*FM 6-02
Field Manual
No. 6-02
Headquarters
Department of the Army

Washington, D.C., 13 September 2019

Signal Support to Operations

Command and control is fundamental to joint and Army operations. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission (JP 1). The Army’s approach to command and control in unified land operations is mission command. Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation (ADP 6-0). Mission command guides commanders, staffs, and subordinates in their approach to operations. The command and control warfighting function enables commanders and staffs of theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigade combat teams to synchronize and integrate combat power across multiple domains and the information environment. Commanders cannot exercise command and control alone. Commanders exercise command and control through the command and control warfighting function. The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power (ADP 6-0). See introductory figure-1 on page viii. Introductory figure-1. Command and control logic map A command and control system is the arrangement of people, processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders to conduct operations (ADP 6-0). The command and control system enables the commander and staff to execute the command and control warfighting function. Signal forces provide the network, information systems, and information management processes that enable command and control. Signal soldiers implementing the network and information systems and performing their staff tasks enable secure communications and situational awareness throughout their operational area. This enables the commander’s exercise of command and control in support of unified land operations. See introductory figure-2. Introductory figure-2. The command and control system By providing the network and conducting information management tasks to support the knowledge management process in the command and control system, signal formations and staff elements enable secure communications and situational awareness throughout their areas of operations. Information management processes enable knowledge management and allow commanders to control their formations and synchronize efforts across warfighting functions while conducting unified land operations. The Army’s network enables every mission, from training the force to executing tactical tasks to influence the operational environment in large-scale combat operations. The network is the part of the command and control system that provides infrastructure for voice, data, and video connectivity to support operations. The network disseminates the common operational picture and enables unified action partner integration. With modern tactical radio systems able to pass digital information, the network extends as low as the individual Soldier on the battlefield. FM 6-02 outlines signal doctrine in five chapters with supporting appendixes to address tactics and procedures for signal support to Army operations. The techniques to accomplish the signal missions, functions, and tasks in this field manual appear in signal-specific Army techniques publications. This revision to FM 6-02 adopts new doctrinal terms, force structure, and tactics implemented since the most recent update. This manual supersedes FM 6-02, dated 22 January 2014. FM 6-02 chapters include— Chapter 1 section I discusses the operational environment, information environment, and threat as they relate to signal support. Section II introduces the fundamental principles of successful signal support to joint and Army operations and the core competencies of the Signal Corps. Section III discusses the role of signal forces in Army operations. Chapter 2 section I discusses signal support to Army operations by echelon—corps and below units with organic signal capabilities; units without organic signal capabilities; echelons above corps signal units that provide support; and signal support to other Army operations. Section II details the core competencies and essential capability of the Signal Corps. Section III discusses individual and collective signal training. Section IV discusses the joint and Army networks that enable command and control across the range of military operations. Chapter 3 section I discusses signal support to Army operations to shape. Section II discusses signal support to Army operations to prevent. Chapter 4 section I provides an overview of signal support to large-scale combat operations. Section II discusses signal support to large-scale defensive operations. Section III discusses signal support to large-scale offensive operations. Chapter 5 discusses signal support to Army operations to consolidate gains. Appendix A discusses tactics and procedures for operations in a contested environment. It outlines the procedures when communications systems and networks come under enemy electronic or cyberspace attack. Appendix B discusses the role of the signal staff in the military decision-making process. It outlines the process and considerations for planning and coordinating Department of Defense information network operations, network transport and information services, spectrum management, and communications security. Appendix C provides procedures for requesting visual information and combat camera support. Appendix D discusses signal systems maintenance. It outlines two-level communications-electronics maintenance, the roles and responsibilities for maintenance management in units, and the external organizations that provide sustainment maintenance support. Appendix E provides procedures for identifying support requirements and requesting signal support from non-organic assets. Based on current doctrinal changes, certain terms for which FM 6-02 is the proponent have been modified for purposes of this publication. The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms. See introductory table-1 for specific term changes. Introductory table-1. Modified Army terms Term Remarks network transport Modified definition Pro Patria Vigilans! (Watchful for the Country) Signal Corps Motto

Signal personnel and units at all echelons provide and secure the network for their commanders to conduct command and control and integrate the other warfighting functions across the range of military operations. This chapter describes the operational environment, the fundamental principles and core competencies of signal support, and the role of signal forces in support of Army operations.

