objectives and character of the operation. This focus will shift and change as operations move either direction along the competition continuum. M ILITARY E NGAGEMENT AND S ECURITY C OOPERATION 1-45. Military engagement and security cooperation comprise all military activities that involve other nations; they are intended to shape the security environment. Military engagement and security cooperation include programs and exercises that the United States conducts with other nations to increase readiness, improve mutual understanding, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. These activities are designed to support a combatant commander’s objectives within the theater security cooperation plan. The theater army is the primary Army echelon directing and coordinating these operations. When directed to, divisions and corps provide forces and echelons of command and control to support exercises or training events. Military engagement and security cooperation encourage regional stability that supports U.S. interests. These activities may be long term, such as training teams and advisors assisting land forces, or short term, such as multinational exercises. They generally do not include combat, although terrorist attacks against deployed forces are possible, and forward deployed forces are at risk should deterrence fail. Policy, regulations, and security cooperation plans, rather than doctrine, typically govern these activities. Military engagement and security cooperation activities are usually conducted bilaterally, but they can involve multiple nations. Examples of joint operations and activities that fall under military engagement and security cooperation include—  Multinational training events and exercises.  Security assistance.  Joint combined exchange training.  Recovery operations.  Arms control.  Counterdrug activities. C RISIS R ESPONSE O PERATIONS 1-46. Crisis response operations are conducted in response to a regional or international crisis, and seek to prevent further conflict. They have an end state clearly defined and limited in scope. Corresponding limitations are imposed on the supporting operations and the size of the forces involved. These operations may be phased, but they are not intended to become campaigns. Although crisis response operations are confined in terms of end state and forces, their execution times may be lengthy. Theater armies are the Army echelon generally responsible for commanding and controlling these operations, and additional forces are assigned to them as required. Commanders conducting crisis response operations should carefully consider all their actions to ensure that they do not further destabilize or inadvertently escalate the situation. Examples of joint operations and activities that fall under crisis response operations are—  Noncombatant evacuation operations.  Foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  Show of force.  Strike.  Raid.  Sanction enforcement.  Reduction of weapons of mass destruction. L IMITED C ONTINGENCY O PERATIONS 1-47. Army forces in limited contingency operations strive to create security conditions conducive to a desired political outcome, primarily through stability operations. Army forces use their offensive and defensive capabilities to deter external and internal adversaries from overt actions against each other. Establishing security and control enables civilian agencies to address the underlying causes of the crisis. Army forces provide specialized support to other government agencies as necessary. Examples of joint operations and activities that fall under limited contingency operations are—  Irregular warfare operations.  Stability operations.  Peacekeeping operations.  Counterinsurgency operations.  Foreign internal defense.  Security force assistance operations. L ARGE -S CALE C OMBAT O PERATIONS 1-48. Large-scale combat operations occur in circumstances usually associated with state-on-state conflict, formally declared or otherwise. Combat between large formations operating in all domains characterizes these operations. Large-scale combat operations usually occur within the framework of a larger joint campaign with an Army headquarters forming the base of a joint force headquarters. These operations typically entail high tempo, high resource consumption, and high casualty rates. 1-49. Large-scale combat operations often include combat between both uniformed armed forces of nation states and between irregular forces supported by both sides. In these instances, conventional and unconventional forces will conduct operations in close proximity to each other. This proximity requires cooperation between forces to ensure success. It also shapes how the conflict is characterized. For example, in Vietnam, both the United States and North Vietnam deployed their armed forces and, although major battles occurred, the United States characterized much of the war as a counterinsurgency. 1-50. Large-scale combat operations against peer threats present additional challenges resulting from their integrated air defense systems, long-range fires, and other advanced capabilities that limit friendly access and freedom of action across all domains. In this highly contested multi-domain environment, armies, corps, and divisions play pivotal roles in penetrating enemy integrated air defense systems, disintegrating the integrated fires complex, exploiting success, and sustaining the high operational tempo across all domains required for success. 1-51. Successful large-scale combat operations defeat or destroy an enemy’s armed forces and seize terrain. Commanders assess them in terms of numbers of military units destroyed or rendered combat ineffective, the level of enemy resolve, and the terrain objectives seized or secured. Not all large-scale combat operations are protracted. Joint operations may capitalize on superior military capability to quickly overwhelm a weaker enemy. Doctrine, including the principles of war, was originally developed for large-scale ground combat operations. D ETERRENCE 1-52. Deterrence applies across the competition continuum. The purpose of deterrence is to dissuade an adversary from taking undesirable actions because of friendly capabilities and the will to use them. Deterrence takes different forms according to the particulars of the situation and its location on the competition continuum. Many of the operations listed in the range of military operations may serve as deterrents in certain situations. The joint force seeks to deter adversaries from taking a specific action, but even if that fails, the force will continue to seek ways to deter further unwanted actions. For example, the joint force seeks to deter an attack against a partner or ally, but even if that occurs it is still possible to deter the attacker from expanding the war. (See JP 3-0 and FM 3-0 for doctrine on the competition continuum and Army operations.) UNIFIED ACTION AND JOINT OPERATIONS 1-53. Army forces operate with a variety of other forces and organizations in a comprehensive approach called unified action. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations (ADP 3-0). These operations ensure unity of effort and create multiple dilemmas for enemy forces that allow friendly forces to maximize the capabilities of military power. 1-54. Military operations are inherent in unified action, and they are most often joint and multinational in execution. Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces (JP 3-0). These operations are the primary way that the Department of Defense (DOD) employs two or more Services in a single operation, particularly in combat. A joint force is a force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander (JP 3-0). The Army depends on and supports air, naval, and space forces across all domains. The Army supports other Services, combatant commands, multinational forces, and unified action partners in operations as required. Army forces give the joint force depth and versatility by offering combatant commanders multiple options to achieve objectives. UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS AND DECISIVE ACTION 1-55. Unified land operations is the Army’s operational concept and contribution to unified action. Unified land operations is the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action (ADP 3-0). Army forces defeat enemy forces, control terrain, protect populations, and preserve joint force freedom of action in the land domain. Unified land operations span the entire competition continuum. 1-56. Army forces conduct decisive action. Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support to civil authority tasks (ADP 3-0). The simultaneity of decisive action varies by echelon and span of control. The higher the echelon the greater the possibility that all elements of decisive action occur simultaneously in its AO. For example, a division, corps, or field army always performs some combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations simultaneously. Subordinate brigades and battalions perform some combination of these operations as well, but they are generally focused on a specific element of decisive action by their immediate priorities. 1-57. Unified land operations span the entire competition continuum. Unified land operations address combat with armed opponents and the conduct of operations amid populations. This requires Army forces to defeat threats while simultaneously shaping civil conditions with unified action partners, which is important to campaign success. The relative emphasis on the various elements of decisive action vary with the purpose and context of the operations. ARMIES, CORPS, AND DIVISIONS IN OPERATIONS 1-58. The Army maintains and employs armies, corps, and divisions for two reasons. Foremost, they exist to prevail in large-scale combat against peer adversaries. Second, they enable political and strategic-level leaders to compete effectively against threats in theaters where peer adversaries have demonstrated the capability to challenge U.S. strategic interests with military means, above or below the threshold of overt armed conflict. 1-59. Armies, corps, and divisions converge effects from multiple domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment to achieve a unified purpose. Brigades and lower echelon forces can mass effects from the physical domains, but they require significant assistance from higher echelons to converge effects from all domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment. The ability to converge effects is a significant capability that echelons above brigade provide to the joint force. 1-60. The ability to converge effects rapidly is central to modern operations. First, a peer threat’s ability to contest the joint and multinational force in all environments means that Army forces cannot rely on capabilities in only a few domains. They must be able to leverage capabilities from across all domains in the event that threats are able to secure initial advantages during competition or conflict. Second, by converging capabilities from multiple directions and domains, Army forces present threats with multiple interrelated dilemmas that are difficult to overcome. These dilemmas can allow the joint and multinational force to offset an enemy’s superior numbers or advantages in niche capabilities, seize the initiative, and exploit fleeting windows of opportunity to defeat the enemy. R OLES OF THE E CHELONS 1-61. The Army employs theater armies, field armies, corps, and divisions with specific roles and responsibilities in support of the Army’s strategic roles. These echelons are foundational to the joint and multinational forces’ ability to conduct sustained operations on land because they provide joint force commanders (JFCs) capabilities and capacity that exist nowhere else. From a Service perspective, they allow the Army to tailor organizations to shape and prevent without sacrificing the Army’s ability to prevail in large-scale ground combat and consolidate gains. From a joint perspective, these echelons provide JFCs with a range of capabilities and command and control options depending on the mission, operational environment, and threat. 1-62. The way in which an echelon operates depends on its mission, the operational environment, the threat, and the type of operation it is supporting. From these considerations, these echelons may perform one of the following roles:  ASCCASCCArmy service component commander.  ARFOR.  Theater army.  Field army.  Theater joint force land component command.  JTF.  Joint or coalition force land component command.  Tactical command. 1-63. Generally, an echelon can perform no more than two of the roles effectively. ASCCASCCArmy service component commander and theater joint force land component are roles that only the theater army can perform. These roles dictate how each echelon internally organizes and trains, which doctrine it uses, and which tasks it performs. Army forces performing joint roles require augmentation. (See Chapter 5Appendix D for information on transitioning echelons above brigade to a joint headquarters.) Army Service Component Command 1-64. The Army Service component command is the command responsible for recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within a combatant command (JP 3-31). ASCCASCCArmy service component commander is a Service role. Service component commanders retain responsibility for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, personnel support training, sustainment (with some exceptions), and Service intelligence operations. There can be only one ASCCASCCArmy service component commander within the combatant command. This is the primary role of the theater army, the specific designation for an operational ASCCASCCArmy service component commander assigned to a combatant commander with an AOR. (See Chapter 3 for more information on the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander.) Army Forces Command 1-65. The ARFOR is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. The ARFOR is the Army component of any joint force. Army doctrine distinguishes, however, between the Army component of a combatant command and that of a joint force formed by the combatant commander. The Army component of the combatant command is the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander, and the Army component of the subordinate joint force is an ARFOR. 1-66. The role of the ARFOR in a joint operations area (JOA) entails several responsibilities. The ARFOR will normally exercise operational control (OPCON) over all Army forces (excluding medical support). It identifies requirements, establishes priorities of support for Army forces, and coordinates with the theater army for providing sustainment. The ARFOR in a JOA normally provides administrative control (ADCON) and Title 10, United States Code (10 USCUSCUnited States Code) authorities and responsibilities for Army forces in the JTF unless these responsibilities are modified by the theater army commander. (See Appendix A for more information on the ARFOR.) 1-67. A corps or division tactical command refers to an Army echelon primarily focused on maneuvering subordinate units (divisions and BCTs). It is a Service role, but it may have joint or multinational forces assigned to it. 1-68. When performing a Service role, echelons above brigade formations use Army doctrine, techniques, and procedures. When performing a joint role, they adhere to joint doctrine, techniques, and procedures. When performing a multinational role, leaders use approved multinational doctrine, techniques, and procedures to supplement joint or Army doctrine as appropriate. For example, a field army serving as a multinational joint force land component commander (JFLCC) under NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization control would use NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization standardization agreements (also known as STANAGs), and joint doctrine, techniques, and procedures. A corps serving as an ARFOR consisting of U.S., British, and Canadian units would use approved American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand Armies’ Program (also known as ABCANZ) standards to supplement U.S. Army doctrine, techniques, and procedures. Likewise, a division serving as a multinational tactical command in Korea would use approved Combined Forces Command, Korea techniques and procedures to supplement Service-specific doctrine. Theater Army 1-69. A theater army is an echelon of command designated as the Army Service component command responsible for recommendations of allocation and employment of Army forces to the geographic combatant commander (JP 3-31). The theater army is organized, manned, and equipped to perform four roles:  ASCCASCCArmy service component commander for the GCC to which it is assigned. This is its primary role. Army executive agent responsibilities Under the authority of the Secretary of Defense and 10 USCUSCUnited States Code, the Army has been designated the executive agent by the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense for foundational activities that are not necessarily landpower equities, but functions necessary to the entire joint force. These functions include, but are not limited to—  JTF headquarters (with augmentation) for a limited contingency operation in that AOR.  Joint force land component (with augmentation) for a limited contingency operation in that AOR.  Theater joint force land component (with augmentation) when designated by the GCC.  DOD detainee operations policy.  DOD Biometrics and Forensics.  Armed Services Blood Program Office.  Chemical and biological defense program.  Chemical demilitarization.  DOD Combat Feeding Research and Engineering Program. 1-70. The theater army is responsible to the Department of the Army for Service-specific requirements. Through the theater army, the Department of the Army provides certain support to other Services through several types of authorities. These are known collectively as Army support to other Services (ASOS). The GCC may designate the Army to serve as the lead Service and provide common-user logistics for the entire theater, areas within a theater, or specific joint operations. 1-71. The theater army always maintains an AOR-wide (theater) focus, providing support to Army and joint forces across the region, in accordance with the GCC’s priorities of support. Depending on the region and the GCC’s priorities, the relative emphasis that the theater army places on its operational and administrative responsibilities can vary greatly. However, the theater army’s operational requirements are generally greatest during competition, the transition from competition to armed conflict, and the transition from armed conflict back to competition. This is because the Army usually introduces other echelons into an AOR to relieve the theater army’s operational burden in a potential or actual operational area when conflict is possible or likely. This allows the theater army to focus on its Title 10, USCUSCUnited States Code duties that support the theater during armed conflict. It also frees the theater army to perform tasks that no other Army echelon can accomplish during armed conflict: shaping the theater to improve the relative positions of advantage that the United States and its allies enjoy, protecting against threat actions outside of an operational area, and preventing the unintended expansion of conflict by friendly decision makers and senior commanders. However, theater army commanders and staffs also play an important operational function during large-scale combat by detecting and striking enemy capabilities that reside in the theater but outside of an operational area. 1-72. In its role as the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander, the theater army executes operational and administrative responsibilities. (See Chapter 3 for additional information on the theater army. See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-93 for additional information on operational and administrative responsibilities.) Field Army 1-73. A field army is an echelon of command that employs multiple corps, divisions, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land (JP 3-31). The field army, when established, is simply a headquarters. Although it employs subordinate units during the course of operations, these units are provided by external Army, joint, and multinational sources based on the situation, the field army’s role, and its mission. When established, the field army will be manned and equipped to perform two roles:  An ARFOR (with significant augmentation) in a joint force for campaigns and major operations.  A JFLCC (with augmentation) commanding multiple U.S. and multinational corps as well as Marine Corps forces together with supporting brigades and commands. 1-74. When constituted, the field army provides Army, joint, and multinational forces with a headquarters capable of performing command and control across the range of military operations. The Army deploys a field army when a JFC or theater army commander perceives a requirement to command and control multi-corps operations. These situations occur when multiple corps-sized formations, including U.S. Army and multinational corps or a Marine expeditionary force, operate in a single operational area. Its most important Service role is as the ARFOR during the conduct of operations involving multiple corps -sized formations. The field army is best suited to serve as the JFLCC during these operations, but it requires augmentation to perform the role successfully. 1-75. Field armies are most likely to be employed in theaters where adversaries have the capability of conducting large-scale combat. Currently, those regions include U.S. European Command and United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). Note. The U.S. Army currently fields one standing field army headquarters, the 8th, which is located in Korea. However, the 8th Army is optimized for the extremely mature nature of the Korean Theater of Operations, and for the robust U.S.-South Korean alliance structure that has developed over the last 70 years. As such, the 8th Army may represent an imperfect model for the wide range of activities and responsibilities required of a field army operating in another region, under vastly different conditions. 1-76. Field armies may be constituted in a variety of ways, including from a standing force structure, from the permanently established operational command post of a theater army, or from a contingency headquarters constituted for a specific requirement. When constituted, field armies provide JFCs and allied organizations with additional capability and capacity to counter peer threats. During competition below armed conflict, they deter such threats by being prepared to transition to large-scale combat operations when the risk for immediate multi-corps, large-scale combat is high. By focusing on activities that must occur in a subordinate operational area, a field army allows a theater army to maintain its AOR-wide orientation as the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander. With joint force augmentation, the field army may also perform joint roles during competition when operations are of such scope that the situation would exceed a corps or division’s capability. During armed conflict, the field army provides the basis for an ARFOR or JFLCC. Theater Joint Force Land Component Command 1-77. When designated by the GCC, the theater army serving as the theater joint force land component supports GCC efforts to posture for a wide range of contingencies. The theater joint force land component conducts the GCC’s combatant command campaign plan as part of pre-conflict activities. Additionally, the theater joint force land component is responsible for setting the theater, assessing the theater and threats, developing the joint land operations plan, and conducting joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration activities for the entire land force. When directed, the theater joint force land component may command and control the land force until a subordinate JTF and JFLCC are established. (See JP 3-31 for more information on theater joint force land components.) Joint Task Force 1-78. A joint task force is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander (JP 1). This is a joint role. Army echelons can provide the nucleus for a JTF, but they require significant joint and multinational augmentation to perform effectively. They may also require robust augmentation from nonmilitary unified action partners, depending on the mission. (See JP 3-0 and Appendix B of this manual for more information on JTFs.) Joint Force Land Component Command 1-79. A joint force land component is a command within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible for planning and coordinating land operations and accomplishing assigned missions. A joint force land component commander is the commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned (JP 3-0). A JFC usually establishes a functional component command to conduct operations when forces from two or more Services must operate in the same physical domain or accomplish a distinct aspect of the mission. Normally, joint land operations involve multinational land forces. When these multinational forces fall under the command and control of the land component commander, they become a multinational joint force land component or combined force land component commander. These echelons can perform this role, but they require joint and multinational augmentation to perform effectively. (See JP 3-31 and Appendix B of this manual for in-depth information on joint force land component commanders.) Corps 1-80. An Army corps is an echelon of command and tactical formations that employs divisions, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land (JP 3-31). The corps is the Army’s most versatile headquarters. The corps functions as one of the principal integrators of landpower into campaigns. When a field army is not present, a corps is the primary link between the operational and tactical levels of war. The corps is organized, manned, and equipped to serve in four roles:  Senior Army tactical formation in large-scale combat commanding two to five Army divisions together with supporting brigades and commands. This is its primary role.  ARFOR (with augmentation) within a joint force for campaigns and major operations when a field army is not present.  JTF headquarters (with significant augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency operations.  Joint force land component (with significant augmentation) commanding Marine Corps and multinational divisions together with supporting brigades and commands. 1-81. When serving under another echelon during multi-corps operations, the corps is a tactical command. When it is the only U.S. Army corps assigned to a higher echelon, it may serve as the ARFOR. When operating independently during large-scale combat, the corps may serve as the ARFOR or as the JFLCC, but it requires significant augmentation from the joint and multinational force to perform the latter role successfully. It may also form the nucleus for a JTF or JFLCC to respond to situations exceeding a division’s capability but not requiring more than one corps, although it would require joint force augmentation. 1-82. Regardless of its role, the corps executes both operational and administrative responsibilities for its subordinate formations. (See Chapter 4 for a detailed description of the corps. For additional information on operational and administrative responsibilities, see ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-92.) Division 1-83. An Army division is an echelon of command and tactical formation that employs brigade combat teams, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades to achieve objectives on land (JP 3-31). The division is the primary tactical formation in the Army. The division is organized, manned, and equipped to serve in four roles:  Tactical formation in large-scale combat capable of commanding two to five Army BCTs together with supporting brigades and commands. This is its primary role.  ARFOR (with augmentation) within a JTF in crisis response and limited contingency operations.  JTF headquarters (with significant augmentation) for crisis response operations and small limited contingency operations.  Joint force land component (with augmentation) under a JTF in crisis response and limited contingency operations not requiring more than one division. 1-84. The division is a tactical unit of execution for a corps or field army. During large-scale ground combat and the consolidation of gains, the division is a tactical command that commands and controls multiple units to accomplish offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in its AO. Once the transition to competition begins and higher echelons redeploy, the division may assume the ARFOR or JFLCC role in an operational area for a limited duration, although this would require augmentation. 1-85. During competition, the division is capable of fulfilling the ARFOR role for operations of limited scope and duration. Under such conditions, it may also form the nucleus for a very small-scale JTF or JFLCC, although it would require significant joint force augmentation. The division can conduct multi-service training or administration and they can coordinate non-combat activities when serving in a joint role, but they cannot effectively direct joint forces in combat. 1-86. The division normally focuses on operational responsibilities. Unless the division is serving as the ARFOR, a higher echelon normally retains ADCON for all units that are not organic, assigned, or attached to the division. However, in certain instances, the division commander may be designated the deputy ARFOR with prescribed responsibilities when the situation warrants. (See Chapter 5 for a detailed description of the division. For additional information on the role of the ARFOR, see Appendix B and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-91.) OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHAINS OF COMMAND 1-87. Echelons above brigade exercise a mixture of command relationships over subordinate forces. As described in JP 1, the President and Secretary of Defense exercise authority and control of the armed forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commanders for missions and forces assigned to combatant commands. This is the operational chain of command or OPCON. For purposes other than the operational direction of combatant commands, the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense, to the secretaries of the Military Departments, and, as prescribed by the secretaries to the service commanders of U.S. forces. Each Military Department operates under the authority, direction, and control of the secretary of that Military Department. This is the ADCON of forces. 1-88. At every echelon, commanders are responsible for the operations and administration of their units and all Army units assigned or attached to them. In joint commands, OPCON and ADCON of forces becomes apparent. The joint commander exercises OPCON over all forces assigned to the command, and the senior Army headquarters assigned to that command is typically responsible for executing the ADCON responsibilities as the ARFOR for that command. The theater army provides essential support through sustainment and medical commands as supporting headquarters to units OPCON to a supported JTF, fulfilling its responsibility to execute ADCON responsibilities for the combatant command. It reduces the workload imposed on the operational headquarters by shifting sustainment, support to other Services, and multinational and combatant command support activities requirements from the corps and division. Without it, the support requirements could overwhelm the ability of the corps and division to exercise effective operational command of their subordinate forces. O PERATIONAL C HAIN OF C OMMAND 1-89. The assignment of forces to the combatant commands comes from the Secretary of Defense in the Forces for Unified Commands memorandum. This memorandum is included in section III of the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. These force assignments are documented in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance assignment tables. These documents are maintained on the classified SIPRNET and require approved access in order to view them. 1-90. There are three types of combatant commands:  Functional combatant commands have global responsibilities for U.S. military power, but do not have an AOR.  GCC commands have a regional responsibility defined by an AOR.  Specified combatant commands (there are none currently) are established by the Secretary of the Defense for a specific purpose and are normally composed of forces from a single department. Global Force Management Implementation Guidance Guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense that codifies the processes used by Department of Defense to execute Global Force Management. The text in this document is updated in even fiscal years and the Force Assignment tables are updated every fiscal year. Every combatant command has an ASCCASCCArmy service component commander. Table 1-1 lists eleven combatant commands and their associated ASCCASCCArmy service component commander. Unless stated otherwise, any mention of ASCCs in this manual refers to the theater armies assigned to GCCs. 1-92. Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates, including the authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion. Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the accomplishment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the establishing authority specifies its extent in accordance to DOD directives and U.S. law. The specific command relationship—combatant command, command authority (COCOMCOCOMCombatant commander), OPCON, tactical control (TACON), and support—will define the level of authority each commander has over assigned forces. Of note, joint and Army command relationships are not the same. (See Appendix A for a brief summary of the joint command and support relationships.) 1-93. The typical operational chain of command extends from the combatant commander to a JTF commander, then to a functional component commander or a Service component commander. JTFs and functional component commands, such as the joint force land component, comprise forces normally assigned to a Service component command but placed OPCON to a JTF, and subsequently to a functional component commander. Conversely, the combatant commander may designate one of the Service component commanders as the JTF commander or as a functional component commander. In some cases, the combatant commander may not establish a JTF, retaining OPCON over subordinate function commands and Service components directly. (See Appendix B for possible joint task force components.) 1-94. A JTF is the organization most often used by a combatant commander for contingencies. Combatant commanders establish JTFs and designate the JFCs for these commands. Those commanders exercise OPCON of all U.S. forces through functional component commands, Service components, subordinate JTFs, or a combination of these. (See JP 3-33 for a detailed description of combatant commanders). 1-95. Support is a command authority in joint doctrine. When one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force, a supported and supporting relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders. Designating a support relationship does not provide authority to organize and employ commands and forces, nor does it include authoritative direction for administrative and logistics support. 1-96. JP 1 specifies four categories of support:  General support.  Mutual support.  Direct support.  Close support. 1-97. General support is support given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. Mutual support is that support that units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. Direct support is a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. Close support is that action of the supporting force against targets or objectives sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force. 1-98. Joint support relationships are somewhat vague but very flexible. Establishing authorities ensure both supported and supporting commanders understand the authority of supported commanders. JFCs often establish supported and supporting relationships among components. For example, the maritime component commander is normally the supported commander for sea control operations; the air component commander is normally the supported commander for counterair operations. Another example, a field army headquarters designated as the joint force land component may be the supporting force during some campaign phases and the supported force in other phases. Often the JFC specifies only a supported and supporting relationship between forces. In that case, the supporting force will be in general support. Note. A joint support relationship is not used when an Army commander task-organizes subordinate Army forces. When task-organized to support another Army force, Army forces use one of four Army support relationships: direct support, reinforcing, general support, or general support - reinforcing. (See ADP 3-0 for more information on Army support relationships.) 1-99. The JFC may establish a support relationship between functional and Service component commanders. Conducting operations across a large operational area often involves both the land and air component commanders. The JTF commander places the joint force land component in general support of the air component until the latter achieves air superiority. Conversely, in the land AO, the JFLCC becomes the supported commander and the air component commander provides close air support. 1-100. When a field army or corps headquarters becomes the joint force land component as part of a JTF, normally subordinate Army units are attached, and OPCON is inherent. Marine Corps forces made available to a joint force land component are normally under TACON, but the JFC may specify an OPCON relationship. (See JP 3-31 for more information on OPCON relationships.) The JFLCC makes recommendations to the JFC on properly using attached, OPCON, or TACON assets; planning and coordinating land operations; and accomplishing operational missions. 1-101. When the Secretary of Defense assigns Army forces to a combatant command, the transfer is either permanent or the duration is unknown but very lengthy. The combatant commander exercises COCOMCOCOMCombatant commander over assigned forces. When the Secretary of Defense allocates Army units (from United States Army Forces Command [FORSCOMFORSCOMU. S. Army Forces Command] or a supporting combatant command) to another combatant command, the transfer of units is temporary. Allocated forces normally return to their parent combatant command at the end of the deployment. The combatant commander exercises OPCON of the allocated force. In either case, the combatant commander normally exercises OPCON over Army forces through the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander until the combatant commander establishes a JTF and functional components. At that time, the combatant commander delegates OPCON to the JTF commander. When the JFC establishes any command relationship (including a joint support relationship), the theater army clearly specifies sustainment responsibilities for all affected Army commanders. A DMINISTRATIVE C ONTROL 1-102. Administrative control is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support (JP 1). This administration and support includes organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. It is a Service authority, not a joint authority. 1-103. ADCON is exercised under the authority of and is delegated by the Secretary of the Army. ADCON is synonymous with the Army’s 10 USCUSCUnited States Code authorities and responsibilities. (See AR 10-87 for more information on ADCON.) Unless modified by the Secretary of the Army, administrative responsibilities normally flow from the Department of the Army through the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander to those Army forces assigned, attached, or OPCON to that combatant command. As the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander, the theater army delegates ADCON authorities and responsibilities as required to Army forces attached by the combatant commander to a joint (or joint and multinational) task force. The ARFOR commander exercises delegated ADCON of Army forces within that JTF as specified by the theater army commander. O VERLAPPING O PERATIONAL AND A DMINISTRATIVE C HAINS 1-104. Typically, Army units are either assigned or attached to other Army units and ADCON responsibilities for those units accompanies this command relationship. Any ADCON responsibilities not transferred to the gaining command are specified in the order. In circumstances where Army units are OPCON or TACON to another Army unit, the order should specify what ADCON responsibilities shift to the gaining command. Similarly, when an Army headquarters receives OPCON of forces from other Services, any specific support requirements should be detailed in the order. In some limited contingency operations, the JFC may elect to employ Marine Corps and Army forces as Service components, instead of creating a functional joint force land component. In that case, the ARFOR and Marine Corps forces would exercise OPCON and ADCON over their respective Service forces. This arrangement may occur in a forcible entry operation due to the complexity of parachute, air, and amphibious operations and limited time available for joint integration. As soon as the JOA matures with the arrival of follow-on forces and headquarters, the JFC may establish a joint force land component command. 1-105. Figure 1-6 illustrates another case. If Army forces are the only conventional land forces attached to a JTF, the JFC may conduct operations with the ARFOR serving as both the Service and operational-level land component of that task force. Since the ARFOR does not control other Service forces, it is not a joint force land component commander. However, it functions as a co-equal component to the functional components—the joint force air component commander, joint force maritime component commander, and joint force special operations component commander—within the JTF. The ARFOR employs landpower to accomplish the objectives of the campaign. Its focus is at the operational level. As the Service component, the ARFOR has ADCON over all the Army units attached to the JTF. It does not have OPCON over all the Army units in this example. 1-106. Multinational operations may also complicate the chain of command. In general, multinational forces will operate under the TACON of a U.S. headquarters. However, the National Command Authority of the multinational force may impose constraints on the use of their forces. Army forces may operate under the TACON or in direct support of a multinational headquarters, but they remain subject to U.S. command. The ARFOR retains ADCON over all Army units under multinational command. The ARFOR and its supporting sustainment command will often provide support to multinational forces within a coalition. The combatant commander normally provides a formal agreement negotiated between the supported multinational force and the U.S. joint force based on agreements concluded at the national level. 1-107. Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely relinquish national command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a multinational operation will have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command. As Commander in Chief, the President retains and cannot relinquish national command over U.S. forces. Command authority for a multinational force commander is normally negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. U.S. Army forces can operate under the TACON of, or in direct support to, a multinational headquarters, but they remain subject to U.S. command. The ARFOR retains ADCON over all Army units under multinational command. The ARFOR and its associated sustainment command often provide support to multinational forces. The combatant commander normally provides a formal agreement negotiated between the multinational forces and the U.S. forces, based on agreements concluded at the national level. (See JP 3-16 for more information on multinational commands.) S USTAINMENT 1-108. Recent changes in sustainment doctrine have revised the Army’s sustainment concept. Each echelon of command has a command relationship with a sustainment headquarters to support large-scale combat operations. Every theater army has an assigned theater sustainment command (TSC). Field armies and corps have an assigned or attached expeditionary sustainment command (ESC). Divisions have an assigned division sustainment brigade. These units will typically have a general support relationship with all of the subordinate units in the command. Each of these headquarters will be task-organized with subordinate units based on support requirements. TSCs, ESCs, and division sustainment brigades all execute six core missions:  Assist the logistics directorate of a joint staff (known as J-4) or the assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4) in determining sustainment requirements and developing the concept of support through parallel planning.  Manage sustainment operations at each echelon.  Provide general support to units assigned to the rear area. Additionally, sustainment units may be tasked to support units passing through an operational area.  Provide direct support to units operating in the subordinate maneuver unit AOs.  Provide general support to all subordinate units of the command.  Integrate and synchronize all sustainment functions, including medical support, throughout an operational area. (See FM 4-0, ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 4-91, ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 4-71, and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 4-93 for additional information on echelon sustainment.) M EDICAL S UPPORT 1-109. The medical command (deployment support) (MEDCOMMEDCOMUnited States Army Medical Command [DS]) is the senior medical command in a theater, and it is assigned to an ASCCASCCArmy service component commander to support large-scale combat operations. The MEDCOMMEDCOMUnited States Army Medical Command (DS) will receive medical brigades, multifunctional medical battalions, and hospital centers based on the force structure and staff estimates. The MEDCOMMEDCOMUnited States Army Medical Command (DS) provides health service support and force health protection to tactical commanders at echelons above brigade. Medical units are typically in a command relationship with the MEDCOMMEDCOMUnited States Army Medical Command (DS) and a supporting relationship with maneuver commands. Based on the theater concept of medical support, the MEDCOMMEDCOMUnited States Army Medical Command (DS), medical brigade, and multifunctional medical battalions coordinate with the surgeon’s cells from battalion through ASCCASCCArmy service component commander level to provide Army health support. The sustainment command is responsible for the integration and synchronization of sustainment in the AOR. Medical commands are responsible for command and control, integration, synchronization, and execution of Army Health System support in the AOR. These medical units work with the surgeon’s cells and sustainment commands at each echelon to integrate the concept of medical support with the overall concept of support for that maneuver unit. Medical units are not placed in a command relationship with the sustainment headquarters. (See figure 1-7 for an example of what this sustainment and medical structure could look like in large-scale combat operations.) S PECIAL O PERATIONS F ORCES 1-110. Recent doctrine has changed how special operations forces support combatant commanders, JFCs, and ambassadors across the competition continuum with discrete, precise, and scalable operations. Special operations forces in a theater will typically remain under the OPCON of the theater special operations command which may also act as a joint force special operations component commander. When required, a joint special operations task force, typically commanded by a major general, may be established to command and control special operations forces in an AO. The overall JTF commander will typically exercise TACON over the joint special operations task force, and the JTF commander will establish a supporting and supported relationship between special operations forces and the other components (including land, air, and maritime) based on the requirements of an operation. (See ADP 3-05 for more information on special operations forces roles, characteristics, and core competencies.) 1-111. The special operations component may establish a subordinate special operations command and control element as the focal point for coordination and integration between special operations forces and a conventional headquarters. A special operations command and control element is task-organized and provided a tailored communications package depending upon the requirements of an operation. The personnel may include forces from special forces, Ranger, psychological operations, civil affairs, sustainment, and special operations aviation units, as well as joint special operations forces. A special operations command and control element is normally co-located at corps level and above, with smaller liaison teams operating at division and lower echelons; however, the scale of an operation may require an expansion of the capabilities provided at echelons below corps. A supported unit provides the special operations command and control element the required sustainment support. At corps level, the special operations command and control element coordinates with the corps staff to deconflict targets and operations. It provides near real time locations of special operations units and provides overlays and other data to the fire support element and the battlefield coordination detachment. 1-112. To integrate fully with conventional and joint operations, Army special operations units must maintain effective liaison and coordination elements with all components of the force to synchronize effects created in the joint operational area. To support this effort, joint forces, conventional forces, and special operations units exchange a variety of liaison and coordination elements in addition to the special operations command and control element provided by the higher echelon special operations commander. These liaison and coordination elements range in size from individual liaisons to small coordination elements. Whatever their size or location, these elements coordinate and synchronize missions in other units ’ areas of operations. 1-113. In addition to the exchange of liaisons, the theater army, corps, and division headquarters include civil affairs and psychological operations personnel in the assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) and chief of staff, civil affairs operations (known as G-9) sections. Additionally, corps and division headquarters have a limited number of special forces personnel in the G-3 section. Field army headquarters can expect to receive the same personnel when they are established. Their respective commanders can leverage these personnel to improve integration, interoperability, and interdependence. OPERATIONAL AREAS 1-114. This manual refers throughout to a hierarchy of operational areas. An operational area is an overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms (such as area of responsibility and joint operations area) for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted (JP 3-0). Operational areas have physical dimensions composed of some combination of air, land, maritime, and space domains. The size of operational areas and the type of forces employed in them vary depending on the mission. 1-115. GCCs conduct operations with their assigned AOR from the unified campaign plan. An area of responsibility is the geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations (JP 1). In an AOR, the combatant commander exercises COCOMCOCOMCombatant commander over assigned forces. All U.S. forces in an AOR (assigned, attached, OPCON, or in transit through the region) fall under the control of that GCC for as long as they remain in the AOR. The theater army commander exercises OPCON and ADCON for all Army forces in an AOR, except for Army forces in transit. Note. Joint doctrine lists three additional operational areas: the theater of war, the theater of operations, and amphibious operations areas. These operational areas are not used often; therefore, they are not included in this chapter. (See JP 3-0 for a more detailed description of these areas.) J OINT O PERATIONS A REAS AND A REAS OF O PERATIONS 1-116. When combatant commanders establish subordinate joint commands, normally JTFs, they assign them a joint operations area that encompasses the three dimensional volume of sea, land, and air in which the JTF will operate. A joint operations area is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a JTF commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission (JP 3-0). The JFC may specify an area for special operations forces, designated as a joint special operations area. A joint special operations area is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities (JP 3-0). 1-117. An area of operations is an operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). An AO assigned to the joint force land component does not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC. The JFLCC establishes an operational framework for the AO that assigns responsibilities to subordinate land commanders and maximizes the operational capabilities of all subordinate areas. This operational framework typically includes subordinate AOs in which their subordinate forces operate. (See figure 1-8.) 1-118. In the AO designated by the JFC, the joint force land component (or ARFOR) commander is the supported commander. In the AO, the JFLCC (or ARFOR commander) integrates and synchronizes maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, these commanders have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires in their AO. 1-119. Synchronization of operations in the land AO with operations in the JOA is of particular importance. To facilitate synchronization, the JFC establishes priorities for all forces within the JOA, including land forces. In coordination with the JFLCC, those commanders designated by the JFC to execute AOR-or JOA-wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations in the land AO. However, any commander accomplishing such a mission in a land AO must coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects and fratricide. If those operations can adversely impact the land AO, the commander assigned to execute the JOA-wide functions must re-adjust the plan, solve the problem with the JFLCC, or consult with the JFC for resolution. C ONTIGUOUS AND N ONCONTIGUOUS O PERATIONAL A REAS 1-120. Commanders may divide operational areas one of three ways: contiguous subordinate AOs, noncontiguous subordinate AOs, or a combination of the two. When they are contiguous, a boundary separates them. When AOs are noncontiguous, subordinate commands do not share a boundary. The higher echelon headquarters retains responsibility for the unassigned portion of its operational area. 1-121. In most operations, commanders seek to employ contiguous operational areas to ensure subordinates are in mutually supporting range of each other while avoiding gaps and seams in responsibility. Contiguous AOs may also provide additional security for maneuver units and headquarters and support units. In some operations, an operational area or subordinate AO may be so large that subordinate units operate in a noncontiguous manner, widely distributed and beyond mutually supporting range of each other. (See figure 1-9.) 1-122. Commanders generally consider noncontiguous AOs or the combination of both contiguous and noncontiguous AOs based on these factors: insufficient forces to cover the entire AO, geographic isolation based upon terrain, or time constraints for completing the mission. The reasons for using a noncontiguous area vary, but they begin with geographical separation of important terrain from the remainder of the AO. A commander’s decision to deploy part of a force in noncontiguous AOs is derived from the commander’s analysis of the operational and mission variables. In particular, the commander evaluates threat forces and their ability to mass sufficient combat power to threaten friendly forces. Second, the commander evaluates the ability of threat forces to sever lines of communication between the noncontiguous AOs. Finally, the commander assesses the risks of having isolated forces defeated in detail against what may be gained in mission accomplishment. 1-123. While a commander can always choose to use noncontiguous AOs based upon specific operational variables, the most obvious AOR requiring the use of noncontiguous areas of operations is the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command AOR. The geography and distances involved between island chains force a noncontiguous approach to land combat that relies heavily on joint capabilities. CONCLUSION 1-124. Armies, corps, and divisions conduct operations from the range of military operations across the competition continuum as part of a joint and multinational force. These echelons are capable of converging combat power from multiple domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment to achieve a unified purpose. 1-125. Today’s OE requires Army forces to continuously evaluate and adapt their operations to ensure they are appropriate. The Army’s conduct of modern operations reveals insights especially relevant for armies, corps, and divisions:  The Army operates as part of a joint force and, when necessary, a multinational coalition. This requires an understanding of joint concepts and multinational considerations to be successful.  All major operations combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations and tasks executed simultaneously at multiple echelons.  An OE evolves over time due to military operations. It also evolves because of outside variables and interactions.  Operations conducted during one phase of a campaign or major operation directly affect subsequent operations and phases. Commanders should conduct current operations in a manner that sets the conditions necessary for future operations and ultimately the de-escalation from armed conflict to a lower level on the competition continuum.  Major operations are conducted not only to defeat an adversary or enemy but also to create the conditions for the long-term consolidation of gains. The military plays a large role in this effort, even after major combat operations have ended. However, long-term success is not possible without the other instruments of national power and a whole-of-nation approach.  In any campaign or major operation, changing conditions require Army forces to adapt their tactics, techniques, and procedures to the operational environment. Successfully navigating these transitions requires collaboration between learning organizations. Commanders need to constantly assess the situation and desired objectives to ensure they are still desirable.  Regardless of how long operations are expected to last, commanders should consider transitions and begin planning early for them. Failure to adequately plan for transitions may result in conflict mutation as defeated enemy forces transition to different forms of resistance, protracting the conflict, and changing the nature of operations. This page intentionally left blank.

Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point. Antoine Henri de Jomini Operational art, and the science that informs it, represents the mechanism through which armies, corps, and divisions generate and apply combat power to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. This chapter describes operational art and the elements used in designing operations. The chapter then describes operational-level combat power considerations. OPERATIONAL ART 2-1. Military operations require integrating ends, ways, means, and risk across the levels of warfare. Joint and Army echelons above brigade commanders and staffs do this through operational art. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). Operational art applies to all types and aspects of operations. It helps commanders and staffs understand, visualize, and describe operations, as shown in figure 2-1. 2-2. Operational art is not limited to a specific echelon or role. Rather, multiple echelons performing joint and Service roles within the scope of operational art all contribute to the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to pursue strategic objectives. Operational art links the echelons above brigade to each other, and to the joint and multinational force, to ensure unity of effort. Applying operational art requires commanders and staffs to answer the following questions:  What is the current state of the operational environment (OE)?  What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state (ends)?  How will the force achieve these desired conditions (ways)?  What sequence of actions helps attain these conditions (ways)?  What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)?  What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in performing that sequence of actions (risk)? D ESIGNING C AMPAIGNS AND O PERATIONS To be practical, any plan must take account of the enemy’s power to frustrate it; the best chance of overcoming such obstruction is to have a plan that can be easily varied to fit the circumstances met; to keep such adaptability, while still keeping the initiative, the best way is to operate along a line which offers alternative objectives. Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart 2-3. Commanders and staffs use two methodologies in the application of operational art. JFCs use operational design to develop operation plans and operation orders for the conduct of campaigns and operations. Operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a planning (JP 5-0). The framework is built upon an iterative process that creates a shared understanding of an OE; identifies and frames problems within that OE; and develops approaches, through the application of operational art, to resolving those problems, consistent with strategic guidance and policy. The understanding and products developed from operational design guide more detailed planning during the joint planning process. (See JP 5-0 for doctrine on operational design and joint planning process.) 2-4. Army commanders and their staffs apply operational art and employ Army design methodology in the development of supporting plans to joint operation plans or operation orders. Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). The Army design methodology is best suited to competition short of large-scale combat. It is a prerequisite for setting the conditions for success because it looks broadly at the environment. Army design methodology is associated with conceptual planning that helps commanders and staffs frame an OE, frame problems, and develop an operational approach to resolve identified problems. Army design methodology informs more detailed planning conducted during the military decision-making process. (See ADP 5-0 for doctrine on Army design methodology and the military decision-making process.) While different, operational design and Army design methodology are used to—  Create a shared understanding of an OE.  Identify and frame problems within an OE.  Envision a desired end state.  Develop an operational approach to achieve the end state. 2-5. A key output of operational design and Army design methodology is an operational approach —a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). The operational approach provides the framework for a campaign or operation, serves as the basis for detailed planning, and facilitates unity of purpose across the force. Operational art and design do not occur in a vacuum. An echelon’s operational approach—and the context that informs it—is based on the operational approach of its higher headquarters, and informs subordinates’ development of their operational approaches. Whenever possible, commanders should also include any unified action partners in these efforts as early as feasible. C OMPONENTS OF D ESIGN 2-6. Several tools are available to assist commanders and staffs in designing campaigns and operations, including the principles of joint operations, elements of operational design, and the elements of operational art as listed in figure 2-2. In addition, commanders and staffs consider both defeat and stability mechanisms when developing their operational approach. These tools help commanders understand, visualize, and describe operations and help to formulate their commander’s intent, operational approach, and planning guidance. 2-7. The twelve principles of joint operations represent important factors that affect the conduct of operations across the levels of warfare. The principles are broadly applied considerations and their relevance varies in each situation, but they are not a checklist. Commanders consider all twelve principles, but they may not apply them in the same way in every operation. The principles summarize the characteristics of successful operations throughout history. (See JP 3-0 for a detailed description of the principles of joint operations.) 2-8. Joint force commanders and staff use the elements of operational design when designing campaigns and operations. As some elements of operational design only apply to JFCs (for example termination), the Army modifies the elements of operational design into elements of operational art as shown in figure 2-2. Echelons above brigade headquarters frequently participate in joint planning and receive joint operation plans and operation orders. As such, they must be knowledgeable with both the elements of operational design and the elements of operational art. JP 5-0 describes each element of operational design in detail. The remainder of this section describes the Army’s elements of operational art and the defeat and stability mechanisms used in the development of supporting plans to joint campaigns and operations. End State and Conditions 2-9. A military end state is the set of required conditions that defines the achievement of all military objectives. It normally represents a point in time and circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. Determining the military end state of a campaign or joint operation links the operational and strategic levels of warfare, and is thus the purview of the JFC, not functional commanders or those of Service echelons. 2-10. Military end state and termination are directly related. Termination criteria are the specified standards approved by the President and/or the Secretary of Defense that must be met before a military operation can be concluded (JP 3-0). At times, strategic-level leaders may express the standards that a JFC must meet before military operations can conclude explicitly. When this occurs, these termination criteria inform the military end state. However, many times such precision is impossible, especially early in a campaign or major operation. When the termination criteria are implicit, the JFC often develops proposed termination criteria based on the envisioned military end state. In such cases, the JFC briefs the termination criteria and military end state to strategic-level leaders, who then approve both elements. As operations progress and conditions change, the military end state and termination criteria may also change. When this occurs, commanders at every level must reexamine all aspects of operational design to ensure that their activities remain relevant; and if not, they determine what changes are necessary to achieve the updated ends. These changes may require consultation with, and approval from, strategic leaders. 2-11. Army, corps, and division commanders must clearly understand the military end state and termination criteria when developing the end states for their supporting operations. An operation’s end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives (JP 3-0). A condition reflects the existing state of an OE. Thus, a desired condition is a sought-after change to an OE. Since every operation should focus on a clearly defined and attainable end state, accurately describing conditions that represent success is essential. Commanders explicitly describe end state conditions that guide the development of their operational approach. Commanders summarize the operation’s end state in their commander’s intent. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates integration and synchronization of the force, and guides subordinates initiative during execution. Center of Gravity For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and Frederick the Great, the center of gravity was their army. If the army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in history as failures. Carl von Clausewitz 2-12. A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). The loss of a center of gravity can ultimately result in defeat. Centers of gravity are not limited to military forces, and they can be either physical or moral. Physical centers of gravity, such as a capital city or military force, are tangible and typically easier to identify, assess, and target than moral centers of gravity. Forces can often influence physical centers of gravity solely by military means. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible and more difficult to influence. Moral centers of gravity exist in the minds of the people involved in the conflict. They can include a charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, or the will of a population. 2-13. As an element of operational art, a center of gravity analysis helps commanders and staffs understand friendly and enemy sources of strength and weakness. This understanding helps commanders and staffs determine ways to undermine enemy strengths by exploiting enemy vulnerabilities while protecting friendly vulnerabilities from enemies attempting to do the same. Understanding friendly and enemy centers of gravity helps commanders and staffs identify decisive points and determine an operational approach to achieve the end state. (See JP 5-0 for more detailed information on center of gravity analysis.) Decisive Points 2-14. A decisive point is a key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). Identifying decisive points helps commanders to select clear, conclusive, attainable objectives that directly contribute to achieving the end state. Geographic decisive points can include port facilities, distribution networks and nodes, and bases of operation. Specific events and elements of an enemy force may also be decisive points. Examples of such events include commitment of an enemy operational reserve and reopening a major oil refinery. 2-15. A common characteristic of decisive points is their importance to a center of gravity. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are key to attacking or protecting centers of gravity. A decisive point ’s importance may cause the enemy to commit significant resources to defend it. The loss of a decisive point weakens a center of gravity and may expose more decisive points, eventually leading to an attack on the center of gravity itself. 2-16. Generally, more decisive points exist in a given operational area than available forces and capabilities can attack, seize, retain, control, or protect. Accordingly, planners study and analyze decisive points and determine which offer the best opportunity to attack the enemy’s center of gravity, extend friendly operational reach, or enable the application of friendly forces and capabilities. Operational art includes selecting decisive points that best lead to establishing end state conditions in a sequence that most quickly and efficiently leads to mission success. Center of Gravity: Republican Guard Divisions in the 1991 Gulf War The coalition campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in the 1991 Gulf War provides an example of a military force massing combat power to destroy an enemy center of gravity. For the defending Iraqi Army, its Republican Guard divisions served as its operational-level center of gravity and mechanized core of its strategic fighting capacity. Coalition planners identified this factor and planned accordingly to first reduce the elite Republican Guard with air and ground fires and then follow with an envelopment from the West by the VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps to destroy or dislodge the entrenched defenders in the deserts of Southern Iraq. The Battle of Medina Ridge on 26 and 27 February unfolded on the VII Corp’s left flank as a decisive maneuver in the campaign. The massive envelopment saw the 1st Armored Division attack through forward Iraqi defenses and then destroy a brigade of the Tawakalna Division, a brigade of the Adnan Infantry Division, and most importantly, most of the powerful Medina Division. Its 2nd Brigade alone fought the single largest armored engagement of the war against its counterpart in the Medina Division where it destroyed 61 tanks, 34 armored personnel carriers, and 5 air defense systems in a single hour. Throughout the Battle of Medina Ridge, the 1st Armored Division experienced over 48 hours of continuous and intense combat while advancing 115 kilometers (71 miles) into Southern Iraq. Tactical successes like this occurred along the entire corps front and effectively destroyed the Republican Guard’s ability to fight, and with it, the Iraqi Army’s capacity and will to defend in depth. At the strategic level, the destruction of their operational center of gravity convinced the Iraqi national command that they could not win the war and resulted in a dramatic retreat and the complete liberation of Kuwait. 2-17. Decisive points identified for action become objectives. An objective can be physical (an enemy force or a terrain feature) or conceptual (established rule of law). In the physical sense, an objective is a location on the ground used to orient operations, phase operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of effort. In the conceptual sense, an objective is the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which an operation is directed (JP 5-0). Objectives provide the basis for determining tasks to subordinate units. The most important objective forms the basis for developing the decisive operation. Combined with end state conditions, objectives form the building blocks for developing lines of operations and lines of effort. Lines of Operations and Lines of Effort If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a campaign. Antoine Henri de Jomini 2-18. Lines of operations and lines of effort link objectives in time, space, and purpose to achieve end state conditions, as shown in figure 2-3. A line of operations links a base of operations to physical objectives that link to end state conditions. Lines of effort link tasks with goal-oriented objectives that focus toward establishing end state conditions. Commanders describe an operation along lines of operations, lines of effort, or a combination of both in their operational approach. Commanders may designate one line as decisive and others as shaping. 2-19. A line of operations is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives (ADP 3-0). Lines of operations connect a series of intermediate objectives that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. Operations designed using lines of operations generally consist of a series of actions executed according to a well-defined sequence. 2-20. Lines of operations can be categorized as interior and exterior. The choice of using interior or exterior lines supports a concept based on the length of movement and the supporting lines of sustainment. Commanders choose interior lines because lines of movement and sustainment in an enclosed area are shorter than those lines outside the enclosed area. Interior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations diverge from a central point. Interior lines allow commanders to move quickly against enemy forces along shorter lines of operations. 2-21. Exterior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations converge on enemy forces. This requires the attacking force to be stronger or more mobile than the enemy force. Exterior lines allow commanders to concentrate forces against multiple positions on the ground, thus presenting multiple dilemmas to the enemy force. Exterior lines facilitate seizing opportunities to encircle and destroy the weaker or less mobile enemy force. While commanders operating on interior lines have the opportunity to set the width of the battlefield, commanders operating on exterior lines have set the disposition of their forces to deploy them outside their boundaries. 2-22. A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state (ADP 3-0). Lines of effort are essential to long-term planning when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may be the only way to link tasks to the end state. Lines of effort often enable commanders to visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power. Tempo 2-23. Commanders and staff consider tempo both when planning and executing operations. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADP 3-0). It reflects the rate of military action. Controlling tempo helps commanders keep the initiative during operations. During large-scale combat, commanders seek to maintain a higher tempo than the enemy does; a rapid tempo can overwhelm an enemy’s ability to counter friendly actions. During other operations dominated by stability operations tasks, commanders act quickly to control events and deny enemy forces positions of advantage. By acting faster than the situation deteriorates, commanders can change the dynamics of a crisis and restore stability. 2-24. Several factors affect tempo, including sustainment and decisions on when and where to consolidate gains. Having adequate forces to consolidate gains simultaneously while maintaining the offense enables greater tempo. This is a key consideration for theater-level planning when determining force allocation and tailoring in support of operation plan development. Commanders and staffs use effective planning to accelerate tempo by anticipating decisions and actions in advance. This emphasis on increased tempo, while a guiding principle, is not an unbending rule. Commanders weigh the advantages of acting more quickly against the advantages of preparing more thoroughly. Army forces expend more energy and resources when operating at a high tempo. Commanders assess their force’s capacity to operate at a high tempo based on its performance and available resources. An effective operational approach varies tempo throughout an operation to increase endurance while maintaining speed and momentum. There is more to tempo than speed. While speed can be important, commanders balance speed with endurance and reach. Phasing and Transitions 2-25. Commanders and staffs use planning to determine the sequence of actions—including the phases and transitions—that best accomplishes the mission and achieves the desired end state. Ideally, commanders plan to accomplish a mission with simultaneous and integrated actions throughout their area of operations (AO). However, operational reach, resource constraints, and the size of the friendly force limits what units can do at one time. In these cases, commanders phase operations. Phasing provides a way to view and conduct operations in manageable parts. 2-26. A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (ADP 3-0). Within a phase, a large portion of the force executes similar or mutually supporting activities. Achieving a specified condition or set of conditions typically marks the end of a phase. Commanders phase operations as required by the specific circumstances of the problem they are trying to solve. A change in phase usually involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement. Phasing helps in planning and controlling operations during execution. Phasing may be indicated by time, distance, terrain, or an event. Well-designed phases—  Focus effort.  Concentrate combat power in time and space at a decisive point. 2-27. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities among the offense, defense, and stability also involves transitions. Transitions require planning and preparation so the force can maintain the initiative and tempo of operations. Transitions normally occur whenever there is an abrupt change to an OE, threat, or friendly forces. Transitions can be planned or unplanned, but any transition creates a period of vulnerability for the side in transition. 2-28. Unplanned transitions present the most danger to a force. Whenever possible, leaders must anticipate transitions through effective planning and preparation, and they mitigate or exploit their effects accordingly. However, since some transitions may defy anticipation, leaders always design and prosecute operations with flexibility in mind. Maintaining reserves is one way of maintaining flexibility. 2-29. Anticipating transitions and managing them effectively are a commander’s responsibility. When commanders anticipate a transition, they, their staffs, and subordinate leaders carefully consider these actions to ensure success:  Forecasting in advance when and how to transition.  Arranging tasks to facilitate transitions.  Creating a task organization that anticipates transitions.  Rehearsing certain transitions such as from defense to counterattack or from offense to consolidating gains. 2-30. Forces are vulnerable during transitions, so commanders establish clear conditions for their execution. Commanders and staffs identify potential transitions and account for them throughout execution. Effective commanders consider the time required to plan for and execute transitions. Assessment helps commanders measure progress toward transitions and take appropriate actions to execute them. Each echelon has a responsibility to anticipate and facilitate transitions for subordinate echelons. Operational Reach 2-31. While designing operations, it is critical to consider operational reach —the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). The limit of a unit’s operational reach is its culminating point. The concept of operational reach is inextricably tied to the concept of basing and lines of operations. Reach may be constrained by the geography, threats, and environmental conditions in and around an operational area. Reach may be extended through forward positioning of capabilities and resources, leveraging host nation and contracted support, and maximizing the throughput efficiency of the distribution system. 2-32. Sustainment enables operational reach. Commanders and staffs increase operational reach through deliberate, focused operational design and appropriate sustainment resource allocation. This requires strategic sustainment capabilities such as materiel, supplies, health services, and other support and the global distribution systems to deploy, maintain, and conduct operations over great distances for extended periods. Army forces can increase the joint force’s ability to extend operational reach by securing and operating bases in the AOR, the use of contracted and local procurements, and the use of aerial delivery. Operational Reach and Basing: Sixth Army in the Philippines Campaign In the fall of 1944, the US military expanded its Pacific Campaign to recapture the Philippines from Japanese control. As the equivalent of a land component command, this required the U.S. Sixth Army to extend its reach from recently seized positions in New Guinea to Leyte in the Philippines for an amphibious assault against entrenched defenders. The offensive, which would enable control of the South Pacific, required an integrated joint approach with supporting naval and air commands to enable movement of multiple U.S. Army corps across over 2,550 kilometers (1585 miles) of noncontiguous maritime spaces. Once Allied air and naval forces had cleared the way to Leyte, the Sixth Army launched from New Guinea in mid-October, prepared for the impending attack during transport, and finally executed a coastal assault from the west on the island. With the X Corps and the 1st Cavalry and 24th Infantry Divisions attacking to the north and the XXIV Corps and the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions attacking farther south, the invasion force fought through monsoon rains that limited air support. Over the next two months, the Allies defeated the 65,000 defenders of Japan’s 35th Army in vicious jungle combat. Basing on Leyte positioned the Sixth Army for its decisive operation: an attack on Luzon where over 275,000 Japanese troops defended the island. As the U.S. Navy repelled the Japanese Imperial Navy to retain maritime control, the field army expanded its reach with new airfields and fortified bases to facilitate the projection, sustainment, and support of its forces on Luzon. The final offensive to recapture the Philippines, two years after they were lost, featured aggressive maneuver by both corps with Filipino support. The 1st Cavalry Division’s final capture of Manila illustrated the benefits of the Sixth Army’s use of the principle of reach and the success of the joint campaign. Culmination 2-33. The limit of a unit’s operational reach is its culminating point. The culminating point is the point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense (JP 5-0). Culmination represents a crucial shift in relative combat power. It is relevant to both attackers and defenders at each level of warfare. On the offense, the culminating point occurs when a force cannot continue an attack and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause. While conducting defensive tasks, it occurs when a force can no longer defend itself and must withdraw or risk destruction. The culminating point is more difficult to identify when Army forces conduct stability tasks. Two conditions can result in culmination: units too dispersed to achieve security and units lacking required resources to achieve the end state. 2-34. Commanders ensure forces and assets arrive at the right times and places to support the operation and that sufficient resources will be available when needed in the later phases. Integration and synchronization of sustainment with the concept of operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control tempo. At both tactical and operational levels, logistics planners forecast the expenditure of resources associated with conducting operations over extended distances and times. They respond by generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve operational objectives before reaching their culminating points. Basing 2-35. Basing is an indispensable part of operational art that enables lines of operations and operational reach. A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 4-0). Determining the location and sequence of establishing bases and base camps is essential for projecting power and sustaining the force. A base may be joint or single Service, and it will routinely support both U.S. and multinational forces and interagency partners. Commanders designate a specific area as a base or base camp and assign responsibility to a single commander for protection, terrain management, and day-to-day operations. Basing is always a critical consideration when arranging operations at any echelon, because bases directly support or determine—  The joint and multinational force’s proximity to an operational area.  The force’s reach and endurance.  The depth the force can achieve.  How quickly the force can generate, apply, converge, and reconstitute combat power. 2-36. Bases exist both in the U.S. and in foreign nations, and they may be temporary or permanent. Types of bases include installations, base camps, intermediate staging bases, forward operating bases, and lodgments. Units located in the base or base camp are under the TACON of the base or base camp commander for base security and defense. In large echelon support areas or joint security areas (JSAs), controlling commanders may designate base clusters for mutual protection and to exercise command and control. When a base camp expands to include clusters of sustainment, headquarters, and other supporting units, echelon commanders may designate a support area. These specific areas of operations facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control operations. Army forces typically rely on a mix of bases and base camps to serve as intermediate staging bases, lodgments, and forward operating bases. (See JP 3-34 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-37.10 for more information on base camps.) Risk It is my experience that bold decisions give the best promise of success. But one must differentiate between strategical or tactical boldness and a military gamble. A bold operation is one in which success is not a certainty but which in case of failure leaves one with sufficient forces in hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A gamble, on the other hand, is an operation which can lead either to victory or to the complete destruction of one’s force. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel 2-37. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. Success during operations depends on a willingness to identify, mitigate, and accept risk to create opportunities. When considering how much risk to accept, commanders consider risk to the force and risk to the mission. Commanders need to balance the tension between protecting the force and accepting risks that must be taken to accomplish their mission. They apply judgment with regard to the importance of an objective, the time available, and the anticipated cost. 2-38. The mission command approach requires that commanders and subordinates accept risk, exercise initiative, and act decisively, even when the outcome is uncertain. Commanders focus on creating opportunities rather than simply preventing defeat—even when preventing defeat appears safer. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is not gambling. Gambling is making a decision in which the commander risks the force without a reasonable level of information about the outcome. Therefore, commanders avoid gambles. Commanders carefully determine risks, analyze and minimize as many hazards as possible, and then accept risks to accomplish the mission. 2-39. Inadequate planning and preparation put forces at risk, as does delaying action while waiting for perfect intelligence and synchronization. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is fundamental to successful operations. Experienced commanders balance audacity and imagination against risk and uncertainty to strike in a manner, place, and time unexpected by enemy forces. This is the essence of surprise. Planning should identify risks to mission accomplishment. Part of developing an operational approach includes answering the question, “What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in employing the operational approach?” Risk decisions range from ways to address resource shortfalls to when to transition the force or parts of the force to the consolidation of gains. Staffs communicate identified risks to higher echelon headquarters, and the commander’s planning guidance provides risk mitigation guidance. 2-40. Risk cuts across the levels of warfare. A risk decision at one level directly affects the other levels. JFCs and their component commanders are uniquely positioned uniquely to assess risk across the levels of warfare. They inform strategic-level risk decisions, or act to shape tactical-level risk decisions. They inform strategic-level risk decisions in several ways. First, they frankly provide their best military advice, and they clearly articulate their assessment of the probable risks associated with a decision. Second, they provide superiors insight into how changes to an OE affect U.S. and multinational interests and objectives. Third, when they determine that an imbalance between the ends, ways, and means available for prosecuting operations is creating risk, they adjust the ways in which they operate by securing additional means to achieve the desired end state or by dialoguing with strategic leaders to adopt an end state more achievable with the resources available. Defeat and Stability Mechanisms 2-41. Commanders consider defeat and stability mechanisms when developing their operational approach. Defeat mechanisms relate to offensive and defensive operations, while stability mechanisms relate to stability operations. Army forces use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate.  Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt (FM 3-90-1).  Dislocate means to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant (ADP 3-0).  Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading its ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight (ADP 3-0).  Isolate means to separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to defeat (ADP 3-0). 2-42. Applying more than one defeat mechanism simultaneously produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. Used individually, a defeat mechanism achieves results relative to the amount of effort expended. Using defeat mechanisms in combination creates enemy dilemmas that magnify their effects significantly. Commanders and staffs use operational art to formulate the most effective, efficient way to apply defeat mechanisms. Physically destroying enemy forces deprives them of the ability to achieve those aims. Temporally dislocating enemy forces anticipates their reactions and nullifies them before they can become effective. Cognitively disintegrating enemy forces disrupts their decision making and erodes their will to fight. 2-43. As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support.  Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority.  Control involves imposing civil order.  Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy audiences through messages, presence, and actions.  Support establishes, reinforces, or sets conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively. Echelons focused on the consolidation of gains employ combinations of both defeat and stability mechanisms. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL COMBAT POWER CONSIDERATIONS No army can be efficient unless it be a unit for action; and the power must come from above, not below. Lieutenant General William T. Sherman 2-44. Commanders and staff at all echelons must understand and master both the art of command and the science of control to apply operational art. Understanding an OE and its problems, determining an operation’s end state, establishing objectives, and sequencing an operation in broad terms are part of operational art. Many aspects of operations, such as movement rates, fuel consumption, weapons effects, and unit capabilities, are quantifiable. They are part of the military science that enables operational art. Effectively generating and applying combat power not only requires an understanding of operational art, but it also requires a detailed understanding of military science. 2-45. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADP 3-0). Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as warfighting functions—a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions (ADP 3-0). Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information guided by the principles of mission command as shown in figure 2-4. 2-46. Combat power includes all capabilities provided by joint forces and other unified action partners that are integrated and synchronized to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. All echelons generate and apply combat power. Theater and field armies (when constituted) tend to focus on generating combat power and allocating resources to corps and divisions. Corps and division headquarters tend to focus on synchronizing and applying combat power to accomplish tasks and achieve objectives. The remainder of this section provides considerations for the generation and application of combat power at the operational and higher tactical levels. LEADERSHIP The American soldier…demands professional competence in his leaders. In battle, he wants to know that the job is going to be done right, with no unnecessary casualties. General Omar N. Bradley 2-47. Before an operation, combat power is unrealized potential. Through leadership, this potential is transformed into action. Leadership is the activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). Influencing is persuading people to do what is necessary. Influencing entails more than simply passing along orders. Through words and personal example, leaders inspire purpose, provide direction, and motivation. The Army acknowledges three levels of leadership—  Direct.  Organizational.  Strategic. 2-48. Factors determining a leadership level include the leader’s relationship to a subordinate, number of subordinates, scope of responsibility, and time horizons of missions. Regardless of which level a leader serves in, a leader is always a direct leader. Direct leaders are task oriented. Organizational leaders are both task and mission oriented and lead through subordinate leaders. Strategic leaders apply a global, regional, national, and societal perspective to the organizations they lead. Organizational and strategic leaders lead through others. 2-49. Commanders, deputy commanders, and primary staff officers at echelons above brigade headquarters exercise organizational leadership. Organizational leaders apply the principles of mission command and exercise leadership through subordinate leaders responsible for leading the various organizations that make up the larger organization. Since missions for larger organizations are more complex and involve concurrent efforts, leaders at higher echelons must encourage subordinate initiative. Effective organizational leaders must delegate authority, support their subordinates’ decisions, and hold them accountable for their actions. Successful delegation of authority involves convincing subordinates that they are empowered and have the freedom to act independently. Empowered subordinates understand that they bear more than the responsibility to accomplish tasks. They have the authority to operate as they see fit, within the limits of the commander’s intent and available resources. (See ADP 6-0 for more information on the mission command approach.) 2-50. Organizational leaders, particularly commanders, are responsible for communicating intent two echelons down and understanding intent two echelons up. This is essential for unity of effort and purpose among echelons. Organizational leaders operate within their commanders’ intent and communicate that intent to subordinates as a means of providing room for subordinate initiative and decreasing the number of decisions they must personally make to keep the organization operating effectively. Organizational leadership includes responsibility over multiple functions, such as leading and synchronizing major operations. (See ADP 6-22 for doctrine on Army leadership.) INFORMATION 2-51. Information, as an element of combat power, is used in three ways. First, information is used as a resource to create the situational understanding necessary for accurate decision making. Second, Army forces use information to direct and coordinate actions in the execution of those decisions. Third, information is used to affect relevant actor behavior, including friendly, neutral, and threat audiences. 2-52. Information enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions about the application of combat power. Success in operations demands timely and effective decisions based on applying judgment to available information and knowledge. As such, commanders and staffs seek to build and maintain situational understanding throughout an operation. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational and mission variables (ADP 6-0). They also use information to build shared understanding of the situation and purpose of operations across the force. 2-53. Multiple processes and activities such as planning, assessment, intelligence, information collection, reporting, collaboration, rehearsals, and liaison all help build, maintain, and share understanding. Knowledge management and information management assist commanders with progressively adding meaning at each level of processing and analyzing to help build and maintain understanding as shown in figure 2-5. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 6-01.1 for more information on knowledge management.) 2-54. Based on their situational understanding, commanders and staffs use information to direct action. Plans and orders are the primary means for communicating direction. Commanders issue plans and orders to subordinates to communicate their visualization of operations and to direct actions. Plans and orders synchronize the action of forces in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish the mission. They inform others outside the organization on how to cooperate and provide support. 2-55. Information is also a powerful tool to influence the behavior of relevant actors in an OE. Commanders and their units must coordinate what they do, say, and portray. Every engagement, battle, and major operation requires complementary information operations to slow and impair enemy decision making, as well as work in consonance with public affairs to inform a global audience and with PSYOP to influence audiences in an operational area. Fundamental to this effort is integration of information related capabilities to provide options for the commander and support warfighting functions. At the operational level information operations affects enemy decision making, supports commander decision points and warfighting functions, and complements the joint and theater level strategic messaging. (See FM 3-13 for doctrine on information operations). Note. Joint doctrine lists information as a joint function. The information function encompasses the management and application of information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, protection, and sustainment) to influence relevant actor perceptions, behavior, action or inaction, and support human and automated decision making. (See JP 3-0 for a description of the joint functions.) The Army considers information an essential element of all warfighting functions. COMMAND AND CONTROL In general, campaign projects have to be adjusted to conditions (time, weather), the number of the enemy. …The more one foresees obstacles to his plans, the less one will find of them later in the execution. In a word, everything must be foreseen; find the problems and resolve them. Frederick the Great 2-56. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1). Commanders exercise their authority and direction through the command and control warfighting function —the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power (ADP 3-0). The command and control tasks are—  Command forces.  Control operations.  Drive the operations process.  Establish the command and control system. 2-57. The command and control system is the arrangement of people, processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders to conduct operations (ADP 6-0). The command and control system supports the commander’s decision making, disseminates the commander’s decisions to subordinates, and facilitates controlling forces. Commanders employ their command and control system to enable the people and formations conducting operations to work towards a common purpose. (See ADP 6-0 for a detailed description of the command and control tasks and the command and control system.) 2-58. Mission command and its principles guide commanders and staffs in the exercise of command and control. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation (ADP 6-0). Mission command requires an environment of trust and shared understanding among commanders, staffs, and subordinates. It requires building effective teams and a command climate in which commanders encourage subordinates to accept risk and exercise initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander’s intent. Through mission orders (what to do, not how to do it), commanders focus leaders on the purpose of the operation rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks. Doing this minimizes detailed control and allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action to accomplish tasks. Finally, when delegating authority to subordinates, commanders set the necessary conditions for success by allocating appropriate resources to subordinates based on assigned tasks. (See ADP 6-0 for a detailed description of the mission command approach and its principles.) Principles of Mission Command  Competence.  Mutual trust.  Shared understanding.  Commander’s intent.  Mission orders.  Disciplined initiative.  Risk acceptance. 2-59. Similar to the leadership levels (direct, organizational, and strategic) described in paragraph 2-47, the exercise of command and control varies by echelon. Higher echelons generally have longer planning timelines and often must anticipate and make decisions concerning operations well in advance of execution. The scale and scope of authority and direction required is also significantly different among echelons. Delegating authority and empowering subordinate commanders and leaders to accomplish tasks and missions is essential at higher echelons. 2-60. The tasks and subtasks associated with command and control are numerous, ranging from planning operations to establishing communications networks. In addition to developing an operational approach, two related command and control tasks set the framework for echelons above brigade operations. They are—  Organize the force.  Establish an operational framework. O RGANIZING THE F ORCE 2-61. Organizing the force, including establishing command and support relationships, is essential for establishing unity of effort. How commanders organize their force affects how they generate and apply combat power. Commanders organize their force through two methods, each of which considers the appropriateness of means at echelon based upon the operational and mission variables. The methods of organizing the force are—  Force tailoring.  Task-organizing. Force Tailoring 2-62. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander (ADP 3-0). Force tailoring combines two complementary requirements—selecting the right forces and deploying the forces in the optimal sequence. The first— selecting the right force—involves identifying, selecting, and sourcing required Army capabilities and establishing their initial task organization to accomplish the mission. The result is an Army force package matched to the needs of the combatant commander. The second requirement of force tailoring establishes order of deployment for the force package, given the available lift and the combatant commander’s priorities. Tailoring the force is a complicated and intensely managed Army-wide process, and the theater army plays a critical role in it. 2-63. Most Army conventional operating forces are designated as “Service Retained” forces in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance assignment tables and are primarily based in the continental United States. United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOMFORSCOMU. S. Army Forces Command), the largest of the Army commands, commands Active Component conventional forces (Regular Army, mobilized Army National Guard, and mobilized Army Reserve), executes training and readiness oversight of Army National Guard forces under state command, and it does the same for non-mobilized Army Reserve units. 2-64. Based upon requirements developed by the theater armies and validated by the combatant commander and the joint staff, the Department of the Army and FORSCOMFORSCOMU. S. Army Forces Command develop force packages for deployment and employment into an AOR. This includes forces for contingencies and forces needed to support security cooperation activities. A tailored force package is task-organized by FORSCOMFORSCOMU. S. Army Forces Command to facilitate strategic deployment and support the gaining JFC’s operational requirements. FORSCOMFORSCOMU. S. Army Forces Command is not the sole provider of Army forces; other supporting ASCCs may contribute forces as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The result is a set of trained and ready Army forces intended either for contingencies or for planned deployments, such as a rotation of forward-based forces. 2-65. The theater army recommends the optimum deployment sequence for Army forces to the GCC’s staff. The GCC’s staff may modify this recommendation in coordination with FORSCOMFORSCOMU. S. Army Forces Command and United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) based upon factors such as available lift, location, and readiness of deploying forces, and surface transportation requirements. The theater army adjusts support provided by theater assets to match the requirements of the joint and Army forces on the ground. Figure 2-6 shows an example of force tailoring. Task-Organizing 2-66. Task-organizing is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADP 3-0). It includes providing forces to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relations hips. This occurs in tailored force packages as commanders organize subordinate units for specific missions and employ doctrinal command and support relationships. As task-organizing continues, commanders reorganize units for subsequent missions. The ability of Army forces to rapidly task-organize gives them extraordinary agility. It lets commanders configure their units to best use available resources. It also allows Army forces to match unit capabilities to tasks. The ability of sustainment forces to tailor and task-organize ensures commanders have freedom of action to change with mission requirements. Rapid Task Organization: 30th Infantry Division in the Normandy Campaign From June to October of 1944 in the European theater of operations in the Second World War, the U.S. Army executed 9 changes in corps alignment under field armies and more than 65 changes of division alignment under corps commands. This required corps, divisions, brigades, and battalions to execute task organization changes rapidly, often while in contact with the enemy, to provide maximum flexibility and options to higher commands. By making organizational transitions a routine action, the Allies were able to converge and mass combat power at decisive points to achieve the objectives of the Normandy invasion, break through the German defenses, and advance into the French interior. The wartime experience of the 30th Infantry Division and its 14,000 Soldiers illustrated the opportunities and challenges created by rapid and continuous changes to task organization. On 11 June, “Old Hickory” joined the war with an uncontested landing on the Normandy beaches under command of the VII Corps. Less than a week later, it reported to XIX Corps to execute its first combat action with one regiment even as the rest of its forces came ashore. The division, when fully consolidated, next defended the vulnerable lines between American beachheads to allow the Allies to mass combat power and then subsequently the division attacked across the Vire River to repel a German counterattack. Beginning on 15 July, the 30th Division served as a lead element in Operation Cobra as the Allies broke through the German defenses surrounding Normandy. The division initially secured the departure point for the entire Allied operation, then executed a mid-night reassignment to VII Corps, and finally resumed its advance the next morning. Seeking to exploit success, the command transferred back to XIX Corps to repel a German counterattack, moved to the V Corps, and then rejoined XIX Corps to repulse a major counterattack at Avranches. This flexibility in changing task organization ultimately allowed field commanders to continuously mass and reallocate combat power at decisive points in the campaign. Command and Support Relationships 2-67. Establishing clear command and support relationships is the basis for establishing an effective task organization. These relationships establish responsibilities and authorities between subordinate and supporting units. Some command and support relationships limit the commander’s authority to prescribe additional relationships. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each command and support relationship allows commanders to effectively organize their forces and helps supporting commanders understand their unit’s role in the organizational structure. 2-68. Army echelons above brigade commanders and staffs must clearly understand joint command relationships and authorities as well as Army command and support relationships. Differences stem from the way Army forces task-organize internally and the need for a system of support relationships between Army forces. Another important difference is the requirement for Army commanders to handle the ADCON of forces. These differences allow for flexible allocation of Army capabilities within various Army echelons. Army command and support relationships are the basis for building Army task organizations. (See Chapter 5Appendix A for a detailed description of command and support relationships.) Span of Control 2-69. Span of control is an important consideration when task-organizing the force. Span of control refers to the number of subordinates or activities under the control of a single commander. A commander’s span of control should not exceed that commander’s capability to command effectively. The optimal number of subordinates is situation dependent. The more fluid and rapidly changing the situation, the fewer subordinate elements a commander can command and control effectively. Within this situation-dependent range, a greater number of subordinates allows greater flexibility, and this increases options and combinations. However, as the number increases, commanders, at some point, lose the ability to control all subordinate forces. At this point, the only way to reintroduce flexibility is to group elements into a smaller number of parts, creating another echelon of command. Establishing a field army headquarters to control multiple corps and divisions in large-scale combat operations is an example. E STABLISH AN O PERATIONAL F RAMEWORK 2-70. The operational framework provides an organizing construct for how commanders intend to organize their AO geographically (deep, close, rear, and support areas), by purpose (decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations), and by effort (main and supporting). When establishing their operational framework, commanders consider the physical, temporal, virtual, and cognitive factors that impact their AOs. Collectively, these considerations allow commanders and staffs to better account for the multi-domain capabilities of friendly and threat forces. Land Force Area of Operations 2-71. Based on their visualization of an operation, the JFC may designate land and maritime AOs as described in Chapter 1. Depending on how the joint force is organized, the land AO may be assigned to a land component commander or divided into land AOs by Service commanders (for example ARFOR and Marine Corps). 2-72. For land operations, an AO includes subordinate AOs assigned by Army commanders to their subordinate echelons. The Army commander or JFLCC is the supported commander within an AO designated by the JFC for land operations. In their areas of operations, commanders integrate and synchronize combat power. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders designate targeting priorities, effects, and timing of fire and maneuver in their AO. Component commanders with assigned AOs designate subordinate AOs in which their subordinate forces operate. The use of unit boundaries delineates responsibilities of subordinate units, facilitates control, and enables freedom of action. Unit responsibilities in an assigned AO include—  Terrain management.  Information collection.  Civil-military operations.  Movement control.  Clearance of fires.  Security.  Personnel recovery.  Airspace control.  Minimum essential stability tasks. 2-73. Commanders consider a unit’s area of influence when assigning it an AO. An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control (JP 3-0). Understanding an area of influence helps commanders and staffs plan branches to the current operation in which the force uses capabilities outside the AO. An AO should not be substantially larger than the unit’s area of influence. Ideally, the area of influence would encompass the entire AO. An AO too large for a unit to effectively control increases risk, allowing sanctuaries for enemy forces and limiting joint flexibility. 2-74. An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. An area of interes t for stability or defense support of civil authorities may be much larger than that area associated with the offense and defense. The area of interest always encompasses aspects of the air, cyberspace, and space domains, since capabilities resident in all three enable and affect operations on land. Deep, Close, Rear, and Support Areas 2-75. In their assigned AOs, Army commanders designate deep, close, rear, and support areas to describe the physical arrangement of forces in time, space, and focus. These areas are typically defined by the boundaries assigned by the higher echelon headquarters. A boundary is a line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas (JP 3-0). Boundaries may require adjustment based on actual and projected rates of maneuver or changes to the situation. Paragraphs 2-76 through 2-81 provide a summary of the geographic areas. (See Appendix C for a detailed description of the areas within a unit AO and the interrelationships of those areas among echelons.) Deep Area 2-76. The deep area is where the commander sets conditions for future success in close combat (ADP 3-0). Operations in the deep area involve efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being committed in a coherent manner. A commander’s deep area generally extends beyond subordinate unit boundaries out to the limits of the commander’s designated AO. The purpose of operations in the deep area is often tied to setting conditions for future events in time and space. Operations in the deep area might disrupt the movement of operational reserves or prevent enemy forces from employing long-range fires. Planning for operations in the deep area includes considerations for information collection, airspace control, joint fires, obstacle emplacement, maneuver (air and ground), special operations, and information and supporting deception operations. Field army, corps, and division deep areas often overlap. Commanders coordinate and de-conflict operations in these areas through the use of control measures (for example, phase lines, fire support coordination line, kill boxes) and by target and target sets. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-94.2 for a more detailed description of deep operations.) Close Area 2-77. The close area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations where the majority of subordinate maneuver forces conduct close combat (ADP 3-0). Commanders plan to conduct decisive operations using maneuver and fires in the close area, and they position most of the maneuver force in it. In the close area, depending on the echelon, one unit may conduct the decisive operation while others conduct shaping operations to fix a specific enemy formation or defeat remnants of by-passed or defeated enemy forces. Planning for operations in the close area includes fire control measures, movement control measures, maneuver, and obstacle emplacement. Operations in the close area are inherently lethal because they often involve direct fire engagements with enemy forces seeking to mass direct, indirect, and aerial fires against friendly forces. The field army and corps close area includes the AOs of committed division and separate maneuver brigades. The division close area is primarily where BCTs operate. Rear Area 2-78. The rear area is that area in a unit’s AO extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear boundary of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. It is an area where most forces and assets locate that support and sustain forces in the close area. Rear operations include—  Security.  Sustainment.  Terrain management.  Movement control.  Protection.  Infrastructure development. 2-79. Similar to a rear area, JFCs establish a JSA. A joint security area is a specific area to facilitate protection of joint bases and their connecting lines of communications that support joint operations (JP 3-10). Corps and divisions have rear areas that expand during offensive operations. The field army’s rear area is normally the JSA; however, the field army may expand its rear area beyond the JSA as it shifts the rear boundaries of its subordinate corps. Support Area 2-80. Commanders designate support areas within the rear area. A support area is the portion of the commander’s AO that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations (ADP 3-0). It is where most of the echelon’s sustainment capabilities originate from and includes lines of communication, bases, and base clusters. The support area is generally the AO assigned to a maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB). The MEB is responsible for terrain management, movement control, mobility support, clearance of fires, and tactical combat forces for security. This allows sustainment units to focus on their primary function. Field armies, corps, and divisions may have one or multiple support areas, located as required to best support the force. Decisive, Shaping, and Sustaining 2-81. This decisive, shaping, and sustaining framework lends itself to a broad conceptual orientation of the operation. When used in conjunction with the other frameworks, it provides greater understanding of the purpose that the formation is trying to accomplish. The decisive operation is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission (ADP 3-0). It is the focal point around which commanders design their entire operation. The commander conducts decisive operations by—  Task-organizing for the decisive operation.  Allocating resources by establishing priorities of support.  Echeloning combat power.  Assigning appropriate areas of operations.  Employing other forces to shape conditions to guarantee success of the decisive operation. 2-82. Commanders identify a single decisive operation and arrange all other operations around that operation. A decisive operation may include multiple subordinate units to ensure its success. This is especially true at higher echelons where the size and scale of enemy forces may make it impossible for a single unit to complete the decisive operation. No echelon will have more than one decisive operation unless its mission changes or conditions in an OE change to such a degree that it requires a reconsideration of objectives. Commanders will assign the preponderance of their combat power to the decisive operation, while shaping operations receive the minimum combat power necessary for their operations. Weighting the decisive operation requires the commander to accept risk to guarantee the success of the decisive operation. If shaping and decisive operations require more combat power than can be provided simultaneously, the commander phases the operation to allow combat power to transfer from shaping operations to the decisive operations when the decisive operations begin. Desert Storm: A Decisive Offensive Operation On 24 February 1991, after a 38-day major shaping operation by the U.S. Central Command air component with land component support, Army forces began one of the most decisive land combat operations of modern warfare. Army forces attacked Iraqi forces as part of a coalition offensive. XVIII Airborne Corps was in the west with VII Corps on its right flank. First (Tiger) Brigade, 2d Armored Division, attacked as part of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in the east. Army forces quickly penetrated Iraqi defenses, rapidly seizing their objectives. Soldiers used advanced technology that allowed vehicle and air crews to acquire and engage targets from beyond the range of Iraqi weapons systems. The shock effect of armor and well-trained infantry, coupled with overwhelming aviation deep and close attacks, massed indirect fires in depth, and responsive sustainment shattered the Iraqi army. XVIII Airborne Corps maneuvered 100 miles north and 70 miles east into Iraq; VII Corps maneuvered 100 miles north and 55 miles east. Coalition forces destroyed 3,800 of 4,200 tanks, over half the personnel carriers, and nearly all of the 3,000 artillery pieces belonging to the Iraqi Army. Coalition forces captured over 60,000 prisoners. After 100 hours of combat, only 7 of 43 Iraqi divisions remained combat effective. The coalition had crushed the fourth largest army in the world and liberated Kuwait. 2-83. A shaping operation is an operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for success of the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain (ADP 3-0). These operations may occur throughout an AO involving various combinations of forces and capabilities. Shaping operations set the conditions for the success of the decisive operation by preparing and isolating the battlefield, disrupting the enemy’s ability to synchronize forces, deceiving the enemy, and delaying the entry of enemy reinforcements to the main battle area. They also set conditions for the success of subordinate echelons and their freedom of action. At higher echelons, commanders generally identify more than one shaping operation to support the decisive operation. At the operational level, depth and timing distinguish shaping operations. Given the operational reach of the joint force, shaping operations extend to, in some cases beyond, the limits of the operational area, although the majority of shaping occurs in an AO. 2-84. A sustaining operation is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power (ADP 3-0). Sustaining operations are inseparable from decisive and shaping operations; they require the same detailed planning and coordination. Proper sustainment is necessary to maintain the desired tempo throughout an operation and to set the conditions for future operations. A failure to sustain may result in mission failure or an unacceptable loss of personnel and materiel in the conduct of operations, thus jeopardizing future missions. Sustaining operations are not limited to support areas, they occur throughout the AO. 2-85. Effective sustainment ensures freedom of action, extends operational reach, and prolongs endurance. Because operational reach underpins all maneuver, sustainment is intrinsic to the scheme of maneuver at these echelons. The success of sustaining operations is dependent on the supporting and supported commanders’ understanding of requirements, capabilities, and priorities. 2-86. Operational-level maneuver demands anticipation, careful planning, and the synchronization of sustainment with operations. Sustainment at this level depends on preparation well before the decisive operation occurs and becomes closely linked with shaping operations. In other words, headquarters not only shape to set conditions for the decisive operations, they shape to ensure the success of sustaining operations. Sustaining operations focus on friendly forces rather than on the enemy or environment. The operational-level commander considers the operational reach of the corps in terms of logistics capacity, distribution, evacuation and treatment of casualties, and personnel services. Their commander and staff continually—  Assess the sustainment posture of the formation.  Position and protect sustainment and medical units.  Establish priorities of support.  Secure and maintain lines of communications with Army and host-nation forces.  Manage movement of subordinate forces and coordinate across the formation for movement of sustainment units. 2-87. At the tactical level, sustainment remains the key to freedom of action. Properly integrated, the support provided by sustainment units allows formations to maneuver, concentrate their capabilities, and adjust their task organization quickly. If poorly coordinated, sustainment becomes a major contributor to loss of momentum and inadequate operational reach. Staffs give particular attention to integrating their sustainment units’ requirements into their concept of operations. This includes careful selection and security of support areas in their AOs, and planning for their displacement based upon adjustments to the tactical AO. This displacement planning is based on movement, general engineering, security, and protection capabilities. The displacement of the support area normally entails more time and effort than shifting a subordinate formation. Main and Supporting Efforts 2-88. The final component of the operational framework is establishing main and supporting efforts. Commanders designate main and supporting efforts to establish clear priorities of support and resources among subordinate units. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success (ADP 3-0). It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power. Typically, commanders shift the main effort one or more times during execution. 2-89. Designating a main effort temporarily prioritizes resource allocation. When commanders designate a unit as the main effort, it receives priority of support and resources to maximize combat power. However, the higher echelon commander may withhold certain resources from the main effort to ensure their availability for the decisive operations. This carries a certain amount of risk that the commander must balance between current operations, the upcoming decisive operation, and possible future missions. 2-90. Commanders may designate a unit conducting a shaping operation as the main effort until the decisive operation commences. However, the unit with primary responsibility for the decisive operation then becomes the main effort upon the execution of the decisive operation. 2-91. A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort (ADP 3-0). Commanders resource supporting efforts with the minimum assets necessary to accomplish the mission. Because they are not resourced the same as the main effort, it is critical that higher echelon commanders clearly identify the task and purpose for their operations so that they do not create a situation that could potentially endanger the success of the main effort or the decisive operation. C OMMAND AND C ONTROL IN M ULTIPLE D OMAINS 2-92. Through command and control, Army forces converge effects from all domains (land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace), and the information environment and the electromagnetic spectrum, to accomplish missions. Convergence involves the continuous integration of capabilities from multiple domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment, to create multiple dilemmas for the enemy. To converge effects from all domains, Army forces must understand the authorities, processes, procedures, and time it takes to receive effects from other domains and for Army forces to create effects in those domains. To converge combat power throughout operations, Army echelons serving as a functional or Service component to a joint force must integrate into various theater command and control processes and procedures addressed in these joint publications: JP 3-12, JP 3-13, JP 3-14, JP 3-30, JP 3-31, JP 3-32, and JP 3-52. 2-93. Liaison and coordination are vital to Army headquarters in gaining access to capabilities and effects from other components of the joint force. Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort. Most commonly used for establishing and maintaining close communications, liaison activities enables direct face-to-face communications between commands and with unified action partners. Liaison activities augment the commander’s ability to integrate and converge effects from multiple domains into the concept of operations. Liaison activities ensure—  Cooperation and understanding among commanders and staffs of different headquarters.  Coordination to achieve unity of effort.  Coordination and synchronization of lethal and nonlethal effects.  Understanding of implied or inferred coordination measures to achieve synchronized results. 2-94. Based on the situation, commanders may receive or request a liaison (individuals and teams) to assist them with command and control in the various domains. Liaisons include, but are not limited to—  An Army cyberspace operations support team.  A military information support operations unit.  An Army space support team.  An air defense liaison/fire control team.  An air liaison officer and associated United States Air Force (USAFUSAFUnited States Air Force) elements.  A naval gunfire liaison officer.  Special operations forces. 2-95. In addition to receiving liaison officers and teams, Army forces send liaison and coordination elements to other joint components. An essential coordination element is the battlefield coordination detachment. The battlefield coordination detachment is a specialized, regionally focused Army element that serves as the senior liaison between the ARFOR commander and the air component commander. A battlefield coordination detachment is co-located with the joint air operations center, combined air operations center, or the Air Force air operations center. The battlefield coordination detachment is the Army’s interface for systems connectivity to the joint air operations center and for personnel integration with their joint air operations center counterparts. Battlefield coordination detachment tasks include facilitating the exchange of current intelligence and operational data, processing air support requests, monitoring and interpreting the land battle situation, coordinating air and missile defense, coordinating airlift, and integrating airspace requirements. The battlefield coordination detachment also provides continuous feedback and information from the JAOC, including the air tasking order, airspace control order and special instructions (known as SPINS). Digital liaison detachments can provide liaison capability among Army, joint or multinational forces and headquarters to ensure communication, interoperability, mutual understanding, and unity of purpose. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-94.1 for doctrine on digital liaison detachments) 2-96. When a U.S. Army headquarters is designated as the joint forces land component command, the battlefield coordination detachment may serve as the land component commander’s liaison to the air component commander when augmented with other unique land force representatives. Army corps relay requirements and requests to the land component, which, in turn, relays land component requirements and requests for joint force air component support to battlefield coordination detachment. Depending on the theater, this may also include space, cyber, and electronic warfare support requests. The battlefield coordination detachment represents the JFLCC throughout the joint air tasking cycle in the joint air operations center. (See JP 3-31, ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-09.13, AFTTP 3-3.AOCAOCAirborne Orientation Course for information on the battlefield coordination detachment.) MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER 2-97. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats (ADP 3-0). Movement involves the positioning of combat power to gain a positional advantage over an enemy force. Movements range from operational movement associated with force projection to tactical troop movements in an AO. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area, through movement in combination with fires and information, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy (JP 3-0). For the Army, maneuver is movement in conjunction with fires (ADP 3-90). A unit’s scheme of maneuver—a description of the employment of maneuver units that includes the form of maneuver or defense—provides the bases for the Movement and Maneuver Warfighting Task  Move.  Maneuver.  Employ direct fires.  Occupy an area.  Conduct mobility and countermobility.  Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.  Employ battlefield obscuration. unit’s concept of operations and various schemes of support such as the scheme of fires, scheme of protection, and concept of sustainment. 2-98. While division and lower echelons focus on planning and executing tactical movement and maneuver tasks (see ADP 3-90), theater armies, field armies, and corps focus on operational movement and maneuver. Operational movement and maneuver involves positioning of forces to achieve a decisive outcome in the conduct of a campaign or major operation. It includes moving or deploying forces into an operational area and maneuvering them to operational depths for offensive and defensive purposes. It also includes assuring the mobility of friendly forces. Operational movement and maneuver combines global force projection with maneuver against an operational objective. Operational maneuver sets the terms of battle initially and then projects forces into or through the depth of the enemy’s defenses. In a defensive campaign or major operation, operational maneuver shifts uncommitted forces into positions of potential advantage and directs them into attacks that capture the initiative or stabilize a defense. O PERATIONAL M OVEMENT 2-99. Operational movement can be broken down into two subsets. One is operational movement from strategic distances or inter-theater movement. Inter-theater operational movement involves the movement of forces from outside of the AOR into the AO to conduct operations, and it is directly tied to force tailoring and setting the theater. The other is intra-theater operational movement. Intra-theater operational movement involves the shifting or repositioning of forces inside the AO, and it is tied to tactical actions or opportunities. The movement of large unit formations over operational distances requires considerable planning and careful control during execution. 2-100. Maneuver of forces at the field army and corps levels are predicated on sustained movement, often over extended distances, prior to the engagement of forces. This sustained movement places a premium on developing and maintaining lines of communication and alternate movement routes, sustainment, and detailed planning to deconflict the movement of units as necessary. Field armies and corps do not need to solve maneuver problems for the divisions as much as they need to ensure that divisions and BCTs are positioned to maneuver with the necessary support. Without effective movement planning, and an effective movement control and sustainment effort, large formations cannot be positioned where maneuver is required. 2-101. The potential commitment of multiple corps and divisions with their supporting formations into AOs with limited road infrastructure makes the successful integration of movement operations with maneuver an operational imperative. Successful planning must account for the movement of field artillery, air defense, aviation support, engineers, intelligence, and sustainment units to ensure uninterrupted support to the commander’s scheme of maneuver. Limited and dispersed mobility corridors place a premium on echelons above brigade headquarters’ abilities to control the movement of large units and sustain them. 2-102. Operational movement establishes basic dispositions for forces and limits the range of possible subsequent movements and maneuver. At the operational level, movement involves establishing a base(s) of operation and distributing forces along lines of operation to facilitate their future commitment. It is important that initial force deployments can support the entire campaign because it is difficult to change lines of operation at the operational level after their establishment. The availability of lines of communication exert a dominant influence on the movement and operation of large forces. O PERATIONAL M ANEUVER 2-103. Operational maneuver involves the movement of large ground forces in conjunction with joint fires. Operational maneuver is the means by which the commander sets the terms of battle, declines battle, or acts to take advantage of tactical actions. Army and corps commanders posture their forces for initial and subsequent operations based on their visualization of the operational end state. The decision on where to position forces in preparation for operations is a critical one. Prior to the conduct of operations, commanders posture their forces to influence the enemy and to support their plans for future operations. Although initial deployment is important, operational commanders posture for subsequent operations based upon their understanding of their higher echelon commander’s intent. Changing the positions of large units once they are in place requires significant effort, therefore time spent planning where units are positioned is essential. A commander has to evaluate multiple factors that will affect operations, either favorably or unfavorably, during planning. For many of these factors, a commander may have to look weeks or possibly months into the future in an attempt to account for their potential impacts. Operational Maneuver: Turning Movement at Inchon On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. By August, the North Korean People’s Army occupied most of the peninsula, with U.S. and Republic of Korea forces confined to a shrinking perimeter behind the Naktong and Nam Rivers. For over a month, both sides engaged in a series of bloody attacks and counterattacks. On 15 September, while United Nations and North Korean forces were decisively engaged far to the south, X Corps conducted a two-division amphibious landing at Inchon, on the west coast of Korea north of Seoul. This operational turning movement, code-named Operation CHROMITE, caught the North Korean People’s Army completely by surprise. Simultaneously, United Nations’ aircraft bombarded North Korean forces along the Naktong River to support an Eighth Army counteroffensive. During the following days, American and South Korean Marines pressed toward Seoul. The remainder of X Corps captured the Seoul-Suwon area and severed North Korean People’s Army supply lines. Army forces soon averaged 10 miles per day over rugged terrain, with the North Korean retreat soon turning into a general rout. By October 1950, the North Korean People’s Army had dissolved into disorganized remnants fleeing into borderlands adjacent to Manchuria and the Soviet Union. INTELLIGENCE From adequate and timely military intelligence the commander is able to draw logical conclusions concerning enemy lines of action. Military intelligence is thus an essential factor in the estimate of the situation and in the conduct of subsequent operations. FM 100-5, Operations (1941) 2-104. The term intelligence is used in three contexts: 1) The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations; 2) The activities that result in the product; 3) The organizations engaged in such activities (JP 2-0). In other words, intelligence is a product, a process, and a function that facilitates situational understanding of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations, and other aspects of an OE. Intelligence is inherently joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational. Every aspect of intelligence is synchronized among echelons and with unified action partners. This synchronization occurs through national to tactical intelligence support. A single collection capability is not persistent and accurate enough to provide adequate intelligence during large-scale ground combat operations. Army forces will have to fight for intelligence. Army forces both benefit from and contribute to national to tactical intelligence and focus the Army intelligence effort through the intelligence warfighting function. Intelligence Warfighting Tasks  Provide intelligence support to force generation.  Provide support to situational understanding.  Conduct information collection.  Provide intelligence support to targeting and information operations. 2-105. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment (ADP 3-0). Specifically, other significant aspects of an operational environment include threats, adversaries, the operational variables, and can include other aspects depending on the nature of operations. The intelligence warfighting function synchronizes information collection with the tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations. Intelligence is driven by commanders, and it involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation. The Army executes intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) through the operations and intelligence processes, with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and information collection. (See ADP 2-0 for more information on the intelligence warfighting function.) I NTELLIGENCE AT E CHELONS ABOVE B RIGADE 2-106. Commanders and staffs at each echelon need timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to understand threat centers of gravity, goals and objectives, capabilities, capacity, and courses of action. Commanders must also have detailed knowledge of threat strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, equipment, capabilities, and tactics to plan for and execute friendly operations. The intelligence warfighting function supports operations from the theater army down to the battalion level. 2-107. The basic intelligence support provided by the intelligence staff at each echelon is the same. What differs is the size, composition, and number of supporting capabilities for the intelligence staff; access to broader-scope information and intelligence; additional ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability and capacity, number and complexity of the requirements; and the time available to answer those requirements. In general, the higher the echelon, the greater the volume, depth, and complexity of analysis and intelligence production the intelligence staff can perform. Lower echelon intelligence staffs often depend on the higher echelon for certain intelligence products and support. Therefore, commanders and staffs must understand the intricacies of the intelligence warfighting function across each echelon. I NTEGRATING I NTELLIGENCE, S URVEILLANCE, AND R ECONNAISSANCE 2-108. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is 1. An integrated operations and intelligence activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. 2. The organizations or assets conducting such activities (JP 2-01). The Army executes ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance through the operations and intelligence processes (with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and leveraging the larger intelligence enterprise) and information collection. Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). 2-109. At the operational level, whether considering an entire theater or a JOA, intelligence staffs manage information collection by weighing the need for answering their own requirements against the capability or capacity gap of subordinate formations to answer their own requirements. Additionally, higher level requirements can sometimes be answered by lower echelon assets, which can simply result in a task for an operation. For example, a corps may need information about the condition of a bridge. Rather than tasking corps assets to answer these requirements, the corps can task the division responsible for the area containing the bridge to answer these requirements. The division would further task a subordinate brigade, and so forth until a maneuver unit receives the task for an area reconnaissance or similar task to answer the requirement and provide a report, ultimately, back to the corps. When tasking subordinate formations for reconnaissance, a higher echelon must be clear about its information requirements and provide adequate time to collect the information. 2-110. In addition to organic and supporting information collection assets, echelons above brigade have access to joint ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets upon request. The joint ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance request process typically requires significant prior planning and approval. In order to receive joint apportionment and allocation for ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, the theater army and corps intelligence staffs collaborate and coordinate early in the joint planning process. These staffs must also understand the various joint ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance scheduling and collection management mechanisms, such as joint targeting and the joint air tasking cycle. 2-111. Joint ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets are a scarce resource. The platforms are limited in number, and in most cases, can only collect for limited periods. Many have limited range and are negatively impacted by terrain, infrastructure, enemy jamming and air defense, and both terrestrial and space weather. Dedicated ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets become more available at higher echelons, but the inability to collect everywhere and all the time still presents challenges in prioritizing collection missions. Beyond sensor availability, analytical capacity to conduct processing, exploitation, and dissemination is also limited, and this can result in delays from the time information is collected to when it is received by a tactical headquarters. 2-112. Peer adversaries possess weapons systems, such as theater ballistic missiles, with ranges that exceed the collection range of tactical-echelon information collection systems. Unlike irregular warfare campaigns, where aerial assets, like unmanned aerial systems, can be flown directly over or in close proximity to the collection area, threat air defense and tactical aircraft in large-scale combat may force those assets to operate well to the rear of the forward edge of the battle area. Additionally, national ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms may be neutralized through cyber, anti-satellite, counterspace, or electronic warfare attacks. 2-113. To mitigate these shortcomings, units first leverage all organic assets to the utmost capacity. Information collection assets should not be held in reserve. Selecting the appropriate capability to answer the intelligence requirement also enhances collection efficiencies. Once organic assets are exhausted, units request support from higher echelons for both collection and analytical support. Low technology information collection assets, such as ground reconnaissance, open-source intelligence, and surveillance and human intelligence collection teams, should be leveraged to mitigate the effects when higher technology capabilities are degraded or neutralized by enemy cyber, anti-space, or electronic warfare attacks. FIRES If after the battle is over, your infantry don’t like you, you are a poor artilleryman. Captain Henry Reilly, The Field Artillery Journal (Sept–Oct 1940) 2-114. Success in operations is dependent on the ability of Army forces to employ fires. Fires enable maneuver. Commanders enable maneuver through the fires warfighting function —the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the adversary or enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations (ADP 3-0). These tasks and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects delivered from both Army and joint forces, as well as other unified action partners. 2-115. Commanders must integrate and execute fires, in combination with the other elements of combat power, to create and converge effects and achieve the desired end state. Fires tasks are those necessary actions that must be conducted to create and converge effects in all domains to meet the commander’s objectives. The tasks of the fires warfighting function are—  Execute fires across the five domains and in the information environment, employing—  Surface-to-surface fires.  Air-to-surface fires.  Surface-to-air fires.  Cyberspace operations and electronic warfare.  Space operations.  Multinational fires.  Special operations.  Information and deception operations.  Integrate Army, multinational, and joint fires through—  Targeting.  The operations process.  Intelligence analysis and collection management.  Fire support planning and coordination.  Air and missile defense planning and integration.  Electromagnetic spectrum management.  Multinational integration.  Rehearsals. (See ADP 3-19 for a detailed description of the fires warfighting function. Refer to FM 3-09 for a detailed description of fire support at the corps and division level.) C ROSS -D OMAIN AND M ULTI -D OMAIN F IRES 2-116. Commanders are responsible for the integration of fires in their AO. Commanders consult the fire support coordinator, air liaison officer, fire support officer, and experts on air and missile defense, cyberspace, electronic warfare, space, special operations, as well as information and deception operations for advice on the allocation, integration, and use of available fires resources. Fires in all domains require detailed coordination and planning to support the commander’s objectives. Employment of these systems requires the use of common terminology and coordination measures across the joint force. It includes surface-to-surface fires, air-to-surface fires, and nonlethal means that the commander uses to support the concept of the operation. 2-117. Commanders use Army and joint targeting to select and prioritize targets (and to integrate lethal and nonlethal effects from different domains, either simultaneously or in close succession), to create an even greater effect than would have been achieved if each effect was created individually. Convergence involves the massing of capabilities from multiple domains to create effects in a single domain. Convergence overwhelms enemy forces, giving them too many dilemmas to address simultaneously, which creates gaps for exploitation by the friendly force. The convergence of multiple effects in an operational area requires careful integration prior to execution to ensure effects do not interfere with one another or pose a risk to the force. 2-118. Cross-domain fires are fires executed in one domain to create effects in a different domain (ADP 3-19). Cross-domain fires provide commanders with the flexibility to find the best system to create the required effect and to build redundancy into their plan. Cross-domain fires also present a more complex problem to the adversary or enemy than fires within a single domain. For example, a commander may employ naval surface fires in conjunction with other fire support assets to attack critical targets. 2-119. Multi-domain fires are fires that converge effects from two or more domains against a target (ADP 3-19). Surface-based fires converged with other effects across domains creates multiple dilemmas, taxing the enemy’s ability to effectively respond. For example, a commander may employ offensive cyberspace operations to attack an enemy air defense network while surface-to-surface fires destroy enemy air defense radars and air-to-surface fires destroy the air defense command and control nodes. The converged effects reduce risk to friendly aircraft. I NTEGRATING F IRES 2-120. To enable freedom of action, commanders must synchronize the effects created with fires with the actions of the rest of the force. This synchronization initially takes place during planning, where commanders and their staffs determine the timing of the creation of the effect and link that timing to a clearly defined, conditions-based trigger. During large-scale combat operations, domains are likely congested, which will require close coordination and integration during planning to bring maximum combat power to bear while mitigating risk to the force. The successful delivery of fires depends upon the rapid synchronization and integration of all fire support assets with the other elements of combat power across all domains. In the physical domains, this may be accomplished through the use of graphic control measures such as maneuver control measures, fire support coordination measures, and airspace coordinating measures. In cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment, this may be accomplished through spectrum management and the delegation or retention of authorities. 2-121. Commanders ensure the coordinated use of indirect fires, and joint fires to create windows of opportunity for maneuver and put the enemy in a position of disadvantage. This is accomplished through the operations process, fire support planning, airspace management and planning, and targeting. These processes ensure the proper detection and delivery assets capable of producing the desired effects on the enemy are allocated against targets to enable friendly maneuver. Fire support is a rapid and continuous integration of surface to surface indirect fires, target acquisition, armed aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal attack/delivery systems that converge against targets across all domains in support of the maneuver commander’s concept of operations (FM 3-09). Fire support planning, coordination, and execution allows for the rapid and responsive delivery of fires by establishing permissive and restrictive control measures. Commanders use long-range fires (including missile, rocket, cannon, naval, cyberspace electromagnetic activities, and air support—rotary and fixed wing) to engage enemy forces throughout the depth of their AO. Units focus operations in their deep areas to set conditions that allow their subordinate units success in their operations in their respective AOs. The land component and corps coordinates and synchronizes joint fires as its primary tool to shape in their deep area. (See ADP 3-19 for more information on fires in the operations process. Refer to FM 3-09 for a detailed discussion of fire support planning and execution.) 2-122. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Units use the Army targeting process and the joint targeting cycle to integrate and synchronize lethal and nonlethal capabilities into operations, creating the desired effects in time and space. During the targeting process, fires cells in the theater armies and fire support elements in the corps and divisions recommend targeting guidance to the commander, develop targets, select targets for attack, and coordinate, integrate, and assign allocated joint, interagency, and multinational fires to specific targets and target systems. (See JP 3-60 for more information on the Army targeting process and the joint targeting cycle.) 2-123. Fires cells (at the theater army) and fire support elements (at the corps and division) develop, recommend, and brief the echelon scheme of fires, recommend targeting guidance to the commander, develop targets, select targets for attack, and coordinate, integrate, and assign allocated joint and multinational fires to specific targets and target systems. The scheme of fires links organizations and systems capable of detecting and tracking enemy targets with fires organizations capable of producing the desired effects on those targets. SUSTAINMENT Before a commander can even start thinking of maneuvering or giving battle, of marching this way and that, of penetrating, enveloping, encircling, of annihilating or wearing down, in short of putting into practice the whole rigmarole of strategy, he has—or ought—to make sure of his ability to supply his soldiers. Martin Van Creveld 2-124. Sustainment is the provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion (ADP 4-0). Sustainment is accomplished through the coordination, integration, and synchronization of resources from the strategic level through the tactical level in conjunction with our joint and multinational partners. Sustainment operations enable force readiness and endurance. Sustainment maintains Army forces by manning it with trained Soldiers and leaders; funding it with required resources; equipping it with the materiel (individual and unit), maintaining Soldier and Family readiness; and enabling Army forces for decisive Action. Principles of Sustainment  Anticipation  Continuity  Responsiveness  Integration  Survivability  Improvisation  Simplicity  Economy 2-125. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extended operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. Successful sustainment enables freedom of action by increasing the number of options available to the commander. Sustainment is essential for retaining and exploiting the initiative. The sustainment warfighting function consists of four elements:  Logistics.  Finance and comptroller operations.  Personnel services.  Health service support. (See ADP 4-0 for doctrine on sustainment.) 2-126. Sustainment must be integrated and synchronized with operations at every level (strategic, operational, and tactical). Sustainment focuses on building an operationally ready Army, delivering it to the combatant commander as part of the joint force, sustaining its combat power across the depth of the operational area, and with the endurance to achieve the desired end state. At the operational level, sustainment is inherently joint. The combination of Army and joint sustainment capabilities enables the combatant commander to maximize the effect of the Army’s capabilities in an operational area. The Army’s robust sustainment capability assists in providing theater and port opening functions enabling joint forces to conduct strategic reach. Army sustainment capabilities provide the bulk of support in a theater, including ASOS, in the forms of executive agent, common-user logistics, lead service, and other common sustainment resources. ASOS enables joint forces with operational reach, freedom of action, and endurance. (See Appendix B for more information on ASOS.) S TRATEGIC TO T ACTICAL S USTAINMENT 2-127. The strategic support area describes the area extending from the JSA in a theater to the continental United States or another combatant commander’s AOR. The strategic support area also includes the air and sea ports that support the force projection, flow, and sustainment of forces into the JSA in a theater. In the United States, sustainment originates in the strategic support area. The strategic support area generates Army sustainment capabilities, which enable sustained operations through end-to-end processes that drive efficiencies across military Services, agencies, and industries. 2-128. The theater army is responsible for providing support to Army forces and common-user logistics and support to other Services as directed by the combatant commander and other authoritative instructions. The TSC is assigned to the theater army. As directed, the TSC provides lead service and executive agency support for designated logistics and services to other government agencies, multinational forces, and nongovernmental organizations. The TSC is the Army’s command for the integration and synchronization of sustainment in the AOR. A MEDCOMMEDCOMUnited States Army Medical Command (DS) is also assigned to the theater army. It is responsible for command and control, integration, synchronization, and execution of Army Health System support in the AOR with strategic ties to the Defense Health Agency. The MEDCOMMEDCOMUnited States Army Medical Command (DS) commander coordinates with the theater army surgeon to provide Army Health System support in the AOR. 2-129. Field army and corps headquarters are responsible for the integration and synchronization of operational sustainment in their assigned AO. A corps is supported by its assigned ESC. When constituted, a field army receives an attached ESC to provide sustainment support. The ESC will typically command and control sustainment units supporting the rear area while providing general support to the forward units. The ESC commander may perform the duties of deputy commanding general (support) if directed by the commander. The ESC assists the sustainment cell with planning, coordinating, and executing sustainment operations. 2-130. Division headquarters are responsible for the integration and synchronization of sustainment in their assigned AO. The division’s assigned, task-organized division sustainment brigade provides general support for all division units. The division sustainment brigade coordinates and synchronizes tactical-level sustainment operations to meet current and future operations. Additional modular combat sustainment support battalions and companies may be attached to the division sustainment brigade to sustain large-scale combat operations. (See FM 4-0 for a detailed description of sustainment at different echelons.) P LANNING C ONSIDERATIONS 2-131. Sustainment enables the success of campaigns and operations by providing commanders the operational reach, freedom of action, and endurance to achieve operational objectives. Sustainment should be planned in concert with operations. At the operational level, this requires a detailed understanding of all sustainment requirements, as the overall feasibility of an operation is often a function of its sustainability. Some of the major operational planning considerations for sustainment are—  Concurrent planning.  Sustainment force flow.  Sustainment nodes and modes. Concurrent Planning 2-132. It is important for sustainment planners to conduct concurrent planning with operational planning. Commanders plan for sustainment as the operational concept is developed. This ensures their courses of action are feasible from a sustainment perspective, allows commanders to request additional assets if required, and gives sustainers additional time to position resources required to support their commander’s plan. 2-133. Often, sustainment actions to support an operation must occur prior to commencement of the operation itself, as when the priority of support shifts to the main effort for the next phase of an operation in order to ensure operations can continue uninterrupted. While the pace of operations will dictate the frequency required, planners should reconcile the operations and logistics synchronization matrices often to validate the plan and adjust sustainment operations to the changing operational picture. 2-134. The inherent joint nature of operations at this level will require the Army to provide support to other services, both sustainment and non-sustainment. As Army planners develop the concept of sustainment at each echelon, they must ensure all ASOS requirements are accounted for. This will mitigate the risk of sustainment shortfalls that could lead to early culmination of the operational plan. Responsiveness and Improvisation: The Red Ball Express To remain effective, sustainers must continually respond to the needs of the commander. Often sustainers must improvise to meet those requirements in a timely fashion. After the breakout from Normandy in July 1944, an acute shortage of supplies and transportation plagued the Allied advance. Some 28 divisions were advancing across France and Belgium, each requiring 700–750 tons of supplies a day. The Army did not have enough trucks or drivers to support the divisions. Patton’s Third Army was in danger of culminating due to a lack of supplies. Controlled supply rates of fuel and ammunition were imposed, not due to a lack of supply, but because of the challenges in moving the supplies to the units that needed them. The key to maintaining the pursuit was a continuous resupply of fuel and ordnance. The solution was the Red Ball Express. The Army Service Forces consolidated its trucks into provisional units. Soldiers from all over the U.S. forces became drivers. The first convoys quickly bogged down in civilian and military traffic. In response, a priority route, marked by signage featuring the Red Ball, was established on two parallel highways between the Normandy beachhead and the city of Chartres, France and the Red Ball Express was born. Truck drivers drove around the clock to push supplies to the front. Their herculean effort in sustaining the Allied drive became famous. At peak operation, the Red Ball Express was running 5,938 vehicles a day carrying 12,342 tons of supplies to forward depots. While lasting only 3 months, from August to November 1944, the Red Ball Express saved the Allied advance. Without it, the Allied offensive would have culminated, prolonging the war. The Red Ball Express was an innovative solution to maintain the offensive momentum. The improvisation and responsiveness of Army Service Force leaders gave the Allies the operational reach and endurance to continue operations in their press toward Berlin. Because of its effectiveness, the term and concepts of the Red Ball Express continues to this day. Sustainment Force Flow 2-135. In order for the Army to maintain its strategic reach, it must be able to project combat power to an operational area. Sustainment commands conduct reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration of forces for the commander. There are several key units that perform the functions to execute reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration; manage ports; and move the elements of combat power to assembly areas. It is important to plan for adequate sustainment capacity to both conduct reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration and support the force as it flows into theater. 2-136. As the size of the operational force increases, so must the sustainment force required to support it. Planners must ensure that sustainment units are built into the force flow to complement operations. As much of the Army’s sustainment capability resides in the Reserve Components, planners need to anticipate and plan for the additional lead-time required to mobilize and deploy those forces. Additionally, once operations commence and friendly forces seize terrain, additional sustainment units will need to traverse the additional distance between the JSA and the forward line of troops. For every increase of approximately 100 miles (161 kilometers) in operational depth, an additional echelon of distribution resources will need to conduct sustainment operations. Sustainment Nodes, Lines of Communication, and Modes 2-137. In developing the initial concept of sustainment, commanders will place their assigned sustainment resources to support operations. Sustainment headquarters at each echelon also bear the responsibility for integrating additional sustainment assets, such as Army Health Support and forward-positioned assets from higher echelon headquarters into the overall plan. At the operational level, maintaining the lines of communication is vital to ensure continual support to the mission. This is typically accomplished in conjunction with the echelon’s rear command post, as these units may occupy a significant amount of terrain in the rear area and will often require security assistance. 2-138. As friendly forces advance, additional sustainment nodes will need to ensure sustainment remains responsive to operational demands. The security of these nodes and the lines of communication that connect them will require additional combat power to secure. Commanders introduce protection assets, such as air defense, route clearance, and maintenance, to ensure uninterrupted movement of sustainment forward. Movement control, particularly in the corps and division areas, becomes vital, as the ability to distribute needed materiel forward can be constrained by the availability of transportation or the capacity of the lines of communication to accommodate the required traffic. Constant coordination between the corps and division transportation officers, ESC, and division sustainment brigade, and their supporting MEBs is required to prevent shortfalls of critical supplies in close operations. PROTECTION 2-139. Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). Commanders protect the force through the protection warfighting function —the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADP 3-0). The protection warfighting function includes these tasks:  Conduct survivability operations.  Provide force health protection.  Conduct CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.  Provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support.  Coordinate air and missile defense support.  Conduct personnel recovery.  Conduct risk management.  Implement physical security procedures.  Apply antiterrorism measures.  Conduct police operations.  Conduct detention operations.  Conduct population and resource control.  Conduct area security.  Perform cyberspace security and defense.  Conduct electromagnetic protection.  Implement operations security.  Airspace planning and management. 2-140. A shared understanding of the joint protection function enables Army leaders to integrate the Army’s protection warfighting function with unified action partners. Army leaders anticipate that joint support will be limited in large-scale combat operations and protect the force using a combination of measures. The joint protection function focuses on preserving the joint force fighting potential in four organically available ways:  Active defensive measures to protect friendly forces, civilians, and infrastructure (including biometrics collection and vetting).  Passive defensive measures (including camouflage, cover, concealment) to make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy when active measures are limited or unavailable.  The application of technology and procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide.  Emergency management and response to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and natural disasters. 2-141. Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing protection is continuous and enduring. Protection preserves the capability, momentum, and tempo that contribute to operational reach. All military activities have some inherent or organic protection capability (including survivability, antiterrorism measures, and local and area security). Effective protection can deny the enemy’s ability to achieve certain positions of advantage. 2-142. Commanders deliberately plan and integrate the application of military force against an enemy force while protecting the friendly force and preserving combat power. Commanders develop protection strategies for each phase of an operation or major activity. They integrate and synchronize protection tasks and systems through the operations process to reduce risk, mitigate identified vulnerabilities, and act on opportunit ies. When properly integrated and synchronized, the tasks and systems that comprise the protection warfighting function increase the probability of mission success. Units consider all protection tasks and systems and apply them as appropriate. Each task and its associated system are typically associated with a staff or staff proponent that performs specific duties. (See ADP 3-37 for additional information on the protection warfighting function primary tasks.) 2-143. Protection is also achieved by changing tempo, taking evasive action, or maneuvering to gain positional advantage in relation to a threat. Formations often derive protection by exploiting terrain and weather conditions, or by using the cover of darkness to mask movement. The use of key physical terrain features supports protection measures and complements the positioning of forces during planning. The ability to protect and preserve the force and secure an AO is vital in seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to shape an OE, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win wars as a part of unified action. 2-144. Initial protection planning requires various assessments to establish protection priorities critical to friendly operational success. Assessments include threats, hazards, vulnerability, and criticality. These assessments are used to determine which assets can be protected with available resources and which assets require additional resources to protect. In protection planning, the challenge is to differentiate between critical assets and important assets and to determine what protection is possible with available protection capabilities. Table 2-1 provides examples of possible protection priorities at the theater, corps, and division levels.