Training, and the Army Network This chapter discusses Army signal capabilities by echelon, the core competencies of the Signal Corps, signal collective training in units, and the Department of Defense information network-Army.

This chapter provides an overview of signal support to Army operations to shape and prevent. Section I discusses signal support in Army operations to shape. Section II discusses signal support in Army operations to prevent.

This chapter discusses signal support to large-scale combat operations. The chapter is divided into 4 sections. Section I provides an overview of signal support to joint and Army large-scale combat operations. Section II discusses signal support in large-scale defense operations. Section III discusses signal support in large-scale offensive operations. Section IV discusses signal support to the consolidation of gains in large-scale combat operations.

This chapter discusses signal support to Army operations to consolidate gains. OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONS TO CONSOLIDATE GAINS 5-1. Commanders and staffs continuously consider activities necessary to consolidate gains and achieve the desired end state. Army units must consolidate gains to achieve enduring success. Consolidation of gains occurs in portions of an area of operations where large-scale combat operations are no longer occurring. Consolidation of gains consists of security and stability tasks and will likely involve combat operations against bypassed enemy forces and remnants of defeated units (FM 3-0). Army forces conduct consolidation of gains across the range of military operations. Consolidation of gains makes military objectives enduring. 5-2. During large-scale combat operations, the size of consolidation areas generally increases as the operation progresses and units achieve combat successes. Eventually, most Army units can expect to conduct some consolidate gains activities during large-scale combat operations. 5-3. During operations to consolidate gains, Army and joint commanders must be able to—  Employ joint fires.  Manage airspace.  Conduct sustainment tasks.  Conduct security tasks.  Begin reconstruction.  Coordinate humanitarian relief. SIGNAL SUPPORT 5-4. Operations to consolidate gains change the focus of signal support. The corps and division G-6 staffs and the theater tactical signal brigade refine plans to transition available signal capabilities to support consolidation areas. 5-5. During operations to consolidate gains, communications requirements will quickly surpass the capabilities of single-channel radio communications. The expeditionary signal battalion’s downward support requirements increase significantly as company-and platoon-sized units conduct area security and other consolidate gains tasks. 5-6. Tactical signal units may support communications requirements for local and area security, civil security and control, restoration of essential services, and security cooperation. Expeditionary signal units provide this support only until civilian, local government or other agencies can establish communications. The transfer of an area of operations to legitimate civil authorities relieves the land force of area security and stability tasks and represents a transition from operations to consolidate gains to operations to shape or prevent. Regardless of the tasks required in a specific area of operations, signal units support the Army’s strategic roles of shape, prevent, win, and consolidate gains. 5-7. During operations to consolidate gains, expeditionary signal capabilities return to their parent commands as soon as fixed communications infrastructure is available to support enduring base requirements. Strategic satellite and terrestrial network transport capabilities provide high-throughput connections to the DODIN-A. DODIN operations and cybersecurity tasks transition from the brigade combat team and division to the corps, theater army, theater tactical signal brigade, and SC(T). RISKS TO SIGNAL SUPPORT 5-8. An enemy may continue to direct information warfare activities, including cyberspace and EW attacks, to disrupt U.S. communications and prevent consolidation of gains. Enemy forces will likely continue to fight even after friendly forces attain their initial military objectives in the close area. 5-9. Some enemy formations may be intentionally or unintentionally bypassed during close operations as friendly forces focus on the decisive effort. As U.S. forces attempt to consolidate gains, command posts and signal sites are vulnerable to physical attack from bypassed conventional and irregular forces.