A war should only be undertaken with forces proportioned to the obstacles to be overcome. Napoleon This chapter provides an overview of the theater and field armies. The chapter is divided into two sections. Section I describes the roles, functions and tasks of the theater army. The section concludes with a description of the theater army’s organization and limitations. Section II describes the roles, functions and tasks of the field army. Section two concludes by describing the field army’s limitations. ARMIES OVERVIEW 3-1. An army is organized with multiple echelons, each of which can be task-organized with an appropriate mix of capabilities and sizes to perform specific roles. Each echelon commands and controls a number of subordinate functional and multifunctional units, employing them in a coherent, coordinated, and synchronized fashion to achieve its objectives. The higher echelon ensures unity of purpose, directing and orchestrating the individual subordinate units to achieve success. 3-2. The theater and field army (when constituted) are the two senior Army echelons available to a GCC. They provide the GCCs flexibility in employing land power as well as planning and coordinating for the consolidation of gains in support of joint operations. Both echelons command and control multiple subordinate echelons as they execute operations across the competition continuum.

[The corps] can engage on an extended front and can carry on a battle until a decision is reached… In actions of long duration, the divisional units are relieved by fresh units; but the corps remains until a decision is reached or the strategical plan is changed. A Manual for Commanders of Large Units This chapter discusses the roles and responsibilities the corps can fulfill across the competition continuum. Then it describes the corps headquarters capabilities, limitations, and organizations to exercise command and control in a variety of roles. This is followed by a description of organizations typically commanded by a corps. The chapter concludes with a section on how the corps is employed across the range of military operations. CORPS OVERVIEW 4-1. The corps is the most versatile echelon above brigade due to its requirement to potentially operate at the tactical and operational levels of warfare. While it is organized, manned, trained, and equipped as a tactical formation, the corps may be called upon to become a joint and multinational headquarters for conducting operations. When operating as the senior Army headquarters under a JTF, the corps will serve as the ARFOR. The corps can also serve as the JFLCC when properly augmented with joint and multinational personnel. If the corps is uncommitted to specific combatant commander requirements, it focuses on building and sustaining readiness to prevail in large-scale ground combat. 4-2. The characteristics distinguishing corps operations from those of the division are scope and scale. Instead of focusing on tactical maneuver, the corps focuses on shaping conditions for its divisions by use of its assets, enablers, and leveraging joint capabilities. Command at this echelon requires operational art, tactical expertise, and complementary employment of Army and joint capabilities. Joint capabilities are the primary means available to the corps commander for setting conditions and shaping the environment for division operations. The ability to execute deliberate and dynamic targeting is a critical capability of the corps regardless of its assigned role. Likewise, the corps ability to comply with the theater airspace control plan, process subordinate unit airspace plans, and integrate organic and supporting airspace users is essential to executing operations in the air domain. ROLES AND FUNCTIONS 4-3. The corps headquarters has specific roles and performs specific functions. They include acting as the—  Senior Army tactical formation in large-scale combat, commanding two to five Army divisions together with supporting brigades and commands.  ARFOR (with augmentation) within a joint force for campaigns and major operations when a field army is not present.  JTF headquarters (with significant augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency operations.  Joint force land component (with significant augmentation) commanding U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and multinational divisions together with supporting brigades and commands when a field army is not present. 4-4. The nature of an operation will dictate how many roles a corps can perform simultaneously. The workload associated with performing two roles during large-scale combat operations can overwhelm a corps commander and staff. Generally, a corps serving as a JTF headquarters should not perform as a tactical formation, ARFOR, or JFLCC. There should be a separate ARFOR because of the differing responsibilities. JTFs focus on the operational level of war and use joint rather than Army doctrine. A corps headquarters can simultaneously provide the nucleus of a land component commander and ARFOR headquarters during major operations if another headquarters acts as the corps commander’s lead agent for the conduct of ADCON tasks. T ACTICAL F ORMATION 4-5. Large-scale combat operations require a corps headquarters to function as a tactical formation under a land component command or subordinate to a field army equivalent established under an alliance or coalition. The corps commander synchronizes the employment of joint capabilities in conjunction with Army decisive action. Corps operations shape an OE and set the conditions for tactical actions by the division and lower echelons. In large-scale combat operations, the corps task-organizes and maneuvers divisions to destroy enemy land forces, seize key terrain and critical infrastructure, and dominate the land portion of the JOA. 4-6. Corps conduct continuous and simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support of civil authority tasks through a series of synchronized divis ion and separate brigade operations. These operations achieve and exploit positions of relative advantage across multiple domains to destroy or defeat an enemy and achieve the operation’s overall purpose. 4-7. The six primary functions of a corps are—  Conduct shaping operations in the corps AO.  Task-organize and employ divisions and brigades.  Integrate and synchronize operations of divisions and brigades.  Mass effects at decisive points.  Allocate resources and set priorities.  Leverage joint capabilities. 4-8. Large-scale combat operations require the corps to shape operations ahead of their subordinate divisions by disintegrating enemy systems, such as the enemy’s integrated fires command, to facilitate current and future operations. The corps task-organizes divisions and its functional and multifunctional brigades with the necessary capability and capacity to achieve objectives and to weight the main effort. During their employment, the corps integrates and synchronizes the operations of its assigned divisions and brigades. As the corps performs these functions, it prepares the formation to bring all of its capabilities and effects to bear on decisive points at each portion of an operation to achieve objectives and accomplish its mission. To set the conditions for enabling and sustaining subordinate units to achieve objectives and accomplish the mission, the corps manages and allocates resources within the corps formation and sets priorities for tasks and support. The corps uses joint capability (both lethal and nonlethal) to facilitate many of these other functions, especially shaping operations and massing effects at decisive points. ARFOR 4-9. The corps headquarters is organized, trained, and equipped to serve as the ARFOR in campaigns and major operations, controlling the operations of two to five Army divisions and corps troops, supported by theater-level organizations across the conflict continuum. When the corps is the senior Army headquarters in a JTF, the corps assumes the role of ARFOR. As ARFOR, the corps executes those ADCON and ASOS responsibilities delegated by the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander for all Army forces assigned or attached to the JTF and OPCON of all Army units not subordinate to another component of the JTF, such as a joint special operations command or task force. As the ARFOR, the corps has extensive ADCON requirements, in addition to operational requirements, and it assumes responsibility through the theater army commander for the Service-specific support of all Army forces in the JOA, as well as for providing any ASOS with forces deployed in the joint operations area. (For additional information on the operations and administrative responsibilities of an ARFOR refer to Appendix B.) J OINT T ASK F ORCE H EADQUARTERS 4-10. The corps headquarters is the preferred Army unit to use as the core element for forming a JTF headquarters for limited contingency and crisis response operations. This is accomplished by adding augmentation from other Services and special operations personnel to transform it into a JTF headquarters. This augmentation includes officers inserted into the functional and integrating staff cells, and additional personal staff sections. This augmentation does not include the personnel needed to augment the corps headquarters battalion network capability. 4-11. A corps headquarters designated as a JTF headquarters requires a separate ARFOR headquarters because of the differing roles and responsibilities inherent in each. For example, JTF’s focus on the operational level of war and use joint rather than Army doctrine. The joint task force commander normally exercises OPCON over most forces and other resources in the joint operations area. A JTF can include functional and Service components. In addition to U.S. forces, JTFs often contain multinational forces from allied and coalition partners, such as in Combined Joint Task Force—OPERATION Inherent Rresolve. J OINT F ORCE L AND C OMPONENT C OMMAND H EADQUARTERS 4-12. The corps headquarters is the preferred headquarters to form the nucleus of a joint force land component command in limited contingency operations. The corps headquarters can command joint land forces with augmentation from the Marine Corps and other unified action partners. It has the necessary staff and experience to control land operations across a JOA. When a mission dictates, the corps headquarters identifies and fills needs for specialized skills not organic to the corps headquarters. The headquarters organizes according to the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) implementing directive. This document establishes the roles and responsibilities of the joint force land component, assigns the mission, and designates forces. Normally, the joint force land component staff consists of corps staffs augmented with members of the other Service components. The distribution of other Service personnel onto the corps staff allocates key staff billets so that all Services share equitably in staffing tasks. Ideally, the deputy joint force land component commander or chief of staff comes from a different Service. Replicating this construct throughout the staff leadership ensures all leaders understand the distinct capabilities of each Service to optimize employment of the forces. The corps commander as the joint force land component commander provides the core elements of the staff to assist in planning, coordinating, and executing functional land component operations. 4-13. When designated as a joint force land component command, the corps exercises TACON or OPCON over Marine Corps forces, as required by the JFC, in addition to its attached Army forces. A corps functions as an operational-level headquarters. A corps is likely to become the joint force land component command when the Army provides most of the land forces. Land operations achieve campaign objectives directly through land operations or indirectly through supporting other components of the joint force. 4-14. Joint land operations require synchronization and integration of all instruments of national power to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Normally, joint land operations also involve multinational land forces. Joint land operations include control of an assigned AO. The joint force land component command employs land forces, supported by naval and air forces (as appropriate), to achieve military objectives in vital areas of the operational area. The corps serving as the ARFOR assumes the additional administrative responsibilities over all Army forces in the operational area. As required by the JFC, a corps normally receives a special operations liaison element and supports special operations forces throughout the land AO. 4-15. When designated as a joint force land component command, the corps follows joint doctrine. As a joint force land component headquarters, the corps has tasks that include, but are not limited to—  Coordinating the planning and execution of joint land operations with the other components and supporting agencies.  Designating the target priorities, effects, and timing for joint land operations.  Providing mutual support to other components by conducting operations in the JOA.  Coordinating with other functional and Service components in support of achieving the JFC’s objectives.  Providing a deputy to the area air defense commander (normally the commander of the Army air and missile defense command) for land-based joint theater air and missile defense operations as determined by the JFC. The AAMDC provides inputs to the JFC’s joint area air defense plan and the airspace control plan for the joint force land component command.  Supporting the JFC’s information operations by developing requirements that support land control and synchronize land force information operations assets when directed.  Integrating the joint and Army networks within the DOD information networks throughout the AO. Performing this function may require joint and Service augmentation.  Performing joint security functions.  Establishing standard operating procedures and other directives based on the JFC’s guidance. 4-16. To facilitate joint security operations, the JFC may establish a joint security element with a designated joint security coordinator to coordinate operations in a JSA. If the JTF commander gives the joint force land component commander responsibility for a JSA, the corps commander may elect to split the corps headquarters functions. The deputy corps commander—with part of the corps staff, augmentation from theater echelon units, and an Army maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB)—receives TACON of the theater units in the JSA for protection and movement. The deputy corps commander becomes the joint security coordinator. Alternatively, the commander may designate and organize a subordinate task force to focus solely on operations in the JSA. 4-17. An associated requirement of the corps headquarters controlling U.S. land forces is for the corps headquarters to also function as a multinational joint force land component command headquarters for multinational units operating in its AO. In most cases, the corps exercises TACON over multinational brigades and divisions. However, in this case, the corps becomes a multinational joint force land component command, and the corps commander becomes a multinational force LCC commander. National caveats often exist on the use of multinational forces. The higher grades structured into the design of the corps headquarters facilitate these concerns. Commanders and staff operating as a joint headquarters must be aware that multinational brigades normally lack the ability to communicate digitally, or if they do, their systems might prove incompatible. This creates an additional layer of complexity to planning and execution. The corps also trains in multinational exercises as part of theater engagement and security assistance managed by the theater army. L IMITATIONS 4-18. There are some limitations and dependencies that must be considered when employing a corps in any of its roles. Those limitations include, but are not limited to Reserve Component mobilization and mobility and security. Reserve Component Mobilization 4-19. The multi-component nature of the corps imposes certain limitations on the corps ’ capability to strategically deploy and rapidly initiate large-scale combat operations. The corps has multiple Reserve Component organizations that require lead-time to mobilize, train, and integrate into their respective roles and responsibilities. The main command post operational detachment is required to man the corps command posts. When the corps is preparing to deploy, commanders, staffs, and planners must take care to coordinate for Reserve Component mobilization with enough time to assemble the formation for deployment. Alternatively, the corps may not have enough time and must either structure its deployment and employmen t to assemble the formation after the main deployment, secure resources and capabilities from other formations, or operate without the pieces of the formation. The main command post operational detachment provides additional depth to the corps staff for sustained operations. The MEB is an integral part of command and control in the corps support area. The corps is also dependent on integration with the MEB to operate the rear command post. If the corps does not have a MEB, then it must either assign another organization to control the corps support area or assume direct control. Additionally, without a MEB to integrate with the rear command post, the corps headquarters would have to integrate with another organization or devote additional staff and equipment from the main command post and tactical command post to properly staff the rear command post. When a second field artillery brigade is required to perform counterfire, it will often be mobilized from the National Guard, requiring the same planning considerations as the main command post operational detachment and MEB. Note. The MEB is an integral part of corps’ ability to command and control in the corps support areas. The mobilization and deployment of the MEB must be prioritized in corps planning and operations to ensure that it arrives as early as possible. Depending upon the situation, corps commanders may consider deploying their assigned MEB ahead of their divisional combat power. Mobility and Security 4-20. The corps headquarters has mobility limitations, and it lacks organic security elements. The corps headquarters is fully mobile with the exception of intermodal containers, which will require movement support from a truck company during command post deployment and employment. During employment, the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion normally receives a company-sized element to secure the corps headquarters, such as a reinforced military police company or infantry company. However, planners must account for the sustainment considerations of these security attachments, particularly their mobility. THE CORPS HEADQUARTERS 4-21. The headquarters and headquarters’ battalion provides the personnel and equipment to support the corps command posts and mobile command group. The corps headquarters is manned and equipped to form three command posts (main, tactical and rear area) and a mobile command group as needed. A command post is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities (FM 6-0). Command posts assist commanders in the exercise of mission command, helping to control operations through continuity, planning, coordinating, and synchronizing warfighting functions. A corps also has the ability to field an early-entry command post. H EADQUARTERS AND H EADQUARTERS B ATTALION 4-22. A battalion operates as a tactical and administrative headquarters for two organic companies : a headquarters and support company and a signal, intelligence, and sustainment company. It also has a Reserve Component main command post operational detachment. Each company consists of staff sections which are organized into three deployable command posts: the main command post, tactical command post, and rear command post. The main command post and the tactical command post are normally co-located with elements of the headquarters and headquarters’ battalion providing the administrative and logistics support to the command posts. 4-23. The headquarters battalion staff provides administrative support, human resources, logistic support, religious support, and life support to corps headquarters elements. When deployed, the battalion staff sections are responsible for unit-level communications support, property accountability, transportation, medical support, and maintenance support for the main command post, tactical command post, rear command post, and mobile command group. When dictated by terrain or distance, the rear command post may receive area support for maintenance and medical support from the corps support area owner. 4-24. The headquarters support company provides command and control and company-level administration and life support to the headquarters and organic maneuver, fires, and protection staff cells. The headquarters support company will normally co-locate with the main command post for oversight, coordination, and synchronization of administrative and logistic support for assigned, attached, or OPCON units of the main command post. 4-25. The signal, intelligence, and sustainment company headquarters provides command and control and limited company-level administration and life support to the organic staff cells. The headquarters also provides company-command-level command and control for the signal elements supporting the main command post and tactical command post. The signal support elements install, operate, and maintain the corps network enterprise in support of 24-hour operations at the main command post and tactical command post. The signal, intelligence, and sustainment company headquarters will normally co-locate with the tactical command post for oversight, coordination, and synchronization of administrative and logistics support for assigned, attached, or OPCON units of the tactical command post. M AIN C OMMAND P OST 4-26. The main command post is deployable and is the corps primary command post. The main command post controls current operations, performs detailed analysis, and plans future operations. The functions performed in the main command post enable the success of subordinate units in the close area. The main command post directs tasks that occur in the close, deep, and support areas. It must plan and synchronize the employment of capabilities across all warfighting functions. Commanders can employ the main command post to—  Control every aspect of the overall mission.  Plan operations, including branches and sequels.  Integrate intelligence into current operations and plans.  Synchronize the targeting process, including target development to joint standards.  Plan and synchronize sustaining operations.  Assess the overall progress of operations.  Receive reports for subordinate units and prepare reports required by higher echelon headquarters. 4-27. The main command post includes the command group and most of the coordinating, special, and personal staffs. It is staffed to organize into five functionally focused cells (including intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment) with broad responsibilities for coordinating these warfighting functions across the corps. The movement and maneuver cell, augmented by subject matter experts from across the staff, organizes into the three integrating cells: the current operations integration cell, future operations cell, and plans cell. The movement and maneuver cell also includes several specialized elements, including the airspace element. It also receives USAFUSAFUnited States Air Force elements structured to support the headquarters’ assigned role. As a tactical headquarters, the corps receives a corps tactical air control party. As a joint force land component command in limited contingency operations, it receives a joint air component coordination element. Because there is no command and control functional cell, staff elements responsible for command and control tasks either receive direction and priorities from the chief of staff or work in an integrating cell. Liaison elements from higher echelon, adjacent, and subordinate units locate at the main command post. If provided, the special operations forces coordinating element also locates here. 4-28. The main command post is significantly larger than the other command posts, and it is less mobile. Although it does have some limited mobility, it requires additional support from a truck company for full mobility. The main command post is capable of 24-hour operations indefinitely, and it needs to only pause operations to displace. The main command post is the only command post that can perform all of the functions of the headquarters without the other command posts functioning. Threat forces can find the main command post more easily than the other command posts due to its size and electronic signature. Commanders and staffs plan for placement of the main command post to mitigate vulnerability to threat targeting capabilities. T ACTICAL C OMMAND P OST 4-29. The primary role of the tactical command post is as the alternate command post of the corps. It provides a place from which the commander can exercise command and control while the main command post deploys or displaces. In a high-threat situation, the tactical command post may offset from the main command post to provide redundancy in the event of an attack on the main command post. Commanders can also employ it as—  A task force headquarters.  The controlling command post for a specific task within a larger operation such as a gap crossing, a passage of lines, a relief in place, or an air assault operation.  The controlling headquarters for the decisive operation or a specific shaping operation.  A forward-positioned headquarters during deployment.  The controlling headquarters for a JSA. 4-30. The tactical command post includes representatives from all five functional cells, including the G-6, the chief of staff, civil affairs operations, the public affairs officer, the chaplain, the knowledge management section, the cyberspace and electromagnetic activities section, the office of the staff judge advocate, and various liaison officers. It also has an engagement element that contains civil affairs, security cooperation, and military information support operations staff officers. 4-31. The tactical command post is mobile, and it is easily deployed or displaced since most of its transportation is organic. The tactical command post can control corps operations for a limited time and form the nucleus of a forward-deployed early-entry command post (sometimes designated as an assault command post). It is deployed as an extension of the main command post to perform specific tactical tasks. It is capable of 24-hour operations for limited periods, and it is scalable in size and composition to reflect operational and mission variables and manpower caps within the corps’ AO. The endurance of the tactical command post is a function of the intensity of the workload and capacity of its staff. 4-32. Displacing the tactical command post requires transportation assets, initially with inter-theater airlift, and subsequently with intra-theater assets. The tactical command post should be strategically deployable by a minimum number of C-17 aircraft. Once in theater, the tactical command post should need minimal reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (known as RSOI) before becoming functional. By adjusting the vehicle and equipment mix, the tactical command post may reconfigure for movement by C-130 aircraft to forward locations if ground movement is not feasible or timely. R EAR C OMMAND P OST 4-33. Depending on the situation, including the threat, size of the rear area, and number of units in the support area, corps commanders may form a rear command post to assist in controlling operations. The rear command post enables corps commanders to exercise command and control over disparate combat, functional, and multifunctional elements operating between the close area and the corps rear boundary that may exceed the effective span of control of the MEB or corps main command post. This is especially true in the case of large-scale combat when the number of units operating behind the close area is large. Commanders may use the rear command post to provide command supervision and general officer oversight for—  Conducting corps support area operations.  Performing terrain management and movement control.  Defeating threats.  Enabling sustainment operations.  Coordinating and synchronizing protection.  Enabling stability operations.  Enabling transitions. 4-34. Deployed as an extension of the main command post, the rear command post is focused on supporting operations in the deep and close areas, and it coordinates activities between those areas and the corps rear boundary. It assists the main command post and the commander in coordinating the activities of the multiple units operating there by managing terrain and controlling movement. The management of terrain and movement control responsibilities are intensive, requiring significant effort to be successful. Normally, a deputy corps commander leads the rear command post. The specific functions assigned to the rear command post will be designated by the corps commander to their deputy commander through an order or terms of reference. 4-35. The corps table of organization and equipment provides equipment for the rear command post, but personnel must come from either the main command post or the tactical command post. The rear command post may be augmented by other units in the corps support area as required. The MEB, which is required anytime a corps deploys, is the primary unit that augments the rear command post. When a MEB is not available, or additional specialties are required, the corps rear command post may use personnel from other units. The rear command post depends upon a MEB, or other brigade-sized headquarters, for security, life support, and area control functions. When integrated with a MEB, the rear command post is capable of coordinating and synchronizing the corps rear operations allowing the main command post to focus on close and deep operations. E ARLY E NTRY C OMMAND P OST 4-36. The early-entry command post is a lead element of a headquarters designed to control operations until the remaining portions of the headquarters are deployed and operational (FM 6-0). The early-entry command post is an ad hoc organization of equipment and personnel from the staffs of the tactical, main, and rear command posts. The tactical command post usually provides the base for the early-entry command post. The corps adds or subtracts personnel based on mission requirements. The early-entry command post includes a mix of current operations personnel, planners, and sustainers able to coordinate the reception of the corps and plan its initial operations. It is usually led by the corps deputy commanding general. 4-37. The corps early-entry command post is established to maintain forward situational awareness early in any corps deployment. It facilitates the deployment and onward movement of the corps and its assigned forces, coordinates with outside military and other government organizations as required, and provides limited command and control of assigned or attached forces when required. Ideally, manning and equipment should allow the early-entry command post to deploy aboard a single aircraft, although the composition adjusts to the lift available. In a non-or semi-permissive area, security for the early-entry command post typically comes from co-location with an already deployed subordinate unit’s command post. If the environment is permissive, the early-entry command post may deploy to a host-nation military facility. M OBILE C OMMAND G ROUP 4-38. The mobile command group consists of specially equipped vehicles that allow the corps commander to move by ground in the land portions of the JOA and have network access to the common operational picture, subordinate commanders, and the corps staff. In addition to the drivers and gunners, the commander normally selects a small number of staff experts to handle en route communications and coordination. The mission and the commander’s preference dictate the composition. When distance or circumstances require air movement, a supporting aviation brigade has specially equipped command and control helicopters that can substitute for ground vehicles. 4-39. The mobile command group is not capable of exercising command and control to the same degree as the three command posts. Its primary purpose is to assist the commander with maintaining the necessary situational awareness to make critical decisions while moving between command posts or subordinate units during the conduct of operations. SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS 4-40. The capabilities of a corps are tailored for each mission by adjusting the corps’ composition. Usually, a corps commands between two to five divisions, a mix of functional and multifunctional brigades, additional BCTs, and a variety of smaller enabler units. The smaller enablers usually come from higher echelon assets and augment the corps’ capabilities. A SSIGNED F ORCES 4-41. The corps routinely has units that are attached or assigned to it. This includes two to five divisions, additional BCTs, an ESC, a MEB, an expeditionary military intelligence brigade, a field artillery brigade, an engineer brigade, a military police brigade, a corps signal brigade, and a medical brigade. Based on the assigned tasks of the divisions and the allocation of brigades, the corps commander determines the appropriate command and support relationships for subordinate divisions and brigades. A corps may retain some forces to consolidate gains concurrently with other operations. 4-42. The corps routinely controls multinational forces in accordance with their individual national caveats. The organization of these units varies as will their support and sustainment capabilities. The corps commander should give particular attention to the national capabilities and limitations of each multinational partner. Some limitations are tactical, while others may be political. Normally, a corps receives a digital liaison detachment to support multinational interoperability (see paragraph 3-89 for more on digital liaison detachments). Figure 4-1 provides an example of the corps and available enablers. Divisions 4-43. Divisions are tactical units of execution for a corps. A division’s primary role is as a tactical headquarters commanding brigades during decisive action. A division combines offensive, defensive, and either stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks in an AO assigned by its higher echelon headquarters, normally a corps. It task-organizes its subordinate forces to accomplish its mission. During large-scale combat operations, a division operates as a formation. Divisions have both operational and administrative responsibilities. See Chapter 5 of this manual for more information on the division. Brigade Combat Team 4-44. BCTs are normally subordinate units for a division; however, a corps may hold a BCTBCTBasic combat training or similar organization for a specific role, such as the corps reserve or area security. BCTs are versatile, modular organizations with inherent capabilities that make them effective in any environment. There are three types of BCTs: armored, infantry, and Stryker. BCTs maneuver against, close with, and destroy enemy forces. BCTs have organic combined arms capabilities, including battalion-sized maneuver, field artillery, reconnaissance, and sustainment units. Each BCTBCTBasic combat training has organic medical support. 4-45. A BCTBCTBasic combat training has organic capabilities across the warfighting functions. These capabilities are scalable to meet mission requirements. Organic BCTBCTBasic combat training capabilities include maneuver, field artillery, intelligence, signal, engineer, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, and sustainment capabilities. The capabilities enable BCTs to operate independently for up to three days depending on the mission. 4-46. A higher echelon commander can task-organize a BCTBCTBasic combat training by adding or subtracting smaller units and capabilities through the use of command and support relationships. Higher echelon commanders may augment BCTs with additional combat power for specific missions. Augmentation might include aviation, armor, infantry, field artillery, air and missile defense, military police, civil affairs, military information support elements, engineers, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, EOD, or other forces or capabilities. Some of this augmentation may come from other BCTs. Multifunctional and functional brigades can also support BCTBCTBasic combat training operations (See FM 3-96 for additional information on BCTBCTBasic combat training operations). Expeditionary Sustainment Command 4-47. The ESC is the corps’ command for the integration and synchronization of sustainment in an operational area. The ESC is assigned to the corps and task-organized with functional and multifunctional sustainment units that provide general support for all units in the corps AO. The corps’ ESC commands and controls the sustainment units operating in the corps rear area. The ESC and its subordinate units provide general support to all units assigned and attached to the corps. A task-organized ESC assigned to a corps normally includes enablers such as a corps logistics support element, petroleum group, financial management support center, movement control battalion, and a sustainment brigade. 4-48. The ESC assists the corps sustainment cell with planning and coordinating sustainment, planning for near-term operations, and synchronizing operational-level sustainment operations to meet current operations. The corps ESC is dependent on the corps staff for long-range planning capability. The ESC main command post positions itself where it can best support operations, generally in the vicinity of the corps rear command post. The ESC tactical command post provides the capability to integrate into other corps command posts as required. The ESC commander may perform the duties of deputy commanding general (support) if directed by the corps commander. The ESC also relies upon the corps for additional force protection, signal, and medical support. (See FM 4-0 for more information on the ESC.) Maneuver Enhancement Brigade 4-49. The MEB is a multifunctional headquarters with limited organic structure and depends on the task organization of units for capabilities to conduct support area operations and defense support of civil authorities for the echelons it supports. Higher echelon commanders base the MEB’s task-organization on identified mission requirements for the echelon it is supporting. When properly task-organized the MEB can perform military police, engineer, and CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear missions simultaneously, in addition to all of the doctrinal functions associated with being assigned an AO. The MEB performs these functions within its AO:  Support to base camp and base cluster defense.  Lines of communication security, maintenance, and movement control.  Liaison and coordination.  Construction.  Host-nation support integration.  Detainee operations.  Mobility and countermobility  Rear command post integration. 4-50. The MEB supports an Army, joint, interagency, or multinational headquarters. The MEB headquarters is staffed and optimized to conduct combined arms operations integrating a wide range of functional branches and combat forces. The MEB organizes, provides, or employs battalion task force and company team combined arms technical experts to conduct maneuver support tasks throughout an AO. The MEB may include a mix of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, civil affairs, engineer, military police, and potentially air defense artillery units in addition to a tactical combat force. The number and type of organizations placed under this brigade depends on the mission, threat, and number and type of battalions or companies operating in the brigade’s AO. The MEB provides staff planning for and command and control of the units required to conduct decisive action in the echelon support area. Current Army force structure places all MEBs in the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. 