This appendix addresses the means to recognize and overcome threat activities affecting signal support in a contested environment. It includes an overview of peer threat tactics, techniques, and procedures and methods to counter threat EW and cyberspace attacks. THREAT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES A-1. Information and its management, dissemination, and control have always been critical to the successful conduct of tactical missions. Given today’s advancements in information and information systems technology, this importance is growing in scope, impact, and sophistication. The opposing force recognizes the unique opportunities that information warfare gives tactical commanders, and it continuously strives to incorporate information warfare activities in all tactical missions and battles (TC 7-100.2). A-2. A peer threat’s information warfare activities will integrate electronic attack, military deception, lethal fires, perception management, information attack, and computer warfare to deny U.S. and allied forces access to the electromagnetic spectrum in a contested environment. A-3. Understanding threat capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum is key to sound signal support plans. Enemy attacks on friendly command nodes may combine electronic attacks, other information warfare effects, and lethal fires to deny friendly forces the use of spectrum-dependent systems. To accomplish this goal, threat forces gather technical and combat information about their enemies. As enemy forces locate and identify friendly units, enemy information warfare elements establish priorities to—  Jam communications assets.  Deceptively enter radio networks.  Interfere with the normal flow of U.S. and allies’ communications. A-4. Commanders, their staffs, and equipment operators must train to recognize and react to peer threat information warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures if they are to continue communicating in a contested environment. U.S. MEASURES TO PREVENT THREAT EFFECTS A-5. There are operational tactics, techniques, and procedures signal planners and operators can take to mitigate peer threat capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum. If an enemy cannot detect friendly signals, they cannot geolocate or jam those signals. L IMITING E LECTROMAGNETIC S IGNATURE A-6. To protect against a peer threat’s ability to locate and target radio signals, the G-6 (S-6) must plan signal support in a way that limits the electromagnetic signature of the command post. Measures to reduce the electromagnetic signature of command posts and communications sites include—  Careful site selection for communications equipment.  Employment of directional antennas.  Operations using the lowest power required.  Limiting radio transmissions.  Using burst transmission to minimize transmission time.  Using a random battle rhythm schedule. A-7. Electronic protection techniques can also help mask the electromagnetic signature of command posts and communications sites. The cyber electronic warfare officer assists the G-6 (S-6) in planning electronic protection measures to reduce the command post signature. Terrain Masking A-8. Terrain masking can effectively block radio signals from reaching enemy direction finding capabilities. Positioning communications systems with large terrain features or manmade structures between the communications system and the forward line of own troops effectively blocks an enemy from detecting the signal. Camouflage Net Masking A-9. Radar reflective camouflage netting is an effective means of blocking unintended electromagnetic radiation from the rear and sides of directional antennas. Camouflage netting to the sides and back of a line of sight or satellite communications antenna ensures only the main beam of the antenna radiates. This main beam is highly directional; it is much harder to detect since the enemy would need to be directly in the transmission path. Line of Sight A-10. High-throughput line of sight radios can carry high bandwidth data over distances up to 25 miles, but the links need to be engineered to minimize the chance of detection, targeting, and jamming. If the line of sight path is parallel to the forward line of troops, an enemy is less likely to detect the signal, and enemy jammers will be unable to reach the antenna with a signal strong enough to jam the radio. R EMOTE A NTENNAS A-11. Large command posts and their high-throughput communications systems emit a significant amount of electromagnetic energy. While planners and operators can mask some of this energy with careful siting, terrain masking, and directional antennas, some electromagnetic energy remains. Because peer threats target friendly command and control capabilities, anything near the communications system is at risk of destruction from lethal fires. A-12. Commanders and signal planners should consider locating major communications assemblages as far from the supported command post as practical. Placing terrain features, man-made structures, or distance between communications systems and command posts provides the command post protection from lethal fires. Commanders and planners must consider the additional physical security and site defense requirements for a remote site during planning. F REQUENT C OMMAND P OST D ISLOCATION A-13. Despite all efforts to reduce and mask the electromagnetic signature of a command post, a peer threat is likely to locate it eventually. Moving a command post frequently reduces the chances of destruction. Frequent moves are especially important when operating within the range of enemy artillery. A-14. Maintaining continuity during displacement of a command post or catastrophic loss requires designating alternate command posts and passing control between command posts (FM 3-0). During training exercises, units must practice frequent command post dislocation and handoff between the main and tactical command posts. I NTEGRATION W ITH O THER S TAFF E LEMENTS A-15. The G-6 (S-6) cannot plan signal support alone. Other staff sections’ functions and capabilities help inform sound, survivable signal support plans. Staff sections activities during the military decision-making process reinforce each other’s planning efforts. A-16. The cyber electronic warfare officer, signal planners, spectrum managers, and the G-2 (S-2) assess threats to friendly communications during the military decision-making process. Integrated planning counters enemy attempts to exploit vulnerabilities of friendly communications systems. When creating electronic protection plan, the cyber electronic warfare officer and signal planners consider deployment, employment, replacement, and concealment of communications systems. Cyberspace Electromagnetic Activities Section A-17. The CEMA section of the G-3 (S-3) from brigade to corps coordinates and synchronizes cyberspace and EW operations for effective collaboration across staff elements. This section includes the cyber electronic warfare officer, the spectrum manager, the EW technician, and EW noncommissioned officers. The CEMA section is key to the collaboration of cyberspace and EW operations. The cyber electronic warfare officer is the cyberspace planner and understands the operations and missions of the unit and the commander’s intent. The CEMA section participates in the planning and targeting process, and leads the CEMA working group to support the military decision-making process. The cyberspace planner submits requests for effects provided by non-organic resources. Other key staff members who assist in CEMA include the G-2 (S-2), G-3 (S-3), G-6 (S-6), supported by the network operations and service center and signal company). CEMA Section activities include—  Plans, requests, and synchronizes effects in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum to support freedom of maneuver.  Coordinates with higher headquarters staff to integrate and synchronize information collection efforts to support cyberspace and EW operations.  Synchronizes cyberspace and EW effects requests with organic targeting capabilities.  Prepares and submits effect requests using the cyber effects request format or electronic attack request format.  Develops, maintains, and disseminates cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum input for the common operational picture.  Plans, coordinates, integrates, prepares for, and conducts EW operations.  Conducts spectrum management coordination for EW capabilities within the unit’s area of operations.  Prepares and submits effect requests using the cyber effects request format, as required.  Provide recommendations on commander’s critical information requirements. The G-6 (S-6) A-18. The G-6 (S-6) section prepares annex H (Signal) to the operation plan or order, with appropriate cross-references to the EW portions of annex C (Operations), operations security portion of annex E (Protection), the military deception plan, and the signal operating instructions. The G-6 (S-6) integrates and coordinates DODIN operations and spectrum management operations through close collaboration with the CEMA section during planning and operations. The G-6 (S-6) also—  Plans alternate means of communications for those systems most vulnerable to enemy jamming.  Provides COMSECCOMSECCommunications security to protect systems most vulnerable to enemy information gathering activities.  Plans measures to protect critical friendly frequencies from intentional and unintentional electromagnetic interference.  Enforces proper use of radio, electronic protection, and transmission security procedures on communications channels.  Performs spectrum management, including designating alternate frequencies for radio networks and modeling the electromagnetic environment.  Publishes and updates signal operating instructions.  Prepares and maintains the restricted frequency list—taboo, protected, and guarded frequencies, in collaboration with the G-2 (S-2).  Implements cybersecurity on the network and automated information systems. The G-3 (S-3) A-19. The G-3 (S-3) is the staff lead in planning and the conduct of Army operations. During the planning and execution of EW and signal support, the G-3 (S-3)—  Exercises staff responsibility for electronic protection.  Includes electronic warfare support and electronic attack scenarios in all command post and field training exercises.  Evaluates electronic protection techniques employed.  Includes electronic protection in the unit training program. Cyber Electronic Warfare Officer A-20. The cyber electronic warfare officer plans, coordinates, and directs the execution of EW activities. The cyber electronic warfare officer is also the lead for the CEMA section. The cyber electronic warfare officer—  Serves as subject matter expert on enemy EW capabilities and EW rules of engagement.  Leads the EW working group.  Submits information requirements to the G-2 (S-2) to support EW planning and assessment.  Supports the G-2 (S-2) during intelligence preparation of the battlefield.  Coordinates with the G-6 (S-6) to plan, implement, and assess friendly electronic protection measures.  Coordinates with the G-6 (S-6) spectrum manager to ensure planned EW activities do not interfere with friendly communications.  Deconflicts EW operations with the spectrum manager in the CEMA section.  Collaborates with the G-2 (S-2) to synchronize and deconflict EW operations with intelligence activities. G-2 (S-2) A-21. The G-2 (S-2) provides current intelligence estimates during the military decision-making process, and updated estimates during operations. The intelligence estimate includes—  Current enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures.  Enemy locations in relation to friendly forces.  The enemy’s electronic technical data—enemy capabilities that could be used to deny friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.  Known cyberspace threats to inform cybersecurity and defensive cyberspace operations efforts. RECOGNIZING AND RESPONDING TO THREAT EFFECTS A-22. Because peer threats consider friendly command and control capabilities to be high priority targets, they have developed capabilities to deny their enemies the effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum for communications. Signal personnel and leaders must learn to identify and respond to threat effects in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. E LECTROMAGNETIC S PECTRUM (J AMMING) A-23. Electromagnetic jamming is the deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of electromagnetic energy for the purpose of preventing or reducing an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and with the intent of degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability (JP 3-13.1). Jamming is an effective way for the enemy to disrupt friendly communications. An enemy only needs a transmitter tuned to a U.S. frequency with enough power to overpower friendly signals can effectively jam U.S. systems. A-24. Jammers operate against receivers, not transmitters. The two modes of jamming are spot and barrage jamming. Spot jamming concentrates power on one channel or frequency. Barrage jamming is power spread over several frequencies or channels at the same time. It is important to recognize jamming, but it can be difficult to detect. Communications Jamming A-25. Radio operators must learn to recognize and react to electromagnetic jamming. This is not always an easy task, since electromagnetic interference can be either internal or external. Other sources having nothing to do with enemy jamming may cause electromagnetic interference. Unintentional electromagnetic interference may be caused by one or more of—  Other radios (friendly and enemy).  Other electronic, electrical, or electromechanical equipment.  Atmospheric conditions.  Equipment malfunction. A-26. Radio operators must train to quickly differentiate between internal and external interference. Refer to ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 6-02.53 for more information about isolating and eliminating internal sources of interference. A-27. Electromagnetic jamming most commonly affects single-channel radio systems. These radios include HF, VHF, and UHF radios. Jamming effects may be obvious or subtle. Obvious jamming is normally simple to detect. When experiencing jamming, it is more important to recognize and overcome the incident than to identify it formally. A-28. Subtle jamming is less obvious because subtle jamming signals produce no sound from the receivers. Although everything may appear normal to the radio operator, the receiver cannot receive an incoming friendly signal. Often, users assume their radios are malfunctioning, instead of recognizing subtle jamming. Table A-1 on page A-6 lists some common jamming signals.