4-51. A corps commander can task-organize parts of a MEB to a BCTBCTBasic combat training or other brigade for a specific mission outside its AO or provide forces to complement or reinforce other organizations conducting select missions or tasks that support the main effort. However, specific or select missions does not imply long term. If the MEB becomes a force provider for an enduring period it could become ineffective in its ability to conduct support area operations. If conditions in the support area degrade, it is detrimental to the success of operations. A degraded support area also inhibits the ability to shape the corps deep area for divisions involved in the corps’ close operations. Therefore, corps support area operations requires planning considerations equal to those in the corps close areas. (See FM 3-81 for additional information on MEB operations.) Expeditionary-Military Intelligence Brigade 4-52. The Army has three Regular Army expeditionary-military intelligence brigades (E-MIBs) in its force structure, each assigned to a corps headquarters, and two expeditionary-military intelligence brigades in the Army National Guard and two in the Army Reserve. The E-MIB provides intelligence capability and capacity to the corps and subordinate divisions. This facilitates situational understanding for the corps and division commanders and critical pieces of the sensor-to-shooter linkage necessary for the corps to execute shaping operations in the corps deep area. 4-53. The E-MIB is designed to receive, integrate, employ, and sustain intelligence capabilities and capacities in the corps AO and to provide support to subordinate divisions. The nature of this support to the corps is enhanced capability and capacity in intelligence analysis, processing, exploitation, and dissemination, multi-domain collection capability, human intelligence, and counterintelligence collection and processing capability. The E-MIB does not conduct reconnaissance. 4-54. The corps commander retains control of the E-MIB and task-organizes elements, generally one intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) battalion, of the E-MIB to divisions as required. The IEW battalion (at corps echelons), organic to the E-MIB, remains with the corps headquarters and provides one detachment of analysis and processing, exploitation, and dissemination to the corps assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2), one detachment of multi-domain collection capabilities, and one company of human intelligence, and counterintelligence collection and processing capability in support of corps multi-domain operations. 4-55. One E-MIB is assigned per corps or field army. The E-MIB staff works closely with the corps G-2 analysis and control element. The expeditionary-military intelligence brigade commander and staff also assist the corps commander in information collection management. E-MIBs are organized with a headquarters, one IEW battalion (at corps echelon), and one IEW battalion (at division echelon) per division. The IEW battalion (corps) provides general support counterintelligence and human intelligence capability to the corps. Both IEW battalions (corps and division) provide direct support analysis as well as processing, exploitation, and dissemination to their respective G-2s, and multi-domain sensing and target development capability in support of multi-domain operations. The headquarters is responsible for the training and readiness of the assigned IEW battalions and can be deployed to serve as the senior military intelligence mission command headquarters for field armies or other deployed operational Army headquarters. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-19.3 for more discussion of E-MIB capabilities and operations). Field Artillery Brigade 4-56. A field artillery brigade’s primary task is conducting corps-level strike operations and augmenting division-level shaping operations. It is capable of employing Army indirect fires and incorporating electronic warfare. In addition, a field artillery brigade can request joint fires and coordinate with Army airspace elements. The field artillery brigade can detect and attack targets using a mix of its organic target acquisition and fires capabilities, a supported organization’s information collection capabilities, and access to higher echelon headquarters information collection capabilities. Note. A corps conducting large-scale combat operations requires two field artillery brigades. One field artillery brigade serves as the counterfire headquarters and the other is the corps force field artillery headquarters. 4-57. Field artillery brigades are typically the force field artillery headquarters for the formation to which they are aligned. The brigade commander is designated as the corps fire support coordinator, allowing them to better facilitate fires and targeting for the corps. However, in the case where there are two field artillery brigades assigned, attached, or OPCON to the corps and no operational-level field artillery command, the corps will employ the corps fires support element as the force field artillery headquarters. In this case, one field artillery brigade will serve as the counterfire headquarters and the other will service the corps commander’s targeting priorities and support division assets. (See FM 3-09 for additional information in field artillery brigade operations.) Engineer Brigade 4-58. The corps assigned engineer brigade controls the mission-tailored engineer battalions that are not task-organized to subordinate divisions and brigades. These battalions typically have capabilities from the three engineer disciplines: combat engineering, general engineering, and geospatial engineering. Their purpose is to enhance mobility, countermobility, survivability, and sustainment. 4-59. An engineer brigade develops plans, procedures, and programs for engineer support. These include requirements determination, operational mobility and countermobility, general engineering, power generation, area damage control, military construction, geospatial engineering, engineering design, construction materials, and real property maintenance activities. The corps engineer brigade integrates and synchronizes engineer capabilities across the corps AO and reinforces subordinate corps units in the execution of engineer tasks by allocating mission-tailored engineer forces. 4-60. Engineer tasks alter terrain to overcome obstacles (including gaps), create, maintain, and improve lines of communication, create fighting positions, improve protective positions, and build structures and facilities (including base camps, aerial ports, seaports, and utilities). An engineer brigade is also capable of rapid deployment in modular elements to support the needs of the operational commander. These elements are capable of providing a wide range of technical engineering expertise and support. (See FM 3-34 for additional information about engineer operations.) Military Police Brigade 4-61. The Army allocates a military police brigade to a corps when the magnitude of military police requirements exceeds the capability of the MEB to control military police activities. The military police brigade is a functional brigade of the Army and is capable of planning, integrating, and directing the execution of military police missions conducted by up to five mission-tailored military police battalions; integrating capabilities from all three military police disciplines (police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support); and integrating police intelligence operations. It may also command other units focused on performing area support, detention, or dislocated-civilian tasks and on synchronizing military police support across multiple organizations that control an AO in support of stability tasks. During large-scale combat operations, a military police brigade is required to allocate, synchronize, control, and provide technical oversight when there are more than two military police battalions’ worth of capabilities within a corps or division AO. Some functional military police elements remain under control of the MEB, even if a corps or higher echelon headquarters provides a functional military police brigade to the corps (See FM 3-39 for additional information on the military police brigade and military police operations). Corps Signal Brigade 4-62. A corps signal brigade provides signal support for corps and division operations. In large-scale combat operations, the corps signal brigade commands one or more expeditionary signal battalions or expeditionary signal battalions-enhanced. Corps signal brigades provide communications and information systems support to a theater army headquarters, their subordinate units, and as required, to joint, inter-organizational, interagency, and multinational partners throughout the corps AO. The corps signal brigade and its subordinate units install, operate, maintain, and secure their portions of the DODIN-A. Each corps signal brigade leverages network extension and reach back capabilities to provide joint communications and information systems services to the GCC and subordinate commanders to support command and control and enable the other warfighting functions. (See FM 6-02 for more information on the corps signal brigade.) P ROVIDED F ORCES 4-63. Based upon the corps’ role and mission, it can receive a variety of forces to assist the corps in matching capabilities to requirement. Provided forces consist of functional brigades, multifunctional brigades, and smaller units and enablers. The most common of the provided forces are a combat aviation brigade; expeditionary combat aviation brigade; air defense artillery brigade; civil affairs brigade; CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations brigade; EOD group; psychological operations battalion; USAFUSAFUnited States Air Force support; Army space support team; military history detachment; mobile public affairs detachment; cyberspace and electromagnetic activities forces; and special operations forces. These forces can be attached, OPCON, or TACON to the corps. 4-64. A corps tailored for major operations may have three to five Army divisions, numerous functional and multifunctional brigades, separate brigades and various detachments and smaller units. A corps receives direct support from the signal and air defense brigades commanded by the theater signal command and Army air and missile defense command, respectively. The corps commander uses the brigades under corps command to reinforce subordinate divisions and to conduct shaping operations for subordinate units. These brigades also support the corps as a whole. A corps ESC, enabled by other theater level assets, provides sustainment support. Depending on the situation, a corps may receive direct or general medical support from an additional medical brigade under MEDCOMMEDCOMUnited States Army Medical Command (DS). Combat Aviation Brigade 4-65. A combat aviation brigade is organized and equipped to synchronize the operations of multiple aviation battalions simultaneously to support corps or division operations. The commander can reorganize a combat aviation brigade in response to the situation. It can provide tailored support to adjacent, supported maneuver commanders at the BCTBCTBasic combat training and below. The combat aviation brigade commander is normally the senior Army aviation officer in the corps or division structure, and advises adjacent and higher echelon commanders on manned and unmanned aviation system employment. 4-66. The combat aviation brigade provides a corps or division commander with a maneuver advantage that can overcome the constraints of limiting terrain and extended distances. Attack, reconnaissance, utility, and cargo aircraft may maneuver independently under corps or division control in the deep area or in an assigned AO. Alternatively, the combat aviation brigade’s attack, reconnaissance, utility, and cargo assets may be under OPCON, TACON, general support, or direct support to another brigade as situationally appropriate. Furthermore, a combat aviation brigade may receive OPCON of ground maneuver forces to conduct security or reconnaissance operations or to accomplish other economy of force missions. The use of aviation assets requires additional detailed planning and synchronization using specific airspace control processes to maximize results. (See FM 3-04 for additional information on Army aviation operations.) Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade 4-67. The expeditionary combat aviation brigade is a multifunctional unit designed to air assault maneuver forces; position personnel, supplies, and equipment; evacuate casualties; conduct personnel recovery; and provide command and control. When task-organized with an attack reconnaissance battalion or attack reconnaissance squadron, expeditionary combat aviation brigades also provide accurate and timely information collection; provide reaction time and maneuver space; and destroy, defeat, disrupt, or delay enemy forces. (See FM 3-04 for additional information on Army aviation operations.) Air Defense Artillery Brigade 4-68. Air defense artillery brigades are structured to perform several functions supporting the Army air and missile defense commands and designated GCC. Air defense artillery brigade functions include command and control activities, integration, planning, and liaison with joint, higher echelon units, and subordinate battalions. Air defense artillery brigades are the force providers for the Army air and missile defense commands, meeting the commander’s air and missile defense objectives. Air defense artillery brigades, both Regular and Reserve Component, must be prepared to integrate a mix of Regular and Reserve Component forces. Air defense artillery brigades are generally aligned under the AAMDC and deployed to control the fires of subordinate units. Each brigade consists of a headquarters, brigade staff, and its subordinate battalions. 4-69. Air defense artillery brigades deploy early to protect aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, early arriving forces, and critical supplies, in accordance with the JFC’s initial defended asset list. As a lodgment expands, air defense artillery forces may reposition to better protect critical assets, communications, transportation, and maneuver forces. Air defense artillery brigades and any available joint and multinational air and missile defense forces combine to form integrated defenses after completion of deployment operations. Echelon commanders, with staff support, designate their echelon priority assets. The JFC and joint staff take these echelon priority asset lists into consideration during the development of an adjusted JTF defended asset list. JFC’s requirements and mission considerations may allow for an air defense artillery brigade to be placed under operational or tactical control of a corps. Support relationships, such as direct and general support, may also be used to enhance air and missile defense of maneuver echelons. Corps and divisions (when further delegated) may integrate air defense artillery firing units and radars into their defense plans, ensuring that they integrate into local security measures. At the division level, the air defense artillery brigade units complement the division’s organic short-range air defense forces. (See FM 3-01 for additional information on Army air defense artillery operations.) Civil Affairs Brigade 4-70. A civil affairs brigade provides a civil affairs capability to joint force and land component commanders. The civil affairs brigade mitigates or defeats threats to civil society and conducts actions normally performed by civil governments across the range of military operations. This occurs by engaging and influencing the civil population and authorities through the planning and conducting of civil affairs operations or enabling civil-military operations to shape the civil environment and set the conditions for military operations. 4-71. The civil affairs brigade headquarters provides a control structure and staff supervision of the operations of its assigned civil affairs battalions or other attached units. Civil affairs force structure contains expertise in five functional specialty areas. These specialty areas include security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization. Within each functional specialty area, civil affairs functional specialists advise commanders and help or direct their civilian counterparts. Civil affairs brigades are capable of establishing or support civil-military operations centers during operations. (See FM 3-57 for additional information on civil affairs.) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Brigade 4-72. A CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear brigade typically provides support to a corps and echelons above corps. However, in some instances, the brigade may also support a division. When a CBRNE command is deployed, it may command a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear brigade. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear brigades consist of a headquarters and two to five battalions with a wide range of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities, including CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance, decontamination, and biological detection. With the advice of the staff and the supported unit CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear section, the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear brigade commander evaluates and determines the CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear unit support requirements for the supported unit. The brigade commander may advise the supported unit commander about the employment and sustainment of CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear assets. A CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear brigade is dependent on other organizations for administrative, logistic, medical, and maintenance support. In some instances, a division, corps, or echelon above corps may only be assigned or supported by a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalion. (See FM 3-11 for more information on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units.) Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group 4-73. An EOD group may be attached or under the operational control of a CBRNE command, corps, or echelons above corps conducting large-scale combat operations or limited contingencies operations such as Task Force Atlas in Operation INHERENT RESOLVE and Task Force Paladin in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. An EOD group commander exercises command and control of two to six explosive ordnance disposal battalions. An EOD group may be task-organized with forces from other Services. An EOD battalion conducts staff planning and control of EOD assets typically within a division AO. EOD groups and battalions position their EOD companies at locations where they can best provide support throughout an AO. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 4-32.1 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 4-32 for doctrine on explosive ordnance disposal.) Psychological Operations Battalion 4-74. Psychological operations battalions are trained, organized, and equipped to support corps-or division-level operations. They support corps with military information support operations across the range of military operations. They can also support the staffing and augmentation of a psychological operations task force in a mature theater of operations. The tactical psychological operations companies are task-organized to support divisions. (See FM 3-53 for more information of military information support operations.) U.S. Air Force Support 4-75. Air support is vital to the conduct of successful corps operations, regardless of the corps' assigned role. The corps depends on joint fires and maneuver provided by fixed-wing aircraft to support many of the corps' decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to include the USAFUSAFUnited States Air Force air functions of close air support, air interdiction, cyberspace and electromagnetic activities, and airlift missions. The USAFUSAFUnited States Air Force interface with a corps depends on the corps' role. As a tactical headquarters, a corps receives an enhanced corps tactical air control party (Note. this level of support does not enable airspace control from the corps level like the joint air ground integration center [JAGIC] at the division. Depending on mission environment should the need arise to have an air support operations center at the corps, this document does not adequately provide information to enable that configuration.). As a JTF or land component command in a limited contingency operation, the corps headquarters also receives a joint air component coordination element as its USAFUSAFUnited States Air Force interface. Army Space Support Team 4-76. If requested, an Army space support team can be tasked to augment the corps organic space support element if the corps is serving as a JTF or land component command headquarters. (See FM 3-14 for more information on the corps space support element) The Army space support team plans, coordinates, and analyzes space-enabled capabilities, and provides input to the corps staff. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-14.3 for more information on the space brigade). Military History Detachment 4-77. Military history detachments are small teams of officers and enlisted Soldiers that carry out directed collection of historical material during combat and contingency operations for use when writing official history. They are trained and equipped to gather historical documents and materials, conduct oral interviews, photograph events, and advise supported units about preserving historical information. The military history detachment provides expertise, advice, and assistance to the corps command historian. (Refer to ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 1-20 for more details on the military history detachment). Mobile Public Affairs Detachment 4-78. A mobile public affairs detachment provides public affairs support to corps units during operations. A mobile public affairs detachment is assigned, attached, or under the OPCON of echelons above brigades. It may support the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander, theater sustainment command, or corps public affairs staff sections. 4-79. A mobile public affairs detachment increases the public affairs capabilities of the corps organic public affairs section. A mobile public affairs detachment can establish or support a media operations center to support corps operations. A mobile public affairs detachment has limited capability to conduct independent public affairs activities and requires higher echelon command guidance, administrative support, and life support. Because of its limited capability, the corps public affairs officer exercises planning and supervisory authority over the mobile public affairs detachment. (Refer to FM 3-61 for more details on public affairs operations.) Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Activities 4-80. The corps G-3 contains a cyberspace and electromagnetic activities section that coordinates and synchronizes cyberspace and electronic warfare operations for effective collaboration across staff elements. The cyberspace and electromagnetic activities section is key to the collaboration of cyberspace and electronic warfare operations. The section participates in the planning and targeting process and leads the cyberspace and electromagnetic activities working group to support the military decision-making process. 4-81. Corps staffs request augmentation for cyberspace operations, first from the regional cyber center and then from the Army Cyber Operations and Integration Center. This support can cover the range of military decision-making process activities including planning for and executing DODIN operations, offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and electronic warfare operations. The regional cyber center working with the Army Cyber Operations and Integration Center will both provide support and determine any additional units, assets, or agencies that may be required to achieve military decision-making process effects. 4-82. The Army Cyber Operations and Integration Center is an operational element of the Army Cyber Command headquarters, and it is the top-level control center for all Army cyberspace activities. It provides situational awareness and DOD information network operations reporting for the DODIN-A. The center coordinates with the regional cyber centers and provides operational and technical support as required. 4-83. The regional cyber center is the single point of contact for operational status, service provisioning, incident response, and all Army network services in its assigned theater. It coordinates directly with tactical units to provide DODIN-A services and (when required) defensive cyberspace operations to enable command and control and the warfighting functions (See FM 3-12 for more information on the cyber protection brigade). Cyber Warfare Support Battalion 4-84. A cyber warfare support battalion enables the defeat of an adversary’s information and unconventional warfare capabilities in and through the cyberspace domain and the electromagnetic spectrum by means of offensive cyberspace operations and defensive cyberspace operations. Its purpose is to deny the enemy access to mission-relevant terrain in cyberspace, repel enemy cyberspace attacks, and counterattack when directed. The cyber warfare support battalion deploys rapidly and can operate using pre-positioned and deployable infrastructure. Generally, the cyber warfare support battalion deploys in support of the theater or field armies. The cyber warfare support battalion is organized with a headquarters company and three cyber warfare companies capable of providing tailored support to corps and divisions. Expeditionary Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities Teams 4-85. The cyber warfare support battalion deploys expeditionary cyberspace electromagnetic activities teams in support of corps operations. Expeditionary cyberspace electromagnetic activities teams are specifically designed to provide cyberspace electromagnetic activities support to corps and below. Each expeditionary cyberspace electromagnetic activities team consists of three platoons: a cyber warfare platoon, an infrastructure support platoon, and a capability development platoon. Special Operations Forces 4-86. In a corps’ AO, conventional forces and special operations forces often operate near each other to accomplish the joint force commander’s mission. Army special operations forces provide capabilities that expand the options available to a corps commander. During mission planning, the corps staff and special operations force planners include options regarding how to integrate conventional forces and special operations ground elements. A corps may receive a special operations command and control element, which provides capability to coordinate unilateral special operations with a conventional ground force headquarters and with a supported conventional force commander. CORPS OPERATIONS 4-87. The corps has the versatility to command and control many different types of operations. It may become a joint and multinational headquarters responsible for conducting crisis response and limited contingency operations. In campaigns and major operations, the corps serves as a tactical formation comprised of multiple divisions and attached brigades. The corps commander synchronizes Army and joint capabilities to shape the environment and set conditions for tactical actions by subordinate forces. 4-88. During combat operations, the corps task-organizes and maneuvers divisions to destroy enemy land forces, seize key terrain and critical infrastructure, and set conditions for the successful achievement of assigned objectives. During operations where stability tasks are the priority, such as a foreign humanitarian crisis, the corps commander integrates Army operations with those of host-nation forces, other government agencies, and nongovernment agencies. M ILITARY E NGAGEMENT AND S ECURITY C OOPERATION 4-89. When uncommitted to specific combatant commander requirements, the corps serves as a tactical echelon that focuses on preparation to prevail in large-scale combat. When committed to a theater of operations, the theater army or field army command and control corps unless the corps is subject to the operational control of a JFC subordinate to the GCC. In such cases, the theater army maintains an ADCON relationship with the corps due to the theater army’s theater-wide ARFOR responsibilities. 4-90. During competition, a corps shapes its assigned AO, depending on the role that it is fulfilling. As an ARFOR, a corps assists higher echelons in their efforts to set, support, and shape operational areas. Corps do so by executing operational-level tasks, collecting information, providing bottom-up refinement to planning, and participating in activities to posture the joint and multinational force to prevail in the event that armed conflict occurs. During the course of shaping an AO during competition, a higher echelon may invest the corps commander with additional authorities or responsibilities to facilitate operations. Key tasks that corps may perform to support shaping during competition include—  Deploying.  Refining and conducting detailed planning for major operations and achieving competition objectives.  Managing assigned airspace.  Executing target development in accordance with joint standards  Sustaining Army forces in the assigned AO.  Synchronizing protection, including air and missile defense support.  Executing security force assistance tasks.  Executing operations to achieve competition objectives.  Contributing to flexible deterrent options and flexible response options.  Transitioning to a joint force land component command or multinational joint force land component command.  Transitioning to a JTF.  Assuming ARFOR and other (as directed) authorities and responsibilities in the operational area.  Assuming selected field army tasks, if that echelon is unavailable (see Chapter 3).  Redeploying.  Conducting training and exercises. Security Cooperation: REFORGER 87 In September of 1987, the III Armored Corps deployed from Fort Hood, Texas to the Federal Republic of Germany as a major part of Exercise REFORGER 87. III Corps reinforced NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization forces already consisting of V Corps and VII Corps, stationed in Germany. The scenario placed III Corps as the Northern Army Group opposing forces penetrating into Northern Germany. III Corps deployed all forces from Fort Hood as an exercise in strategic and operational mobility, as well as assuring NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization allies against Warsaw Pact aggression. The deployment involved 35,000 Soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division, 2d Armored Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 45th Infantry Brigade, 6th Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat), 420th Engineer Brigade (Reserve), III Corps Artillery, III Corps Combat Support Brigade, and 13th Corps Support Command. The deployment involved extensive planning and preparation, deploying the corps main command post to monitor and control movement, marshalling and staging equipment, and drawing equipment in theater. III Corps demonstrated that it could move 11,000 vehicles across Germany from densely populated areas to densely wooded areas with speed while navigating peacetime constraints and obstacles imposed by limited facilities. Despite the limitations, obstacles, time, and distance, Exercise REFORGER 87 was the single largest deployment of U.S. Army forces overseas during peacetime. It was also the first deployment of a U.S. corps to Europe since World War II. This demonstration of strategic mobility assured NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact members the level of U.S. commitment in defending NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization members. C RISIS R ESPONSE 4-91. During crisis response, the corps is the preferred Army echelon for use as a JTF headquarters because of the seniority of its staff and its deployability. A corps acting as a JTF requires a separate ARFOR because of the differing roles and responsibilities inherent in each. JTFs focus on the operational level of war and use joint rather than Army doctrine. Normally, the commander of the JTF exercises command and control over all forces and other resources in a JOA. Once constituted as a JTF, the corps operates according to joint doctrine. Figure 4-3 on page 4-20 shows an example task organization for a corps operating as a JTF in a limited contingency operation or crisis response. 4-92. Corps support higher echelons’ efforts to leverage joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities during competition. Unlike large-scale ground combat, the emphasis on other instruments of national power during competition requires increased integration of the corps with non-military unified action partners. This requires higher echelons to resource corps with additional capabilities and authorities when conducting operations to achieve competition objectives. L IMITED C ONTINGENCY O PERATIONS 4-93. In a limited contingency, a corps normally fills the role of the JTF or the joint force land component command. Normally, the commander of the JTF or joint force land component command exercises command and control over all forces and other resources in a JOA or ground forces in a JOA. If the corps is functioning as the joint force land component command, then it is also capable of filling the ARFOR role, and it often does. Figure 4-2 shows an example task organization for a corps operating as a JTF in a limited contingency operation or crisis response. Figure 4-3 on page 4-20 is an example of a corps task organization when operating as a joint force land component command in limited contingency operations. 4-94. JFCs may also task a corps to serve as a JTF or joint force land component command during competition when situations emerge in a theater or operational area beyond a division’s ability to command and control. During limited contingency operations, a corps may serve as a JTF or joint force land component command subordinate to the GCC. This normally occurs when the GCC intends to conduct limited contingency operations on land and the scope, scale, and duration of such operations exceed the command and control capability of a division or sister Service organization. In such cases, the theater army provides support to the corps using an ADCON relationship. This often occurs through an element subordinate to the corps that its commander designates as the ARFOR. Corps require significant augmentation from the joint and multinational force to perform the joint force land component command or JTF roles successfully. 4-95. To effectively synchronize multi-domain effects requires corps headquarters capable of managing the technical employment of space, air, and maritime-delivered assets, as well as information-related capabilities. Understanding these capabilities is fundamental to the operations process. The corps headquarters ’ assigned and task-organized capabilities enable it to prioritize effects in support of assigned or attached forces and synchronize them with subordinates’ operations to achieve assigned objectives. The corps has access to a wide variety of Army and joint information-related capabilities, ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and military deception or tactical deception capabilities and authorities that are combat multipliers during large-scale combat operations and essential enablers during competition. When fulfilling the role of a JTF or joint force land component command, the corps joint targeting requirements necessarily increase. Augmenting the corps joint targeting and execution capability allows the corps to perform the joint targeting cycle and conduct deliberate and dynamic targeting to joint standards. command in a limited contingency operation L ARGE -S CALE C OMBAT O PERATIONS 4-96. During large-scale combat operations, the corps’ primary purpose is to command and control multiple division operations as a tactical command. Large-scale combat operations require the corps headquarters to function as a tactical land headquarters under a multinational force land component or subordinate to a field army equivalent headquarters. This function is vital to the joint and multinational force’s ability to prevail in large-scale combat against peer threats. 4-97. During large-scale combat operations, a corps operates as a tactical echelon exercising OPCON over two to five divisions and a variety of supporting brigades or battalions. It is likely to exercise TACON over various multinational and U.S. Marine Corps units, and it is supported by various theater sustainment organizations. Due to the scarcity of some specialty units, like CBRNE commands, chemical brigades and EOD groups, the land component commander or another higher headquarters may retain capabilities outside of corps control. However, because large-scale combat operations generally involve allied or partner forces, the corps is more likely to receive attached or OPCON multinational forces and liaison elements from other alliance contributors. scale combat operations 4-98. Operations in the corps deep area involve efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being committed in a coherent manner. A corps deep area generally extends beyond division boundaries out to the limits of the corps designated AO. The purpose of operations in the corps’ deep area is often tied to setting conditions for future events in time and space. Operations in the corps’ deep area might disrupt the movement of operational reserves, prevent enemy forces from employing long-range fires, or neutralize a portion of enemy integrated air defenses. Planning for operations in the corps’ deep area includes considerations for information collection, airspace management, joint fires, obstacle emplacement, maneuver (both air and ground), special operations, and information and deception operations. 4-99. Considerations when task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to, the mission, training, experience, unit capabilities, sustainability, the operational environment, and the enemy threat. Task-organizing the corps includes allocating assets to subordinate divisions and functional and multifunctional brigades, and establishing their command and support relationships. This occurs within tailored force packages as the corps organizes subordinate units for specific missions and employs doctrinal command and support relationships. As task-organizing continues, the corps reorganizes units for subsequent missions. The ability of a corps to task-organize gives it extraordinary agility by configuring its units to best use available resources. It also allows the corps to match unit capabilities to tasks. The ability of sustainment forces to tailor and task-organize ensures commanders have freedom of action to change with mission requirements. 4-100. A corps integrates and synchronizes the operations of its divisions and brigades in depth so that their timing multiplies their effectiveness across multiple domains throughout the corps AO. The timing could be simultaneous or sequenced in a way to maneuver friendly forces or compel enemy forces to move. A corps must consider its entire AO, enemy forces, and information collection activities as it synchronizes combat power to conduct operations that fix, suppress, or surprise enemy forces. Such actions nullify an enemy force’s ability to react in a coherent fashion. 4-101. A corps achieves mass by concentrating the effects of its combat power at the most advantageous places and times to produce decisive results. Massing is enabled by the other functions of the corps in large-scale combat operations. A corps shapes the deep area and maneuvers its task-organized subordinate formations into positions of advantage to enable the concentration of effects to achieve the most decisive results. A corps, as a senior tactical echelon, ensures these tactical results to support operational objectives. 4-102. A corps sets priorities to achieve objectives. A corps uses management techniques to ensure it has the resources to shape the deep area and that its subordinate divisions and brigades have the necessary resources to win in their assigned missions. A corps can change the allocation of resources by condition or phase of an operation to switch between the priority of a main effort or shaping operations in the deep area. 4-103. A corps leverages joint capabilities that will assist its other corps functions during large-scale combat operations. Joint capabilities enhance a corps’ ability to conduct shaping operations, provide additional combat power effects to concentrate, and provide additional logistic services to aid in resource distribution. This page intentionally left blank.

...the smallest formation that is a complete orchestra of war and the largest in which every man can know you. Sir William Slim The division is the Army’s primary formation for decisive action against threats with peer capabilities during large-scale combat operations. This chapter discusses an Army division’s roles and functions across the competition continuum and throughout the range of military operations. It also discusses the various command and control nodes it can create along with a short description of its typical subordinate units. DIVISION OVERVIEW 5-1. The division is the Army’s principal tactical warfighting formation during large-scale combat operations. Its primary role is to serve as a tactical headquarters commanding brigades during decisive action. A division conducts decisive action in an AO assigned by its higher headquarters— normally a corps. It task-organizes its subordinate forces according to the mission variables to accomplish its mission. A division typically commands between two and five BCTs, a mix of functional and multifunctional brigades, and a variety of smaller enabler units. Winning battles and engagements remains the division’s primary purpose. During limited contingencies, it can organize itself to serve in multiple roles. 5-2. While the division is manned, trained, and equipped as a tactical formation, it can, with significant augmentation, transition to a joint or multinational headquarters for operations other than large-scale combat operations. When it is the senior Army formation assigned to a joint task force, it may also serve as the ARFOR. When the division is uncommitted to a specific operation, it focuses on building and sustaining readiness to prevail in large-scale combat. DIVISION ROLES AND FUNCTIONS 5-3. An Army division can perform one of four roles, although its primary role is that of a tactical headquarters during operations on land. An Army division may serve in the following roles:  Tactical headquarters.  ARFOR headquarters.  Joint force land component command.  JTF headquarters. 5-4. It is important to note that the ARFOR and joint roles require significant augmentation. While it is possible for a division to serve in multiple roles, this should be avoided whenever possible. A division should avoid performing a Service and a joint role simultaneously because these roles can overwhelm the commander and the staff, even with augmentation. However, if necessary, a division can perform the ARFOR and joint force land component command roles in a limited contingency or crisis response operation for a limited duration. This requires significant reorganization and retraining of the headquarters to succeed. When a division is tasked to form a JTF headquarters, a different headquarters is required to perform the joint force land component command or ARFOR responsibilities. D IVISION T ACTICAL H EADQUARTERS 5-5. The division is organized, trained, and equipped to command between two and five BCTs in combat as well as support the BCTs with a mix of functional and multifunctional brigades and other enablers. A division headquarters may command any mix of armored, infantry, and Stryker BCTs, as well as joint and multinational land forces. Divisions employ BCTs to conduct operations in the close fight against enemy formations. Divisions conduct deep operations against an enemy to set conditions for success in the current and future close fights. They synchronize and coordinate rear operations to maintain tempo and operational reach for the division. 5-6. A division’s core functions as a tactical headquarters are—  Task-organizing, employing, integrating, and synchronizing brigades and battalions.  Training and preparing for large-scale combat operations.  Conducting shaping operations in the division AO.  Massing effects at decisive points.  Employing joint capabilities.  Assuming directed Army, joint, and multinational authorities and responsibilities. 5-7. When serving as a tactical formation, divisions conduct battles and engagements as part of a larger campaign under the control of a corps. Engagements typically last from less than an hour up to 48 hours, while battles (a series of engagements) can last from less than a day to seven days. In large-scale combat operations, these engagements and battles are likely to occur against large, well-trained, and heavily armed enemy conventional forces operating in concert with unconventional forces. A division commander employs BCTs with aviation, fires, intelligence, and joint capabilities as part of a combined arms approach during operations. Joint capabilities coordinated through the corps are enablers for the division, allowing the division commander to shape conditions for subordinate brigades and weight the decisive operation or main effort. A division commander conveys requirements for joint shaping through the corps commander while limiting most division shaping efforts to those things affecting close operations. 5-8. The division commander translates the division’s higher echelon headquarters’ operational objectives into tactical tasks assigned to subordinate brigades and other supporting units. Divisions plan combined arms operations, direct and coordinate BCTBCTBasic combat training maneuver, use fires to exploit maneuver, and make coordinated use of all subordinate units. The division commander focuses on the current operation and potential branches to the current operation while visualizing the concept of operations for the next tactical phase (sequels). The division commander continuously allocates and re-allocates combat power under division control to support its brigades during phases of an operation and when conditions change. Planning horizons for the division are shorter than those for the corps, cycling, as necessary, within the longer campaign horizons of the corps. 5-9. While the corps commander develops operations informed by estimates of operational reach, the division commander develops operational approaches informed by calculations related to mutual support, supporting range, and supporting distance. The division commander also carefully monitors the endurance of subordinate brigades in terms of days and hours until their organic sustainment units require replenishment. The tempo of operations becomes as important as the distance between the division’s brigades and supporting sustainment elements; these factors determine the relative endurance of the division. D IVISION AS ARFOR 5-10. In limited contingencies, or when a division is the joint force land component, the Army division becomes the ARFOR. As the ARFOR, the division retains OPCON of all Army forces not subordinated to another component of the JTF. To function effectively as both a joint force land component and an ARFOR, a division headquarters requires additional sustainment support. The theater sustainment command normally operates in general support-reinforcing to a division acting as the ARFOR. This enables the division to oversee logistics and administrative support to all Army forces, while also providing logistics support to other Services and multinational units. Without augmentation, the ARFOR responsibilities for sustainment degrade the operational focus of the division. If the tactical situation permits, the division headquarters and expeditionary sustainment command co-locate to closely integrate operations and sustainment. Of transitioning from a division headquarters to an ARFOR headquarters, absorbing the responsibilities and the broader horizons expected of an ARFOR headquarters, was really a demand that was truly a challenge. Major General Stephen L. Arnold Cited in Operation RESTORE HOPE Oral History Interview 5-11. The role of the ARFOR is significantly more diverse and broad than a division operating as a tactical headquarters as part of a corps. When serving as an ARFOR, a division continues to perform all of the functions of a tactical headquarters and—  ASOS.  ADCON of all Army forces in the JTF, including those subordinate to other components.  Service-specific matters involving administration and support of Army forces.  Common-user logistics.  Providing Army executive agent support to unified action partners in the AO. 5-12. The ARFOR focuses on tactical operations in its AO and providing operational-level support to U.S. forces and others through the JOA. The ARFOR participates in operational planning and decision making for force provision and deployment, fires, sustainment, and force protection. (For additional information on ARFOR see Appendix B.) D IVISION AS J OINT F ORCE L AND C OMPONENT C OMMAND 5-13. The JFC may organize a JTF with a division as the joint force land component for limited contingency operations. The joint force land component of such a JTF may have TACON of Marine Corps or multinational forces. When a Marine Corps’ brigade-size or smaller Marine air-ground task force is under control of an Army division, the division employs it as a BCTBCTBasic combat training with unique capabilities. When operating as a joint force land component command, a division headquarters receives staff augmentation from the Marine Corps and other Services, and individual Army augmentation and communications support from higher echelons. When it is the joint force land component, the Army division may also be the ARFOR, although this is not optimal because of the potential task saturation that would degrade the overall effectiveness of the staff. 5-14. The division’s higher echelon headquarters—corps, Marine expeditionary force, or combined JTF— assesses the additional load placed on the command and control systems of the division headquarters as multinational forces come under the division’s control. A division headquarters requires communications and personnel augmentation to fill liaison requirements. As the intensity of combat increases, the higher echelon headquarters should assess the span of control of any division commanding multiple multinational brigade equivalents. 5-15. When the division serves as a joint force land component command, it has all the functions of a tactical headquarters, plus the additional functions of—  Setting the land JOA.  Assessing the threat in the land JOA.  Developing the joint land operations plan.  Receiving and employing the land force.  Contributing to operation or campaign success.  Coordinating with other component and functional commands. (See JP 3-31 for additional information on joint force land component commands.) Note. A division can command multinational forces either as a tactical headquarters or as a joint force land component. Normally, these forces are under TACON of a division. Depending on the size of the multinational force, the division commander reorganizes the staff and command group to accept some members from the other nations to assist and ensure understanding of the various national caveats and requirements. The division commander may deploy the tactical command post to the command post of a large multinational formation to ensure that the multinational force has full connectivity with the division main command post. Normally, a division receives a digital liaison detachment to support this requirement. D IVISION H EADQUARTERS AS J OINT T ASK F ORCE H EADQUARTERS 5-16. In limited contingency operations involving peacekeeping operations, humanitarian operations, or limited combat, a division headquarters may become the base for a JTF headquarters. A division may integrate with a small theater army command post already deployed and use some of its personnel to accelerate JTF staff integration. When it becomes a JTF headquarters, a division headquarters organizes and operates in accordance with joint doctrine, which requires extensive augmentation from both joint and Army forces. The combatant commander provides joint network capabilities, and each Service provides command and control detachments. The USAFUSAFUnited States Air Force provides the JTF with a joint air component coordination element. If present, Navy forces normally have a supporting relationship with the JTF. A theater sustainment command augments the deployed Army force. 5-17. When a division headquarters becomes a JTF headquarters, it requires an ARFOR. The quickest solution is to designate either the division’s tactical command post or rear command post as the ARFOR headquarters. The tactical command post or rear command post, with an assistant division commander, co-locates with the largest brigade’s command post and exercises OPCON over land forces while the division commander and the main command post forms the JTF headquarters. A less desirable option is to task a subordinate brigade with the ARFOR responsibilities, because of the augmentation required. 5-18. When the division serves as a joint task force, it has all the functions of a tactical headquarters, plus the additional functions of—  Providing the overall mission, purpose, and objectives for military operations.  Defining the JOA.  Developing and promulgating the rules of engagement and use of force tailored to the situation.  Establishing and assisting liaison with U.S. embassies and foreign governments involved in the operation. (See JP 3-33 for additional information on JTFs.) L IMITATIONS 5-19. There are limitations and dependencies that must be considered throughout a division’s employment. Those limitations include, but are not limited to division mobility, security concerns, and Reserve Component mobilization. Mobility and Security 5-20. The division main command post is not 100-percent mobile; it requires additional transportation to displace. It is also not fully transportable by C-130 aircraft and requires numerous C-17 sorties to deploy by air. Normally the main command post deploys by a combination of air and sealift; it also requires reception, staging, onward movement, and integration to reach full capacity. No command post has an organic security force. The division headquarters tasks a subordinate unit to secure command posts as required. Reserve Component Mobilization 5-21. Two critical Reserve Component organizations mobilize to support a division when it deploys. These are the main command post operational detachment and the MEB. The main command post operational detachment provides additional depth to the division staff for sustained operations. The MEB is integral to command and control of the division support area. If a division does not have a MEB, then it must either assign another organization to control the division support area or assume direct control itself. Additionally, without a MEB to collaborate with the rear command post, a division headquarters would either have to integrate with another organization or devote additional staff and equipment from the main command post to properly staff the rear command post. When a division is preparing to deploy, commanders, staffs, and planners must take care to coordinate for Reserve Component mobilization with enough time to assemble the formation for deployment. Alternatively, the division may not have enough time to incorporate mobilizing members prior to deployment and must assemble the entire formation in theater, secure resources and capabilities from other formations until mobilized forces arrive, or operate without the key elements of the formation. Note. The MEB is an integral part of a division’s ability to command and control in the division support area. The mobilization and deployment of the MEB must be prioritized in division planning and operations to ensure that it arrives as early as possible. Depending upon the situation, division commanders may consider deploying their MEB ahead of their BCTs. DIVISION HEADQUARTERS 5-22. A division headquarters is organized and equipped for sustained combat operations. By design, it resembles the corps headquarters, but it has different manning and equipment. The headquarters and headquarters’ battalion consists of a main command post, a tactical command post, a rear command post, and a mobile command group. When necessary, a division can form an early entry command post. Plans and operations across the staff sections, cells, command posts, and echelons are facilitated by a network and suite of command and control systems to enhance collaboration and synchronization. The divis ion commander may command the division from any of the command posts. H EADQUARTERS AND H EADQUARTERS B ATTALION 5-23. The division headquarters and headquarters’ battalion provides all administrative support, life support, communications, and transportation for the division’s command posts and mobile command group. The headquarters and headquarters’ battalion has a complete battalion staff. The headquarters and headquarters’ battalion consists of two companies with distinct missions: the headquarters and support company, and the signal, intelligence, and sustainment company. Based on the mission and operational variables, a division headquarters may require additional security elements to augment the headquarters and headquarters’ battalion. 5-24. The organization of the division headquarters and headquarters’ battalion is similar to that of the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion. The headquarters and support company includes life support and maintenance sections for the division command posts and provides administrative support to the movement and maneuver, fires, and protection sections of the staff. The signal, intelligence, and sustainment company provides administrative support to the signal, intelligence, and sustainment sections of the division staff. It connects the division headquarters into the Army global network enterprise, and through it, into the DODIN. The signal company ties into the network through a supporting expeditionary signal battalion from either the corps or theater signal brigade, depending upon the division’s role. Both companies task-organize to support the division command posts. D IVISION M AIN C OMMAND P OST 5-25. The main command post is the primary command post of the division. It controls division operations. The division main command post is responsible for the sustained conduct of current operations, future planning, analysis for current and future operations, targeting, and other staff functions. The division staff at the main command post operates under the general supervision of the division chief of staff. The main command post can accomplish its command and control responsibilities without the tactical command post. Main command post responsibilities include—  Synchronizing division operations with adjacent units and the higher echelon.  Controlling all division operations.  Planning operations.  Monitoring and assessing current operations for impact on future operations.  Conducting shaping operations in the deep and close areas.  Producing operation and contingency plans.  Preparing and maintaining division running estimates, plans, and orders to support future operations.  Integrating intelligence operations into both current and future operations.  Coordinating and managing force structure, to include requests for forces and equipment.  Synchronizing the division’s targeting process.  Controlling division-assigned airspace with the assigned joint air ground integration center.  Preparing all reports required by higher headquarters. 5-26. Division assigned airspace is normally the airspace assigned by the airspace control authority from the division rear boundary to the fire support coordination line and between the division’s lateral boundaries up to the coordinating altitude. The airspace control authority assigns airspace based on the size of the area, the terrain, the volume of aircraft in the airspace, and the organized and trained capability of the unit to conduct airspace control in accordance with the requirements. 5-27. The main command post consists of a command group, functional cells, and integrating cells. There are five functional cells—intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment. The movement and maneuver functional cell forms three integrating cells—current operations, future operations, and plans—to which other staff cells attach subject matter experts. The functional cells are scalable to accommodate joint staff augmentation when required, such as when a division becomes a joint force land component or JTF headquarters. J OINT A IR G ROUND I NTEGRATION C ENTER 5-28. A JAGIC is located in the Army division current operations integration cell (known as COIC) to provide commanders a technique to coordinate, integrate, and control operations in division -assigned airspace and efficiently collaborate requirements with external airspace elements outside of the division area (ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-91.1). The JAGIC co-locates USAFUSAFUnited States Air Force and Army personnel with a shared situational understanding to support the maneuver commander’s concept of operations while meeting JFC and joint force air component commander objectives and intent. The JAGIC organization is unique to the division. The USAFUSAFUnited States Air Force provides an air support squadron that includes an air support operations center (ASOC) and tactical air control party. The ASOC works with the division JAGIC to execute the air tasking order, integrate airspace use and users, control close air support and other air support missions in the division AO during current operations (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-91.1 for more information on the JAGIC). The joint air ground integration center is responsible for—  Executing the air tasking order and airspace control order as directed by the joint, combined, or multinational force air component commander.  Managing airspace assigned to the division.  Providing procedural control of close air support aircraft operating in the AO.  Establishing, maintaining, and operating the air communications architecture.  Processing and sourcing immediate air support requests.  Serving as decentralized execution air space control element that obtains clearance of airspace for fires and other warfighting functions.  Deconflicting use of immediate air support and obtaining clearance of fires for the appropriate fires echelon.  Integrating, coordinating, directing, and controlling other air component missions.  Coordinating air missions that fly in the division-assigned airspace but do not directly support the ground component and other supporting arms activities to de-conflict with ground force maneuver and fires, in addition to receiving target and threat updates.  Assisting with dynamic targeting and friendly force location information.  Advising the division commander on close air support employment, target nominations for those air interdiction and suppression of enemy air defenses missions that support the ground force, airborne surveillance, and airlift that directly supports the division.  Integrating division fires, joint fires, and other complementary and reinforcing functions for effects in the land and air domains. 5-29. As currently organized, trained, and equipped, USAFUSAFUnited States Air Force ASOCs are optimized for the division echelon, but could potentially be positioned to support corps operations as a tactical headquarters. The corps tactical air control party would continue its complementary planning and execution functions. USAFUSAFUnited States Air Force does not position ASOCs subordinate to other ASOCs since they are an extension of the combined air operations center, so a consequence of positioning the ASOC at the corps echelon would be the commander, Air Force forces, retaking control of the airspace previously delegated to divisions. The commander, Air Force forces, should consider collocation with the ground element most capable of integrating fires and effects and executing airspace control when determining ASOC placement. Placement of an ASOC is dependent on mission variables. Movement of capabilities, personnel, and equipment to align an ASOC at the corps echelon to execute airspace management and control responsibilities requires detailed planning and analysis, including systems interoperability and range capabilities and the ability to manage and integrate large volumes of fire and air missions. This configuration has not been tested, exercised, or trained yet. D IVISION T ACTICAL C OMMAND P OST 5-30. A division employs a tactical command post to control specific operations. The tactical command post contains a robust network capability with many of the same command and control systems as the main command post. A tactical command post maintains continuous communication with subordinates, higher echelon headquarters, other command posts, and supporting joint organizations. One of the two deputy commanding generals usually controls operations from the tactical command post as directed by the commander. The G-3 section is usually responsible for the operation of the tactical command post, supported by other staff sections as required by the mission. 5-31. The tactical command post focuses on specific actions, activities, or tasks within a larger operation. Potential roles for the tactical command post include—  Controlling forces committed to a specified operation. Examples include brigade-sized air assaults, wet-gap crossings, deliberate breaching operations, or passage of lines involving multiple subordinate units.  Temporarily controlling division operations. When the main command post displaces or otherwise is not available, the tactical command post may serve as the main command post until the main command post is re-established. The tactical command post requires augmentation from the main command post to control continuous operations for periods extending beyond 48 hours.  Serving as the headquarters of a multi-brigade task force organized from divisional units for a mission. For example, during an offensive operation, the commander may establish the tactical command post to control forces eliminating bypassed enemy forces along a line of operations, while the main command post maintains control (and focus) on operations in the close and deep areas.  Controlling decisive and shaping operations. The division commander may distribute control of decisive and shaping operations between command posts in complex operations. For example, the tactical command post may control a BCTBCTBasic combat training and supporting units in a covering force mission while the main command post controls defensive preparations in the main battle area.  Employing and deploying forces simultaneously with the main command post. In protracted operations, the main command post can control the deployment of forces into an AO while the tactical command post is in the AO controlling initial operations. These roles could be reversed over time, with the main command post controlling operations in the AO and the tactical command post managing the onward movement and integration of forces into the AO.  Augmenting the main command post. In protracted operations, the commander may combine the tactical command post and the main command post into a single co-located command post. This may be done to increase the capacity to control particularly complex tas ks or as part of reorganization after losses during operations.  Serving as an ARFOR. When the division serves as both a JTF and an ARFOR, the division commander can designate the division tactical command post, with an assistant division commander, as the ARFOR headquarters. This role requires substantial augmentation to enable sustained 24-hour operations. 5-32. The tactical command post is completely mobile and can move all its personnel and equipment with organic transportation. Factors that influence the movement of the tactical command post include the flow of operations, the threat of enemy action, and the desires of the commander. Based on the threat environment and the typical close location of the tactical command post to the close area, frequent displacements are typically required to enhance survivability and maintain tempo. D IVISION R EAR C OMMAND P OST 5-33. A rear command post enables the division commander by unifying the efforts of the various units, both under division control and not under division control, that operate in the division’s rear area, between the close area and the division rear boundary. When synchronized, these efforts enable the division to maintain tempo and operational reach. A rear command post performs seven functions, or possesses linkages to the main command post in order to command and control the division’s rear. Commanders may use the rear command post to provide command supervision and general officer oversight for—  Conducting division support area operations.  Performing terrain management and movement control.  Defeating threats.  Enabling sustainment operations.  Coordinating and synchronizing protection.  Enabling stability operations.  Enabling transitions. 5-34. A rear command post may also control particularly complex sustaining operations such as reception, staging, and onward integration; or reorganization involving multiple subordinate brigades. The deputy commanding general for support usually controls operations from the rear command post. The G-4 section is generally responsible for the operation of the rear command post, with augmentation from the other staff sections as required. The division table of organization and equipment provides equipment for the rear command post, but personnel must come from either the main or tactical command posts. The rear command post is dependent on other units for security and life support. A properly resourced rear command post allows the main command post to focus on operations in the close and deep areas. M OBILE C OMMAND G ROUP 5-35. A mobile command group allows a division commander to—  Provide personal leadership, intent, and guidance at the critical place and time.  Make a personal assessment of the situation.  Maintain situational understanding while moving around the area of operations.  Travel with key staff officers necessary to provide information relevant to the current operation. 5-36. A mobile command group allows a division commander to move to the point of decision. Division commanders move about the AO to interact with their subordinate commanders and different staffs, assess the operation, make decisions, and issue guidance. What division commanders learn and see helps them mentally visualize adjustments needed in current and future operations. The mobile command group allows the commander to command from anywhere in the division AO. A mobile command group requires a security force. Usually, the unit tasked to secure the headquarters and headquarters’ battalion secures the mobile command group. 5-37. A division commander selects the individuals who staff the mobile command group. These personnel are normally functional representatives of those staff sections which control combat operations (such as maneuver, fires, and intelligence) in addition to the air liaison officer, and when needed, a joint terminal attack controller. The mission and staff available, however, dictate its makeup. D IVISION E ARLY -E NTRY C OMMAND P OST 5-38. The early-entry command post is an ad hoc organization comprised of equipment and personnel from the staff of the tactical, main, and rear command posts. The tactical command post usually provides the base for the early-entry command post. The division adds or subtracts personnel based on mission requirements. The early-entry command post includes a mix of current operations personnel, planners, and sustainers able to coordinate the reception of the division and plan its initial operations. For joint forcible entry operations, the assault command post is the early-entry command post. SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS 5-39. The capabilities of a division are tailored for each mission by adjusting the division’s composition. Usually, a division commands between two and five BCTs, a mix of functional and multifunctional brigades, and a variety of smaller enabler units. The smaller enablers usually come from higher echelon assets and augment the division’s capabilities. See figure 5-1 on page 5-10 for an example tailored division. A SSIGNED F ORCES 5-40. A division routinely has units assigned to it. This includes two to five BCTs, a division sustainment brigade, a division artillery (DIVARTY) brigade, a combat aviation brigade, and a main command post-operational detachment. Brigade Combat Teams 5-41. BCTs conduct decisive action to seize and retain key terrain, exerting constant pressure on the enemy, and break the enemy’s will to fight by maneuvering against, closing with, and destroying the enemy. BCTs are the principal ground maneuver units of a division. The three BCTBCTBasic combat training designs—armored, infantry, and Stryker—make up the ground maneuver combat power of a division. All divisions can command any type of BCTBCTBasic combat training. The three types of BCTs currently have two to three maneuver battalions, a cavalry squadron, a field artillery battalion, a sustainment battalion, and an engineer battalion. (See FM 3-96 for more details on BCTs.) Division Sustainment Brigade 5-42. The division sustainment brigade is assigned to a division. The division sustainment brigade commander is the senior advisor to the division commander and to the deputy commanding general (support) for the sustainment warfighting function. The commander is responsible for the integration, synchronization, and execution of sustainment operations at echelon. The division sustainment brigade employs sustainment capabilities to create desired effects in support of the division commander’s objectives. 5-43. The division sustainment brigade and its subordinate units provide general support to all units assigned and attached to the division as directed by the division commander. The division sustainment brigade coordinates and synchronizes tactical-level sustainment operations to meet current and future operations. The division sustainment brigade is dependent on the division staff for long-range planning capability. Depending on the operational and mission variables, the division sustainment brigade can command up to seven battalions. A division sustainment brigade includes an organic division special troops battalion and an organic division sustainment support battalion to support tactical-level sustainment operations. Additional modular combat sustainment support battalions and companies will need to be attached to a division sustainment brigade to sustain large-scale combat operations. (See FM 4-0 for more details on division sustainment brigades.) Division Artillery 5-44. A DIVARTY is a brigade-level command assigned to each division that plans, prepares, executes, and assesses fires for a division. The DIVARTY commander is the fire support coordinator for the division and is also the primary advisor to the division commander for the fires warfighting function. The division artillery brigade can also serve as the division’s force field artillery headquarters as required. 5-45. The DIVARTY is not allocated organic firing units, but is task-organized, from corps-or theater-level field artillery brigades, with additional units based on mission requirements. The DIVARTY command post provides the division with the ability to have an alternate command post, and it can perform command and control functions for a limited time. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-09.90 for more details on the DIVARTY.) Combat Aviation Brigade 5-46. A combat aviation brigade is organized to synchronize operations of multiple aviation squadrons, battalions, and joint aviation units. The core competencies of the combat aviation brigade are to provide accurate and timely information collection; provide reaction time and maneuver space; destroy, defeat, disrupt, or delay enemy forces; air assault maneuver forces; position personnel, supplies, and equipment; evacuate casualties and conduct personnel recovery; and enable command and control in support of the combined arms team. A division is usually assigned a combat aviation brigade. 5-47. A combat aviation brigade consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, an air cavalry squadron, an attack helicopter battalion, an assault helicopter battalion, a general support aviation battalion, and an aviation support battalion. A combat aviation brigade is modular and tailorable, and it is typically task-organized as required to support offensive, defensive, and stability operations in support of ground maneuver forces. A combat aviation brigade may split into four aviation maneuver battalion or squadron task forces, and one aviation support battalion. It can also operate the subordinate battalions as organic organizations. A combat aviation brigade can receive two additional aviation battalion or squadron task forces without staff augmentation, but it will require additional maintenance personnel and equipment. A combat aviation brigade can also be task-organized with ground maneuver, joint aviation, and other non-aviation joint and Army units. Main Command Post-Operational Detachment 5-48. The main command post-operational detachment is a unit that augments the division staff with a collection of specialists from the National Guard or Reserves during both training exercises and deployments. Nine of the Army’s divisions have a National Guard main command post operational detachment. However, the 25th Infantry Division has a reserve main command post-operational detachment. The 2d Infantry Division does not have a main command post-operational detachment. P ROVIDED F ORCES 5-49. Based on the division’s role and mission, it can receive a variety of forces to assist it in matching capabilities to requirements. The most common of the provided forces are rocket or cannon battalions from a field artillery brigade; an expeditionary-combat aviation brigade or subordinate battalions; a MEB; a military police battalion; an intelligence and electronic warfare battalion from the corps expeditionary-military intelligence brigade; civil affairs battalion; EOD battalion; CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalion; tactical psychological operations company; theater tactical signal support element; military history detachment; mobile public affairs detachment; cyberspace electromagnetic team; Army space support team; and special operations forces. These forces can be attached, OPCON, or TACON to the division. Field Artillery Brigade 5-50. A field artillery brigade conducts operations to provide shaping and decisive fires. A division will normally receive support from one of the corps field artillery brigade’s subordinate battalions, not from the entire brigade. That supporting battalion has either a direct, general, or general support-reinforcing relationship to the DIVARTY. A field artillery brigade is capable of employing Army and joint fires, supporting special operations forces, and electronic warfare. Field artillery brigades have the ability to reconnoiter, detect, and attack targets and confirm the effectiveness of their fires. They have the necessary capabilities to facilitate the efficient application of fires. A field artillery brigade provides a division with—  Fires and counterfire.  Close reinforcing fires in support of BCTs.  Fires, counterfire, and radar coverage for units lacking organic capability such as combat aviation, expeditionary-military intelligence brigade, MEB, and sustainment brigades.  Field artillery headquarters for a division. 5-51. A field artillery brigade and each of its subordinate elements can be task-organized as required. This may include a combination of one to five battalions that include a mixture of rocket and cannon systems and other enablers. Organic field artillery brigade assets include a brigade support battalion, a signal network company, a target acquisition platoon, and a headquarters and headquarters battery. A support battalion is organized to provide sustainment support (including supply, maintenance, field services, and transportation) to the organic units of the brigade. The signal network support company deploys, installs, operates, and maintains the command and control networks that support brigade operations and integrate with the division networks. The target acquisition platoon is organized with meteorological, survey, and target acquisition capabilities. The field artillery brigade headquarters and headquarters battery and its assigned staff provide expertise across a broad range of functional areas. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-09.24 for more details on field artillery brigades.) Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade 5-52. An expeditionary combat aviation brigade from the Reserve or National Guard organization is typically employed as a standalone organization to support the theater, corps, or division headquarters. The core competencies of the expeditionary combat aviation brigade are to air assault maneuver forces; position personnel, supplies, and equipment; evacuate casualties; conduct personnel recovery; and enable command and control in support of the combined arms team. When task-organized with an attack reconnaissance battalion or an attack reconnaissance squadron, expeditionary combat aviation brigades also provide accurate and timely information collection; provide reaction time and maneuver space; and destroy, defeat, disrupt, or delay enemy forces. 5-53. An expeditionary combat aviation brigade consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, two assault helicopter battalions, a general support aviation battalion, and an aviation support battalion. An expeditionary combat aviation brigade is modular and tailorable, and it is typically task-organized as required to support offensive, defensive, and stability operations in support of ground maneuver forces. An expeditionary combat aviation brigade can organize as pure battalions or into three battalion task forces. An expeditionary combat aviation brigade can receive two additional aviation battalion or squadron task forces without staff augmentation, but it will require additional maintenance personnel and equipment. (See FM 3-04 for more details on Army aviation.) Maneuver Enhancement Brigade 5-54. A MEB receives and controls forces that provide protection and mobility capabilities. A MEB is responsible for security in its assigned area of operations, which typically includes the division support area and the division main supply routes. Typical missions include area security; line of communications security and maintenance; mobility; countermobility; vertical and horizontal construction; CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense; and limited offensive and defensives tasks. 5-55. Currently all MEBs reside in either the National Guard or Army Reserve. The organization of a MEB varies based upon the mission. A typical force mix includes engineer, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, and military police. EOD units may be designated to provide EOD support to a MEB. In some circumstances, such as when the division is an initial entry force, the MEB may receive direct support from short-range air defense units, including counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar systems. The MEB can also command and control a tactical combat force from a BCTBCTBasic combat training when assigned an area security mission. 5-56. The presence of a MEB in the support area of operations does not supplant unit self-defense responsibilities. Units remain responsible for self-protection against level I threats. The MEB provides forces to respond to level II threats and, when task-organized with a tactical combat force, it can respond to level III threats. If a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear command or CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear brigade are not deployed, the MEB may have wider responsibilities for CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations. The MEB may also have wider responsibility for air and missile defense when it controls these types of units. (See FM 3-81 for more details on MEBs.) Engineer Battalion 5-57. A division will normally be augmented by one or more engineer battalions, each capable of commanding and controlling up to five engineer companies. Engineer battalions are capable of planning, integrating, and directing the execution of engineer combat and general engineering and construction tasks. One or two engineer battalions can be assigned or attached to a divisional MEB. But if the division has three engineer battalions and/or must conduct a wet-gap crossing, an engineer brigade should be assigned to the division. Military Police Battalion 5-58. A military police battalion is a functional battalion capable of planning, integrating, and directing the execution of military police operations conducted by up to five mission-tailored military police companies, integrating capabilities from all three military police disciplines (police operations, detention operations and security and mobile support) and integrating police intelligence operations. It may also command other units that focus on conducting area support, detention, or dislocated-civilian tasks. The military police battalion synchronizes military police support across multiple organizations that control the area of operations. The battalion is instrumental in the execution of key stability tasks including traffic management and control, host-nation police development, as well as area security. 5-59. A military police battalion is required when military police missions exceed the command and control command capability of the MEB, which is most likely to occur during large-scale combat operations. (Refer to FM 3-39 for more details on the military police battalion). Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Battalion (Division) 5-60. Intelligence and electronic warfare battalions (division) from the E-MIB will be co-located in direct support with the divisions they support. They may be further task-organized based upon the mission when deployed. The intelligence and electronic warfare battalion (division) provides direct support analysis; processing, exploitation, and dissemination; and multi-domain sensing and target development capability to the division G-2 and the division commander. This facilitates situational understanding for the division commander and critical pieces of the sensor-to-shooter linkage necessary for the division to execute shaping operations in the division deep area. The intelligence and electronic warfare battalion (division) is designed to receive, integrate, employ, and sustain intelligence capabilities and capacities in the division AO. A typical expeditionary-military intelligence brigade battalion task-organized to a division consists of three processing, exploitation, and dissemination platoons, one multifunctional platoon, and two counterintelligence operations management teams. 5-61. The intelligence and electronic warfare battalion (division) staff works closely with the division’s G-2 analysis and control element. The battalion commander and staff assist the division commander in information collection management. The intelligence and electronic warfare battalion (division) does not conduct reconnaissance. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 2-19.3 for more details on expeditionary-military intelligence brigade military intelligence battalions.) Civil Affairs Battalion 5-62. The role of civil affairs is to understand, engage, and influence unified action partners and indigenous populations and institutions, conduct military government operations, enable civil-military operations, and provide civil considerations expertise through the planning and execution of civil affair operations. Civil affairs facilitates situational understanding and addresses civil factors that influence military objectives and support unified action. A civil affairs battalion focuses on planning, enabling, and shaping civil affairs operations in support of the division. The majority of civil affairs that work with conventional forces are located in the Reserves, impacting their availability. Division commanders and staff must account for mobilization times and request forces early during planning in order to ensure their availability. 5-63. A civil affairs battalion is task-organized based on mission requirements, but it usually consists of two to five civil affairs companies and can operate a civil-military operations center. The battalion can command and control up to seven civil affairs companies without staff augmentation. The civil affairs battalion can also provide a civil affairs planning team to assist the assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations and division staff with planning and integrating civil affairs operations throughout the division AO. (See FM 3-57 for more details on civil affairs operations.) Explosive Ordnance Disposal Battalion 5-64. The EOD battalion is a functional headquarters that directs EOD operations. The EOD battalion is responsible for detecting, identifying, evaluating, rendering safe, exploiting, and achieving final disposition of all explosive ordnance, including IEDs, in its AO. The battalion can also provide enabling support, analysis, support to targeting efforts, CWMD operations, and counter mine and theater exploitation. The EOD battalion is capable of supervising EOD operations for three to seven EOD companies. The EOD battalion is organic to the EOD group. The battalion may be attached or OPCON to a JTF, division, corps, or echelon above corps. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 4-32.1 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 4-32 for more details on EOD units.) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Battalion 5-65. A CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalion usually supports a division by providing a mix of units that specialize in decontamination, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance, and bio-detection. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalions support allocation, alignment, and logistics management for all assigned CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear formations. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalions also provide the capability to assess, protect against, and mitigate CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards and support CWMD operations. 5-66. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalions are scalable, tailorable, and multifunctional formations that consist of a headquarters and two to five CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear companies. A CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalion may also be task-organized to a CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear brigade, a MEB, or as an independent CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalion to the division. A CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalion depends on the division for sustainment support. (See FM 3-11 for more details on CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear battalions.) Psychological Operations Company 5-67. A division normally receives a psychological operations company. This company enables a division commander to influence—either directly or indirectly—foreign populations and militaries to achieve behavior changes consistent with stated objectives. A psychological operations company develops messages and actions in a series to address operational requirements of the maneuver unit. Series development consists of developing both product concepts and actions for a psychological effect. Tactical psychological operations companies develop messages and talking points for Soldiers and leaders. The company command section augments the division staff to provide military information support operations, senior leader engagement, and military deception planning assistance in coordination with the information operations staff element and the military deception officer. The psychological operations company commander works with the division staff to integrate attached military information support forces. The company requires sustainment support from a division as its organization does not include sustainment assets. (See FM 3-53 for more details on the psychological operations company.) Theater Signal Brigade 5-68. A theater signal brigade provides functional signal support to division operations, through the division’s organic signal assets. The signal brigade augments the division’s organic assets as the division’s operational reach expands. Additionally, the signal brigade provides augmentation to subordinate division units without organic signal capabilities. (See FM 6-02 for more details on the theater signal brigade.) Military History Detachment 5-69. Military history detachments are a small team of officers and enlisted Soldiers that carry out directed collection of historical material during combat and contingency operations for use when writing official history. They are trained and equipped to gather historical documents and materials, conduct oral interviews, photograph actions and events, and advise supported units on planning and conducting historical operations. They also assist the division information management element in packaging and forwarding collected information to appropriate agencies. Military history detachments are attached or assigned to divisions during all operations. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 1-20 for more details on the military history detachment.) Mobile Public Affairs Detachment 5-70. A public affairs detachment consists of one officer and nine enlisted Soldiers that provides support to Army, combined, joint, or multinational operations. A public affairs detachment is either assigned, attached, or under OPCON of a division. A public affairs detachment may be used as a liaison with the Department of State press attaché office, host nation, or multinational partner public affairs staff. A public affairs detachment has personnel and equipment to—  Assist and advise commanders on public affairs programs and missions.  Plan, prepare, and execute information strategies.  Facilitate, assess, and monitor media activity.  Acquire and process public affairs digital video, audio, and imagery. 5-71. A public affairs detachment has limited capability to conduct independent public affairs activities and requires higher command guidance and support. The unit generally co-locates with, and is under the planning and supervisory guidance of, the division assistant chief of staff, public affairs (known as G-7). (See FM 3-61 for more details on public affairs operations.) Expeditionary Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities Team 5-72. Divisions can request augmentation to execute cyberspace electromagnetic activities operations. Divisions plan, integrate, and synchronize all aspects of cyberspace and electronic warfare operations across the warfighting functions. The division may receive an expeditionary cyberspace electromagnetic activities team from the cyber warfare support battalion, if required. Expeditionary cyberspace electromagnetic activities teams are designed to provide cyberspace electromagnetic activities support to corps echelons and below. Each expeditionary cyberspace electromagnetic activities team consists of three platoons: a cyber warfare platoon, an infrastructure platoon, and a capability development platoon. Army Space Support Team 5-73. Divisions can request augmentation in the form of an Army space support team. The Army space support team is a six-Soldier space-enabled capabilities analysis team, comprised of two officers and four enlisted Soldiers, each having unique space-related skills, knowledge, and abilities to provide situational awareness of space capabilities, assets, and products available to the division. Army space support teams plan, coordinate, and analyze space-enabled capabilities and provide input to the division staff. Army space support teams work with the division’s organic space support element. (See FM 3-14 for more details on space support units.) Special Operations Forces 5-74. A division may have special operations forces operating in its AO. When this is the case, a division may receive a special forces liaison element to synchronize special operations forces activities with division operations. This element should locate at the command post where it can most effectively support the division. (See FM 6-05 for more details on special operations forces integration.) DIVISION OPERATIONS 5-75. Divisions operate in a joint, multinational, and multi-domain environment, integrating their assigned forces and available joint capabilities and synchronizing their effects to achieve objectives. During the planning and conduct of operations, the division commander develops an operational framework to focus the division’s combat power most effectively over time and space and across domains. Operational-level commanders at the corps echelon and above are focused on the ability to orchestrate complex joint operations and campaigns. A division commander is normally focused on conducting decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations simultaneously across the depth and width of the division’s assigned AO. 5-76. Division commanders seek to attack the enemy across the depth of the battlefield in ways that create multiple dilemmas for the enemy and opportunities for friendly forces. They create opportunities by accepting risk in some areas to mass the effects of combat power in others, usually but not always in support of their decisive operation. They set the conditions that enable the freedom of action by subordinate brigades acting in concert with their intent, seeking to avoid presenting division elements as lucrative targets to enemy long-range fires. Operations in depth expand the battlefield in ways that create greater numbers of opportunities and allow the division commander to control the tempo of operations and establish positions of relative advantage. 5-77. Division commanders task-organize their assigned and attached forces in accordance with their judgment of the tactical situation. They designate command and support relationships to ensure subordinate and supporting commanders understand their roles in the operation and support the division commander’s intent. Commanders consider five related guidelines when organizing a division for decisive action:  The BCTs are organized, trained, and equipped to operate as a combined arms force. The division commander normally reinforces the BCTs with additional Army and joint capabilities and adjusts the tasks assigned to the BCTs accordingly.  Multifunctional brigades are more effective when they operate as they organized and trained. The division commander maintains the tailored organization of multifunctional brigades until tactical circumstances require temporary task organization of forces from one brigade to another.  The division operates more effectively when the commander adjusts tasks to subordinate units rather than constantly adjusting the division’s task organization.  The division commander determines the effective span of control for each brigade and does not exceed it. Additional units can slow the operations process in a brigade, particularly as the tactical situation becomes more fluid.  When task-organizing brigades with multinational forces, the division commander considers reducing the brigade’s span of control, depending on the situation. The effective integration of multinational forces into a brigade will require significant effort and coordination. 5-78. An effective division task organization—  Facilitates the division commander’s intent and concept of operations.  Retains flexibility within the concept of operations.  Facilitates massing combat power at the decisive point.  Weights the division’s decisive operation.  Adapts to conditions imposed by the mission variables.  Maintains or creates effective combined arms teams.  Provides mutual support among brigades.  Ensures flexibility to meet unforeseen events and support future operations.  Allocates resources with minimum restrictions on their employment.  Ensures unity of command and synchronization of effort through command and support relationships.  Offsets limitations and maximizes the potential of all available forces.  Exploits enemy vulnerabilities. DIVISION OPERATIONS ALONG THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM 5-79. No matter what role a division serves in, a division is capable of executing operations across the competition continuum and throughout the range of military operations. These categories describe operations that share general characteristics of military operations and activities but not necessarily the details of their execution. Divisions can simultaneously command and control and support several subordinate efforts across the competition continuum and throughout the range of military operations that are focused in one theater. M ILITARY E NGAGEMENT AND S ECURITY C OOPERATION 5-80. Divisions provide trained and ready forces and echelons of command and control in support of exercise or training events with the intent to shape the security environment, improve mutual understanding, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Due to the limited scale and short duration of violence, a division usually serves as a tactical headquarters, joint force or multinational force land component command, and if required, as a JTF headquarters or ARFOR. While most U.S. military engagement and security cooperation typically takes place in the echelons below brigade, there are multiple exercises where a division is used to assist in command and control or sustainment activities. These exercises support military engagement and security cooperation efforts in critical theaters. SPARTAN SHIELD: Military Engagement and Security Cooperation Operation SPARTAN SHIELD is a combined forces security cooperation and contingency operation based in Kuwait. SPARTAN SHIELD has been a continuous DOD operation since 2012, and it enables U.S. Central Command to counter, protect, defend, and prepare while building partner capacity. This operation contributes to regional deterrence, reacting to a possible threat in the Middle East, and performing security cooperation missions in U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. The 29th Infantry Division (National Guard) commanded Task Force Spartan from December 2016 to July 2017. The task force consisted of five brigades from multiple divisions and components that deployed on a rotational basis. The task force was responsible for improving readiness across 13 countries, facilitating multiple training exercises, and maintaining a strategic rapid reaction force. The division headquarters was responsible for executing the theater security cooperation program with partner nations in the Middle East and Center and South Asia regions. The division headquarters successfully integrated brigades from multiple divisions and components, prepared for large-scale combat, and conducted shaping operations throughout the AO. The division also supported combat actions conducted by Operation INHERENT RESOLVE in Northern Iraq and Syria. The division completed a transfer of authority to the 35th Infantry Division (National Guard) in July 2017. C RISIS R ESPONSE 5-81. In crisis response, because of the clearly defined end state and limited scope, divisions can serve as a tactical headquarters, joint force, or joint force land component command, and if required, as a JTF or ARFOR. Even with a well-defined end state, forces, and scope, a division’s execution of these operations may take considerable time. Commanders conducting crisis response operations carefully consider all actions to ensure they do not further destabilize the situation or inadvertently escalate it. A division, while smaller than a corps or army, still provides a robust and experienced combined arms team and three general officers to lead any U.S. military efforts in response to a crisis. UNITED ASSISTANCE 2014 Liberia experienced an outbreak of the Ebola virus in December 2013. Ebola overwhelmed the medical capacity of Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and the international emergency health response community. This outbreak quickly became a public health, humanitarian, and socioeconomic crisis with devastating impact on families, communities, and multiple West African countries. During this outbreak, over 11,000 died and over 28,000 were infected. The severity of this outbreak prompted the United States to employ military assets to assist in controlling the spread of the virus. In October of 2014, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) headquarters deployed to Liberia as a JTF and assumed control of Joint Forces Command-United Assistance from U.S. Army Africa who had established the JTF in September 2014. The division headquarters was also tasked as the ARFOR, the JFLCC, and with establishing an austere theater of operations. The division was responsible for the command, control, and synchronization of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational assets to combat Ebola in West Africa. Among these attached assets were a medical brigade, Marine Corps and Army aviation assets, engineers, logistics support elements, and contractor support. The main lines of effort for the division were to provide logistics support in theater, provide life support for all forces, and construct medical treatment facilities. During this operation, the division headquarters served in multiple roles and performed multiple functions including shaping operations, massing effects, assuming directed Army and joint authorities and responsibilities, leveraging joint capabilities, and organizing and employing brigades and battalions. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) headquarters executed a disciplined operation that supported the United States Agency for International Development (the lead federal agency) and demonstrated the versatility and capability of the division. L IMITED C ONTINGENCY O PERATIONS 5-82. Divisions are uniquely suited to create safe and secure environments in limited contingency operations. Divisions provide offensive, defensive, and stability capabilities to deter or defeat adversaries and establish security. They provide specialized support to other government agencies as necessary, and they can serve as a tactical headquarters, ARFOR, JTF, or joint forces land component. JOINT ENDEAVOR In April 1992, civil war erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by the end of 1995, between 140,000 and 250,000 people had been killed. Ethnic cleansing created over 1.3 million refugees. During this time dozens of diplomatic solutions failed. In late 1995, the Dayton Peace Accord was signed, allowing a NATONATONorth Atlantic Treaty Organization military force to enter the country to enforce the peace. 1st Armored Division served as the land forces command for the units involved, and it served as the nucleus for multinational Task Force Eagle. Task Force Eagle consisted of 31,000 Soldiers in 42 different battalions organized into roughly 15 brigades, of which approximately one-third were from multi-national partners. 1st Armored Division, as the senior Army headquarters, retained ARFOR responsibilities in its assigned AO, where it conducted all logistics support and 10 USCUSCUnited States Code responsibilities. U.S. Army Europe (Forward) provided these capabilities to the rest of U.S Army forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 1st Armored Division task-organized, employed, integrated, and synchronized brigades and battalions, conducted shaping operations in the division AO, massed effects at decisive points, leveraged joint capabilities, and assumed directed Army, joint, and multinational authorities and responsibilities. Task Force Eagle concluded its operation on 20 December 1996, transferring responsibility for its AO to the stabilization force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. L ARGE -S CALE C OMBAT O PERATIONS 5-83. During large-scale combat operations, divisions act as combined arms tactical formations organized to defeat or destroy enemy forces and seize terrain. This usually means that a division operates as one of several in a corps, and its headquarters only serves in a tactical role. 5-84. As a tactical headquarters, a division uses the operational framework of deep-close-rear-support areas to do three things simultaneously. It shapes enemy forces in the deep area, synchronizes subordinate forces in the close area, and coordinates friendly activities in the support areas. The division commander allocates resources to all areas to ensure synchronization of all of the division’s actions in executing his operation. Priorities of support may change with phases of an operation, but the division should preserve unity of effort throughout its AO all of the time. 5-85. A division operates deep in both time and space to develop both the friendly and enemy conditions necessary for its subordinate BCTs to be successful. While a corps focuses deep to determine how the enemy is preparing for the next phase of an operation, a division is focused on identifying the enemy’s course of action, identifying the enemy’s main effort, and disintegrating enemy forces into smaller elements of combat power that, under favorable conditions, BCTs can defeat. For a division to do this, it needs time and space to make decisions. In terms of time, deep planning for a division is roughly 72–96 hours into the future. Spatially, a division’s deep area is usually beyond the BCTBCTBasic combat training’s coordinated fire line and focused on uncommitted or out of contact enemy forces. In terms of geographic control measures, the deep area often encompasses physical space between the coordinated fire line and the fire support coordination line. 5-86. As the division shapes enemy forces, it simultaneously conducts combined arms operations by planning and coordinating BCTBCTBasic combat training maneuver and by using fires to exploit that maneuver in close operations. While many division assets are focused on deep operations at any given time, the division can attrit enemy forces in the close area with lethal and nonlethal effects in support of a particular course of action. In support of close operations, the division synchronizes the maneuver of the BCTs with mobility, countermobility, and protection capabilities by modifying the task organization and support relationships of the units under division control. It further allocates protection assets like air defense and engineer assets to mitigate threats against the friendly forces in the close and support areas. Enemy disruption to friendly activities in the support area has almost immediate negative impacts on operations in the close and deep areas. 5-87. As the division is either defeating or destroying an enemy and seizing terrain, it also ensures that activities in the division’s rear are synchronized and secured. The division’s rear, which encompasses both the support areas and the physical space between the BCTBCTBasic combat training rear boundaries and the division rear boundaries, grows as a division conducts offensive operations and shrinks as the corps shifts its rear boundary forward. The rear typically has one or more support areas during sustained offensive operations. Divisions have a wide variety of tasks associated with their rear, including defeating bypassed enemy forces and performing minimum essential stability tasks, terrain management, lines of communication security, route clearance, movement control, and security. A large number of different units are located in the division’s rear (inside and outside of the support area), not all of which are under division control, but which support the division (and corps). 5-88. In support areas, the focus is on maintaining and extending friendly operational reach to prevent friendly culmination. This requires anticipation by the staff and commander. While a division is planning 72 to 96 hours out in terms of shaping operations, it generally plans even further out in terms of sustaining operations because of the physics associated with moving large amounts of supplies and distributing them. Generally, a MEB is responsible for the security of the support area, which allows sustainment units to focus on their primary mission. A division may have one or multiple support areas to avoid presenting a single lucrative target and to facilitate sustainment when the division is operating along multiple axes on a wide front, exceeding the MEB’s security capabilities. In this case, the division commander directs other units to provide additional security or accepts risk.