The G-6 (S-6) advises the commander and conducts planning and coordination for DODIN operations, network transport and information services, spectrum management, and COMSECCOMSECCommunications security. Signal planners are subject matter experts in these areas, so they can formulate signal plans and evaluate the signal supportability of various courses of action during the military decision-making process. MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS B-1. The military decision-making process is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). In simple terms, the military decision-making process is a systematic method to solve a specific military problem. During the planning and orders production process, G-6 (S-6) staff maintains the running signal staff estimate and plans the scheme of signal support to support the unit’s operation. S IGNAL S TAFF E STIMATE B-2. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). Commanders and staffs use running estimates throughout the operations process. In their running estimates, the commander and each staff member continuously consider the effect of new information and update—  Facts.  Assumptions.  Friendly force status.  Enemy activities and capabilities.  Civil considerations.  Conclusions and recommendations. B-3. The signal staff estimate outlines the G-6 (S-6) and assigned or supporting signal elements’ ability to support various friendly courses of action. Signal planners evaluate the communications and network requirements for each proposed course of action and against the available signal support. Evaluating the available signal support includes considering the capabilities and limitations of supporting signal systems. An accurate running estimate is invaluable throughout the military decision-making process. If signal elements cannot support a proposed course of action, the running estimate should identify the shortfall. The signal staff estimate includes all relevant signal information, including a signal mission analysis chart, which outlines—  Signal equipment on-hand.  Equipment in-use, non-mission capable, and available.  Capabilities of available communications systems.  Projected retransmission sites.  Combat net radio coverage.  Status of communications and automated information systems.  Projected communications node locations. B-4. The staff derives the running estimate from facts, assumptions, and situational analysis (terrain, friendly situation, enemy situation, and support requirements). Signal planners use the running estimate through each step of the military decision-making process. Planners update the running estimate when—  The commander and staff recognize new facts.  The staff can replace assumptions with facts or find previous assumptions invalid.  The mission changes.  Planners receive updated information from other staff sections. B-5. The staff adjusts the running estimate based on the course of action development and war-gaming. After course of action approval, the signal running estimate forms the basis for annex H (Signal) of the operation plan or order. P RIMARY, A LTERNATE, C ONTINGENCY, AND E MERGENCY P LAN B-6. Building an effective PACE plan may be simultaneously the most useful and challenging practice for communications planners. The key to a good PACE plan is to establish redundancy, so some means of communication is always available. Signal leaders and planners must understand their organization’s authorized and available communications capabilities and limitations, as well as the personnel and logistic requirements to employ and sustain the capabilities. During the military decision making process, G-6 (S-6) planners ensure proposed PACE plans are feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete.  Feasible. The unit and subordinates must have enough working systems to implement each step of the PACE plan.  Acceptable. Time needed to set up a redundant capability must not interfere with the unit’s operation or command post displacement.  Suitable. Redundant capabilities must have the capacity to meet the commander’s requirements.  Distinguishable. Redundant communications means cannot rely on a denied method. For example, if network data is not available, voice over Internet protocol would be a poor backup method. If VHF radio communications are degraded or denied, the next step in the PACE plan should use a different transmission medium.  Complete. The scheme of signal support should outline each means of communication, along with triggers for execution. B-7. The PACE plan should be as simple as possible to support reliable communications during dynamic operations. If possible, PACE plans should revolve around warfighting functions. The principal warfighting functions for the purposes of PACE planning are movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, and sustainment. The G-6 (S-6) does not dictate PACE plans for these warfighting functions, but does educate the warfighting function leads on available capabilities during operations and assists the warfighting function staff in formulating a PACE plan. B-8. Planners should identify appropriate PACE systems for each phase—for example, defense, offense, or consolidating gains—and publish them in annex H (Signal) of the operation order. An emergency means of communications does not necessarily have to be equipment; it may be a procedure such as moving back to the last known effective communications point or rallying at a specified grid coordinate. The PACE plan helps ensure communications availability if the primary means of communication fails. Units should rehearse and validate the PACE plan during mission and communication rehearsals to ensure all personnel can execute the plan as necessary. Refer to ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 6-0.5 for information about communication rehearsals. Table B-1 shows an example of a simple PACE plan for one phase of an operation, aligned with warfighting functions.