Echelons above brigade commanders and staffs must clearly understand both joint and Army command and support relationships. This appendix defines and describes joint command relationships and other authorities, followed by a discussion of Army command and support relationships. It concludes with a discussion of command and control considerations for multinational operations. CHAIN OF COMMAND A-1. The President and Secretary of Defense exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command, as described in Chapter 1. One branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commanders for missions and forces assigned or attached to combatant commands. Within their commands, combatant commanders establish joint command relationships among forces as described in paragraphs A-3 through A-11. A-2. For purposes other than the operational direction of the combatant commanders, the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments and, as prescribed by the secretaries, to the commanders of military Service forces. The military departments, organized separately, operate under the authority, direction, and control of the secretary of that military department. The secretaries of the military departments exercise ADCON over Service forces through their respective Service chiefs and Service component commanders as described in paragraphs A-16 through A-17. JOINT COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS A-3. Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort. The authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates, including the authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion, is inherent in command. Although commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the accomplishment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the extent of authority is specified by the establishing authority, directives, and law. The four types of joint command relationships are—  Combatant command (command authority) (COCOMCOCOMCombatant commander).  OPCON.  TACON.  Support. A-4. The specific command relationship (COCOMCOCOMCombatant commander, OPCON, TACON, or support) defines the authority a commander has over assigned or attached forces as each is summarized in this section. (See JP 1 for the full discussion of the authorities for each joint command relationship). C OMBATANT C OMMAND (C OMMAND A UTHORITY) A-5. Combatant command (command authority) is the nontransferable command authority, which cannot be delegated, of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces; assigning tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command (JP 1). COCOMCOCOMCombatant commander is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in commanders of combatant commands or as directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense and cannot be delegated or transferred. The combatant commander exercises COCOMCOCOMCombatant commander of assigned forces and may delegate OPCON, TACON, or establish support relationships of assigned and attached forces as shown in table A-1.

This appendix discusses the role of the ARFOR. While an ARFOR controls forces operationally, this appendix discusses the ARFOR’s administrative and support responsibilities to subordinate Army forces and to other Services in a joint force. ARFOR OVERVIEW B-1. The ARFOR is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. The ARFOR is the Army component of any joint force. Army doctrine distinguishes, however, between the Army component of a combatant command and that of a joint force formed by the combatant commander. The Army component of a geographic combatant command is called the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander, and the Army component of the subordinate joint force is an ARFOR. Note. The Army’s designation for an ASCCASCCArmy service component commander assigned to a geographic combatant command is the theater army. A RMY S ERVICE C OMPONENT C OMMAND B-2. The ASCCASCCArmy service component commander is the senior Army command assigned to a combatant command. It consists of the Army Service component commander and all those Army forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command. B-3. ASCCASCCArmy service component commander commanders exercise command authorities, normally OPCON, of assigned and attached Army forces as delegated by the combatant commander, and ADCON as delegated by the Secretary of the Army. ADCON is the Army’s responsibility to administer and support Army forces even while in a combatant command AOR. OPCON is the basic authority for command and control of the same Army forces. B-4. ADCON for Army units in a combatant command normally extends from the Secretary of the Army through the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander, through an ARFOR, and then to the Army units assigned or attached to an Army headquarters in that command. However, ADCON is not tied to the operational chain of command. The Secretary of the Army may redirect some or all Service responsibilities outside the normal ASCCASCCArmy service component commander channels. In similar fashion, the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander may distribute some administrative responsibilities outside the ARFOR. ARFOR IN A S UBORDINATE J OINT F ORCE B-5. All joint force commands that include Army forces have an ARFOR. JTFs are the organizations most often used by a combatant commander for contingencies. The typical JTF has a combination of service and functional components (See figure B-1 on page B-2). JTF commanders normally exercise OPCON of all U.S. forces through functional component commands, Service components, subordinate JTFs, or a combination of these. The senior Army officer assigned to a JTF, other than the JFC and members of the JTF staff, becomes the ARFOR commander. The ARFOR commander answers to the Secretary of the Army through the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander for most ADCON responsibilities. ARFOR RESPONSIBILITIES B-6. The theater army provides sustainment to all Army forces stationed in, transiting through, or operating in an AOR. It also provides most ASOS, common-user logistics, and Army executive agent support to unified action partners in an AO. The theater army executes these sustainment responsibilities through its assigned TSC. (See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the theater army.) B-7. The ARFOR in a subordinate joint force provides administrative and logistics support to all Army forces and retains OPCON over Army units not subordinate to another component of the JTF. Sin ce the preferred approach to establishing a JTF headquarters is use of an existing Service headquarters, the JTF commander (if an Army headquarters) retains all responsibilities associated with both headquarters (the ARFOR and JTF). This can overload the JTF headquarters unless the commander delegates authority for Service-specific matters to another commander. For example, when a corps headquarters transitions to a JTF headquarters, the corps commander becomes the JTF commander. The corps retains ARFOR responsibilities through the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander back to the Army, unless the corps commander shifts Service responsibilities to another headquarters. The corps commander normally designates a subordinate Army commander and staff as the deputy ARFOR commander to perform those duties. Note. Generally, an Army headquarters that transitions to a JTF headquarters designates a subordinate Army commander and staff as the deputy ARFOR commander for performing ARFOR duties. A RMY S UPPORT TO O THER S ERVICES B-8. In addition to controlling Army forces, the ARFOR coordinates ASOS. ASOS includes provisions of common-user logistics and executive agent support to the JTF as required by the JTF establishing authority. ASOS is directed through 10 USCUSCUnited States Code, DOD executive agent, and combatant commander directed authorities. The ARFOR headquarters manages support to other Services including, but not limited to—  Missile defense.  Fire support.  Base defense.  Transportation.  Fuel distribution.  General engineering.  Intra-theater medical evacuation.  Veterinary services.  Logistics management.  Communications.  CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense.  Consequence management capability.  Explosive ordnance disposal. B-9. Sustainment operations are critical to enabling operational reach. The Army’s sustainment capability provides crucial theater support that further enables the strategic and operational reach of the joint force. Much of this support is provided through ASOS. B-10. In all joint operations, sustainment is a Service responsibility except as specified by DOD directives, combatant commanders’ lead Service designations, or inter-Service support agreements. Each Service retains its responsibility for sustainment. Combatant commanders direct theater army commanders to provide common-user logistics and ASOS, agencies, or multinational forces, as required. However, shared sustainment responsibility or common-user logistics is more effective, especially for joint operations. Title 10, USCUSCUnited States Code authorizes combatant commanders to assign common-user logistics responsibilities that overlap the military department’s prescribed functions. Additionally, directive authority for logistics is the additional authority used by combatant commanders to eliminate duplicated or overlapped sustainment responsibilities. The theater army coordinates with the combatant command staff to determine joint sustainment requirements, identify responsibilities, and enable commanders to exercise command and control for sustainment. Theater army commanders focus on operational-level theater support involving force generation and sustainment during campaigns and joint operations. B-11. ASOS affords support external to Army forces to increase or improve capabilities. Paragraphs B-12 through B-26 provide descriptions focused on a few key capabilities provided through ASOS. A few of the key examples of ASOS provided at theater and operational levels include general engineering, protection, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, air and missile defense, and signal. The ARFOR commander advises the JFC on the employment of Army organizations and their capabilities and ensures a clear understanding of capability requirements and gaps. General Engineering B-12. Specialized engineer units are typically employed at theater and operational levels to augment capabilities. The general engineering support is fully coordinated with combat operations, while planners consider and anticipate the impact of geography, force projection infrastructure, and available assets. General engineers perform engineering tasks, including support to construction management, lines of communication, infrastructure development, theater opening and closing, and protection. B-13. Engineer assets providing support to the theater and field armies focus on those operations that help to set the theater. General engineer units such as echelon above brigade engineer construction companies and specialized units enable force projection, expeditionary logistics, and the development of the infrastructure needed to support the joint force. Military construction in an AO is characterized by using the minimum necessities when possible, and maximizing the use of host-nation facilities such as ports, airfields, roads, and barracks. Missions include base camps and improving ports and airfields. Engineer assets in the corps and divisional support areas are primarily focused on mobility and limited protection tasks to improve survivability. Theater commanders decide on construction standards early in the planning process. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-34.40 for information on constraints or planning considerations for construction missions.) Protection B-14. Combatant commanders must take protection into consideration as large-scale combat operations entail significant operational risk. Protection emphasizes the importance of planning and expanding protection priorities, including protecting mission partners, civilian populations, equipment, resources, infrastructure, and cultural landmarks across the range of military operations. The synchronization, integration, and organization of protection capabilities and resources to preserve combat power from the effects of threats and hazards are essential. B-15. The ARFOR plays a significant role in setting the theater, which includes conducting activities to ensure protection of the force while preserving combat power and increas ing the probability of mission success. Combatant commanders must consider protection requirements for assets such as aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, lines of communication, and critical infrastructure at theater level, and requirements such as support areas, command posts, and signal nodes at corps and division level. The ARFOR anticipates changes to protection prioritization and prepares for reassessment and transition of assets throughout operations to coincide with the commander’s priorities. B-16. Protection occurs throughout all operations, and ARFOR responsibilities include executing key protection tasks such as survivability, coordination of air and missile defense support, CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations, police operations, and population and resource control. B-17. If the JFC elects to establish a JSA in the JOA, the ARFOR normally determines its structure and its controlling headquarters. The options for the JSA depend on the threat and the mission variables, particularly the forces available. If the threat to the JSA is low to moderate, the theater army commander may tailor the ARFOR with a MEB specifically for controlling the JSA. The MEB may include additional military police and intelligence assets. If the threat to theater bases and lines of communications is significant, the theater army may tailor the ARFOR with an additional BCTBCTBasic combat training to control that AO. A third option, in the case of very high threat levels, is to assign the mission to an Army division with BCTs and one or more MEBs. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear B-18. CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities support operations conducted across the range of military operations by assessing CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards, providing protection against CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards, mitigating CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, and providing hazard awareness and understanding. All CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear functions share a common fundamental purpose that fits within the protection warfighting function to achieve or contribute to national objectives. B-19. The ARFOR staff integrates CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear considerations as part of protection. They are responsible for understanding the current CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear conditions and integrating this understanding into the intelligence preparation. Ultimately, the ARFOR commander identifies the need and directs protection considerations and guidance concerning CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards to the force. Signal B-20. As commanders operate across the range of military operations, signal capabilities must be tailorable to meet the commander’s requirements. The way signal formations deliver communication services varies based on the mission. Communications requirements during theater security cooperation activities from fixed posts, camps, or stations differ from a BCTBCTBasic combat training commander’s requirements during a movement to contact mission in large-scale combat operations. Signal staff officers and leaders need to articulate to commanders what communications capabilities are available during critical points of an operation and how these capabilities support the exercise of command and control. B-21. Networks enable the exercise of command and control and the conduct of support operations through the wide dissemination of data and relevant information. Networks allow commanders to communicate information and control forces, and they are key enablers of successful operations. B-22. Signal operations are critical to flexibility and redundancy. While standard operating procedures, various communications prioritization efforts, and trained staff personnel can mitigate some of the challenges with command and control, effective signal operations remain central to the operational success of armies, corps, and divisions. When planning to operate in a degraded or austere environment, these echelons, especially the corps and division, need to build plans from the bottom up. They need to start with lower line of site and non-line-of-sight systems, and then scale up to upper and beyond line of sight systems as conditions permit. B-23. Operations in degraded environments require units to develop redundant networks that are not solely reliant on space-based assets to function properly. Truly redundant primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency communications plans mix space-and terrestrial-based systems and networks to ensure the greatest possible flexibility. Air and Missile Defense B-24. Air and missile defense mutually supports all Services by contributing capabilities necessary for mission success. Unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key elements in countering air and missile threats. Typically, air and missile engagements will be conducted in accordance with guidelines and rules established by area air defense commander who is normally the joint force air component commander. A joint force air component commander is a commander from the Service with the preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air operations in an AO, generally from either the Air Force or Navy. B-25. The AAMDC is the Army’s lead organization for Army air and missile defense forces. The Army air and missile defense commander in the roles of the theater army air and missile defense coordinator and deputy area air defense commander is involved in this development process by assisting the ARFOR commander and area air defense commander in the planning and coordination of the critical asset list and creating the defended asset list. B-26. The ARFOR plays a significant role in identifying the priorities for air and missile defense operations. As part of the planning and development of the Air and Missile Defense Appendix of the operations order, the ARFOR details a prioritized list of critical assets in coordination with the AAMDC. This coordination extends to collaborative and exhaustive planning with joint and multinational air and missile defense partners. THEATER ARMY SUPPORT TO THE ARFOR B-27. The theater army assists the combatant command in developing support priorities, including those affecting other Services. To support the ARFOR, the theater army also coordinates the projection of additional required support from the continental United States, another theater, or an intermediate staging base using air lines of communication and sea lines of communication. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-93 for more information on theater army support.) B-28. The theater army is the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander and has the responsibility to control attached and assigned Army forces in the AOR through ADCON and OPCON or TACON. As the Army component of the combatant command the ASCCASCCArmy service component commander is the ARFOR for the theater, and once delegated to a subordinate Army formation, the Army component of the subordinate joint force is an ARFOR for the JOA. B-29. The theater army commander will specify the ADCON responsibilities of the ARFORs with the theater army normally retaining control of reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration; logistic support of the deployed force; personnel support; finance operations support; and medical support. Administrative responsibilities normally retained by the ARFOR include internal administration and discipline, training in the JOA, and Service-specific reporting. The theater army normally retains OPCON of Army sustainment and medical commands operating in the JOA. The theater army commander establishes an Army support relationship between the ARFOR and these units. It commands all Army forces in the region until the combatant commander attaches selected Army forces to a JFC. B-30. The theater army initially maintains control of all Army units assigned to an AOR until that control is passed to the senior Army force or ARFOR in a subordinate JOA. As part of the controlling of Army forces, the ARFOR maintains ADCON of Army forces and addresses Service responsibilities such as coordinating ASOS. (See ADP 4-0 for more information on ASOS.) FIELD ARMY AS AN ARFOR B-31. Large-scale combat operations often require the Army to conduct land operations with multiple corps-sized formations as part of a joint or multinational command. Large-scale combat operations could require a theater army headquarters to expand and transform into an operational land headquarters (field army equivalent) exercising command over multiple Army corps and a Marine expeditionary force. B-32. A field army (when constituted) performs operational ARFOR tasks and is the Army component of the joint force to which it is assigned. A field army, specifically tailored to mission requirements, may be assigned to a joint force command with an enduring operational requirement. Typically, a subunified command is established instead of a JTF when a military operation is anticipated to be enduring. In this case, a field army would be appropriate as the Army component or ARFOR to the subunified command. The theater army exercises ADCON over the field army and its subordinate Army forces, and it provides the field army and its joint force command with all Army Service functions. CORPS AS AN ARFOR B-33. The corps headquarters is organized, trained, and equipped to serve as the ARFOR in campaigns and major operations. This is done when commanding two or more Army divisions, while also coordinating with supporting theater-level organizations, across the range of military operations. As the ARFOR for the JFC, the corps serves as an operational-level headquarters, conducting land operations as the Service component. A corps commander and staff should not attempt to simultaneously perform the roles of a JTF and an ARFOR headquarters during major operations. The workload associated with simultaneously conducting these two roles can overwhelm the commander and staff. The corps can control up to five Army divisions in large-scale combat operations. The corps normally has an assigned ESC and one medical brigade (support) in direct or general support. Other theater-level assets are attached as required. The corps allows other theater-level assets to adapt to operational-or tactical-level roles depending upon the combatant commander’s requirements. B-34. In addition to operational requirements, the corps has extensive ADCON responsibilities as the ARFOR. When it serves as the ARFOR, the corps is responsible through the theater army commander for the Service-specific support of all Army forces in a JOA and for providing any ASOS with forces deployed in a JOA. The Army force package attached to the ARFOR receives the sustainment necessary to conduct land operations effectively and indefinitely. The corps commander must balance responsibility for Service component actions while communicating requests for support from various theater-level commands and units. B-35. The JTF commander sets priorities for Army sustainment and support to other Services while delegating most 10 USCUSCUnited States Code tasks and ASOS to these commands. Sustainment is assigned to the corps ESC. Medical units remain in a general support role to all forces in an AO. Air units require centralized control of air and missile defense engagements through the joint air operations center, and signal units must integrate into an AOR-wide network. Therefore, these units may remain attached to the theater commands and provide direct or general support. Attachment of units—such as the civil affairs, engineers, military police, and aviation—allows the corps commander to allocate their capabilities among the division, corps, and multinational units. DIVISION AS AN ARFOR B-36. A division commands multiple Army brigades and is one of the Army’s tactical headquarters for decisive action. When required it may serve as a JTF or joint force land component headquarters in a limited contingency operation. As required, a division may be the ARFOR and the joint force land component in a JTF. When the division headquarters serves as a JTF headquarters or a joint force land component headquarters, it requires joint augmentation. B-37. A division headquarters may serve as a joint force land component headquarters with staff augmentation in a limited contingency operation. With extensive joint augmentation, it may serve as a JTF for a limited contingency operation. When serving as the ARFOR or joint force land component, a division is primarily concerned with the conduct of operational tasks. The theater army provides most of the ADCON and Army support to forces deployed in a JOA. Joint manning documents specify other Service augmentation according to the role determined by the combatant commander, either as a JTF or as a joint force land component headquarters. When serving as a JTF headquarters, the division headquarters organizes and operates in accordance with joint doctrine. (See JP 3-33 for doctrine for the JTF. See JP 3-31 for doctrine for the joint force land component command.) B-38. When it is the joint force land component, an Army division becomes the ARFOR. As the ARFOR, the division retains OPCON of all Army forces not subordinated to another component of the JTF. To function effectively as both the joint force land component and the ARFOR, the division head quarters requires strong coordination with the TSC. This enables the division to oversee logistic and administrative support to all Army forces while also providing logistic support to other Services and multinational units. Without it, the ARFOR responsibilities for sustainment would degrade the operational focus of the division. This page intentionally left blank.

This appendix describes the multi-domain expanded battlefield framework, followed by a detailed description of the physical components of the operational framework introduced in Chapter 2. The appendix concludes with a friendly force doctrinal template of echelons above brigade frontages and depths. INTRODUCTION TO USING THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK C-1. An operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). Operational frameworks provide an organizing construct for visualizing and describing activities in time and space within the context of an AO, area of influence, and area of interest. This appendix expands upon the description of the operational framework in Chapter 2 by describing the physical arrangement of forces in time, space, and purpose. The primary purpose of this appendix is to provide a logical architecture that assists commanders and staffs with differentiating responsibilities between the four echelons discussed in this manual: theater army, field army, corps, and division. C-2. The multi-domain extended battlefield is not easily translated into two-dimensional operational graphics for the conduct of operations without a commonly understood mental model. The operational framework provides a means of orienting friendly forces relative to enemy forces in the context of large-scale combat operations and many, if not most, limited contingencies involving combat by division and higher echelon formations. Each formation fits into and employs the operational framework in complementary ways when each shares mutual understanding of the overall friendly, enemy, and environmental situations. The perspectives of each echelon within the framework differ because the focus, roles, and responsibilities of each echelon differ, but each perspective is linked to a common purpose defined by the higher commander's intent and an operational course of action. MULTI-DOMAIN EXTENDED BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK C-3. Adversaries of the United States are increasingly able to contest the joint force in all domains and the electromagnetic spectrum. The same is true for the informational environment. Some adversaries have capability overmatch. Peer threats, including China and Russia, have expanded the battlefield, and they can effectively contest multiple domains, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment in ways that threaten U.S. interests. C-4. Peer threats seek to employ capabilities inside of U.S. AOs from a distance. Commanders and their staffs must consider and know this to account for the full range of possible enemy actions. For this reason, while AOs portray a geographic representation of where a formation is positioned, Army forces are concerned with enemy capabilities well outside of their assigned AOs. C-5. The joint force has similar offensive capabilities that can be employed from strategic distances. Commanders and their staffs plan for and request these capabilities early to ensure that they are available when needed. The ability of echelons above brigades to successfully converge these capabilities with maneuver in an operational area is critical; indeed it is this convergence that distinguishes the operational level of warfare and armies, corps, and divisions from other echelons. C-6. Figure C-1 (on page C-2) illustrates the multi-domain extended battlefield. It is a generalized spatial depiction of the nature of operational environments when space, cyberspace, electromagnetic warfare, and information capabilities are accounted for during operations. These capabilities have a global reach and can be located far outside of an operational area and affect operations. The multi-domain extended battlefield is an expanded framework consisting of four areas: the strategic support area, the joint security area, the assigned operational area, and the deep area. C-7. Figure C-2 illustrates how space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and information capabilities can have strategic, operational, and tactical effects depending upon where and how they are used. In certain instances, an effect at one level can also have effects at multiple levels of operations. Commanders need to account for adversary capabilities that reside outside of the assigned AO that can directly impact their operations. Although they do not have the authority or ability to target those capabilities, commanders must protect against them and request assistance from higher echelons to combat them. Higher echelons have to set the conditions for subordinates to successfully contend with enemy capabilities originating outside of their assigned AOs. S TRATEGIC S UPPORT A REA C-8. The strategic support area describes the area extending from a theater of operations to a base in the United States or another combatant commander's AOR. It contains those organizations, lines of communications, and other agencies required to support forces in the field. It also includes the airports and seaports supporting the flow of forces and sustainment into a theater. Finally, a strategic support area may also contain key operational capabilities, such as cyber assets, that may be employed inside of an operational area from outside of it. Most friendly nuclear, space, and cyberspace capabilities, and important network infrastructure, are controlled and located in the strategic support area. Army strategic support areas will often transition through or reside in other combatant command close and deep areas. J OINT S ECURITY A REA C-9. A JSA is an area inside, or immediately adjacent to, an operational area where forces and sustainment are postured to support operations. The JSA is where friendly forces posture combat power, sustain operations, and project power into an AO. C-10. A joint security area is a specific surface area, comprised of mainly of land areas but it may have limited sea areas as well, designated by the JFC to facilitate protection of joint bases and their connecting lines of communication that support joint operations in an operational area. A significant amount of joint forces position themselves in the JSA to conduct operations. A SSIGNED A REA OF O PERATIONS C-11. Inside of an assigned AO, Army forces will generally have a rear-close-deep orientation. These areas will overlap with operational and strategic areas on their edges. Paragraphs C-15 through C-40 describe this framework in greater detail. E XTENDED D EEP A REAS ON THE M ULTI -D OMAIN B ATTLEFIELD C-12. Operational deep areas are generally those areas immediately beyond the land component's initially assigned AO. These areas may or may not be in the boundaries of a JOA or a theater of operations. Operational deep areas are often beyond the feasible movement of conventional forces without significant support from the joint force. C-13. Operational deep areas are often highly contested and contain enemy supporting formations and capabilities for their main forces. Enemy forces can generate significant combat power from these areas, and capabilities that reside here are often vital to their conduct of operations. In most campaign designs, operational objectives for friendly forces reside initially in the operational deep area. C-14. Strategic deep areas are the areas beyond the feasible range of movement for conventional forces, but they are where joint fires, special operations forces, information, and virtual capabilities can be employed. These areas are either beyond the operational reach of conventional forces, or they are prohibited by policy to employ capabilities there. Many enemy space, cyberspace, and information physical capabilities reside in strategic deep areas across international boundaries and outside the JOA, and they often comprise multiple geographically noncontiguous areas. DEEP, CLOSE, REAR, AND SUPPORT AREAS C-15. In their assigned AOs, Army commanders designate deep, close, rear, and support areas, to describe the physical arrangement of forces in time, space, and purpose. The areas are dynamic and require continuous adjustment as the situation changes throughout an operation. Each of the echelons reflects these adjustments in perspective by modifying existing graphic control measures and creating new ones. Careful management of graphic control measures to reflect a common understanding of the operational framework and simplify command and control facilitates subordinate echelons’ freedom of action necessary to create and exploit opportunities. The locations of the deep, close, and rear areas shift in relation to each when unit boundaries change at the direction of a higher headquarters. C-16. Figure C-3 illustrates the overlap between areas of different echelons and their relationship with each other. For simplicity, this figure only illustrates a single formation at each echelon (division, corps, and field army) for ease of explanation. In practice, these may often overlap. Two additional examples of contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operations using multiples of each echelon are described in paragraphs C-46 through C-52. D EEP A REA C-1. The deep area is where the commander sets conditions for future success in close combat (ADP 3-0). Division, corps, and army commanders conduct deep operations against uncommitted enemy forces to set the conditions for subordinate commanders conducting operations in the close area. Commanders strike enemy forces throughout their depth and prevent the effective employment of reserves, command and control nodes, logistics, and other capabilities not in direct contact with friendly forces. Deep operations extend operations in time, space, and purpose. They are not necessarily a function of geographic distance, but rather a function of the intent of the operation. Deep operations may include actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy forces and capabilities before their commitment and efforts to prevent or limit their coherent employment against friendly forces. Commanders combine maneuver, joint fires, military information support operations, and cyberspace electromagnetic activities supported by intelligence to conduct deep operations. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-94.2 for a detailed description of the deep area.) C-2. The purpose of deep operations is to prevent uncommitted enemy forces or capabilities from being employed in an effective manner. Deep operations are normally those conducted against an enemy’s forces, functions, or resources not currently committed or in contact with friendly maneuver forces. Deep operations might aim to disrupt the movement of operational reserves or prevent enemy forces from employing long-range cannon, rocket, or missile fires. In an OE where enemy forces recruit insurgents from within a population, deep operations might have a temporal rather than geographic focus to interfere with the recruiting process, disrupt the training of recruits, or eliminate the underlying factors that enable an enemy to recruit. C-3. During major operations, the effects of deep operations are typically more influential when directed against an enemy's ability to command, mass, maneuver, supply, and reinforce available conventional combat forces. Deep operations are more difficult against an enemy that employs a covert force structure, a simple supply network, and unconventional tactics. However, with timely accurate intelligence and persistent operations, deep operations can disrupt enemy supply operations, destroy weapons caches, and deny sanctuary. Commanders may use any number of tactical tasks during the execution of deep operations to divert, disrupt, delay, and destroy enemy forces. These actions are not mutually exclusive, as actions associated with one effect may also support the others. For example, deep operations conducted to disrupt an enemy force's movement may force the enemy commander to divert to an alternate avenue of approach, thereby delaying enemy forces from advancing. D EFINING THE D EEP A REA C-4. A commander's deep area is that area that extends beyond subordinate unit boundaries and is not assigned to subordinate units. The establishing commanders, supported by their staffs, plan and control execution of all operations in the deep area. Deep operations are combined arms operations. Deep operations are not simply attacking an enemy in depth; they are the sum of all activities that influence when, where, and in what condition enemy forces can be committed into close operations. Deep operations typically include a combination of information collection, target acquisition, ground and air maneuver, fires, cyber, electromagnetic activities, and information operations. Deep operations are inherently joint, since many of the capabilities employed by Army formations reside in other domains outside of an Army AO. C-5. The theater army’s deep operations planning begins before the onset of hostilities while conducting operations to achieve competition objectives. It determines the desired cyberspace, space, and information capabilities required for large-scale combat operations against a specific threat. The theater army also begins planning for the return to competition and the long-term consolidation of gains. C-6. Army and corps headquarters play a significant role in physical and temporal deep area operations. Their planners must project into the future and decide what conditions must be created and exploited to achieve their objectives. A field army employs Army and joint capabilities to shape enemy forces beyond the range of corps systems; field armies also have longer range planning horizons that allow them to set conditions for corps operations. A field army may leverage capabilities that do not reside in the operational area against enemy capabilities that may or may not reside in the operational area. Corps deep operations are those activities directed against enemy forces not currently engaged in the close operation, but capable of engaging or inflicting damage in future close operations. Corps headquarters also coordinate the anticipatory sustainment necessary to support divisional maneuver in the deep area to exploit windows of opportunity. C-7. Division deep operations, reinforced by corps capabilities, focus on enemy forces and capabilities beyond the range of the BCTs engaged in close operations. They identify opportunities for BCTs to exploit, disrupt enemy command and control, and destroy key enemy capabilities to enable the rapid maneuver of BCTs. Division headquarters coordinate the anticipatory sustainment necessary to support BCTBCTBasic combat training maneuver in the deep area to exploit windows of opportunity. C-8. Unit boundaries serve as a clear delineation in time and distance for where each echelons’ deep areas start and end. The distances and times will change based upon the mission and operational variables of every operation. It is in the designation and assignment of deep areas where there is often significant overlap between echelons. Corps and division deep areas will overlap with each other as well as with their adjacent units. For example, enemy forces moving laterally in depth may not concern the nearest friendly division, but they may be of great interest to a neighbor. Similarly, some enemy elements positioned in a division’s deep area may not have the same priority for the division as they do for the corps. C-9. Field army, corps, and division commanders can employ a wide range of lethal and nonlethal capabilities to conduct deep operations. These capabilities include artillery strikes, manned and unmanned aviation attacks, airborne and air assault operations, raids, reconnaissance in force, information and deception operations, and cyberspace electromagnetic activities. Additionally, commanders may coordinate for assets from other unified action partners to support deep operations through strategic reconnaissance or lethal and nonlethal engagements. Commanders may use these capabilities individually, but they normally use them in combination to create the desired effect. Deep operations may assume high levels of risk when air or ground maneuver forces are employed. Therefore, commanders and staffs must clearly understand the purposes and objectives of deep operations. They must also know the capabilities, experience, and training of friendly and enemy units to appreciate or justify the risks involved in maneuvering aviation or ground forces in the deep area. Planning Considerations for the Deep Area C-10. There are number of focus areas that echelons above brigade and their supporting formations consider when planning deliberate deep operations. This list is not all-inclusive, and commanders may adjust it based on differing mission and operational variables. Commanders and staffs—  Converge capabilities from multiple domains to isolate, penetrate, and disintegrate an enemy's integrated fires commands and integrated air defense systems.  Develop and coordinate appropriate coordination measures (graphic control measures, maneuver control measures, fires support coordination measures, airspace coordination measures) to enable attack and reconnaissance aircraft, deployment of unmanned aircraft systems or other ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms to confirm target locations and dispositions, and fixed-wing aircraft for close air support and air interdiction.  Develop an integrated and synchronized fire plan for the movement to engagement that includes continuous target refinement, joint suppression of enemy air defenses from fire support platforms, and integrated electronic warfare as part of joint suppression of enemy air defenses attacks.  Consider triggers and conditions for initiating attacks through maximizing the element of surprise by attacking from unexpected areas, directions, or at unexpected times; executing during hours of limited visibility; and using terrain to mask maneuver routes and attack by fire positions.  Move forward arming and refueling points forward to enable increased tempo and multiple attacks.  Maximize use of combined arms rehearsals, aviation rehearsals, tactical and technical field artillery rehearsals, and sustainment rehearsals.  Consider methods of command and control, including the location of command posts, especially when conducting deep maneuver in contested environments. C-11. Deep operations are generally shaping operations for a campaign or major operation, but they can be a branch or sequel designed to take advantage of an opportunity. Their planning and execution require detailed planning and execution from most staff sections to ensure their success. Deep operations are usually begun in the future operations or plans cell before being handed over to the current operations cell for execution. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-94.2 for a more detailed description of deep operations.) C LOSE A REA C-12. The close area is the portion of the commander's area of operations where the majority of subordinate maneuver forces conduct close combat (ADP 3-0). It contains the current battles and engagements of its major maneuver units. Each echelon focuses on providing its subordinate formations with the capabilities required to for success. Close operations require speed and mobility to exploit windows of opportunity by rapidly concentrating overwhelming combat power at the right time and location (either physical or virtual). This enables formations to exploit success while maintaining the initiative and setting the tempo for successful operations. Theater and field armies do not typically conduct close operations; however, their deep and rear operations directly affect the ability of the corps and divisions to conduct close operations. Defining the Close Area C-13. A corps’ close area includes the deep, close, rear, support, and consolidation of gains operations of its committed divisions and separate maneuver brigades. Corps headquarters focus on assigning tasks and resourcing their divisions and separate brigades with capabilities that help identify and exploit windows of opportunity. These capabilities include information collection, cyberspace operations, s pace, and electronic warfare. Corps headquarters also reinforce divisions with supporting capabilities, including aviation, fires, mobility, intelligence, and sustainment. C-14. A division's close area is primarily where BCTs operate. The division headquarters focuses on information collection, sustainment, and planning that enable freedom of action for its brigades. The division headquarters also provides or coordinates capabilities in support of its BCTs to shape close operations through operations in the division deep area or to reinforce BCTs in close operations. These capabilities include indirect fires, air and missile defense, aviation support, electronic warfare, mobility, and joint fires. C-15. The size of the close area is dependent upon multiple factors, including missions, friendly capabilities, enemy capabilities, terrain, and subordinate unit mobility. This area might expand or even contract during the course of operations to allow subordinate units to focus combat power or to provide the flexibility to exploit opportunities. Controlling and accounting for this elasticity is critical. C-16. A field army’s close area is where its committed corps and divisions conduct operations. The field army gives guidance and direction to corps and divisions conducting combined arms operations in the close area. The field army’s focus is on setting the conditions for corps and divisions to defeat enemy formations to achieve their initial objectives and prepare for future operations. Field armies have access to diverse capabilities across domains and warfighting functions to support the BCTBCTBasic combat training as the primary executor of combat operations in the close area. Planning Considerations for the Close Area C-17. In the close area, the primary considerations of the corps and division formations are enabling subordinate units operations against enemy maneuver formations. Corps and division commanders and staffs enable subordinate operations by—  Controlling the movement of large units.  Maintaining an uninterrupted flow of sustainment activities to enable sustained combat operations.  Maintaining tempo to prevent enemy forces from regaining the initiative.  Creating and maintaining the flexibility to exploit windows of opportunity across domains.  Sustaining the ability to converge capabilities across domains against enemy vulnerabilities.  Protecting critical infrastructure and key lines of communication for future operations.  Managing boundaries and control measures.  