Visual information and COMCAM provide vital information to support decision making. Because the available support is limited, the operational chain of command validates and approves support requests before committing COMCAM assets. Archived visual information products are available from a centralized repository. PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING COMBAT CAMERA SUPPORT C-1. Planners develop COMCAM requirements and submit them to Joint Chiefs of Staff through the combatant command personnel directorate and operations directorate (J-3) by entering the requirement into the Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager. The chain of command validates and resources rotational and contingency COMCAM requirements supporting joint operations through the global force management process. When the supporting Service sources the requirement, they enter the personnel and logistics information into the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System for assignment of unit line numbers. C-2. Any Service’s COMCAM unit or activity can fulfill a COMCAM requirement. COMCAM assets belong to their parent Service until placed under the operational or tactical control of a supported unit. C-3. Before sending a tasking message, the requesting unit should contact the COMCAM unit to discuss the type of support and timeframe required. This coordination should take place as early as possible. The COMCAM unit evaluates the feasibility and supportability of the requirement. If the COMCAM unit cannot support the requirement, the unit helps identify other support resources. Figure C-1 on page C-2 shows the format for an official COMCAM support request. Note. Verbal contact is not a commitment or an agreement to provide support. PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING VISUAL INFORMATION PRODUCTS C-4. Units prepare requests for visual information products on official letterhead signed by a branch or unit head. They may submit requests to the Defense Imagery Management Operations Center by facsimile, postal mail, or e-mail. C-5. The following information is required when requesting imagery—  Subject and/or image identification number.  Unit, location, event, or operation name.  Date or date range.  Equipment or equipment type to represent, if any.  Action requester wants to see.  Media format, size, and quantity.  Date needed.  Requester’s name, rank, and position title.  Requester’s Defense Switched Network and commercial telephone numbers.  Complete official mailing address, including building and room or suite number.  How media is to be used (briefing, training).  For motion media requests, the approximate total number of minutes needed for each subject. C-6. The Defense Imagery Management Operations Center provides high-resolution photograph archive files for download through the defense imagery Website. Requesters bear expenses for hard copy production and duplication. Official government customers can also obtain visual information products from the Defense Imagery Website. This page intentionally left blank.

This appendix outlines two-level maintenance at brigade and below. It discusses communications-electronics maintenance and the logistics support provided to build and preserve operational readiness. Early detection by the operator, crew, or maintainer, correction of failures as far forward as possible, and prompt replenishment of repair parts are essential to readiness. MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT D-1. Army organizations are required to establish standard operating procedures and maintenance management processes to sustain, repair, evacuate, and report maintenance readiness status of critical communication systems. The Cyber Lessons and Best Practices Website contains sample maintenance standard operating procedures. Refer to FM 4-30 and ATPATPArmy Techniques Publications 4-33 for detailed information on maintenance support. TWO-LEVEL MAINTENANCE D-2. The Army utilizes a tiered, two-level maintenance system comprised of field and sustainment maintenance. Command teams, maintenance personnel, and planners must have a complete understanding of two-level maintenance fundamentals to plan and execute their mission. See table D-1 for the alignment of units to the type of maintenance performed.  Field maintenance takes place as close to the point of use as possible. The owning unit retains the equipment or receives it back from the maintenance support facility. Equipment operators, operator-maintainers, and ordnance-trained maintainers perform field maintenance. Army maintenance units also provide field maintenance support.  Sustainment maintenance restores equipment to a national standard, after which the equipment is returned into the supply system. Sustainment maintenance requires evacuating the equipment to a support facility. When a unit sends equipment to a sustainment maintenance organization, the owning unit usually removes the equipment from its property book. Only in rare instances, such as unit reset, does the equipment return to the owning unit.