Massing combat power at decisive points, spaces, and times. C-18. Operations in the close area are planned in future operations but they are executed by current operations, primarily in the current operations integration center. Commanders may choose to deploy a tactical command post to provide command and control of a critical part of an operation. R EAR A REA C-19. Rear area operations occur in the portion of the commander’s AO that extends forward from the commander’s rear boundary to the rear boundary of the commander’s subordinate units. It is an area where most of the forces and assets locate that support and sustain forces in the close area. Rear operations are controlled from the support area, but they generally occur across the width and depth of the broader AO. Within a division or corps, rear command posts have designated coordinating authorities to ensure that operations are deconflicted and synchronized with the overall plan. Theater and field armies do not have a separate command post to assist in the management of rear area operations; all of their operations are usually controlled out of their main command posts. Defining the Rear Area C-20. Rear area operations are focused on ensuring freedom of action and reach in current and future operations. In linear terms, these actions occur behind lead maneuver formations. At the tactical level, these operations ensure the tempo of combat, ensuring that commanders have the agility to exploit opportunities without hesitation or delay. At the operational level, these operations focus on the next phase of the campaign or major operation. These operations are numerous, complex, and continuous. Four activities in particular occur in the rear area, and they must be accounted for: assembly and movement of reserves, redeployment of fire support, the movement of tactical units through the area, and the maintenance and security of sustainment and command and control. C-21. Reserves must be positioned to support their anticipated commitment, and their probable routes must be free of obstruction. Likewise, fire support assets must be deployed and redeployed to support current and future operations. While the majority of sustainment and command and control assets will be deployed inside of the support area, they will have elements conducting operations outside of the support area that must be accounted for by the rear command post. Finally, tactical units will be moving through the rear area into and out of the close area and combat operations. All of these activities will compete for limited terrain and lines of communications to support their operations. (See paragraphs C-29 through C-37 for more information on the support area.) C-22. A JFC normally establishes JSAs in the territory of a sovereign host nation. Because of this, theater and field army rear areas generally reside in an area where the host nation retains some level of control and overall responsibility for security, movement, and terrain management. In such cases, theater and field armies are responsible for robust coordination and liaison with the host nation. C-23. During operations, commanders may need to establish AOs for subordinate formations in their echelon’s rear area. This is particularly true in the offense as friendly force gains territory, to exploit tactical success while enabling freedom of action for forces operating in other areas. When designated, these areas may have all of the characteristics of the close area as subordinate forces conduct operations. The purpose of establishing these AOs is to unencumber units conducting close operations and enabling the higher echelon headquarters to focus on close operations, deep operations, and future planning. C-24. When these AOs are initially established by corps and divisions they are focused on the reduction of bypassed enemy forces, securing routes and population centers, and setting the conditions for broader, more focused stability operations in the future, as conditions allow. As the overall operation develops, commanders may identify areas where operations can transition to consolidating initial military gains and setting conditions for the eventual transition to follow-on forces or other legitimate authorities. Operations in these AOs may be overseen by the either the rear command post or the main command post depending upon the overall pace of operations and the commander’s guidance. C-25. Corps and divisions may establish multiple subordinate AOs in their respective rear areas during operations. Once these AOs are established, they must be managed as units request boundary shifts to support future operations. As tactical formations continue their advance, they pass responsibility for these AOs to their higher echelon headquarters when the span of control exceeds their capability to effectively command and control them. These transfers allow them to maintain their focus and the tempo of operations. The higher headquarters then decides whether to continue operations or shift the focus of those formations to other tasks. The land component command, or field army when constituted, plans and coordinates the capabilities necessary to exploit military success across an AO. Although field armies may not initially control forces directly, it may become necessary for them to assume responsibility for any areas handed off by corps and divisions. When field armies assume responsibility for these areas, they will also assume control of the units operating in them. By doing so, they unencumber their subordinate tactical headquarters allowing them to remain focused on combat operations. C-26. The land component command, or field army, in conjunction with the theater army, prioritize longer term stability operations in areas where ground combat is largely concluded to set the conditions for the successful consolidation of gains as part of fulfilling the strategic objectives for the conflict. Field armies also coordinate with the theater army for the eventual transition of these areas to other legitimate authorities. The theater army plans and coordinates the capabilities necessary to sustain the long-term consolidation of gains during and after conflict. This planning begins as early as possible and in close coordination with the field army to ensure success. Oftentimes, this planning will run in parallel with planning for large-scale ground combat operations. Planning Considerations for the Rear Area C-27. During rear operations, the primary considerations of commanders and their staffs are the positioning, employment, and protection of assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations. These considerations include—  Security.  Sustainment.  Terrain management.  Movement control.  Protection.  Infrastructure development.  Coordination with host-nation and multinational governmental organizations.  The orderly transferring of areas to another headquarters as their units continue to advance or their mission changes.  Focusing initial operations on establishing security, limiting human suffering, and providing basic life support to prevent the further movement of refugees or displaced persons on the battlefield.  Maintaining freedom of maneuver for friendly forces through the AO. C-28. Rear area operations are planned in the main command post, but they are controlled by the rear command post. Normally, corps and division commanders will designate a deputy commander responsible for coordinating these operations. What authorities are designated to the rear command post need to be established in unit standard operating procedures or identified in the base operations order and updated as necessary in subsequent fragmentary orders. (See ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 3-94.2 for more information on rear area operations.) S UPPORT A REA C-29. A support area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations (ADP 3-0). Commanders assign a support area as a subordinate area of operations to support functions. In a division or corps support area, a designated unit such as a BCTBCTBasic combat training or MEB, provides reconnaissance; area security; terrain management; movement control; mobility support; clearance of fires; CBRNCBRNChemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations; and required tactical combat forces. This allows sustainment units to focus on their primary functions. Defining the Support Area C-30. Corps and divisions are likely to designate support areas beyond the JSA, while armies are not. The headquarters that establishes the support area is the one that orchestrates the sustainment and protection tasks essential to ensuring freedom of action in the deep and close areas. It will orchestrate movement and terrain management, protection of sustainment assets, and planning to support continuous operations. These headquarters will control movement short of their subordinates’ boundaries and allocate resources. Planning in the support area largely influences current and future operations in the deep, close, and consolidation areas. Support areas are generally positioned out of range of most of the enemy’s weapons systems when possible. However, security considerations must be balanced with maintaining responsiveness to subordinate units conducting close and deep operations. C-31. The field army support area is usually in the JSA. The JSA is a specific area, designated by the JFC, to facilitate protection of joint bases and their connecting lines of communications that support joint operations. It performs the same functions as the other support areas; the main difference is that Army forces may only be tenants instead of in control of it. The field army may not have a command or support relationship with the unit tasked to command and control the JSA. Field army planning in the JSA largely influences current and future operations in its deep area. It also influences the conduct of corps operations in the close and consolidation areas through the allocation of resources. The field army's temporal horizon for sustainment planning is from 96 hours out to 9 days in large-scale combat operations. C-32. Corps support areas often contain subordinate division support areas that have not yet displaced forward during offensive operations or are positioned out of the range of enemy long-range fires during defensive operations. Some corps controlled activities co-locate in subordinate division AOs to facilitate better support. Corps planning in the support area largely influences current and future operations in the deep, close, and consolidation areas. Their temporal horizon for sustainment planning is from 72 hours out to 6 days in large-scale combat operations. C-33. Division support areas include assigned division assets and additional corps assets that may be co-located to facilitate the conduct of operations. Units in the division support area will conduct those tasks essential to ensuring freedom of action in the division deep and close area. They will also provide limite d support to division consolidation areas when they are established. The division headquarters controls movement short of the BCTBCTBasic combat training boundaries. The division headquarters orchestrate the movement and terrain management in the division support area, the protection of sustainment assets, and planning to support continuous operations. The division headquarters temporal horizon for sustainment planning is 48–96 hours in large-scale combat operations. C-34. Field army, corps, and division commanders position critical sustainment, command and control, and protection capabilities in the support area. These capabilities are focused on enabling close operations, supporting operations in the consolidation area, supporting deep operations, and setting the conditions so that formations can exploit windows of opportunity during operations. Commanders may also chose to co-locate some of their assets in their subordinate units’ support areas to facilitate timely support to their operations. Corps are most likely to do this to maintain tempo. Planning Considerations for Support Areas C-35. In the support area, the primary considerations of commanders and their staffs is the positioning, employment, and protection of assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations. Some critical considerations are—  Command and support relationships between units in the support area.  Transportation networks (including road, rail, inland waterways, and air) into and out of the area.  Protection from enemy indirect fire assets.  Survivability of critical assets.  Terrain management and security responsibilities.  Displacement considerations to sustain tempo and shorten lines of communication.  Movement control into, through the support area, and out of units enabling combat operations. C-36. Planners must account for the differing nature of the majority of units performing functions in the support area and plan accordingly. Some capabilities may not arrive quickly in theater due to mobilization and movement restrictions. Therefore, planners must consider when capabilities arrive in theater. To compensate for any limitation or critical need, options include other Services, multinational partners, host-nation contractors, and DOD logistics contracts when available. C-37. During large-scale combat, operations in the support area are vital to the overall success of an operation. Displacing the corps or division support areas require significant planning and preparation for successful execution. Support area operations are integrated into all planning efforts and accounted for in any course of action and subsequent scheme of maneuver. Commanders may decide to control these operations from their main command post or delegate that control to their rear command post based upon the situation and overall operations. DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE C-38. Paragraphs C-55 through C-68 briefly explain a doctrinal template for the operational framework based upon relevant friendly and enemy weapons systems. The purpose of this template is to provide commanders and staffs with a common point of reference to which they can apply the variables specific to their operations during planning. This template is one expression of the science of operations. C-39. Figure C-4 on page C-11 shows a generic AO for corps, divisions, and field armies in large-scale combat based upon some basic calculations using current Army capabilities. Frontages were determined using the ranges of direct fire weapon systems, available ISRISRIntelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, and the operational reach of select systems (air and missile defense, unmanned aircraft system, and reconnaissance and aviation assets). Physical depth of the battlefield is primarily driven by the effective ranges of friendly joint and adversary fire systems combined with the reconnaissance assets assigned to those echelons. The depth of the close and deep areas are based on friendly indirect fires systems, the ability to observe fires, and the ability to detect enemy forces. These calculations do not account for specific types of operations or the terrain. Commanders and staffs must analyze the mission variables to determine the actual frontage echelons can reasonably command and control. F RONTAGES C-40. Using the information listed in paragraph C-55, the following frontages can be derived for the division, corps, and field army:  A division’s frontage is from 18 to 28 kilometers (11 to 17 miles), depending upon whether the division has 2 or 3 BCTs abreast and those individual frontages.  A corps’ frontage is from 55 to 85 kilometers (34 to 53 miles), depending upon whether the corps has 2 or 3 divisions abreast and those division's individual frontages.  A field army’s frontage is from 110 to 250 kilometers (68 to 155 miles), depending upon whether the field army has 2 or 3 corps abreast and those corps’ individual frontages. D EPTHS C-41. The depths of the division and corps close and deep areas are defined in kilometers beyond the forward line of troops. Using the information in paragraph C-55, depths can be derived for the division, corps, and field army:  The division close area extends out to 15 kilometers (9 miles).  The division deep area extends from 15 to 24 kilometers (9 to 15 miles).  The corps close area extends out to 24 kilometers (15 miles).  The corps deep area extends from 24 to 45 kilometers (15 to 28 miles).  The field army close area extends out to 45 kilometers (28 miles).  The field army deep area extends from 45 to 300 kilometers (28 to 186 miles). C-42. The placement of support areas is influenced by enemy artillery and rocket ranges. Support areas are generally placed out of range of the majority of the enemy’s indirect fire systems to increase their survivability. These general considerations results in the minimum distances behind the forward line of troops:  The division support area extends from 29 to 36 kilometers (18 to 22 miles) behind the forward line of troops.  The corps support area extends from 70 to 90 kilometers (44 to 56 miles) behind the forward line of troops or 40 to 60 kilometers (25 to 37 miles) behind the division’s support areas.  The field army support area extends from 300 to 500 kilometers (186 to 311 miles) behind the forward line of troops depending on where the enemy is able to position its long-range munitions. C-43. These distances are generic, and they do not account for specific mission variables such as the terrain, availability for friendly mobility assets, types of formations, and specific missions. C-44. Consolidation areas are areas designated by the commander to facilitate the security and stability tasks necessary for freedom of action in the close and deep areas. As such, their placement will generally be behind the rear boundary of each echelon's subordinate units. Although this may not be true in all instances, in large-scale combat operations they most probably will because of the inherent fluidity, lethality, and tempo of close operations. C-45. This construct is generic and not tied to specific terrain. In a scenario like that on the Korean peninsula the frontages could be much narrower based upon the terrain and the enemy with less available depth to protect critical support assets. In a European scenario, these frontages could be much wider. CONTIGUOUS AND NONCONTIGUOUS AREAS OF OPERATIONS C-46. The previous construct portrayed a linear construct for operations using only one formation for each echelon. It also did not display areas of influence and areas of interest. AOs can also be organized contiguously or noncontiguously depending upon the situation. C-47. An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control (JP 3-0). This area is bounded by the ranges of the commander’s assigned maneuver and fire support units. It is not dependent upon those capabilities that can be requested from higher echelons but are not assigned to the formation. A commander’s area of influence is normally larger than that commander’s assigned AO, but it is smaller than their area of interest. C-48. An area of interest is that area of concern, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0). An area of interest will vary in size and shape from operation to operation. It should include all enemy activities that might affect a friendly force throughout the duration of an operation. An area of interest will usually surround an AO, extending forward and to the flanks of the AO. Depending upon the operation, it may also extend rearwards. During offensive operations, portions of the area of interest may become part of an AO as friendly forces advance. C-49. Commanders generally consider noncontiguous or the combination of both contiguous and noncontiguous AOs based upon these factors: insufficient forces to cover the entire AO, geographic isolation based upon terrain, or time constraints for completing the mission. The reasons for using a noncontiguous area vary, but they begin with geographic separation of important terrain from the remainder of the AO. A commander’s decision to deploy part of a force in noncontiguous AOs is derived from the commander’s analysis of the operational and mission variables. In particular, the commander evaluates threat forces and their ability to mass sufficient combat power to threaten friendly forces. Second, the commander evaluates the ability of threat forces to sever lines of communication between the noncontiguous AOs. Finally, the commander assesses the risks of having isolated forces defeated in detail against what may be gained in mission accomplishment. C-50. While a commander can always chose to use noncontiguous AOs based upon specific operational variables, the most obvious AOR requiring the use of noncontiguous areas of operations is the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command AOR. The geography and distances involved between island chains force a noncontiguous approach to land combat that relies heavily on joint capabilities. C-51. Contiguous AOs ensure that subordinates are in mutually supporting range of each other while avoiding gaps and seams in responsibility. Contiguous AOs may also provide additional security for maneuver units and headquarters and support units. C-52. In noncontiguous AOs, subordinate units are not mutually supporting to each other and there are gaps between their boundaries. These gaps remain the responsibility of the higher echelon headquarters, and they can present added risks to an operation.

This appendix addresses the transition of Army echelons to a joint headquarters. Forming and transitioning an Army echelon into a JTF or joint force land component headquarters is a key organizational decision that will influence the conduct of joint land operations. This appendix describes the significant activities involved in manning, training, and equipping an Army echelon above brigade as it forms and transitions into a joint headquarters. JOINT HEADQUARTERS OVERVIEW D-1. The Army provides the combatant commander with trained and equipped headquarters that can apply land power from the theater to the tactical level. Armies, corps, and divisions are the echelons prepared to fulfill a joint headquarters role in the conduct of operations. They provide the necessary options for the employment of land power in an interdependent joint force. The primary joint headquarters roles these Army echelons fulfill is that of the JTF headquarters and the joint land component headquarters. J OINT T ASK F ORCE H EADQUARTERS D-2. A JTF headquarters is a joint force headquarters that is constituted and designated by a JFC, such as the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or a state governor (for JTF-state). This is done in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 (50 USCUSCUnited States Code 3001), 10 USCUSCUnited States Code, and 32 USCUSCUnited States Code. D-3. A JFC establishes a JTF headquarters when the scope, complexity, or other factors of an operation require capabilities from at least two Military Departments operating under a single JFC. JTF commanders are responsible for establishing command relationships between subordinate commanders and for accomplishing any operational missions. D-4. Based upon the decision of the establishing JFC, the commander of a JTF may exercise OPCON or TACON over assigned and attached forces. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs normally direct the delegation of OPCON over forces attached to those subordinate commands. A JFC with assigned or attached OPCON forces has the authority to organize to best accomplish the mission. The organization of these forces is usually based on the commander’s intent, concept of operations, and the consideration of Service organizations. If the commander has TACON of assigned or attached forces, the force can be tasked but not reorganized. See Appendix A for more information on command relationships. D-5. JTF headquarters’ responsibilities are driven by mission requirements. These requirements further drive the required capabilities of the staff, and, ultimately the organization and manning needed to support the combatant commander. For instance, the JTF staff must have awareness of joint terminology and familiarity with joint staff processes. Also, the commander, JTF, and the commander’s staff have critical roles in ensuring unified action. Note. A designated Service headquarters can be considered a JTF-capable headquarters once the establishing authority (combatant commander) is satisfied with its level of training and readiness. D-6. Army echelons above brigade can provide expertise and be the nucleus for JTFs of various sizes and durations. This is because Army echelons above brigade are organized for scope and scale. Army echelons habitually train personnel and exercise missions to perform command and control in operations requiring unified action. Therefore, with augmentation, these echelons have the expertise, knowledge, and staff organization to form and transition to a JTF headquarters. Figure D-1 is an example of a notional JTF headquarters. (See JP 1-0, JP 3-0, and JP 3-33 for additional information on JTFs.) J OINT F ORCE L AND C OMPONENT H EADQUARTERS D-7. A joint force land component headquarters is a component of a unified command, subordinate unified command, or JTF. It is responsible to the establishing commander for recommending the proper employment of assigned, attached, and available land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. D-8. A JFC establishes a joint force land component headquarters when the scope, complexity, or other factors of an operation require capabilities from at least two military departments operating in the land domain. Joint force land component headquarters, at the direction of the JFLCC, are responsible for establishing command relationships between subordinate land component commanders and for accomplishing assigned operational missions. D-9. In some limited contingency operations, the JFC may elect to employ Marine Corps and Army forces as Service components, instead of creating a functional joint force land component. In that case, the ARFOR and Marine Corps forces would exercise OPCON and ADCON over their respective Service forces. This arrangement may occur in a forcible entry operation due to the complexity of vertical insertion, or amphibious operations and limited time available for joint integration. As soon as the JOA matures with the arrival of follow-on forces and headquarters, the JFC may establish a joint force land component headquarters. Figure D-2 is an example of a notional joint force land component headquarters. FORMING AND TRANSITIONING Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command. Napoleon D-10. Once granted by the Secretary of Defense, the JFC has the authority to form a joint headquarters under a named operation. Through this authority, the JFC establishes subordinate commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command relationships, and establishes coordinating instructions for the component commanders. This contributes to the forming of a joint headquarters. D-11. Forming a joint headquarters provides for unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. Unity of command is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning and direction are essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. D-12. In order for an Army echelon to fully exercise its new joint authorities and provide new capabilities, it must first man, train, and equip for its new joint role. There are many challenges associated with an Army echelon above brigade preparing to form and transition to a joint headquarters. These challenges come in terms of the time it takes to form, and other activities such as planning and managing transitions, manning the headquarters, equipping the headquarters, training the staffs, and exercising the headquarters. Paragraphs D-13 through D-43 focus on the activities an Army headquarters executes as it forms and transitions into a joint headquarters. Figure D-3 (on page D-6) is an example of a process and activities the headquarters may perform to reach joint headquarters capability. (See TC 6-6 for more information on transitioning to a joint headquarters.) T IME TO F ORM D-13. Ideally, Army units designated for transition to a joint headquarters have six months or more before transitioning. Six months provides the unit time to complete the recommended Army training tables, which are found in TC 6-6. However, a typical transition to a joint headquarters is less than 42 days. D-14. In cases where an Army unit must transition quickly, there are a number of products and resources that assist commanders, joint task forces, and staffs in expediting the process of forming the JTF headquarters and organizing the staffs for an effective transition. Some of these products and resources can be found on the joint force headquarters training websites non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp. These products include notional JTF headquarters templates that contain joint manning documents to assist in manning; command and control architectures, systems, software, telecommunications, and video requirements for equipping; and the Joint Force Headquarters Training website on the Joint Electronic Library Plus with learning resources for training the JTF staff. D-15. In addition, there are numerous organizations that may provide subject matter expertise to a rapidly forming joint headquarters. Such organizations include—  The joint enabling capabilities command. It provides global, rapidly deployable, temporary joint expeditionary capabilities across the range of military operations to assist in the initial establishment, organization, and operation of joint force headquarters.  National intelligence support. It is sourced from intelligence and communications experts from across the national intelligence community.  The Defense Threat Reduction Agency integrates, synchronizes, and provides expertise, technologies, and capabilities to safeguard the U.S. and its allies from global weapons of mass destruction and improvised threats.  The Joint Information Operations Warfare Center. It provides information-related subject matter expertise and advice to the joint staff and combatant commands and develops and maintains a joint information assessment framework that measures and reports performance of information-related capabilities supporting joint operations.  The joint communications security monitoring activity. Provides information security monitoring and analysis support to JTFs.  The Joint Warfare Analysis Center. It assists in preparation and analysis of joint operation plans and Service chiefs’ analysis of weapons effectiveness. (For more organizations and information on rapidly forming a joint headquarters, see JP 3-33 and JP 3-31.) P LANNING AND M ANAGING T RANSITIONS D-16. Upon notification, commanders with support from their existing staffs immediately begin planning and managing transitions and apply transition techniques towards the end state of becoming a joint headquarters. The transition of operational responsibilities from a combatant command to a joint headquarters usually occurs in the early stages of a crisis. Transitioning to a joint headquarters is not a discrete event. The staffs may overlap some activities over time. Eight techniques recommended in TC 6-6 are—  Plan early and often.  Build flexibility into plans.  Be as transparent as possible.  Integrate transitions across lines of operations.  Ensure key leaders actively manage transitions.  Adjust staff processes to account for increased requirements.  Design organizations and processes with consideration for their short-term and long-term consequences.  Develop a plan for the transition to a joint headquarters. D-17. Additionally, there are things staffs should identify and understand, as part of planning, to promote a smooth transition. The staffs should identify and understand—  Authorities of the joint headquarters.  The joint operational area.  Interoperability issues.  Lines of communications.  Classification for headquarters developed products.  Techniques for creating situational and shared understanding. D-18. Joint headquarters forming on short notice may not have the opportunity to conduct the level of detailed planning they would like to or have the time to develop relationships with staff augments, unified action partners, and stakeholders. However, by organizing early in the transition process, seeking support from the joint community, following the eight techniques in paragraph D-16, promoting shared understanding, and executing timely decision making the echelon may overcome most challenges during transition. (See TC 6-6 for more information on transition.) M ANNING THE H EADQUARTERS D-19. A joint manning document must be developed to effectively form a joint headquarters from an Army echelon, in its routine Service-related mission, to that of a joint headquarters. A joint manning document defines the joint headquarters’ overall manpower requirements needed to complete its mission. D-20. The commander, in coordination with the current and the establishing commander’s staffs, develops and organizes a draft joint headquarters joint manning document that clearly establishes required sourcing to assign mission tasks or accomplish joint headquarters mission tasks. The joint manning document can be filled through multiple sourcing methods, including units, multinational partners, other government agencies, and contractors. The joint manning document provides the venue for requesting the joint individual augmentation necessary to staff the joint headquarters. (See JP 1-0 for more information on augmentation.) D-21. Key staff considerations include manning staffs using those with the expertise to assist in the integration of joint enablers as well as interagency, mission partner, and coalition members. The staff framework is based on doctrine, standard operating procedures, and requirements to the combatant command. This may require the establishment, or manipulation of existing positions, to support key billets. Some of these may include—  Deputy commanders.  Chiefs of staff.  Command senior enlisted leaders (equivalent to Army command sergeants major).  Principal staff officers.  Political advisors or foreign policy advisors.  Interagency liaisons.  Coalition members.  Other liaison officers as required.  The commander’s action group or commander’s initiative group.  Executive officers. D-22. In general, the roles and responsibilities of key staff positions are the same regardless of mission set. However, specific guidance on roles and responsibilities outside of normal operations and functions should be identified. For example, special consideration of joint service involvement for assignment needs to ensure subject matter expert participation and create collaboration in the joint headquarters construct. Integration of an existing staff that will form the future joint headquarters becomes more complex, and special attention must be given to apportioning roles and responsibilities for inclusion and building teamwork. D-23. The chief of staff, in coordination with the staff, ensures the joint manning document is complete and supports the commander’s intent. Once complete, the staff submits the joint manning document in accordance with the establishing authority’s guidance. The document is then forwarded to the establishing commander where it is validated and approved. (See JP 1-0 for more information on joint manning.) Organizing the Staffs D-24. The commander, JTF, and staff establish and maintain cross-functional organizations such as working groups and boards to enhance planning and decision making in the headquarters. They establish, modify, and dissolve these entities as the needs of the headquarters evolve. D-25. Commanders decide how to organize and transition the headquarters. They consider several options:  A standard application of the Army warfighting functions of command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.  A functional organization of a command group; logistics group; and knowledge management, information superiority, planning, and operations sections.  A mission-based command group, strategic communications, reconstruction, security, and political and military sections.  A hybrid organization with typical joint staff sections, current operations, future operations, future plans; or the joint-code structure with commander, personal and special staff, deputy commanders, chiefs of staff, and joint staff sections. D-26. Commanders arrange their organization to best support decision-making requirements, to support higher echelon headquarters and mission partner information requirements, and to set conditions for subordinate success. They direct how the headquarters monitors, assesses, plans, and directs operations. The commander must dedicate time to identifying headquarters functions and determining the appropriate organization and processes before focusing on specifics of manning. Joint Enablers D-27. Upon deciding the type and functions of the headquarters, the commander codifies staff roles and aligns Service strengths with a joint manning plan. This plan identifies billets and the means to man the headquarters through by-name-requests, enabler augmenters, unit sourcing using requests for forces, and joint individual augmentees. Commanders continually assess these plans and adjust as necessary to accomplish the mission while maintaining agility and flexibility. Establishing a Battle Rhythm D-28. A battle rhythm provides a logical arrangement of cross-functional, repetitive staff events that integrate the commander’s decision cycle across the three event horizons (current operations, future operations, and future plans). Ultimately, every event of the battle rhythm supports the commander’s decision making and produces shared understanding across staff sections. When developing a battle rhythm, the staffs first consider which higher echelon headquarters events they must participate in, followed by determining where to locate the JTF commander’s touchpoints that best facilitate the decision cycle. Identifying the right time to receive guidance so that planning and product development can continue and timely, well-informed decisions can be made is essential. D-29. The commander formalizes the battle rhythm by establishing boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working groups, and operational planning teams. The commander directs the chief of staff to ensure they support commander-centric decision making. D-30. Each of the boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working groups, and operational planning teams is organized for its respective purpose or function. This facilitates a cross -functional approach, leverages expertise, and allows for relevant stakeholder interface to solve problems required to coordinate and synchronize efforts across time and space. Logical arrangement of boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working groups, and operational planning teams allow staffs to manage activities across three event horizons and to effectively support the commander’s decision-making process. Consideration on the participation and frequency of boards, bureaus, centers, cells, working groups, and operational planning teams is important as to not overwhelm the manning, capability, and capacity of the staffs involved. Assistant chiefs of staffs, under the direction of the chief of staff and commander, lead this effort. E QUIPPING THE H EADQUARTERS D-31. Equipping the JTF headquarters to execute the mission is a deliberate and essential process that sets the conditions for transitioning and mitigates potential delays. Commanders emphasize the importance of developing an equipping plan that includes the necessary equipment for a joint capable headquarters. Special attention must be paid to command and control and other communications equipment to ensure systems are integrated for joint operability. D-32. Designated Service headquarters commanders emphasize the development of a joint mission es sential equipment list of joint command and control systems, applications, communications systems, and support equipment for the JTF headquarters. D-33. The preparation of a command and control equipping plan that includes the joint mission essential equipment list, identifies required manning and system-specific training for command and control systems and applications, and addresses how command and control capability shortfalls or gaps will be sourced. Command and control equipment planning helps joint-capable headquarters have a joint command and control systems, applications, and communications capability that is interoperable with the supported combatant command’s command and control architecture, functional component commands, subordinate Service and multinational tactical forces, and potential mission partners. D-34. The chief of staff, in coordination with the staff, ensures that the joint mission essential equipment list is complete and supports the combatant command’s order and the joint headquarters commander’s intent. The joint headquarters ensures that a commander O-6 (or federal employee level 15) or above signs the joint mission essential equipment list as the certifying official indicating that the joint mission essential equipment list is valid in content and accuracy. Upon completion of the joint mission essential equipment list, the command forwards the joint mission essential equipment list to the establishing authority for record of completion. D-35. The assistant chief of staff for personnel (known as G-1), G-4, G-1 noncommissioned officer in charge, and G-4 noncommissioned officer in charge lead the effort to build the sustainment and manning plan. The G-6 briefs the command post action plan and the commander approves it, then the G-6 sends the requests to higher echelons for approval of command post architecture. Once approval is received, the operations sergeant major works with the personnel and logistics sections on the command post sustainment and manning plan. The sustainment and manning plan includes but is not limited to—  All required classes of supply.  Command post meal schedule.  Shift work considerations.  Mail.  Trash.  Parking.  Command post protection.  Mechanic support.  Host-nation constraints.  Operating tempo. D-36. The final step in the planning process for equipping the headquarters is for each section to build their initial load out plan. This plan entails all equipment the section brings to the JOA. T RAINING S TAFF M EMBERS In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military. Douglas MacArthur D-37. Staffs develop ongoing training efforts to improve their joint and multinational capabilities at the individual and collective levels. Various resources may be available to provide checklists for these training efforts. Staffs analyze training resources and produce recommended timelines to serve as a guide for setting the conditions for transitioning to a joint headquarters. D-38. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Operations, Plans, and Training section (also known as the G-3/5/7) leads the effort to establish a joint training plan. The joint training plan is tailored to the mission, operational environment, coalition participation, commander’s intent, and direction from higher echelon headquarters. Commanders give their staffs guidance on which direction to take and which areas to focus on to build the joint training plan. The joint training plan encompasses all joint and coalition partners to the extent possible. The joint training plan covers the multi-domain battlefield and encompasses specific areas of emphasis as outlined by the commander. D-39. The Joint Training System is used to instill this training. The Joint Training System is divided into four phases: the requirements phase, plans phase, execution phase, and assessment phase. (See TC 6-6 for training tables for transition to a joint headquarters for commander, staff, command post, and essential signal capabilities.) D-40. The joint training tables in TC 6-6 allow for a “crawl, walk, run” approach to transitioning. Along with initial guidance and receipt of orders from higher echelon headquarters, an Army unit may conduct staff exercises, warfighter exercises, and participate in external evaluations as it prepares for transition. The staffs capture their progress in the Joint Training Information Management System to determine effectiveness and to create training proficiency assessments. E XERCISING THE H EADQUARTERS D-41. Units may increase their proficiency and readiness for transitioning to joint headquarters, by conducting exercise events. Headquarters forming exercises are based on potential missions; they stress staffs to identify deficiencies and create opportunities to gain efficiencies. These events can be conducted as part of a Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise or as a separate training event. D-42. Joint headquarters readiness events can be designed to exercise the formation of the joint headquarters under combatant command-defined conditions. A forming exercise builds trust between organizations, increases understanding in the combatant command of its requirements for a joint headquarters, and exercises the joint headquarters on the most probable mission sets. A forming exercise takes the place of a traditional Army staff exercise (also known as STAFFEX) or command post exercise (also known as CPX). D-43. After the completion of the joint training tables and other staff exercises, a final evaluation, and the combatant command joint exercise (also known as a JT-X) serve as the capstone events. This is an operational capability assessment certification conducted to allow the commander to certify the status of the unit and its ability to execute the roles and responsibilities of a JTF. Upon completion of a combatant command joint exercise, the combatant commander or designated representative certifies the transition is complete. (See TC 6-6 for more information on exercising and training Army units to be a joint force headquarters.) This page intentionally left blank. Source Notes This section lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it lists both the page number followed by the paragraph number. 1-2 “The first, the supreme…”: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 88. 2-1 “Logistics comprises…”: Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1862), 68, Project Gutenberg. Available at http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/13549. 2-2 “To be practical…”: Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Company), 330. 2-4 “For Alexander…”: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 596. 2-5 Center of Gravity: Republican Guard Divisions in the 1991 Gulf War. Vignette adapted from Stephen A. Bourque, Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2002), 349–56. 2-6 “If the art of war…”: Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1862), 114, Project Gutenberg. Available at http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/13549. 2-9 Operational Reach and Basing: Sixth Army in the Philippines Campaign. Vignette adapted from Dale Andrade, Luzon (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998). 2-10 “It is my…”: Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, trans. Paul Findlay, ed. B.H. Liddell-Hart (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1953), 201. 2-12 “No army can…”: William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, volume 1, 2nd ed. (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1889), chap. XXV, Project Gutenberg Ebook. Available at http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5850. 2-13 “The American soldier…”: Omar Bradley, “American Military Leadership,” Army Information Digest (February 1953): 5. 2-14 “In general…”: Frederick the Great, as cited in Owen Connelly, On War and Leadership (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 15. 2-18 Rapid Task Organization: 30th Infantry Division in the Normandy Campaign. Vignette adapted from Brian C. North, Making the Difficult Routine: US Army Task Organization at the Army and Corps Level in Europe, 1944 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2016), 1–2. 2-22 Desert Storm: A Decisive Offensive Operation. Vignette adapted from Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Krauss, eds., The Whirlwind War (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1994), chap. 8. 2-26 Operational Maneuver: Turning Movement at Inchon. Vignette adapted from Korea— 1950 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1981), 7-8. 2-26 “From adequate…”: FM 100-5, Operations, 22 May 1941 (obsolete). 2-28 “If after…”: Captain Henry Reilly, quoted in Lowell M. Riley, “Duty of a Military Attache,” The Field Artillery Journal 30, no. 5 (September–October 1940), 366. 2-30 “Before a commander…”: Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 2-32 Responsiveness and Improvisation: The Red Ball Express. Vignette adapted from Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume 1: May 1941–September 1944 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1995), 559–63. 3-1 “A war should…”: Napoleon Bonaparte, The Officer’s Manual: Napoleon’s Maxims of War (Richmond, VA: West and Johnston, 1862), Project Gutenberg eBook. Available at http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50750. 3-1 “The nature of…” B. H. Liddell Hart, cited in Robert Debs Heinl Jr., ed., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1967), 17. 3-9 United States Army Pacific as a Theater Joint Force Land Component Commander. Vignette adapted from JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations, 03 October 2019, II-2. 3-22 “The functions…”: Ian Hamilton, The Soul and Body of an Army (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1921), 58. 3-24 Multi-Corps Command and Control in Korea, 1950. Vignette adapted from Richard W. Stewart, ed., The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917–2003, American Military History Volume II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2005), chap. 8. 3-29 Land Component Commands in World War II. Vignette adopted from To Bizerte with the II Corps, 23 April–13 May 1943 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1943). 4-1 “[The corps] can…”: A Manual for Commanders of Large Units (Provisional), Vol. I, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1930 [obsolete]), 40. 4-18 Security Cooperation: REFORGER 87. Vignette adopted from Frank Cox, “REFORGER: Certain Strike, The Battle,” Soldiers (January 1988): 29–30. 5-1 “…the smallest…”: William Slim, Defeat into Victory, Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945 (New York: First Cooper Square Press, 2000), 3. 5-3 “Of transitioning…”: Stephen L. Arnold, oral interview, “OPERATION RESTORE HOPE Oral History Interview,” 26 February 1993, Armed Forces Headquarters, U.S. Embassy Compound, Mogadishu, Somalia. 5-17 SPARTAN SHIELD: Military Engagement and Security Cooperation. Vignette adapted from U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Permanent Order 016-07, Award: Meritorious Unit Commendation, 16 January 2015. 5-18 UNITED ASSISTANCE 2014. Vignette adapted from U.S. Africa Command, History of United States Africa Command and Joint Force Command—UNITED ASSISTANCE, 03 June 2016. 5-19 JOINT ENDEAVOR. Vignette adapted from Cody Phillips, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The U.S. Army’s Role in Peace Enforcement Operations 1995 – 2004 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2005). D-5 “Nothing is so…”; Napoleon Bonaparte, The Officer’s Manual: Napoleon’s Maxims of War, (Richmond, VA: West and Johnston, 1862), Project Gutenberg eBook. Available at http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50750. D-10 “In no other profession…”; Douglas MacArthur, Report of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1933 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933), 19.

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which FM 3-94 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

Entries are by paragraph number. ADCON, 1-102–1-103, 3-28–3-31, A-15–A-16 and command relationships, 1-104–1-105, 3-128–3-129, B-27–B-30, B-33–B-34 and multinational operations, 1-106–1-107 administrative chain of command, See ADCON Army air and missile defense command, 3-81–3-82 Army Corps of Engineers, Army Cyber Operations and and command relationships, 1-99, 1-109, B-2–B-4 theater army as, 1-72, 3-6, 3-18–3-22, 3-15, 3-105– 3-106, B-27–B-30 battlefield coordination air and missile defense command, 4-68 Army Service component command, See ASCCASCCArmy service component commander brigade combat team, 4-44–4-46, 5-41 air defense artillery brigade, 4-68–4-69 area of influence, C-63 area of interest, C-64 and joint operations, C-8–C-10 and unified land operations, 3-136 assignment of, C-11, C-15– C-16, C-20, C-29–C-32, C-35, C-39, C-46, C-51– C-61 contiguous, C-65, C-67 coordination, 1-118–1-119, 3-107, C-32 corps, 4-86, 4-98, C-22–C-24, C-29, C-33, C-40–C-41, C-45–C-50 division, C-24–C-25C-30, C- 40–C-41, C-45–C-50 noncontiguous, C-65–C-66, C-68 operational deep areas, C-12– C13, C-17–C-27 synchronization within, C-1– C-2 ARFOR, 1-65, B-1 and command relationships, B-5, B-8, B-27 and tactical operations, 1-67, 5-11–5-12 responsibilities, B-6–B-7 roles of, 1-66, 5-11, B-15, B-19, B-26 Army special operations forces, 3-96 Army strategic roles, 1-21–1-22, 1-27–1-28, 3-26–3-27 and unified land operations, 1-55–1-57 consolidate gains, 1-26, 1-38, 2-24, 2-41–2-43 3-51–3-53, 3-137–3-138 large-scale ground combat, 1-25, 1-39–1-41, 1-48–51, 3-74, B-14, 3-139–3-140, 4-96, C-53 See also competition continuum , multi-domain operations, range of military operations, and unified action shape operational environments, 1-23, 1-36, B-15, 3-17, 3-133–3-134 Army support to other Services, B-35 added capabilities, B-11–B-26 ARFOR responsibilities, B-8– B-11 by a field army, 3-130–3-132 See also support relationships ASCCASCCArmy service component commander, 1-64, B-2 and ADCON, 1-103, 3-29, 3-129, A-16 and combatant commands, 1-90, B-2 chain of command, A-1–A-2, A-5, A-11, A-14–A-18 and joint operations, A-3, A-12–A-13, A-17–A-18, B-10 and logistic support, 2-65, 3-107–3-109, A-6, B-38 and multinational operations, 1-106–1-107, 4-17, A-30– A-40 and synchronization of See also OPCON and ADCON civil affairs brigade, 4-70–4-71 close area operations, C-28–C-33 combat aviation brigade, 4-65– 4-66 combat power, 2-44–2-46, C-1 and areas of operations, 2-71– 2-82 and command and control, 2-56–2-60 and fires integration, 2-115– 2-123 and force organization, 2-61– 2-69 and movement and maneuver, 2-97–2-103 and protection, 2-139–2-149 and sustainment, 2-125–2-126 and ADCON, 3-29–3-31