Units with no organic signal assets, or units tasked to perform a mission beyond their organic signal capabilities, request signal support through the request for forces process. The signal requirements may be fulfilled in-theater using regionally-aligned forces, or may require resources from the global force pool. IDENTIFYING SIGNAL REQUIREMENTS E-1. Units that require signal augmentation do not request a unit, such as an expeditionary signal company, or a communications assemblage, but the operational capability required to accomplish their mission. The requesting unit G-6 (S-6) identifies the signal requirements. Accurately defining requirements simplifies the process of validation as the request routes through successive levels of the chain of command. The G-6 (S-6) determines—  Services required by type and quantity—  NIPRNET.  SIPRNET.  Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System.  Secure and nonsecure voice.  Video teleconferencing.  Coalition—mission partner environment.  Commercial services.  Mission and purpose for each service.  Period of services—  Starting date-time group.  Ending date-time group, if known.  Location of services. REQUEST FOR FORCES E-2. Once the G-6 (S-6) identifies the signal requirements, the G-3 (S-3) initiates a request for forces and forwards it to their higher headquarters for validation. For the request for forces to be validated, it must make operational sense. The request for forces identifies—  The unit requesting support.  The capability required. Requestors describe the capability clearly enough to identify in lieu of sourcing, if applicable.  Time needed.  Earliest arrival date.  Latest arrival date.  Deployment duration, and whether or not service rotations are authorized.  Mission justification.  Why the capability is required.  Operational risk, if not sourced.  Mitigation measures available to reduce that risk.  Similar capabilities in the area of responsibility.  Number.  Justification why they cannot be used.  Identify whether the request is for additional or replacement forces.  Detailed justification.  If additional, what change in the operational environment created the requirement?  Special training requirements.  Command and control relationships.  Urgency.  Non-urgent—120 days prior to earliest arrival date.  Urgent or emergent—within 120 days.  Immediate—within 30 days. R EQUIREMENT V ALIDATION E-3. As the request for forces routes through the chain of command to the geographic combatant commander, each successive level reviews the request to determine—  Whether the requirements are valid.  Whether the requested forces are operationally necessary.  Whether the requirement can be satisfied internally with organic or attached signal elements.  A sourcing recommendation to fulfill the requirement. S OURCING E-4. If the theater army or geographic combatant command can fulfill the requirement with forces already in theater, the geographic combatant command sources the capability internally. The tasking order defines operational, tactical, and administrative control relationships for the supporting and supported units. E-5. If the geographic combatant cannot fulfill the requirement, the combatant command J-3 forwards the request to the Joint Staff J-3 force management office. The J-3 force management office—  Validates the unit request.  Assigns a force tracking number.  Forwards the request to United States Army Forces command for sourcing. E-6. United States Army Forces Command G-3—  Identifies a unit to fulfill the requirement.  Forwards to the Joint Staff J-3 force management office for allocation. E-7. The Joint Staff J-3 force management office—  Approves the source.  Allocates the requirement in the Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager system.  Forwards the allocated requirement to U.S. Army Forces Command. E-8. United States Army Forces Command issues a deployment order to the identified unit. The deployment order identifies the operational, tactical, and administrative control relationships for the supporting and supported units. Figure E-1 on page E-3 outlines the request for forces process. This page intentionally left blank. Source Notes This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it lists both the page number followed by the paragraph number. 1-2. “There is no better example…”: General Martin E. Dempsey, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Information Environment White Paper, 22 January 2013. 2-40. “A strong case can be made…”: A History of U.S. Communications Security (U): The David G. Boak Lectures, Vol. II, National Security Agency, July 1981. This page intentionally left blank.

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which FM 6-02 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

Entries are by paragraph number.